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CH.KPTER I 
INTRODUCTlON 
A.. The l?roblem of the· Diss:ertation 
The problems of philosophy are po2ed qy persons, and persons 
rep~e&ent the highest level of reality that the Yarld-Process has:p~e· 
duced. Thus, TemRi.e~· argues, the clue-~· to an expi.ana:tion of these prob-
lems is provided qy the princip-le of IJ.ersonality. Hence, 'llemJiie ·employs 
his conception of personality as> a philosophical principTe of exp:Dana:-..-
tion. The pro:blem of the IJ.res:ent study is to evaluate; the adequa:cy of 
Temg[e!s conception of personality and the legitim~~y of the use he 
make:s. of personality as:: a princiJIIe of eXR;i:anat.ion to so:Itv~ tr~ditioll8iL 
J.!hilbsoP.hical problems of moral and sociailJ philosophy, philosophy 0£ 
history, and metaphysics. 
B. Limitations of the Study 
"William TemJ[le~• s life,, reached out into many areas. So did his 
thought. In addition to some distinctly philosoph±cair: essays, 1lemWLe:t s 
writing includes treatises on theoretical ~roblems and on practic~ 
concerns ranging from Christian theology to citiz-enshig_.. 
The pres-ent study focuses on Tempi.&: a:s a P.hiiosophica:l thinker 
and examines his phllbsoyhy from the-! P.·ersp;ective: o"f his conception o"f 
persona[ity. The theological vieYs of TemF.~e~are~considered wherever 
2 
they are relevant to his philosophical :gusition. However, there is no 
separate consideration of' the theology of' William T_em:P.ie. Nor has; 
every facet of' Temyie-!s philosophy been examined. But, since the~: prob-
lem of' the investigation which follows concerns the use TemFle makes~ of' 
gersonali ty as; a p_hilbsoph.ical principle of' eX'_RLanation, his views on 
some of' the major problems of: philosophy are; pre-sented and evall:ua.ted. 
The historical devele>:gment of' Temn:Le ''s thought is no.t tracced, 
though signif'icant changes in his RC:rsition are noted.. In 193.9 Temple 
despaired over the atte~x to formulate a Christian nhilosonby an& 
indicated that his own concern at that time wasl centered more on re~ 
deeming the world than it was> on exp:Ilaining it. 'Whether or not this: 
rew-e-.sents a major- change in n:cYsi tion is analyz-ed in the Appendix to 
ChB.pter VI. 
At the appropriatep_::Uaces throughout the study the relation mf 
T'emQ:l!e 's philosop_hicrl p:osi tion to other views, both similJar to, and 
dif'f'erent from, his own, is indicated. In the evalUation offered in 
the; seventh cha'}~:ter some comparisons are made of' TemP.51-e t s views- with 
the views of others. However, the pre~ent study concentrates on 
Temy:Le 's p_hilosop):licai. ,ROsition, and nm attem_P.X is made to compare 
his position extensively with that of' any other thinker. 
The, s:cope of the:: present investigation combines: a broad approach 
in which major aspects of Temnle!s philosophy are examined with a more 
restricted approach in which his conception of' personality and its 
signif'icance as a principle o£ explanation in his :Eflilosopby are em-
:ghasized •. 
3 
G.. Previous Relevant Reseanch 
There; have be·en no major studies de-ailing with the :!).articular 
p;roblem of the p_res-ent dissertation. However, some previous disser-
ta.tions on William TemP.le .do bea.r in part on his conception of phi-
losoP,hy and his conception of personality. Indeed, since.the concept 
o£ p~rsona.lity is central to Tem:gleJs thought, both to his philosophy 
and to his theology, every previous study of Temple has-; some relevance 
to the p_re-s-ent p]:"oblem. 
There: have:; bee-n four P.revious disserta:tions which deal directly 
and primarily with some asp_ect o:f the thought of William T"eillElle. John 
p·. Me Garvey wrote on, '!Modernism in Archbishop; Temp5t'e}s Meta.P.bysics 
'and Value Theory .. "1 The issue. around which Me Garvey's dissertation 
centers is, the contra.lrling idea:ls o::f intelligibility P.roposed by phi-
losophy and science, or what is referred to as the personal and im.Q-er-
sona.i iderls o::f intelligibility. 2 According to the philosophical ideal 
the will o:f a. SuP,reme Being directed toward vail.ue renders the; universe) 
intelligible; the ideal exem~lified by science abstra.~ts values :from 
things and finds intelligibility only in necessary connections among 
things.33 
It is Me Garvey's contention that Temple followed the philosophical 
1. Unp11blishe.d Ph. D. dissertation, Sbhool of Theology, Tem:p'le 
University, (1951). 
2. See ibid., pp:~ vi, 99-103. 
3~ Ibid., PP• 103-I05. 
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ide-al of intelligibility in his earlier writings-e.g. , Mens Crea.trh 
(l9l7} and Christus Verita.s (1924)--but that in the Gifford Lectures--
Nature, Ma.n and God (l934)--modernism, in the f'orm. of "Whitehead's proc-
e.ss philosophy, appears, rendering Tem12le 's metaphysics unintelligible.l 
Me Garvey points up ambiguities in Teml{ie 1s conception of mind 
and of' value. Insofar as Me Garvey's criticism refers to the lack of' 
clarity and the inconsistency in TemP.ie 1 s use of' these terms, it is 
justified and illuminating. Ho:wever, what is evident is that much more 
is a.t stake for Me Garvey than these internal criticisms. Me Garvey is 
hiinself' proppunding a. view. and he criticizes TemQ:l.e whenever the latter 
digresses from it. Thus, to the extent that 1lemP.:l.e is attacked f'on-
f'alling to conf'orm to the P.Srticular !!:~-'priori and mystical version of 
the intelligibirity of the universe and of' value that Me Garvey holtls, 
his criticism is not justified. 
The validity of' Me Garvey's charge that 'Fem]21.e changes to a sci-
entific ideal of' intelligibility fails to acknowledge the central role 
that the doctrines of the Christian faith p~a.y throughout ~empie's 
writings. Kmore~comRlete~a.nalysis of Me Garvey's contention is con-
siderad below in Chapter VII where TempTffi1s p®sition is evaluated. 
Another dissertation on Temple,was written in l95l by EUgene 
Skelton.2 This study deals with the problem of evil, and its mood is 
1. Ibid., PP• 29-31. 
2. 11 The Problem of' EVil in the Works of' William 'l:emJ{len· (unpub-
lished Ph. D. dissertation, Schoon of Theology, Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, 1951). 
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quite the opposite .from that found in Me Garvey's work. Skelton is 
much more. appreciative of Temple 1s p,osition; and though he makes some 
penetrating criticisms, he is especially apQreciative of the way in 
which Temvle solves the problem of evil. 
Skelton believes that Temple possesses an "'almost unerring .fac-
ulty of intuitive judgment. rrl He stresses the believing quality o.f 
Tempie:1s mind as opposed to the sceptical tenor of some minds. 2 In a 
most perceptive statement Skelton puts his .finger on the ambiguity in-
herent in Temvle's philosophy by suggesting that it is the result of an 
ambivalence in Temvl'e 1 s attitude tovard ph.ilosophy as compared vith his 
single-minded devotion to religion. ~empie, Skelton suggests, "~elt an 
obligation to be loyal to philosophy, yet he was more-; concerned for the 
welfare of' religion."3 
Specific difficultie-s in Temp,i'e 1s philesophical position are noted 
concerning his assumption of the complete intelligibil~ty of the uni-
vers-e-' and his ambiguous value theory.4 The basic problems of Temp:Ve 1 s 
theism are:· held to center on the notions of Divine 'Ilranscendence and 
Divine Personality • .5-': With these suggestiveJ and constructive criticisms, 
though only touched upon by Skelton, the present study is in agreement. 
In the .. analysis which follows, esp_ecially in Chapj:;er VII, these 
1. Ibid., P• 19. 
3. Ibid., p. 35. Cf'. William Temple, Nature, Man and God 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 55. 
4. See Skelton, PP• 67-6S. 
5. ~., PP• 72~73. 
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difficulties are;develop~d more,extensively. It is Skelton's contention 
that the criticism? he has raised do not vitiate Temple's total posi-
tion; they are, rather, defects in an argument which on the whole is 
valid.1 Comment on this estimate of ~emP.le's position is best reserved 
for later. 
In analy~g Temple's approach to, and solution of, the problem 
of evil, Skelton observes that Temple's primary concern is with moral 
and not natural evil. 2 Furthermore, when dealing -w-ith pain and suf-
fering as one aspect of natural evil, Temple. is concerned more with a 
practical than a speculative solution. Skelton notes with some mis-
giving Temple's failure to deal with intrinsic evil and in contrast 
refers to the emphasis placed upon dysteleological evil by Brightman.3 
Ho-w-ever, the.second aspect of natural evil, the problem of accident, 
is aaequately exp~ained by Temp;e according to Skelton.4 
Skelton closes his study with a brief summary statement on "·The 
Out.come for Temp,ie. 11 He finds that Temple is closer to Personal ,Ideal-
ism than to the philosophy of Realism despite Temple ''s avowed realistic 
em~ases. The basis of Templ'e·~s difficulty is held to be his attemgt 
to construct an idealistic system from a realistic starting point.5 
Other writers have"aiso proffered this interpretation of Temple 1s 
l. lQM., P• 74. 2. s·ee ibid., P• 79. 
3. See ibid., pp. 91-92; also Edgar Sheffield Brightman, ~ 
Philoso~by of Religion (New .. York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940), PP• 245-
246. 
4· See.Skelton, p. 92. 5. Ibid., P• 137. 
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position •. 1 The validity of the label is examined in Chapter VII of the 
]2resent study when some of TemJ2]e's vie:ws on personality are: compared 
with those of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, a P.ersonal Idealist. At this·; 
_P.Oint, however, it should be) no:ted that the . terms Idea:Id.sm and Realism 
are; being used in an ambiguous way so that it is not clear whether 
epistemology or metap,hysics is intended. Skelton, goes on to-assert 
what is surely closer to the truth, namely, that T~mple's ppsition is 
best classified as: a philbsophy of the Christian faith. 
Skelton's ana:iysis and eval.uation of TemitL-eJs attempt to. solve the 
problem of evil reflect an understanding and ap2reciation of Temple's 
JI!Dsition, coupied with a constructively critical insight into his basic 
difficulty. Natural evil remains unexplained in Tem:g:Le' s system, and 
the intelligibilit.y of the universe is to 'that extent diminished. The 
collapse pf the system as. a who:Le is res:cued by TemJ!~e 's empha:srl.s upon 
the· future in which evil_ will be transmuted into goou. ~e world does 
no:t make sense: as it is; it will make sense only when the Kingdom of God 
apy:ears. A. measure of intelld.gibili.t.y is achieved and rests mm:re on faith 
than on demonstrative knowledge. 2 Skelton's interpretation of T.emJ?.Jle's 
view. of intelligibility in eschatological terms, Irerhaps, clarifies the 
dissatisfaction Me Garve-y feels toward T.em:gl'e 1's p:o:sition on this issue. 
A third dissertation was: written in 19555 by John W:. Ca:rlton 
1. RandolRh CrumJ21Miller referiDto·Tem~e as closest t~ Personal 
Idea.lism in his article, "Is Temp1e a:· Rerlist ?:, 11' JournaL of Religion, 
XIX (J" anuary, 1939), :g_. 50~. 
2.. See Skelton, pp· •. l42-JJ43·. 
dealing with the relation between Temple's natural theology and his 
Cbristology.1 In this investigation Temple's natural theology is shown 
to be based upon a rejection of Cartesian dualism, on the one hand, and 
the affirmation of the continuity of nature, on the other hand. The 
major emphas~s of the study comprises how Temple advances from thi$ 
emP.j_rical starting point to his interp,retaticm of the person and the~· 
roYe of Christ in providing the special revelation philosop)y needs but 
cannot find on its own and which man needs to redeem him from self-
centeredness. Ih the concluding chap~er a comparison is made between 
the views of Karl Barth and William Temple on the nature o:f man, the 
nature of religious knowledge, and on Jesus Christ as the revelation 
of God. 
Temple 1 s views on natural theology and Cbristology are admirably 
summarized in this work leading to a p_ercepti ve understanding of the 
~ositive aspects of his Christian thought. I;a;cking, however, is a: sus-
tained criti,eal evaluation of Temple's views. No final estimate of 
the vaYidity of Temple's P.PSition in regard to the problem analyzed is 
made. Rbssible ambiguities are only occasionally alluded to 0,1 summa-
rizing or quoting criticism levied by others against TemP.le 1 s position. 
But, for the most part, no attem,Rt is made to assess the accuracy of the 
criticisms. A. critical evaluation of Temple 1 s natural theology and 
Cbristology especially as they relate to the views of Karl Barth would 
1. "The Reach and Limits of Natural Theology in the Formulation 
o:f William Temple 1s Christologyn: (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
S.chool of Arts and Sciences, Duke University, 1955}. 
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have greatly enhanced the value of' Carlton's study. Nonethele·ss, :fruit-
f'ul insights into Temple ''s position are evident throughout. Some of' 
thecse idea83 bear directly upon the pFe·sent study and warrant brief' 
mention. 
The' signif'icance and :function of' natural theology :for Temp~e re-
side in preparing the way f'or theism by indicating the need :for inter-
Rreting the universe according to the higher rather than the lower 
crate-gories:' of' exp:erience; but belief' in God is held to be rooted in 
religious experience.l"L Reason and conscience represent the supreme 
evidences of' the image of' God in man, and, though distorted, the image 
is not annihilated.2 However, :faith ppecedes its vindication in reason 
and Rrovides the illumination necessary :for such vindieation.3 Carlton 
ends by emphasizing that the revelation of' God as a personal being 
through the person of' Christ to human persons is central to TemRle •·s 
R0Sition. These conclusions are also substantiated by the precsent in-
ve·stigation. 
A :fourth and :final dissertation concentrating on Temple 1 s thought 
wa-s written by Owen Clarke Thomas in 1956.4 The purpose' of' the study 
is to analyze and to evaluate Temple's venture; into· J?hilosophy of 
1. See ibid., Chap., II, PP•· 24-75; especially P.lo·· 64, n. 141. 
2. Ibid., pp.o 307-308. 
3. Ibid., P• 320; in Tem_P.le see Christ's Revelation of' God 
(London: S. C. M. Press, Ltd., 1925), PP• 8-9. 
4• ttThe Philosophy of' Religion of William Tem.Rl-e" (:unpub.tished. 
Eh. D. dissertation, Colnmbia·University, 1956). 
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religion. A.. secondary aim is to indicate the imp0rtance of philosophy 
of religion in an analytic age b.r reminding philosoppy of its metaphysi-
cal commitments, and theology of its necessary involvement in philosoph-
iced problems. This latter ppint is made especially evident by a con-
cise but illuminating survey of the background and context of Temple's 
thought in terms of the dominant philosophical strands in England in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Before taking Up) TemP.].e 1·s theistic argument as expo1m.ded in 
Nature., Man and God, Thomas :Qre"Sents a careful analysis of the basic: 
notions of Temp:le's philosoRhy •. Here are revealed some significant 
insights into TemP,ie 1 s position, as well as some ambiguities, that 
bear· Up()n the p.re·sent study., 
Temple 1s basic metaphysical p_re·sup.P-Osition, Thomas·. states, is 
that the universe is a rational whole or a unity. For philosophy this 
means that reason is capable of understanding the world as a whole. 
If6wever, Tem:Qle gives up_this metaphysica£1. pre-supp0sition of the ra-
tionality of the universe as.a re-sult of the influences of process: 
P:hilosop.hy and of vorld conflicts. Unlike others faced with this ap-
J?.arent shift in p0sition, Thoma;s contends it rep_resents a change in 
emphasis only and not a reversal of vieWP.,oints.1 This Qeint bears 
close scrutiny throughout the pre"Sent stady which confirms Thoma-s·' 
conclusion. The issue is developed at length in the Appendix: to Chap-
ter VI. 
1. S.ee ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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The confusion on the part of some interpreters. of TempXe as to 
whether to classify him an Idealist or a Realist is partially clarified 
by Thomas. Temple means;to reject epistemological idealism, that is, 
the view that the mind has only its own ideas as objects. But Temple 
ends up close to metaphysical idealism, Thomas. contends. Thomas goes 
on to suggest that the problem is further compounded by Temple's ref-
erence to mind 1 s finding itself in its object. Such a view does not 
seem to fit in with his realistic epistemology; indeed, Thomas argues, 
it is closer to epistemological idealism, suggesting as it doas that 
the objects of the mind are themselves of the nature) of mind. 1 There 
is confusion on this issue, as Thomas suggests, but it does not in-
valve a contradiction of TemRle 1 s realistic epistemolggy. 
In introducing Temple's theistic argument as stated in Nature, 
Man and God Thomas shrewdiy observes that Temp~e tried to do something 
for which he was not suited temperamentally, that is, to give an ob-
jective account of the facts of religion and offer a theory which best 
eX2lains these facts. Temple was a committed Christian, and the result 
is that he has arranged the f~cts in a w~ that supports his faith. 
Thus, Thomas states regarding Tempie 1's theistic argument: 
There·is some investigation of facts and argument, 
but this is employed to elaborate and supp0rt a 
vision of reality already present. The Gifford, 
Lectures are really the articulation of a:~ system 
of personal convictions and ar~9ased on the 
suppressed premise of the truth of the Christian 
faith. 2 
1. See ibid., PP.•- 114-116. 2. Ibid .• , P• 203 •. 
. ~ . 
; 
1 
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~his does not diminish the significant contribution Thomas believes 
:that Temple has made to philosophy o:f religion; and whenever this part 
o:f the philosophic task is taken seriously, Temple's position warrants 
careful consideration. 
Thomas' study regresents the most careful exposition and evalua-
tion o:f Temple's Christian philosophy of the :four studies noted. The 
accuracy o:f many o:f the interpp.etations o:f:fered and the> criticisms 
levied by Thomas :find additional suppr;rrt in the analysis to :follow .. 
Irowever, Thomas~. woUld seem to have overstated both 'Iremple •·s :failUre to 
argue empirically :for Gad and the impossibility o:f such an approach's 
being abjectively executed. Hence, the conclUsions Thomas draws :from 
TemJtle"s e:f:forts do not seem to :follow in precisely the way Thomas- con-
tends. The issues involved at this p9int are sufficiently significant 
to warrant a thorough analysis both in regard to the adeq1J,acy of Tem-
P._ie 1's ppsition and o:f any meta:ghysics. Thus, discussion o:f the issue? is 
p:ostprmed to Chapter VII when T'empl'e:Fs views are critically evalilated. 
Three other dissertations need to be noted in which 1rempie is com-
P.ared with other thinkers. Ohe is concerned with relating Te!IIJ2le:1 s views 
on the Christian Church to those o:f other contemp.o.rary theoJ:bgians.1 
Such a study, though significant in its o\m right, has no-:: direct bearing 
on the problem o:f the p_resent study. The other two disserta-tions, 
.. l. Walter F •. Rei:f, "The Ethical Ghara.rcter and Function o:f the 
Church:· .An Expository Dissertation o:f the Ethi.crl Ghara.:cter and Function 
of' the Church in the Thought o:f William Adams Br.o:wn, Enil Brunner, 
William T:empTe·. and W~ A. Visser 1 t Hoo:ft"' (unnublished Ph. D. disserta-
tion, Union Theological Seminary, 1954). 
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however, do deal more; directly with the £resent subject o:f concern •. 
A dissertation was written in 1951~.by William D. Geoghegan on the 
influence o:f Platonism in the religious thought o:f six prominent con-
tem._porary thinkers, among whom TemJ.!le was included.1 This work has 
since been pnbl"ished and will be~considered in its published :form. 2 
Geoghegan's study represents an im_portant contribution to th~ 
problem o:f discerning what role classical philosophy can legitimateiy 
pf:ay in contemperary religious thought. Temg:ie 1 s discussion o:f the) 
philosophy o:f Plato is :found to make ":ho advance:: in our knowledge o:f 
Elate, exce:gt as it incidentally corrects some o:f Taylor•:s errors:-. 113 
Nonetheless, Tem_ple is commended :for making the social emphases o:f 
Christian flatonism relevant to the p_7.'e:ssing social _problems o:f the:· 
day.~- Temp:ie exhibits a social realism that other contemporary Pia-
tonists coula well emulate. Also, Temple alone, o:f the men examined, 
is held to take Christianity seriously in the synthe&is,o:f Platonism 
and Christianity.5 In a summary statement indicating the superiority 
o:f TemJ!l'e 1·s ppsition over that o:f A. E .• Taylor•s, Geoghegan suggests:; 
the :gositive contributions o:f T>emp:ie 1s brand of Christian Platonism: 
1. The other five men included are:: W:. R. Ihge, Paul Elmer 
More, A. E. Taylor, A. N. Whitehead, George S'antayana. 
2. William D. Geoghegan, . Platonism in Recent Religious Thought 
(New; York:~ Columbia·iUniversity Pre:ss, 1958). 
3. Ibid~, P• 91. 4• See ibid~, PP• 108, 168, 174. 
5. See ibid., Pi~ 175. 
He wa:smore;sensitive to the P.ressing p_roblems 
o:f contempexary man, and saw that cata:elysmic 
social change-s req"¢red radicail.. revisions o:f 
traditional thinking. On a :fundamental level 
he sought to synthesize creatively leading 
themes; of' classical, Christian, and mcrdern 
thought. His thought exgresses a profounder 
religious spirit than Taylor's because he 
-emf!hasized the importanee ef worship as a 
vital act. Towards the end of his career 
T.emP.ie came·, closer to exgressing the fulL re-
ligious genius o:f Christianity in its con-
temporary relevance than any other Christian 
:Platonist. 
The pre:s:ent study confirms Geeghegan 1's estimata: o-f Tem'QieJ~s con-
tribution to Christian social philosophy. Also relevant to the P.resBnt 
investigation is Geoghegan 1 s acknowledgement of the s:ignificance; that 
both Christianity and the desire to solve PTactical :personal and social 
p_roblems exercised on Temif.ie 1 s ppsitio:n. 'Ifemple.fs emP.:haa-is on l).Srson-
ality as. a princip_le of explanation is recognized, and his p_osition is 
referred toat one pei:ntLas:personalistictheism. 2 In :fact, Geoghegan 
argue83 that TemHU~::' s ea-gerness to show that Plato.' s concef!tion of· the~ 
Idea of' the Good anticipated the notion o:f a personal Ge:d Terada> '.rrem:Qile> 
iiltoJ anachronistic: interpretations o:f Plato. 1 s meta:gbysics. 3~ other in-
sights into Tempie.1s nosition relevant to· the pre-sent investigation are 
no::ted in the1 apP._rop_riate; context. 
A~ more1 comp_lete· discussion o:f T.empi'E~ ''s philosophy is J?.re:sented by 
v. P .. Thomas, who compares Temple 1's Christian 'Illi.eism with the Abso]utSJ 
1. Ibid., P• lOS. 2. See ibid., P• 107. 
3. Ibid., P• 92; see also ibid., PP• 168-l69. 
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Iderlism of Sarvep~i Radhakrishnan. 1 · There are three p_a.rts to the 
dissertation dealing with an exposition of T.emple 1s Theism, Radhakrish-
nan's Idealism, and a critical appraisal of the·~ two systems, resp~ctively. 
In the section on TemR.le, V. P. Thomas:. pre·sents a general summary of 
Temple's theological philosophy including his methodology, epistemology, 
value theory, and theism, culminating in a Ghristo-centric metaphysics. 
Seme of the social implications of Temple 1 s Christian Theism are also 
noted. Because V. P. Thomas is comp_aring Tem2ie with another thinker, 
the procedure. followed, for the mest p,art, is that ef summarizing the 
various facets of Temple 11s p:0sitien, rather than analyzfug TemP.i.e 1 s 
arguments for the views. at which he arrived. These summaries·reveal 
many insights into TemQle:'s :gosition. 
A!. concern with the practical implications of any p)lllosophy on' 
theology for everyday life is shown to be: a baslic element of TemJ?5te 1s 
thought. One 1s vision of God must throw light on the dark problems of 
life so as to provide strength and guidance for living.2·: This Q0int 
has not received sufficient attention by the interRreters of Temple. 1s 
ppilosophy. As a re:sult, he. has been misconstrued as wavering between 
Idealism and Realism when his real concern is with neither, as such, 
but with the relevance of a Christian philosophy for living. v. P. 
1. Vadakan E. Thomas, "Christian Theism and Absolute Idealistic 
Monism: . .An .Analysis of the Respective Systems of' William Temple and 
Sarvepd1i Radha.krishnan n: (].lnp_ublished Ph. D. dissertation, Drew1 
Theological Seminary, Drew University, 1945). 
2. See ibid., PP• 6, 1213, 141-142· 
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Tho:ma;s> does not emphasize this issue as much as it deserves, but he 
does take note o~ it, thereqy avoiding the co~usion over whether 
TempTs is an Idealist or a·· Rea£List. Idealistic tendencies are> a:ckn0wl-
edged to be evident in Temple's p9sition, but his epistemology is 
identliied as reEcl..istic. As other interpreters have:. no:ted, the con-
~us ion is partly due to ~em.P._le ~ s use . of mind. According to V. P. 
Thomas, Tem_P.le means to employ mind in his discussion o~ its emergence 
in the World-P.roces~ in the.generic sense as're~erring to a modeo~ 
being and activity with distinctive characteristics. What the mind 
~inds in its object is its counterpart in which the same princiP,J19:a> 
characterizing its own activity are' operative.TI Sbmmarizing ~emP.ie 1 s 
approach, V. P •. Thomas stateB'"; 
After rep;udiating the priority o~ mihd qUaJ 
knowing subject a83 a :Qrecondi tion o~ the: 
actuality o~ the objective world (Idealism), 
Temple reaffirms the priority o~ mind gua 
purpos i ve3 as the only condition o~ the in-
telligibility o~ the same objective world.2 
In this way epistemrrlogiCal realism is combined with metaphysical 
idealism resulting in what TemJtlffi ca:Lls Diaie:etical Realism. 
Tem~le is criticized ~or failing to deai adequately with evil' 
and ~or ~ailing to re:solve ·the inconsistency in his treatment o~ divine 
supremacy and human ~reedom.T These) criticisms are justliied and re-
ceive=; ~urther elaboration in the analysis which ~ollbws. 
1. See ibid., P• 3_6. 2. Ibid., P• 72~ 
3. See ibid., PP• 90, 140. 
17 
The notion of Qersonality is held to serve as the ~guiding star": 
in the construction of TemP.le..' s theism, moving a:s he doe:s. from nature 
to man and from man to God.1 ~ers0nality emerges in the process and, 
hence, only a personal Being can a~count for its occurrence. The reve-
lation of Gou in Christ provides the content for an understanding of 
the nature of the personal God· to which p;hil0soRhfcal inquiry ·leads. 2 
Concerning Temple's position, V. P. Thomas concludes:; rrso what is phil-
osoRhically pFObable is made certain by religion.n3 This is a per-
ceptive insight into Temple's ppsition, but if stated conversely is 
even more revealing. ~at is, what is religiously certain to Temple 
is shown to be philosophically p_robable, or at least, not philoso:ghi-
cally imP-robable. That this is the conclusion to which V. p:. Thoma:s 
also is led is indicated by the following quotation:: "~ the last 
analysis Temple's brilliant and eloquent argumentation is to be 
regarded as an exposition of his r~ligious convictions, for the defense 
of which he has ably ca:lled in the aid of the best philosophical think-
ing and scientific truths •. rr4 
Tem:gle is appropriately designated a personal theist. The_: chief 
difference metaphysically between Temple and Radhakrishnan is found to 
reside;. in the emP.hasis which TempTe give:s to P.ersonality. Reality is 
personal for Temple; reality is beyond both personality and 
1. See ibid., PP• 124, 140.-
3· Ibid., P•- 124. 
2. Ibid., P• 75. 
4· Ibid., P• 142. 
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impersonality for Radhakrishnan. 1 
Many other monographs, articles, and essays dealing with various 
aspects of Temple. as a man 1 as a thinker, and as a churchman have been 
written. These are considered at the appropriate ~laces in the investi-
gation which follows. However, two works should be mentioned at this 
Bmint. In William Temple: An Estimate:: and .An Appreciation2? is to be 
found a brief but perceptive critical evaluation of Temple::.'s varied 
life and work; and William Temple, .Archbishop of Canterbury; His Life 
and Eetters3 provides the most thorough biography of Temple. 
There. seems to be no doubt that T~mple 1 s unique encounter with 
re·al.ity, as Owen Thomas· calls it, 4 led him to employ personality as 
the key-concept for interpreting experience. The importance of per-
sonality in ~ample's position has been suggested, at least implicitly, 
by all the previous studies of Temple. However, no one has attempted 
to consider his P9Sition from the p~rspective of the dominant role of 
personality as a principle of explanation in his thought. Untll. ~llem-
p;l.e 1s entire position, philosophica:J.. and theological,. has been ana-
lyz:ed and evaluated from the p_erspective.'of the concept of personality 
and its piace in his :R0Sition, all. other studies remain incomp-lete. 
1. See ibid., PP}· 3..02-:30):. 
2. W. R. Matthews and Others, William Tiemple: .An Estimate~: and .An 
Appreciation (London:: James Clarke & Co., I.td., 1946), P.P•' 16-17. 
J. 
His Life 
.. 
~=;:.====-:~~~r......:;:::::--7=~=-=-~~~=~=o~-·· 
4· S'ee Thomas, pp~ 215-216. 
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Lt is the purpo·se. of the pre·sent study to make a contribution toward 
filling this gaP.J in the interpretation and estimation of the philosophy · 
o£ Vlillia.m Tem:Rl:e. 
D. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
The particul-ar aspects of 1rem~ers thought and how they are 
handled in this study can now be stated. The first chapter, dea:l.ing 
with the formal p;rocedureO! f'ollowed in the diss:ertatinn, includes at 
survey of wevious research on William 2lemp:Le and concludes with a 
brief' biography of' Temple. The task of' the second chapter is an ex-
p,psition of' Temple's conception of' philosopby. It is necessary to 
examine what the philosophic enterprise means to him; what method and 
criterion of truth he approves; his understanding of', and solution to, 
the pro·blems of ep.istemo·logy; the relation religion bears to: philosophy 
for him; and his conceP.tion of a Christian philosophy. This general 
survey of' Temple .-s philosophi.:cal outlodk is f'ollowed by a:·: similar ex-
p0sition of' his conception of' personality in the third chapter. The 
status of' personality in the Woxld-Process and the distinction between 
:gersonal and sub-Rersonal levels of' existence areJ explored, along with 
an analysis of the main dimensions of' human personality and its limita-
tions. 
The nex:t three chap_ters seek to expound TemJ?le 1 s application of 
both his conception of' philosophy and ~is conception of' personality as 
they are:~ joined in the solution of some of the major philosophical 
:groblems. Hence, the relevance of' human and divine personality f'or 
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value theory and £or the solution to the problems o£ personal ethics-
are} set £orth in the £ourth chap_!f;er. Th this chaprter the relation of 
the p,erson to society, particularly to-, the .P.,olitical and economic or-
ders, is a3..so examined. Chap:ter V a ttem.2ts to develOP.· the place and 
the role o£ personality in TeJDP.le}s philosophy of history and concludes 
with an analysis of the grounds for personal survival of death. Tem-
p_le:;'s use of personality as a metaphysicd principle o£ explanation is 
analyzed in the sixth chapter. Sup~lementing the conception o£ human 
personality P,roposed in Chap;ter nr, there is ad.so a )2resentation o.£: 
the:oarguments for Divine~Eersonality and the resultant conception of 
a personal GGd to which Tem2Te}:S ]:?O-sition leads. In an .A:pJ?endi.x to 
Ghap,ter VI. an analysis is presented on the . q:p.e-stion of whether or· not 
a major alteration in Temp_i.e 1's position is made;as a re:sult of his; 
desp_air in 1939 over the feasibil:ity of constructing a. Christo-eentric' 
metaphysics. 
These chapters are primarily of a descrip;tive nature; and t];le:o aim 
is to J:>re:sent Temp:te·•·s RGSition as sympathetically as J:{0Ssible. ·crit-
ical comments are; inserted whenever doing so facilitatecs the interpre-
tation of P!i'rticular issues and clarliies ambiguities in Temple '·s posi-
tion. However, extensive critical comments are reserved £or Chapter 
VII where there is pre-sented an evaluation of the adequacy of Temi?i.e•s 
conception of ppilosophy, his concep~ion of ~rsonality, and the use he 
makes of personality to solve some of the major problems of p_hilosophy. 
Aspe:cts of TemRle}s conception of p,ersonality are compared with the 
views of others. An estimate is tendered of the contribution Temp~e 
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has made to Christian philosophy and of' the use he made of' his time 
and talents. 
The study ends with a summary in Chapter VIII of' the conclusions 
drawn f'rom an analysis and evaluation of' the conce:Rt of' personality in 
the philosophy of' William TemJrl.e. 
E. A. Brief' Biography of' William Tem:J:P1Le (].881-1944} 
Tempne the philosopher cannot be disasscr.ciated f'rom TeiDJ:Pre the 
man. He constantly strived to make his thought relevant to COP.i"ng 
with the pro·blems of' actual living. Most of' his writing grew directly 
out of' the resp_onsibl'e. positions he held in educa:tion, in journalism, 
and in the Chur.ch of' England. It is apJ>roP.riate, theref'ore1 to con-
clude th1s introductory chapter with a brief' biography of' W:illiam 
Temp-le. 
Ihf'ormation is not suf'f'icient to warrant· tra:eing the entire:. an-
cestry of' William 1lemf?).e. However, it do:e:s seem worthwhile to take 
some note oi' the f'amily tree. 'William Johnston Temple (17.38-1796), 
a p,aternal great-grandfather, was an Anglican pries:t and essayist. 
He- had two sons, Francis, who bacame an admiral in the British na;yy, 
and Octavius, who became:: a'' ma:j or in the army. Octavaus (17g4-l83#;) 
had f'if'teen children, one of' whom was Frederick Tem~le, the f'atber of' 
the Vlilliam Tem:gSle with whom the pre:sent study is concerned. Frederick 
T.emRi'ets lif'e and career (1821:....1902) are, perhaps, best characte-rized 
as Victorian. Frederick studied and taught at ~ord and, then, in 
1846 wa:s ordained to the Anglican prie:sthood, by Bishop; ("Soapy S'am.":) 
Wilberforce. His intere-st in education Ted him to hold many posts in-
clUding the-f_ollowing:; FJreminer in the Education Office (.18M~)-; Prin-
cipal of Kneller Ball (,l850); H. M. Inspector of T:raining S:ehoo:ls 
(_18:5.5:); and Headmaster of Rugby (,1858 ). Intere-st in the church was> 
also maintained, and after some opnmsition he was- appointed BishOJt of 
Exeter. Then came marriage to Beatrice ].a.scelle·s in .1876, and through 
her Wi.lliam has a claim to royalty since bOth of her grandfathers were:: 
Earls. Frederick performed his priestly dutie·s with !Precision and 
perseverance. His concentrated efforts .led him to higher resppnsibil-
i tie:s :: in 188w he: be came Bishop) of'_ Eondon, and, then, in .1896) he; was3 
elevated to~ Archbishop1 of Canterbury.-
Two sons, Frederick and William, had been born to Frederick and 
Beatrice Temple. Frederick Charles 1/em.IPi.'e was:. born in 1879 and William 
TemR.i"ffi Wa$ born in the Ealace' at EXeter on Octo-ber 15, 1881• William 1 s 
boyhood was, however, sp5'lnt at Fulham Ralace in Eendon. 
F.. A. Iremonger in his biograplily of William Temple n<D:te:s the in-
fluence of two persons in particular during William's early years. 1 
First, was his oiu "Nana, n Ellen Langdo~, with whom he shared a' deep 
mutual affection, and who remained with him until· his marriag~ in 19I6. 
In fa:ct, Miss Langdon was so. much a P.art of the Temple .familtr that she: 
became a householl:i institution and as Iremonger suggests, "perhaps toe 
much of' an institutien."~ Edith Maskell, William's governess, was the 
1. s·ee Iremonger, PP• 3-4. 2. Ibid., P:• 3· 
second major influence upon his young life. 
Kowever, it was to his ~arents that young William turned more than 
to anyone else for his inspiration and guidance. Though the old Arch-
bishop• doecs not seem to have been too we,ll liked :g:ersonally by his 
p,eers, in his own home quite;:, the oppositre was true. Iremonger reports 
that, 11the Archbisho_!pwon from his children their comP.lete devotion, 
their unaffected reverence, and a confidence that was absolut~ 1Father 
says so' clinched every argument. n1 William himself made the following 
statement at the time of his own enthronement concerning his father: 
"He was and is among men the chief inspiration of~ Life."~ Moreover, 
the entire atmosphere of the p~aees in which the Bishop1and Archbishop 
resided played their roles in relating young William to the tradition 
of: the church. 
William's love for, and devotion to, his mother was deep and 
abiding. In 1902, when William was twenty-one years old, his father 
died, and mother and son were joined together in even closer bonds until 
her death in 191:5.: Home for him was where his mother resided; and when 
he,became Headmaster of Repton, and later Rector of St. James's, his 
mother moved in with him and took charge3of his home. 
Academic p~eparation was well founded in the best that Britain 
had to offer through her so-called PUblic s:chools. First, he went to 
l. Ibid. 
2. Q:!J.oted by G. K • .A. Bell, "Memoir"' in William T'emple and His 
Message, collected and ed. A. K. Baker (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,:; 
Penguin Books, 1946), P• 11. 
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Colet CQurt Ereparatory School in 1891, followed qy Rugqy in 1894 and 
on to Balliol, OXford, in 1900:. By the time William was ready to leave 
Rugby, the outlines of his p~rsonality, as well as his purpose in life, 
had taken shape. To his fellow classmatffs a crear picture of Tem~~e 
could be constructed: 
They recall the stout vigorous boy with a strik-
ing and intelligent face; walking with a delib-
erate. stride, a little uncertain what to do with 
his hands-but quite sure of himself in all else • 
• • •. Quick to absorb, ready to talk on all sub-
jects and to laugh about most; with an insatiable 
thirst for knowledge, and an intense zest in life; 
enjoying keenly everything lovely and of good re-
port, from cream buns to classical music. Very 
friendly to the smaller boys •••• Above all un-
swervingly loyar to his father, his school, and 
his friends; already possessed by a sense of 
strenuous purpose, and with at least the outline 
of a philosophy of l"ife.~ 
At Balliol Temple came under the intei+ectual, social, and spir-
itual influence of Edward Caird, the Hegelian Idealist. How grea:tL 
Temple's re:spect was for Caird is shmm by the fact that his :major 
intellectual contribution to~· phliosoppy and religion, the Giffordi 
Eectures, were dedicated to Caird. I..t was from him that TemR~e learned 
the dialectical process o~ reasoning which he never forgot. 
Two special interests developed at Oxford which were to remain 
part of the burden of his life's work, namely, concern for social and 
educational reform. One outlet for the latter became the Workers 1·· 
Educational Association, which he joined in 1903 and served as·prffsident 
1. Iremonger, pp.; 34-35. 
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of from 1908 to 1924. Tem:gle 1 s direct affiliation with the labor move-
ment and party in England, and his concern for their cause~ never ceased. 
Temp-le 's intere-sts were varied. He koew and enjoyed good music; 
and he read; widely. Literature especially futere:sted him. Soon Habert 
Bro:wning became his favorite p,.o:et and Ge0.rge Bernard Shaw his favorite: 
playwright. Upon graduation from Balliol he was presented with various 
alternative vocations: he finally decided on Qp.een 1's College, where he 
became a fellow and lecturer. During his tenure he visited Germany and 
sat in on lecture.s at .Jena under the tutelage· of Hilgenfe-ld aDd Ernst 
Haeckel, Rudolp~ Eueken, and Hans Heinrich Wendt. 1 
As TemR1e thought a1Dout the world sce:ae and his own contem:R:<:>ra.ry 
England in p~rticular, he became convinced of the need for intelligent, 
active leadership on the gart of the clergy. He wrote to his friends 
(e.g., ffiirry Hardy and .John Stocks) telling them o:f his concern and 
enco:uraging them to join the church 1s forces. 2 Eventua:lly, he faced the 
choice himself. Certain theological dogma'S, particularly the virgin 
birth and bod:O.y- re:surrectfon, Temple:• could anl!r supp~t tentatively 
so he was refused orders qy BishowEaget. However, after two years of 
further reflection and gro~h for ~emR1e the Archbishop;of Canterbury 
(Randrll~- Davidson} was satisfied that he wa:s orthodox. In 1908'; he be-
came·- deacon and in 1909 he was a:ndained priest. 
1~ See ibid., pp,:.. 69-72. 
2~ For a sam.Rjjing of the letters written during this period, see 
ibid., PP-• 96-107. 
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It is impQssible in such a brie£ survey to COYer the vide inter-
ests and activities which encompassed Temp:I.e's li£e and thought in his 
remaining years. I.t is necessary, there£ore:, to be concerned only with 
some o£ the highlights o£ his career which seem to illustrate~be.st his 
many-sided personality. 
Many of'fers of work were p;resented to-: TemW.e £allowing his ordi-
nation, but he decided to-take the position o£ Headmaster o£ Repton in 
191m Here;; he had an opJtOrtunity to try out his ideas £or education in 
a :gractical setting. Although greatly loved by most o£ the students 
and £aculty, he came to.£eel that it was not his vocation •. 
Temp:re turned hi·s energies to active and £ull-time church work. 
In 19~ he became rector o£ St.. J ame:s 's, E~cadilly, London. Here Tem-
p_;le had the op_H0rtunity of matching his abilities with the needs o£ 
chur.ch P.eop~e in a time o£ international conf'lict, and he discovered 
that they £itted well together. He threw himsel£ into his work with 
all the immense vigor o£ .his personality. T.'empl.e 1s views regarding 
the £irst World War and Britain 1 s rol.'e in it are;aptly summed upJby 
Iremonger in the £o·llowing words:· 11By tem:g:erament and conviction en-
tirely non-chauvinist and as unequivo:ca:J..ly non-pacllist, he held that 
it would have been imp0ssible:£or Great Britain, consistently with 
honouring her solemn obligations, to keep:1 out o£ the war. nl Through 
both the~ written and spoken word TemR~e carried his me:ssage t~ th& 
peop:le o£ the church and to:-l an ever-widening circle o£ admirers. This 
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work P.roNed to' be. excellent P.reP.aration for the roie that destiny had 
in store' for the last years of his life·. He: challenged people every-
where~to.renew..their faith in Goo and confronted them with the vision 
o£ GOd contained in the person of .Je-s:us Christ., 
A:: sentence from one of his sermons ~e.ached during World. War II 
be:st summariz:es::: Tem:gie:!s views> regarding the=-: attitudes o£ Christi:ans} 
in wartime:: 1'We are.' called to the· hardest of all tasks':: to- fight with-
out hatred, to~re.sist without bitterness, and in the end, if Gsd grantt 
it so, to·· trium:gh without vindictiveness. nl In ']emJtLe Irs re'sponse to· 
war, one may catch a glimyse of what constituted the basic springs of 
action of llls 11tf'e. He was not one to~ r.ema:.fn indifferent or indeci-
s:i.ve· am a crucial issue; he ·made U:N:J his mind and then threw the entire 
weightl of' his mind and bo·dy on the side he felt wa:s1 right, always.: striv-
ing to; remember the wisdom o:f St •. Paui .. that action without love, no 
matter hOM. righteo-us it may seem, has miss-ed the mark .. 
'Ilem~e 1is general outward:! ap_R:eara:nce ha:s. been described as follb.ws: 
He. was 5 ft •. 9f: ins. tall. As a boy he waS> fat, 
and when he was:; gro:wn up.: the• im:gression that a 
su:gerficid. o·bserver might easily get was of' a 
robust stoutness ........ But though he:~ had bulk, 
• • • it was his look that struck one most of 
all.;....a clear, somewhat round face, with blue-
gray eye-s both piercing and kind. He always 
wore1 glasses· in a H.ght go.ld frame, qu:llte incon-
sp_icuous. The im.P.re:ssion he gave was of greati:. 
sti.lJ.i1ess and gentleness, combined with extra-
ordinary P._ower •. His hair was rather fair, with 
1.. William Temgle, The Hope of' A New World (New-• York:· The 
Macmillan Comyany, 1942-), p;-. 81. 
no trace) of grey yet showing. When he had gout 
he~; walked with a' stick, bravely and firmly: but 
when in his ordinary health he stood and walked 
erect. He .was. tidy in his dre·ss, correct on 
official occasions, never fussy, and on holidays 
very ready to relax in an o:Ld tweed suit.l 
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Inwardly, Temi[~e was:; basically an uncomJ!ricated man. He:; did not~ seem 
to-, be beset by the conscious and semiconscious frustrations and fears' 
which inhibit and intimidate~most people. He possessed, in the highest 
sense, an integrated personality. From this integration flowed the 
inner assurance, sim:p:Le trust, and loving devotion to God and fellowman 
which so characterized all that he did. For Temp,l~ the truths of Chris-
tianity were. not matters of probability about which there was some 
doubt and, hence, hesitancy to~speak; they were:;a:ssured truths. 2 On 
the believing qua1ity of ~nemP.le• 1 s mind, W. R. Matthews writes::: 
I. should say that by tem:g:erament he wa'S'' the-1 very 
op]:!0site of a sceptic.. He said once that he:; had 
never for one moment doubted the divinity of 
Christ-surely a revealing statement. I believe; 
it tm be, simP.lY true that he. had never had to 
face as a :gersonal ppo·blem the ultimate.-doubts. 
His was both a hospitable:and believing mind. 
• • • on ene eminent philosopher he :~made a sus-
tained attack-on De:scarte-s, ••• and he· ob-
jected, characteristically, to that thinker•·s 
famous "method of universal doubt •. n3 
Since T.em:gi.e- wa-s~ certain of what he· believed, and consequently.· was re-
lieved of tension regarding his beliefs, he could devC>:t:ec, himselif fully 
1. Bell, ltMemoir 111 in Baker, P.P.:•- 40-41. 
2. See T.emJtl-e, Nature) Man and God, pp;· 35, 44, 54. 
3~ "Wilriam Tem:r;rle as Thinker" in Matthews, p;~ 9. 
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both to prop~mnding hi's vie-ws and, at the"' same time, loving those who 
disagreed. In this way he never seemed to be on the defensive. The 
key to Temp,le 1s inner security and outward assurance was his "single-
minded faith in God.u+l In right of this it is not difficult to under-
stand that T"em_P.le was able to- retain his humility.. He knew. and ac-
knowledged that G0rl was the source:: of his strength and he sought Ge:d 's 
_P.re:s·ence often. It is &lso significant to realize the importance for 
Tem_2i.e of his sense of mission. From his early youth he felt the hand 
of God upon him and the need for integrating all areas of llie:-, show-
ing how they all find their unity and illumination in the. Incarnation. 2 
Tempie pps~essed what is commonly. referred to as a ppotograp,hic 
memory.. Thus, though he read everything at 'the- same, slow _2ace, P.ro-
nouncing each word,as he read, he was able to qu0Jte long :passages of 
pxo·s·e and poetry at will. Y The. working CJxf Temple 1's mind itself is re-
vealing. TemJ?.le in the "Preface 11 of his Gifford Lecture:s indicate:s 
the intuitive nature of his thought:: 
All my decisive: thinking go-es on behind the seenes; 
I seldom knaw when it takes p~ac~--much of it cer-
tainly on walks or during sleep~and I never know 
the p,ro.eesses which it has followed. 0i'ten when 
teaching I have:; found myself expressing rooted con-
victions wh£ch until1 that moment I had no notion 
that I held. Yet th~y are genuinely rooted con-
victions--the resppnse, not of my ratiocinative 
l. ]remonger, P• 524. 
intellect, but of rny whole being, to certain 
theoretical or practical propositions.l 
30 
TempTe numbered among his friends many of the most prominent 
leaders of his day in all areas of life. A complete list is not 
possible to reconstruct. H6wever, it is worthwhile to note some of 
those who exerted the mo·st personal influence on him. In addition 
to those already mentioned, Charles Gore and Hastings Ra:shdalT of 
the older generation and R. H. ~awney and Sir Walter Moberly o£ his 
~ 
own age were among those who:se guidance he sougl?:t and friendshiJ!- he 
prized. 
Another facet of TemHlets life blossomed forth during his years 
at St. James··.1s. Iremonger conveniently and concisely summarizes it 
in the following statement:: "In the summer of 1916 the gap: which his 
mother 1 s death had left in Templet s life was; filled by his marriage:; 
with Frances .Anson. n2 Mrs. Tem:g:le provided a home life which combined 
an ordered household with personal warmth that was the ideal setting 
from which her husband could go forth refreshed to take up his taxing 
work again. 
The demands on Temple 1s time and en~rgy continued to increase. 
ffe became one of the secretaries for the National Mission of Repentance 
and H0pe in 1916. All the while his intellectual productivity was· not 
1. TemJi-Le, Nature1 Man and God, P:• ix. 
2. Iremonger, p. 197. 
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diminished. He had alre·a:dy p;m.blished some lecture:s and sermons, l and 
he-, was editor of the:; Challenge from l9l5 to l9lS. 2 Mens Cre-atrhr, 3 
rewe:s:enting Tem~e:1s first major efforts in the area of theological 
philosophy, wa"S nu.blished in l9F71 and is considere.d by many to be his 
finest work. 4 Thus, Temv.le 's .fame. was growing. But the movement which 
was to catanNlt him into national prominence was the Life and Liberty 
Campfiign (1918). Temv.Te le.ft his parish at S:t. James's and took u1:r· 
the task of awakening the nation to the need .for disentangling the 
church from the government so that the church could have newer to~ con-
troll its own affairs. In .fulfillment of his new re"Spensibilities Tem-
ple visited parishes throughout England and carried his message a:s well 
to the armed services. Tem:gj.e •~s :gersonal success was tied in with the 
success o.f this movement. National prominence:was his; and as the 
mo:vement succeeded, he rode the crest o.f the wave'l of pepuTar app;:-o:val •. 
In l9l9 the Enabling Kct was passed. 
Meanwhile, Temple had m0:;ved on to a new charge::: he became Canon 
of Westminister. ffdwever, the stay proved teml{0-ra.ry, for in l92l he 
1. E.g., The Faith and Modern Thought. (London: Macmillanri.and Co., 
Ltd., l9l0); The Nature o.f Personality (London: Macmillan and Co•, I.td., 
l9lD); Re ton Schoor.Sermons: Studies in the Reli ion of the Incarnation 
(London: Macmillan and Co., L.td., l9l:B • 
2. The Challenge:; was a weekly newspaner taking as its stand the:: 
tenets o.f the Church o.f England with the aim of interpreting religious, 
p0liticajl, and international issues ey the standard of Christian con-
duct •. 
3. l!.ondon::Ma:cmillan and Co., Etd., 1917. 
4. See Iremonger, n:• 2lS. 
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becameJ Bishop .. o£ MancheBter and in 192-9 he:~ was enthroned as Archbishop 
o£ York. 
During these years Temp1e never slowed down his pace. He con-
tinued to write, preach, and te:a·ch. Some· comments are:! in order re-
garding Temp1e ''s writings. A. sequel to Mens Creatrhi, developing £ur-
ther 1lemp1e~'s Christian philosophy and entitled appropriately Christus 
Veritas, 1 was published in 1924. These two volumes together with his 
Gi££ord Lectures published under the title, Nature, Man and God (1934), 
ar.e; generally considered to constitute the basic sources :for Temp-le 1 s 
theological philosoppy. 2., G •. K. A. Bell ap;tly summarizes the reception 
which TI"emp,1·e •·s Gi££ord I.ecture·s received uppn publication:: uThey were 
generally welcomed as work of a very high order, admirable if they had 
come £rom a University Pro:fe~sor, astonishing when the magnitude o£ the 
author's activities in p,u.blic life was remembered .. n3 Arr.together, 
thirty-four books and twice that many p,ampPJ_ets, sympo·sia, and articl'e:s 
wer~ somehow ppoduced by Temp1e in the midst of his amazingly active 
career. 
It shoU:Vd be reca:lled that :for a time 'TI'em:g1e thought that p_hilb~­
oppy wouid be his pro£e:ssion.4 C0ncern with the formulation of' f'Ul'lda-. 
mental principl'e:s regarding any:· issue remained foremast in his thinking 
I. London:· Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1924. 
2. See Matthews, "William Temp:I.e.as Thinker,n'P• 8. 
3. Bell, 1'Memoirn: in Baker, p• 26. 
4• See Templ'e·! s statement in the. "Preface" to Mens Creatrix, 
P• vii. 
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to the end, but the bent o.f his mind and inclinations seems to have been 
toward the apn~ication of phil0sophical thought to concrete problems of 
living. As lremonger state:s concerning Temp:l.e 18 interests in philosophy:= 
His concern with philosophy became centered 
on its practical significance for the conduct 
of life, and--when he grew conscious that 
there.was a social problem--for the proper 
ordering of society.l 
Similarly, TempJe •·s approach to religion was more that of the prophet 
and teacher, than that of the theologian. Above all he sought to con-
front anyone who would listen with what he considered to be the rele-
vance of the will of God to the perplexing problems life p0ses •. 2 
Frayer was for him the heart of the personal religious H..:fe, and evan-
gelllsm was.: the real j o·b of the~~ church• The latter task he interp_reted 
in the. widest sense as witnessing for Christ in all areas of life, and 
in the twentieth century this meant particularly in the p0~itical and 
economic realms. 
Temnie 1s intere"Sts a:lso carried him into international activities 
and prominence. He was chairman of the Edinburgh Conference on Faith 
and Order in 1937, which was the seed bed from which the: World Council 
of' Churches was to grow. 
No one•was better p_repared for the task that was to be his than 
was William Temnle. He had the personal assurance of his faith, the: 
1. Iremonger, p~ 19. Also: see th~statements evaluating Temple's 
lecture note:s recorded in Iremonger, PP• 62-63. 
2. .A:. reference to his own attemgt to discern God 1 s will regarding 
a decision he faced is made in Christian Faith and Lif'e (New York:: The 
Macmillan Comp:any, 1931), P• 51. . 
intellectual acumen, the background and training, and the sense o:f 
humor--all o:f which (and much more) are necessary to lead a national 
church during wartime. Ob. April .23, 1942 William Templ.e was enthroned 
as Archbishop of Canterbury. From this ecclesiastical pinnacle, 
Tem:gi:e challenged the p_eople of Britain and of the western world, as] 
he had done before-from the parish at St. James's, to a new and vital 
:faith in the God Jesus had reveailed. 
Gout had troubled Templ.e since his early youth, and as the 
years wore on his legs gave; him more trouble. In October o:f 1944 
one such siege was:especially severe and the doctor advised that the 
Temp:Des go to Westgate:. Though he recovered some, the change of air 
could not sufficiently reduce the inflammation. On October 29, Mrs. 
Temgie, seeing the exp;r-ession on her husband•s face·, hurried :for 
help<> But the great Ar..chbishop was in other hands and even medical:. 
science could not reclaim him. He died without pain and at peace 
with God and the world. Thus ended the earthly career o:f trthe 
gre.atest moral :force in Brita'in. nl · 
G. K. A. Bell has supplied a fitting conclusion to this brie:f 
biography: 
William Temple had all the vividness and swift-
ness o:f a :flame. It was like a :flame that he 
sped through our whole firmament, :filling every 
corner of it with a new splendour. It was like 
a flame that he communicated warmth and light 
l. See Iremonger, P• 499. 
to all who saw or heard him. We cannot expect 
to look upon his like again in our lif'etime.l 
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Having sketched in the ld.f'e of William Temple, it is necessary 
now to pre:sent thoroughly and systematically his pP.ilbsophical thought 
and to evaluate the attempt he made to emp:Loy the concept of person-
ali ty as a principle o:f eXP.l'anation. 
1. ''Memoir" in Baker, P.~ 47. 
CHAPTER II 
TEMPLEJ'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter there is an analysis of Templels conception of 
the role and fUnction of philosophy and a resolution of issues integral 
to the philosophic task. All exposition is made of the method by vmich 
philosophy should proceed in fulfilling its aim. The false start on 
1vhich Descartes set the course of modern philosophy regarding episte-
mological issues is exposed, and Templefs own resolution proposed •. 
Finally, the relations between philosophy and religion are examined, 
leading to the conclusion that only a philosophy taking its concepts· 
from the Christian faith and its certainty from the personal fello~ 
ship one shares vdth the God revealed in Ghrist is adequate to the 
task of solving the problems life poses. 
~ The Philosophic Enterprise 
1. Tlie Philosophic Approach 
Temple conceives of the philosophic task in its broadest sense 
as the attempt to render meaningful all of experience. As such, phi-
losophy is not to be taken lightly, for it represents the most serious 
efforts of man to comprehend the meaning of existence.l The philoso-
pher makes lla determined effort to think clearly and comprehensively 
l. See~Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. l. 
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about the problems of' life and existence)ll 
In this attempt to weave all of' experience into a clear and mean-
ingful pattern, the philosopher moves beyond the uncriticized impressions 
which prevail in most areas of' life. Most men exercise their critical 
faculties to some extent in organizing their sense impressions and dis-
tinguishing these from dreams. But here the reflective process is often 
of' short duration, and the guiding principle is practicality, not the-
oretical satisfaction of' the will to know or integration of' all of' onet.s 
experience into a coherent system of' belief's. The philosopher does not 
stop his investigation at •Jb.at appears to be sufficient for the busi-
ness of' daily living. Far from simply accepting impressions and feel-
ings as they come to man, he strives to organize all of' experience and 
to relate sensory data to other data such as that derived from man's 
aesthetic, moral, and religious experience.? 
Hence, 1.Jhen its task is conceived in this broad sense, philoso-
phy is identified with metaphysics. In fact, Temple at one point makes 
this identification explicit by defining philosophy a:s nthe study of' 
1. Ibid., p. 7. 
2. In so far as each of' these areas represent activities of' 
the human mind, they are equally subject to philosophy. However, reli-
gious experience suggests an object not only independent in the sense 
of' existing in the world apart from any individual experience of' it, 
but as the source of' tb.e w-orld and all experience.. Religion in this 
sense serves as the completion of' the other activities of' the mind. 
See ibia., p. 260. This point is developed below. 
reality as such, nl and he appeals to Aristotle to support this defini-
tion. 
When philosophy is viewed as the attempt to understand reality, 
then the various divisions of philosophy snpplementing or presupposed 
by this task are relegated to the status of sciences an.d are not con-
sidered as philosophy in the broad sense. Accordingly, epistemology, 
ethics, or physics, as separate disciplines, are to be considered Sci-
entific Philosophy. For Temple the term philosophy should be restrict-
ed to the comprehensive task of relating all the separate analyses of 
experience and integrating them into some meaningful explanation of 
the~ totality of experience. 
It is only when ~ore have at least the aspiration 
to relate together all departments of experience 
and all the contents of each that we are, strictly 
speaking, engaged upon the philosophic enterprise .• 2 
Thus the procedure of the philosopher is to collect all the facts 
of eA~erience that can be gathered and, without giving priority to any 
one area of experience, to construct a system 1.Jhich accounts for all 
the areas. AS such, philosophy proceeds vdthout any assumptions other 
than the single one in the efficacy of reason to comprehend the universe; 
that is, that the u_~iverse is rationally intelligible to the mind of man. 
As Temple states: 11Philosophy assumes the competence of reason-not nee-
essarily your reason or mine, but reason when free from all distraction 
1. Christianity in Thought and Practice (London: Student Chris-
tian MOvement Press, 1936), p. 13. 
2. See ibid. HoWI:Wer, else:t?.here Temple distinguishes bet1-1een 
Scientific Philosophy and Theological Philosophy and restricts his use of 
the term philosophy to the former.. See Nature, Man and God, p. 44, espe-
cially n. 1. 
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of impulse-to grasp the world as a whole. ul 
However, there is a difficulty which the philosopher encounters 
from the start in this task because "our observation is, in fact, very 
largely determined by the general conceptions with which -vre undertake 
it.u2 The philosopher does not begin his examination of experience in 
a vacuum.. He is a product of his culture and thus brings to the inves-
tigation a mind already overflo1ving with facts and theories. Further-
more, the process';in which he is engaged does not yield to exact meas-
urement. As philosophers, Temple concludes, Hwe start with a vision 
of the world coloured by our history, our family, and our temperament; 
and precise and detached observation in this field is not to be at-
tained.n3 Temple's point seems to be that the philosopher can and 
must look for an hypothesis to explain all the facts which on the basis 
of the separate areas of investigation cannot be justified. It is 
there that religion plays a significant role for Temple. 
Though Temple does indicate that. the guiding principle of the 
philosophic quest is the theoretical satisfaction of the idll to knovl 
and not practical guidance in the daily business of living, another 
emphasis is evident in his writings." Philosophy is held to be inte-
gral to life, on the one hand, and life is held to require the guidance 
1. ~~ns Creatrix, p. :2. 
2.. Temple, Christianity in Thought and Practice, p. 14. 
3. Ibid., PP• 15-16~. The implications of this procedural 
difficulty confronting the philosopher are examined below. 
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that a philosophical world-view alone can provide, on the other hand. 
Hence, the ultimate aim of philosophy for Temple would seem to be that 
of providing insight into, and guidance fm; the life mari lives in the 
universe.l When philosophic world-views are examined and evaluated by 
Temple, that one 1vhich provides the individual with inner assurance and 
practical guidance for living is held to be superior even if it fails 
to provide a coherent ~ccount of the facts. Temple makes no attempt~ 
to reconcile these different interpretations of the philosophic task. 
This raises the question of how the philosopher should proceed 
in his work so as to gain an adequate understanding of the universe 
and to provide guidance for living?' The problem is to discover a phil-
osophic method which can satisfy the demands of the philosophic enter-
prise. 
2' The Philosophic Method 
.An analysis of the methods of philosophic inquiry must begin by 
acknowledging the fact that much actual thinking occurs on a level 
below conscious awareness.2 A person confronted with a problem may 
find that his mind momentarily goes blank, only to be aware moments lat-
er of some comment he ~o7ishes to make, after which his mind may go blank 
1., S:ee Christianity in Thought a'tld Practice, pp. 33-34;; Mens_ 
Oreatrix, pp. 3-4;~Christus Veritas, p. S8. 
2., See T.:emple, Mens Creatrix, p. 10 .. , In Mens Creatrix this type 
of thinking is held to be true of everyone, but in the Preface to Nature, 
Man and God, pp. viii-ix, Temple refers to two different types of think-
ing, only one of which is primarily of a semiconscious nature. 
again. In a similar >.:ray one may find himself' asserting a strong con-
viction on a subject in the course of a discussion which up to that 
moment he was not fully aware he held. 
Much of man 1 s thinking thus goes on in the semiconscious re-
gions of the mind•~ The rightfUl authority of a number of social con~ 
ventions resides prec:i:sely in the fact that many men over an extended 
period of time collaborated, though with only partial awareness; in 
determining certain courses of conduct as preferable to others. This 
process is praised by Temple, and the conclusions reached are con-
sidered to be representative of rttruly ·scientific induction. nZ The 
possibility of relevant facts being omitted in this process is far 
less, Temple contends, than >.:rhen a single individual consciously 
strives to consider all the relevant data and infers from them a le-
gitimate conclusion. 
Temple seems to be indicating his preference for non-directefr 
or sponta11eous thinking as opposed to an extensive conscious effort 
specifically designed to work through to conclusions from acknowledged 
premises. Wnen this preference is related to Temple 1 s ovm intuitive 
type of mind, then a significant insight into Temple 1s approach to 
1 •. There is a striking similarity here with ~orhat Bowne calls 
thought llhiding behind itself. n" S.ea Borden P~ Bowne, Theory of 
Thought and Knowledge (Ne~or York: Harper & Bl?others, 1897), pp. 39, 
4$. 
2. Temple, Mens Greatrix, P• ll.. Once again there is a;. sim-
ilarity here with what Bowne refers to as the 11great catholic sen-
timents of the race. 11 '' See Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
P• 370. 
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philosophical problems is evident. This is, perhaps, one of the bases, 
though never so stated by Temple, on which Descartes' method of con-
scious doubt is rejected. 
a. Deduct;ve and inductive methods. However, it is with the 
conscious processes of thinking and inferring that the philosopher must 
be concerned. This is the domain of logic, and two chief logical meth-
ads have evolved:: deductive and inductive. Each one is inadequate, and 
yet both are necessary and are, in fact, used together. 
The difficulty with deduction has become commonplace., Starting 
as it does from a major premise from which necessa_~ conclusions are 
inferred, the deductive method fails to establish the certainty of the 
initial premise.l Furthermore, the theory of evolution has destroyed 
the sharp divisions into distinct lcinds of beings once believed to 
prevail in the natural order. SUch absolute divisions can no longer 
be drawn any more than one can separate absolutely manhood from boy-
hood in the life of any individual. Knowledge is not of static ob-
jects clearly distinguishable from one another and once defined evi-
dent and clear-cut in essence. The theory of evolution in discarding 
Real Kinds also poL~ted up the fallacy of Aristotelian logic, for in 
life clear-cut distinctions based on definitions cannot be made, or 
if made, are irrelevant.2 In order to know ·what a thing is, according 
to evolution, it is necessary to know how it arose since the meaning 
1. See T.emple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 12-13; also Nature, Man and 
God, P• 90. 
2. See:, Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 102. 
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of certain things is derived from the process:. by which it came to be.1 
It is for this reason that the historical method has become so sig-
nificant in modern thought. Hence, deduction is no longer adequate 
as a philosophic method. 
However, induction is not a sufficient method taken alone either. 
Though it has the advantage of starting ~odth the particular facts of 
experience and thus avoids the criticism of irrelevancy levied against 
deduction, it fails to establish ~lith certainty the conclusions to 
which it leads. The only way to establish the certainty of a conclu-
sion arrived at inductively would be by demonstrating the impossi-
bility of all possible alternatives, which is itself impossible.. This 
poses something of a paradox for the philosopher in search of an ad-
equate method:; lfi£' knmo~1edge is of actual experience it la:cks cogency; 
if it has cogency it is not concerned mth actual experience.u2 The 
difficulty w.i th both deduction and induction as separate philosophical 
methods may be briefly summarized: 
The difficulty about Deduction is that we have no 
certain right to our starting-point. The difficulty about 
Induction is that vTe have no certain right to any con-
clusion.3 
1. See ~.~, p. 101.. This is akin to what Sartre refers to 
as the priority of existence over essence. See Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Existentialism, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1947)), pp. 15-20~ 
2. T.emple, Nature, Man and God, p. 91. 
3. Temple, Mens Creatrix, p~ 15.. See also Nature, Man and 
God, p. 90. 
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The criticism Temple malces against induction is on the basis of' 
its failure to give the same logical certainty f'or its conclusion that 
deduction does, but 1v-hat prescribes that logical certainty is the ideal 
sought?" Temple 1's appeal to logical certainty as the norm seems espe-
cially strange since he is critical of' Descartes, and of' much of' mod-
ern philosophy, f'or using mathematics as the ideal discipline. 
b. The dialectical method., However, this does not mean that 
there is no hope f'or the philosopher or that there is no sound phil-
osophic method. The clue to the discovery of' an adequate method is 
to be f'ound in the evolutionary process by which a: thing ha:s its being 
in the very process of' coming to be. Applying this insight on a 
broader scale leads to the use of' the historical method by •mich one 
seeks to understand something in terms of' its historical antecedents 
and; present prevailing conditions.. Tb.e thinking p,rocess alse must 
be understood in terms of' its historical orgins and development:: 
We now recogni5e that the understanding of' all other 
existing things is to be reached in part by study 
of' the historical process: which has led to their being vroat::. 
they are; is it not probable that in like manner the 
understanding and consequent evaluation of' thought is 
to be reached by a study of' the history of' thought?.l 
The conclusion to 1v-hich Temple is led is that logic should be 
conceived dif'f'erently both in terms of' the objects with which it deals 
and the method by which it strives to interpret them. If' logic is to 
be relevant to lif'e, it needs to be concerned with the actual changing 
1." Nature, l.fan and God, p. 106~,, The orlglll of' mind in the 
World-Process is considered in the next section. 
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worl~, that is with the World-Process. It can no longer be confined 
to the eternal unchanging entities of Greek philosophy or of mathe-
matics •. Logic is to deal not inerely with the formal relations among· 
ideas in separation from the real world, but with the actually exis~ 
ing facts of experience. Therefore, logic must come to be thought of 
as the discipline which traces the historical development of thought 
itself as manifested, for example, in the history of philosophy. Logic 
defined in this way becomes 111the logic of facts n or 11the logic of the 
situation. II;~. F.ollowing Bosangp.et, Temple proposes as the synonym for 
logic lt.the spirit of totality.u2 However, exactly what Temple means 
by logtc and how the history of philosophy exemplifies it remains un-
clear. 
But how is the philosopher to preceed in understanding the world 
which is in process?; This can be done by following the manner in 'Hb.ich 
thinking actually functions, including both deduction and induction at. 
one and the same time., In the analysis of any problem one does not 
start without any clues to an interpretation, but, rather, one begins 
an analysis of the facts at hand vlith the assumption that the data 
constitute. some pattern and some hint of the nature of that pattern •. 
When the facts are explored, the theory of their relationship is mod-
ified in ~ccordance with the insight gained by the fUrther investiga-
tion. Thus the deductive and inductive methods are both employed, 
1. See:· i!ri.9,., p. 108~ 
2~ See ibid.~ p. 108; also Bernard Bosanquet, The Princinle of 
Individuality and Value (London:; Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1912), P• 23. 
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each complementing the other. It is a matter of nsee,-.sa-1.-ri.ngfl back and 
forth between facts and theory so that flknowledge of both grows to-
gether.11L 
It is not possible to start either with pure facts or pure gen~ 
eralizations.2 What the significant facts are can be determined more 
adequately at the conclusion of the investigation, and apart from some 
facts thought to be relevant to the problem there would be nothing from 
which to generalize.. Thus Temple states: 
It is at the end, not at the beginning, of our intel-
lectual process that we are in possession of the 
"facts. tt< Hence our ";conclusion"' should always modify its 
own premises; for our goal is not the formation of one 
judgment whose truth is guaranteed by others, but a 
whole system whose parts support each other and in which 
all the llfactstr are found.3 
SUch an approach is called by Temple the dialectical method 
and has similarities with the Hegeliru1 approach but is closer to the 
critical method of Kant and Plato.~ By the dialectical method is 
meant lithe attempt to reach truth by the putting of different points 
of View over against each other and trying to do justice to them all. u5 
1. Temple, Mens Greatrix, p. 15. 
2. The epistemological basis for this will be indicated in 
the next section. 
3. Mens Greatrix, p. 16. 
-4- See Ghristiani ty in Thought and Practice, p. 18. 
5. Ibid. 
Such a reasoning process is indeed circular, but it is all right to 
reason in a. circle so long as the circle is large enough: 
I believe that in the search for knowledge all valid 
argument is circular, only it is of vi tal importance 
that the circle should be large enough, and, in the 
end of the day, the only circle which is quite large 
enough is the circle of the universe itself.l 
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How logic, the history of thought, and the dialectical method are 
related is never clarified by Temple.. What does seem clear is that 
Temple follo1ors the dialectical method and perhaps in doing so means to 
provide, by way of illustration, the meaning of logic when applied to 
solving philosophical problems.2 
The correct method by -which thought should proceed, according 
to To8mple, in the quest for knowledge can now be summarized. One :must 
continue to work with the data, manipulating it into a scheme of 
thought and altering the scheme to fit the facts Ulltil they are so 
arranged as to constitute ~ intelligible system. When such a coherent 
scheme is formulated, one can be assured that truth has been attained, 
at least for that stage of analysis.3 The circularity of thought is 
thus evident in the attempt to understand facts by moving around the 
facts:,; building up a system on them, all the -while gaining more un-
derstanding of the facts and their significance.4 
l~ Ibid., P• 19. 
2•- see-cThomas, lfThe Philosophy of Religion of William Temple, IIi P• 5S. 
3•- see Temple, 9.kristianity in Tllought and Practice, P• 20~ 
4. See:: ibid, p. 39. see also William Temple, Studies in the_ 
SR_irit and Truth of Christianity (London: Macmillan and C.o., l914J, pp. 
42-43 and Mens Creatrix, p. 17. · 
In this way the philosopher moves. from particulars to a general-
ization based on them, which in turn enables him to understand better 
the particulars. Such a shuttling back and forth between fact and 
theory is essential if both particulars and universals evident in all 
facts are to be adequately understood and interpreted, and dogmatism 
is to be avoided. In a descrip~ive passage that calls to mind White-
headrs famous analogy of' philosophic method and the flight of' an air-
Q~ane, Temp~e states the proper relationship between facts and gene:r:'-
alizations based on them: 
We need to come back to the world with our gener-
alisation in our mind, and see the world again in 
the light of' it; and then to return to the gener-
alisation with the new.'maf.erial obtained by our 
last vision of' the world. L 
This conception of' the philosophic method rules out absolute 
logical certainty for the philosopher but encourages growth in knowl-
edge• What is known now may have to: be modified in light of' new knowl~ 
edge yet to be determined, but what is now held to be true, for ex-
amp~e in medicine, reppesents a closer approximation to truth and~ 
certainty than when magic.prevailed. 11he philosophic method, then, 
consists in "the progressive systematisation of our experience as we 
ap_:g_rehend it •. n.2 ~ Temp~e woul'd seem to have. returned to a view of 
1 •. Mens Creatrix" p. 19. Alfred North Whitehead in Process and 
Reality (New York:: The HUmanities Press, 1955), P• 7 states:~ 11The true 
method of discovery is like the flight of' an aeropiane. It starts from 
the ground of' particular observation; it make·s a fl":ight in the thin 
air of' imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interp_J?etation. rr 
2. Mens Creatrix, p;.. 29. See also Nature:! Man and God, P• l08. 
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knowledge as probability that is very much like the kind of knowledge 
induction yields and which he criticized for faillilg to provide logical 
certainty.. Temple offers here a defense of philosophical probability 
as opposed to logical certainty. However, he does not seem to be con-
tent to accept probability as the adequate norm, but also demands that 
a view provide psychological certitude. 
c. Meaning and task of philosophy. As a result of this analysis 
of how philosophers strive to philosophi~e, a.fuller definition of phi-
losophy, its aim and the method by which it should proceed may now be 
offered:: 
Philosophy attempts to deal 1~th all the facts as 
related in the one system of the Universe, and with that 
one system as uniting them. And its method is neither 
Inductive nor Deductive. It aims at a comprehension cov-
ering the multitude of particular facts and penetrating 
to the principle of unity -vrhieh holds them together; it 
does not proceed from first principles or to them, but 
it allows particulars and universals, differences and 
unity, parts and whole, to influence one another in the 
intellectual construction which it forms, until all facts 
are seen knit together in one system whose principle is 
the explanation of the world.l 
In shaping the facts of experience and being shaped by them 
the mind follows the dictates of its o-vm inner structure.. There is 
an intellectuaL demand for coherence. 
Temple uses coherence here in a different way from that in-
dicated above. He seems to mean logical unity in this context and 
suggests that the coherence demanded by the mind is inadequate as an 
explanatory principle ·since something must cohe:re.. It is the facts·: 
1. Mens C.reatrix, p. 22~ 
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which are exhibited as cohering, and it is the mindts demand for unity 
which organizes the facts; the facts, in turn, direct the pattern that 
results while at the same time the facts become meaningful in terms of 
the pattern. Follo1~g Kant's general analysis in the First Critique, 
Temple contends that the facts provide the content and the mind the 
form., and each modifying the other culminates in a meaningful system 
of explanation.J-
k narrow conception of both mind and philosophy is hence rejected, 
for both encompass more than intellectual activity taken in isolation 
from other activities of the mind such as imagination and conscience. 
ATI.l of these activities are the function of mind. Sib too'plnilosophy 
is concerned with the totality of experience and not just a disembodied 
intellect. T.hus, 11Ehilosophy--the attempt to grasp the whole as a 
whole-requires ·Imagination as well as Intellect, the artistic a:s well 
as the scientific capacity. 112 
The purpose of the philosophic enterprise, therefore is to dis-
cover a principle 1-1hich renders the universe meaningful to man. illl.:e-
prived of logical certainty in such matters, man can still hope for 
psychological certainty and concrete guidance for living. Indeed, until 
the latter are provided, the philosophic enterprise remains incomplete, 
though to complete the task may mean moving beyond what philosophy 
alone can establish. 
l. See ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 23. 
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B:e.fore these issues can be pursued .further, it is necessary to 
turn to Temple 1 s analysis o.f some o.f the basic problems arising .from 
the knowledge venture itself'. 
B.. TJie Knowledge Venture 
1.. Origin and Impetus 
a. Thought as the extension o.f organic process. As the dis-
cussion o.f the philosophic method revealed~ it is Templers contention 
that to Imm.; anyt)Jing one must trace its historical origins and the 
process o.f development which it has undergone. The mental activity o.f 
man must also be understood in terms o.f the history o.f its occurrence 
and development in the World-Process •. An analysis o.f the .function o.f 
thinking in the development o.f the human species through the evolu-
tionary process indicates that thinking is itself' an extension o.f the 
organic process .from which it arose, serving as an additional means by 
which an organism strives to adjust to its environment.l 
The scientific world view clearly indicates the priority o.f the 
physical world to the appearance o.f mind which apprehends it. Thus, 
the apprehension o.f the world by the mind o.f man is not primary in 
terms o.f temporal sequence but derivative; 
The world as apprehended is now something which 
antedates apprehension. The world which we 
apprehend is apprehended as having been extant 
1. See Temple, Nature, Han and God, pp. 107, 109-134. 
historically before any one apprehended it.. So 
far as our e:xperience is concerned, !l:m.rehe~ 
i1,q.kes place within the -vrorld, not the world 1dthin 
aoorehension~l 
Furthermore, mants ability to apprehend intellectually the natural 
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order with some accuracy is not surprising when one realizes that the 
intellect came into being in interaction with the natural order.Z 
b. Desire ·as the imoetus of thought. ' Mental acti vi tyf then, 
is rooted in the organismt s total response to its environment as one 
means of satisfying the needs of the organism.J As such, desire 
constitutes the impetus initiati.l'lg thought. The object of desire in 
the lower stages of mental activity is what will satisfy the immediate 
needs of the organism.. S6lecti vi ty by the mi.11d among the objects 
presented to it is thus present from the start but at the lowest lev-
els operates solely to serve the needs of the organism.. This is the 
rudimentary stage .for what later becomes ideally, at least, the love 
of truth for its o'W!l sake. As Temple puts it:: 
1. Ibid., P• 111. The significance of this fact for an 
interpretation of the universe and man t s status in it is e:xplored in 
the next chap:ter of the present study •. 
z. That it is not surprising does not diminish for Temple the 
metaphysical significance of a kinship between mind and reality as 
an examination of Templet s metaphysics indicates. see ibid., p •. 14$, 
and Chap. VI below. 
3. The epistemological implications ot this view of mind are 
considered in the following sections. 
Rooted as it is in the life of the organism, mental 
activity begins as a means of satisfying more fully 
the need or appetition of the organism. In other words:· 
thought is at the outset closely linked to desire. • • • 
But thought in its rudimentary stages is highly selective: 
as regard·s the elements in~<iexperience of which it takes 
note;· indeed it remains seiective to the end; and while 
the informing principle of its selection in the scientific 
student is love of truth, at the rudimentary stage its·: 
informing principle is conc~rn for the needs of the organ-
ism itself; and this concern, as an element in conseious-
. ness, is desire.1 
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It is doubtful if one is ever motivated only and totally by the will 
' to know. Nonetheless, the latter impulse does, develop and serves as 
the motivation for all creative thought. 
'' 
c. Practieal and speculative interests. Even on the higherr 
stages of man r s development two impulses may be noted whieh motivate~ 
man to pursue lmowledge: Praetieal and Speculative. 2 Thus, lmowledge~ 
is often sought because the insight gained may be put to use to solve 
some pressing problem vrhich confronts the individual. In this ease 
the knowledge is not desired merely as a possession or enjoyed for 
its own sake, but is prized for its practical usefUlness. However, 
one may also seek to know something simply for the sake of knovring it, 
to satisfy one 1s o~m irltellectual curiosity on an issue quite apart 
from the use to which the knowledge gained may be put in the business· 
of livfug. 
l. Nature, 1>1'..a.n and God, pp. 139-140. 
2. See Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 27. The material which follovrs:: 
in this section is based primarily on Chap~ IT in Mens Creatrix, 
PP• 27-35. 
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In terms of' the history of' the human.race it is evident f'rom the 
above discussion that the practical interest was prior to the speculative 
interest since mind itself' arose precisely.f'or that end. BUt once the 
speculative interest developed, then it is .irrelevant to ask which one 
of' these impulses exercises priority in any individualfs quest f'or knowl-
edge.~ The method employed to learn and the knowledge attained f'or prac-
tical or speculative purposes are indistinguishable, which ever impulse 
initiated the quest. The dif'f'erence between the t1·TO at this level lies 
rather in the sort of' answer which satisfies the quest. The ttpractical 111 
interest will stop the quest as soon as an ans-vrer is attained which 
seems to meet the immediate demands of the problem at issue; but f'or 
the speculative interest understanding the universe as a whole is the 
ter:mi:nal point. 
The "practicaltr; interest may be satisfied -;.rith a 
provisional ans-;.rer; 1.re may know enough about a subject 
11f'or practical purposes, 11 and therefore close our enquiry; 
whereas the "speculative 11 interest can only be finally 
satisfied when the subject of' enquiry has been grasped 
in all its relations, or, in other words, when a complete 
theory of' the Universe has been f'orinf?d .. Z' 
When a general -;.rill to know is the motivation f'or enquiry, then 
Reality is sought; and only -when it is grasped is the mind content •. 
At this point insight is gained into the nature and status of' man. For 
l. Tbis point represents making explicit -what is implicit in 
Temple when the relevant material in Mens Greatrix, pp. 27-35~, is relat-
ed to that in Nature, Man and God, pp. l09-l34. 
2.. Temple, l1ens Greatrix, pp:. 27-28. 
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man is finite, but he also possesses a mind which enables h:im to under-
stand his finitude against the background of' a seemingly infinite uni-
verse.. Tb recognize one t:s finitude is, in part, to transcend it, and 
thus the will to know for the sake of knowledge itself' is one example 
of' self-transcendence •. SUch an ef'f'ort on man 1 s part to rise above his 
limited self' and situation is the source of the quest for truth, beauty, 
goodness, and holiness;l 
The knowledge venture, then, whether it be ttpractical~~' or rrspec-
ulativell' arises under the impetus of' some interest which the individual 
s.eeks to satisfy. But the interest, while posing the question to be 
answered, does not also supply the answer -vlb.ich will terminate the 
quest:: liMy interest determines which question I am to ask, but in no 
way affects the answer I ought then to find. nZ 
d. Rational legitimacy of' the speculative impulse. A> distinction 
may n01.J be drawn between 11logical tt and "rational." The former refers 
to the process by which an answer is sought to a question raised but" 
does not include the raising of' the question itself'. t1Logic is there-
fore the science of' intellectual process so f'ar as this leads to knowl-
edge; choice and preference have nothing whatever to do with it. 113 
l. See ibid., p. 29, and also Nature, Man and GOd, pp. 128-129. 
2.. Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 30 •. · There is a simila:ri ty here 
I·Ii th T3.llich r s method of correlation; see:-; Paul Tillich, r.stematic 
Theology (Chicago:· The University of' Chicago Press, 1951 , I, 59-66. 
3. Temple, Mens Oreatrix, p. 30. 
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However, in order for this intellectual process to begin, a non-logical 
interest must initiate it •. The total process in which a question is 
raised and an attempt made to answer it is designated by the word ra-
tional. And in this sense it is a legitimate q~estion to ask whether 
the desire initiating the quest is, in fact, rational or irrational •. 
Defense of the practical impulse would seem to be unnecessary 
since by its very natU!e the question posed is one demanding immediate 
resolution grovling out of man 1 s present needs. But can the speculative .. 
impulse be held to be rational and hence a legitimate quest for knowl-
edge?.· Some questions would seem to be useless (e.g., How many dollarr 
bills are necessary to reach around the earth?·}, and under certain 
circumstances merely satisfying one 1:s impulse of curiosity could be a;:, 
temptation to be avoided, as with any other impulse. 
- ' 
Eor Temple, then, whether a certain desire to know something is· 
rational depends on the effort to be expended an~ what other values must. 
be neglected in order to achieve it. In general one could state: ~~~-o 
satisfy any desire is good; whether it is to be done depends on the 
amount of other good so prevented from being realised or the amount of . 
harm. incidentally invol ved .. 111. 
When such considerations are applied to some of the major phil-
osophical issues (e.g., Is there a God~ Is man free? Is there life 
after death?.), it is no idle curiosity which man is tempted to satisfy 
at the expense of other more significant probl~s. For the answer to 
1 •. Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 31. 
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such problems as philosophy poses vitally affects man and his life in 
the world in which he finds himself. 'Ilhe meaning of his life and his 
status in the universe are at stake in such questions~ FUrther, though 
man t s nature is not altered by the answers he proposes, what he does 
1d th the nature -which is his is vi tally affected. 
Our answer to them may not alter our conception of 
what we ought to do, nor increase our knowledge of 
how to do it; but it may very vitally affect our res-
olution to do what we know how to do a:i:ld believe -we 
ought to do. We may not be able to use for our ends 
any faith we reach with regard to these matters; but 
it may use us; and it may even be true that in letting 
it use us we find the fulfi~..m.-rt~ of our own destiny.l 
Thus, :for example, man :finds himself' in a universe which he did 
not create and does not control, except in a very limited way. The 
world as man comes to know it is ordered and the question he :finds con-
:fronting him is:. uwnat is the nature and character of' the Power or Force 
that orders it? 11 2 But even in lmow"ing what the principle governing the 
world is man does not possess it and 
knowledge of it will not add to our , skill in weaving 
or in carpentering, · in medicine or in generalship~ 
ButJ without it everything is uncertain, and all res-
olution becomes infected with ultimate doubt.3 
e. The kno-wledge venture itself' justified. What, then, of' the 
knowledge venture, is it rational and legitimate -whatever avenue it may 
ta.ke2 T.emple of'f'ers the :following answer: rrso :far as the possession of' 
1. Temple, lvlens Ci'eatrix, P• 32~ 
2. Ibid •. , P• 33. 
3. Ibid. 
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knowledge is the exercise of a natural function and the satisfaction of 
a real impulse, it is a good thing. nl However, as has already been 
noted, knowledge is rarely, if ever, pursued for its own sake. Thus',; 
the intrinsic ·worth of knowledge and the results produced, even when not 
directly sought, are both to be valued. Knowledge is intrinsically val-
uable and is at the same time one of the chief instruments for attain-
ing other values. Furthermore, its m:m intrinsic worth is enhanced by 
its interrelation with the other interests and activities of man.2 Ac-
cordingly, though knowledge is and should be pursued for its own sake, 
it does not follow that this is the sole motivation for lcnowledge or 
that it can be isolated from other interests of the self._ 
This is as it should be. F.or knowledge to be sought there must 
be some impulse to know, which in turn must take on the characteris-
tics of something in particular. To learn man must want to know the 
ans-vrer to some particular question, ho1'mver generalized the curiosity 
may be, and the particular issue that is raised will be determined by 
the interests of the individual. This is true even of scientific 
activities where the will to know dominates but does not exist alone. 
The decision to be a scientist does not carry with it the necessity of 
being a botanist or a chemist, and 1.rhich field is chosen is determined 
by something other than simply the will to know. The decision cannot 
be avoided since to come to know anything the individual must settle 
1. Ibid.-
2. For a similar view of the coalescence of values, see Brightman, 
.!L Philosophy of Religion, pp. 94-102. 
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on some one area of investigation.1 The field of investigation is de-
termined by one 1 s o-wn interest. This is so because knowledge is knowl:.. 
edge. sought and attained by persons. It is your knowledge, his knowl1-
edge, and my knowledge. Further, the place where one starts his quest 
is determined by the personality of the individual making the venture. 
Thus knowledge exists in and for persons and is valued by them. 
What value it has is relative to the individual p~rsonality. But for. 
no one can it be the highest good since the latter "is a condition of 
the whole soul in which knowledge takes its place -with other good 
things.rr2 That knowledge cannot be considered an absolute value or 
unconditionally good is indicated by the realization that it is con-
ceivable that it would be better for someone not to know something or 
not try to know it. This is not to be viewed as a defect in the knowl-
edge itself but, rather, serves to ppint out that knowledge is rel-
ative to the person who knows •. 3 .And, tp affirm that knowledge is not 
the supreme good does no:t diminish the high value of knowledge, for 
"it is one of the proper treasures of a complete personality, the first 
and simplest deliberate work of the creative mind. n4 
1. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 141, and Mens Oreatrix, 
PP• 30-31. 
2. Temp!-e, Mens Oreatrix, P• 35. 
3. See Temple, Nature 1 Man and God, p~. 136, and Mens Oreatrix, 
P• 35. 
4· Temple, Mens Oreatrix, P• 35. 
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2.. The Cartesian Error 
Tb.e knowledge venture has been launched and its justification 
established even for the speculative problems of philosophy. BUt how 
is it that man knows, and what are the objects of thought in the know-
ing situation? To ask these questions is to pose the traditional 
problems of epistemology. Using Descartes as the pivotal figure Temple 
outlines the main solutions proposed in the history of philosophy to 
the problems of epistemology.l-
For Temple the emphasis on the self a:nd what the self can know 
on his own was initiated in the modern era of philosophy by Descartes; 
(in the religious realm by Luther and politically by the rise of na-
tionalism). Though the emphasis on the individual was necessary to 
offset the exclusive reliance on the authority of the church, it has 
already passed its stage of usefulness and from the beginning repre-
sented an exaggerated claim. Thus he begins Lecture III of his 
Gifford Lectures, entitled 11The Cartesian Faux-Paus, 11 with the words: 
If I were asked what was the most disastrous 
moment in the history of Europe I .should be 
strongly tempted to answer that it was that 
period of leisure when Rene Descartes, having 
no claims to meet, remained for a whole day 
tlshut up alone in a stoven.2 
There seems little doubt that Temple is being somewhat facetious here, 
but the import of the remainder of the chapter reveals the seriousness 
of the charge as well.-
1. The material for this section is based primarily on Lecture 
III of Nature, Man and God, PP• 57-Bl. 
2.. Ibid.' p. 57. 
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a. The dialectical movement of thought.~ The history of thought, 
Temple claims, is best understood in terms of the Hegelian dialectic. 
ACcording to this view the thesis is rooted closely in the dictates of 
II common sense lF: and thus represents as true what appears to be the truth. 
T~mple states concerning the wisdom of the thesis:; tt![t is like the wis-
dom of the uneducated rustic--a wisdom which is the direct deposit of 
actual experience in a mind of which the balance has never been dis-
torted.n2 
But there are always limitations to such an unsophisticated view, 
and the antithesis stage emerges as a result of the recognition and 
formulation of these limitations. The result is a new beginning based 
on the aspects of the problem previously neglected or a challenging of 
the unquestioned pri:ilciples of the thesis stage. 
Limitations, however, are equally evident with regard to the an-
tithesis since the antithesis tends to neglect that which vms affirmed 
by the thesis •. It has the additional disadvantage of being purposely, 
and hence artificially contrived9 Though it may be ingenuous, it is 
less apt than the thesis to be truly ;.T.is~·· Temple seems to be employ-
ing his preference for semiconscious and intuitive thinking noted above 
as a norm for evaluating other thought processes. Thus, he assumes that 
what is consciously sought and attained is less~valuable and desirable 
1 •. see ibid., and also Christianity in Thought and Practice, pp. 
39:-45.. The latter source represents a stmllna.ry of the material presented 
in Nature, Man and God, pp. 57-Sl. 
z,. T.emple, Nature, Man and God, p. 58. 
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than 1-rhat is spontaneously achieved. This emphasis on spontaneity does 
not seem consistent with his high regard for personality defined in terms 
of purposive wdll, anticipation, and conscious self-determination.l 
There is, hence, a necessity for a synthesis. Tlie latter does not 
consist of a mean between thesis a11d antithesis, but is rather a retu_~ 
to the thesis vmdle correcting it by incorporating the valuable aspects 
of the antithesis.2 
b. Naive realism versus sophisticated idealism.. In applying this 
ttdialectical movement of thought 1t to the problems of epistemology, Temple 
views the thesis as comprising most of ancient and medieval philosophy. 
The basic principle of this stage 1va.s ffthat ;in experience we are directly 
aware of real objects.n3 Such belief led to the formulation of an in-
ternally coherent system in theology and a feudal order in politics. 
A' doubting of the authority of the sta'Ge apart from the ruler who 
makes the state t:s lavm (Machiavelli) and of the church apart from the 
individualls conscience (Luther) gained its intellectual expression in 
/ 
Rene Descartes. In this way the antithesis was formulated which a:sserted 
that the individual nrust start with himself if he is to attain truth •. 
The self isolated from the external world and from the authority of 
state and church must proceed alone in quest of truth. Indi:.ltidualism 
is~; thus p:rroclaimed in the antithesis against the collectivism of the 
1. See Chap; L'II of the present study, in which Temple 1's conception 
of pe~sonality is presented. 
2.. S.ee Nature, Man and G0d, pp. 5$-59~ 
3.. Temple,. Nature, Man and God, p. 60. 
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thesis.;; 
c •. The ultimacy of the subject-object relationship. Disclaiming 
any attempt to assess Descartesr princip~es or procedure from the stand-
point of logical validity, Temple does, nonetheless, challenge some of 
Descartes' conclusions and the premises on which they are based.~ While 
Descartas is correct that one cannot doubt himself when doubting, this 
assurance of the self is merely psychological. Furthermore, can one 
really doubt at the moment of doubting that not only the self but also 
the earth, the stars, and other people exist~ These entities seem just. 
a:s evident in the process of doubting as does the self.2 
The point is, Temple contends, that Descartes has separated quite 
arbitrarily and falsely the content of thinking from the thinking proe-
ess..; Such a separation is impossible. Man does not think in general, 
for when he thinks he must think somet}:ling. T.o isolate thought from all 
objects of thought eliminates thought itself. And it is this isolation 
of the objects of thought from thinking itself which is the crux of the 
Cartesian problem. Despite a certain superficial cogency in regard to 
Descartes t: famous dictum cogi to, ergo sum, it fails to provide certitude 
precisely because there can be no separation of what is thought from the 
process.:; of thinking itself. As Temple states:: 
l. Descartes r procedure :is held to be invalid by Temple, but a: 
formal refutation is not being offered. 
2. S.ee Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 64. 
The subjective function of thought can be properly 
and usefully distinguished from every object of 
thought taken separately; but it cannot be isolated 
from all: ebjects of thought whatsoever without 
ceasing to exist. And it is on the pessibili~ of 
such isolation that Descartes 1 argument turns. 
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Templ"e confesses that vhat disturbs him is the notion that the 
assurance of the self is primary and all other beliefs derivative and 
secondary.2 Furthermore, Descartes' doubt can just as vall be extended 
to include the self also, there by making all of one 1 s experience a 
£Ossible dream state.? Descartes' doubt is forced; it is doubting for 
doubting's sake and as such is artificial., As Temple puts it; ''What 
Des cartes indulged in his stove was purely academic doubt; he was; 
really as sure of the stove as of himself •. n4 Such academic doubt is 
but the "extension of nursery make-believe 115 to the problem of doubt 
itself, and the real pl:)int of Descartes 1 doubting must reside in his 
effort to find a basis for his beliefs other than medieval tradition. 
Temp~e would seem to have missed Descartes' point. The question 
certainly is not whether Descartes in fact believed the stove to be 
reail. ()f' course he did! But the question which puzzles Descartes, and 
1 •. Ibid. 
22 See ibid., p. 65. 
3· Such a thorough-going scepticism is advocated by George 
Santayana, S.cepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1923), p;; 35. 
4· Nature, Man and God, p. 66. 
5. Ibid. 
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which Temple neglects, is on 1vb.at basis ·can such a belief be a:ffirmed 
in light o:f the fact that man does dream and that error also exists.l 
According to Temple, even if Descartes 1 approach is taken seriously, 
what one arrives at in doubting is not a self isolated from all else but 
a self in relationship to all else. Thus, referring to the termination 
of Descartes• procedural doubt, Temple states: ttWhat he {Descartesj 
ought to have reached as the irreducibl~ basis of all thought, includ-
ing doubt, was the subject-object relationship; 112 Ins:tead Descartes 
arrived at the sel:f alone with all the difficulties for gaining knowl-
edge of anything beyond the sel:f which this entails., Descartes justi-
fied belief in the external world through recourse to God who guarantees 
the veracity of one 1 s clear and distinct ideas but whose existence is 
dependent on these very same ideas.- SUch difficulties are due entirely 
to the unnecessary and hypothetical doubt and by the Ul1justi:fied con-
elusion Descartes drevr from his untenable method. I.f Descartes 1 method 
and conclusions are accepted and the se'l:f, as such, is taken to be the 
starting point of knowledge, then the only lmowledge one can get must 
also be of the sel:f. 
The plain .fact is that Descartes, having con:fined 
himself to sell-consciousness as the only immediate 
1. It. critical evaluation of Temple 1 s analysis of Descartes is: 
offered in Chap. VII. 
2. Nature, lY"Jan and GOd, p. 66., On this point Temple quotes 
approvingly fr~ Baron Von Hugel who holds that experience involves 
simultaneously experience of the subject, the object, and thought which 
connects them both. see ibid., pp. 78-79. 
datum, has, and can have, no right to believe in 
the existence o.f anything else at all except his sel.f 
and its states. Solipsism is the only logical issue 
o.f his initial procedure.l · 
But such a conclusion is plainly absurd even as the method on 
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which it is .founded is unnecessary. The .fault, then, lies in Descartesf 
method and the abstract .fo~~a o.f his conclusion. The latter is, how-
" ever, inherent in the procedure itself. Thus, .for Temple, there is an 
inherent error in assuming nthat in knowledge the mind begins tvith it-
self and proceeds to the apprehension o.f the external world by way o.f 
construction and in.ference.n2 
d. The .failure o.f Hume and Kant. The. problem which Descartes 
bequeathed to the history o.f thought is a false one and the dead end 
to 1~ich Hume ultimately pushed the issue shows the inherent absurdity 
of the approach initiated by Descartes. I.f all man has to build knowl-
edge upon are his o-wn impressions of -which ,there is no impression o.f 
continuity or of causality, then the unive~se itself, Hume reasoned, 
must be built up by principles of association as applied to the im-
pressions. Kant sought to solve this untenable view of the wnrld, as 
composed of discrete and disconnected impressions which even Hume had 
to repudiate in practical living, by showing t.h..at the mind itself 
contains the organizing principles by which impressions are related. 
1.. Ibid., PP• 67-68. 
2. Ibid., p. 73. 
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Bv_t remaining true to Hume ts analytic method, Kant . held that the mind 
only knows the sensations it receives but not the source o£ these 
sensations vihich Kant called things-in-themselves. Knowledge for Kant 
is the proces$of organizing these sensations by the mindrs understand-
ing in the very act of perceiving them. 
There is truth in the £am.iliar expression that 11what Hume gave to 
Kant as a problem Kant handed back unchanged as the solution.rrL How-
ever, Kant did open the way £or a more adequ~te solution by means of 
the critical method which he employed. It is his method which is 
original and creative •. According to this method one does not proceed 
either deductively or inductively in regard to the facts of experience. 
Rather, one llinterrogates the conditions of eJq>erience in general to 
ascertain the principles presupposed in its possibility. 11 2 It is Kantts 
critical method of seeking the conditions implicit in experience itself 
as principles of explanation which supplies 11the true substitute £or 
that scholastic Logic which had both guided and cramped thought for 
centuries, and which the C.artesian philosophers had discarded without 
providing any substitute •. rr3 
e. Merits of antithesis and thesis., The chief merit of the an-
tithesis may now be noted. It consists in the principle of individual 
judgment and Hwhat this great principle affirms is the obligation upon 
every rational intelligence to master his ovni experience as fully as he 
can~Jt4 The ideals of individuality and of self-reliance fostered by 
1. Ibid., P• 74 •. 
4· Ibid., P• 76. 
3. Ibid., P• 75. 
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this principle are excellent. Howeve:r, t)J.e results of carrying out the 
implications of this p:rinciple histo:rically have been negative since it 
produced the departmentalization of field~ of study and of work (e.g., 
politics, art, philosophy, science). Eac~ area became independent of 
the others, and devotees of art proclaimed Hart for art 1;s sake" and of 
business:, llbusiness is business. 111 For philosophy the result was equally 
' 
disastrous since it became preoccupied wi~h how it is possible for one 
to know. Bnt neither science nor mankind•in general could wait while 
philosophy solved this issue, and they proceeded to get on w~th their 
business without philosophy.l 
The strength of the antithesis in placing rightful emphasis upon 
the integrity and autonomy of the individual in knowing and in doing 
must be supplemented by, indeed be encompassed in, the more basic con-
tribution of the thesis as represented p~ticularly by the medieval 
thinkers •. Their contribution consists ofithe insight that knowing must 
be view·ed in the perspective of the whole , of experience of which know-
ing itself is but a segment. 
The great strength, to my mind, of the medieval habit 
of thought lay in its perpetual insistence upon the 
whole of any subject that was studied, and, in the 
last resort, its insistence that nothing can ever be 
properly understood at all except when it is seen in 
its place in the entire scheme of things.~ 
l~ See ibid., PP• xviii, 78. 
2. Temple, Christianity in Thought, and Practice, p. 44:~ 
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Applying this principle to the issue of' ho-vr man comes to know and what 
it is he knows, Temple claims that there is the need to "return to the 
concrete richness and bewildering variety and still more bewildering 
interconnexion of' actual experience":' as the necessary ttmode of' deliver-
ance from that false scent on which Descartes set the modern mind in 
its search for truth.nl 
3. Knowledge as the Apprehension of' Reality 
Before the presentation of' Temple t:s suggested synthesis to the 
epistemological problem, i·b may be well to review briefly the problem 
as he has developed it. Descartes 1 emphasis on the self' isolated from 
everything else and, thus, necessarily dependent on its own ideas for 
knowledge of' the world has been shown to be fallacious6 But it is not 
des1:7r!able_, nor possible to return to the naive realism prevalent in the 
medieval period which claimed that the miJ]_d is directly aware of' real_ 
objects L~ experience and gains direct knowledge of' the world. The 
latter represents the thesis in the triadic attempt to solve the prob-
lems of' epistemology revealed in the history of' thought, of' which 
Descartes 1 proposal is the antithesis. 
A synthesis of' these two positions is needed if' epistemology is 
to be set on its proper task •. But this synthesis will not be a mere 
relating of the two alternatives. Rather, it will consist of' a return 
to the organic wholeness of' thought vrith its objects indicated by the 
1. Nature, Man and God, p. 80. 
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thesis while incorporating the signific~t claims o:f individual integrity 
maintained by the antithesis. There. :muSt be a return to the unity and 
variety which constitute actual experience in the act o:f knowing and 
:from which the thesis and antithesis have" both abstracted their re:spec-
tive positions with varying degree-s o:f accuracy •. 
i 
The analysis o:f philosop~ic method has sho'Wll that Desca:rte·s 1 
q~est :for logical certainty~ such as maihematics provides, and based 
as it is on deductive reasoning, is inadequate and misleading in deal-
ing with the real world. Nor does the inductive method supp~y the need 
since its conclusions lack certainty. A combination o:f induction and 
I 
deduction is necessary :for the ppilosop~ic method so as to enable one 
to grasw a thing in its total context. This ultimately means the uni-
verse as a whole, o:f which its own historical development constitute$ 
a significant :facet. 
Ifence; the clue to the solution o:f the epistemological problem 
is to be :found in tracing the origin o:f 1man 1 s thinking as an episode 
I 
' 
in the process o:f the world 1s historY and in an examination o:f one's 
' 
own .concrete experience. As was Rointed out in the discussion o:f the 
origin o:f knowledge, thinking arose as a :function o:f the organism in 
its effort to adjust to its environment~ 
But i:f thought arose as a result o:f the organism1s interaction with 
' its environment and :for the sake o:f :facilitating adjustment, then there 
is no question o:f thought's being disas~ociated :from the real world. 
I 
It is :from its very inception in intera9tion with the external world 
I 
beyond it.. Thinking is not a peculiar 9P~ration o:f a unique organism 
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unrelated to the physical 1·JOrld and operating distinct from a physic-
logical organism. Thinking is, in fact, an extension of the total organ-
ic process by which an organism strives to adjust to its environment.l 
It is a significant fact that the physical order existed long 
before anyone perceived its existence. Ks Whitehead rightly asserts: 
"Consciousness presupposes experience andnot experience conscious-
ness. n2 Whether or not the principle of continuity of all levels of 
reality from inorganic through organic to the personal is fully aecnrate, 
there can be no doubt of the historical priority of the inorganic and 
hence the need for understanding what de~elops later in the perspective 
of what came before.3 
a •. Rudimentary consciousness as organic reaction to environment. 
It is essential, therefore, to examine the operation of mind at the lower_· 
levels of life. As a matter of fact, a Tudimentary consciousness is ev-
ident in the organismts response to its 'environment so as to adjust to 
1. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 107. This work is the 
basie source for the material which follows; see Lectures V, VI, VIII. 
The position developed by Temple in the; Gifford Lectures would seem to 
represent a further explication of the views on knowledge expressed in 
Mens Oreatr~x, PP• 27-90, 153-161. Qn some issues the latter source 
is the more complete one. 
2.. Whitehead, Process and Realitv, p. S3 •. QUoted by Temple in 
Nature, Man and Go.d, pp. 112, 121, 217, 490, 497. T.emple acknowledges 
his debt to Whitehead for much of the material he presents on this issue, 
though it is debatable whether Whitehead always means what Temple seems 
to think he means. 
3. See Nature, :IYJa.n and God, pp. 113-114.. The significance of 
the temporal priority of matter in te~s of the levels of reality will 
be examined in the next chapter •. 
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it.. Cognition is a later development growing out of the mind1 s conative 
activities and aiding the mind to pur~e its ends more effectively.l 
In its most elementary form thought is rooted in desire. It arises in 
the effort of the organism to satisfy its needs. The interaction of the 
organism with the world is the· fundamental fact; and if the organism is: 
mental, then one type of interaction is apprehension. All higher intel-
. . . 
lectual development rests and must be based on the interaction that 
transpires between an organism and its environment. kn organism can 
exist only within an environment and only by reacting to it. The con-
scious process itself arises as a result of the effect of the environ-
ment on the organism and, in turn, the organism's response to its 
environment, including not only the natural order but other organisms·• 2 
Desire serves both to provide the motivation for and the direc-
tion of thought about the ~>mrld. It is not ·mere random desire, for 
satisfaction of the needs of the organism is at stake. Hence, thought 
even at this stage is se.lective in \-!hat it takes note of in its environ-
ment. Desire is itself, however, unspecified except in the most general 
way. Some kind of object is 1vanted; namely, what will satisfy the needs 
of the organism; but no one particular object of that kind is sought. 
1. See ibid., p. 221. The biologist Edmund W. Sinnott refers to 
the origin of mind in 11protoplasmic purposiveness 11 ; See Matter, Mind and 
Man (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 87~ 
2. See Nature, Man and God, pp. 138-139. 
Bergson's insight that one of man's distinctive 
use the environment for his ends; see ibid., p. 
Temple notes approvingly 
traits is his ability to 
122~ 
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Ah e~ple at a higher level· would be when someone is very hungry. At 
such a time it is food that is desired and not specifically steak or 
ice cream. Thought is not first concerned with particulars as distinct 
objects from which more generalized concepts are later developed, but 
is in the first instance dir$cted toward particular objects as repre-
sentative of a general object which is sought. Thought 11is first con-
cerned with the particular data of experiemce precisely not in their 
particularity, but in their general character as capable or incapable 
of satisfying desires. nl 
Desire, as the effort of the organism to satisfy its needs, 
produces and is produced by a condition qf tension within the organism 
due to the fact that its needs are not beli1g met. Once these needs are 
met, desire ceases temporarily. Another,response of the organism to 
its environment grows not out of the tension.created when a need is 
felt which is not being satisfied, but out of a feeling of intimate 
relationship with objects in the environment. This is the response of 
affection and is, perhaps, the more basic form of consciousness since 
it is not dependent on tension due to a felt need to be satisfied •. 
Affection as the experience of trust in the presence of certain objects 
can lead to desire when the objects are a:bsent; but affection remains 
when the need has b~en fulfilled. lifuen desire and affection as the t1vo 
fundamental forms of consciousness are developed in man 1 s intellect, 
they result in science and art respecti~ely. Though the latter 
1. Ibid. ' p. 142. 
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disciplines become ends sought for themselves, they never become totally 
I, 
free o:f the conditions which originally produced them. Thus,_ science 
seeks laws and treats the individual in term~ o:f the universal; art 
I 
deals vlith the universal through what is ind~vidual. 
b. Human mind in relationship -vri th the -vmrld. It is evident that 
the human mind :far surpasses in complexity of response its rudimentary 
I -
counterpart consisting of mere reaction to the environment for the sake 
I 
of furthering survival, but it is never independent of fts origin in 
' 
organic reaction to enviroment. Therefore,! the mind from its crude 
! 
beginning to the highest level o:f philosopbi~ speculation does not merely 
know itself or its own subjective states merely, but always know-s i;he 
world and itself as in the lvorld.l 
What the mind apprehends is in process~ but this poses no problem 
:for the mind since it too is in process; and!. trso long as mind and oc-
casion move together all is straightforward. tl2 Furthermore,. its ovm 
i 
experience is not some mathematical rnid-poiny between a vanishing pasi; 
and an approaching future, but encompasses a time-span, or 11specious 
present,n even as do the objects vrhich it apprehends: flThe apprehend-
' 
ing mind is living in and through time, as t:r}uly as the objects -vrhich 
it apprehends. n3 -
I 
! 
That ndU1d can grasp what i~ in process offers no 
difficulties, :for mind itself appears in the !:flux of the World-Process 
precisely as the capacity :for apprehending t4e process. 
2. Ibid., p~ 120. 
3. Ibid., p. 119. The full signi:fica.rice of this fact as a 
characteristic of mind will be developed in ~he next chapter. 
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The conclusion to be dra1~ from this analysis is that the mind al-
' 
ways apprehends reality.l This follows from vrhat has been shown to be 
the ftLDdamental fact, namely, the interaction of the organism with the 
1o1orld;: and that one type of interaction is apprehension. But then this 
apprehension is of the world and not of ideas as mere mental states. 
In fact, llreality is the presupposition of thinking • • • and the dis-
tinction between mind and its objects is dr?-wn within the given tatum 
of experience. u2 This does not mean that naive realism is correct in 
its claim. that an object is the same whether knovm or not, but the 
issue is mea.ni.7lgless and quite irrelevant. The point is that 11in cog-
nition the subject-object relation is ultimate, and neither term is in 
any degree reducible to the other. Apprehension is of the objeet~n3 
For mind when it thinks, thinks objects of ~he real world, even as on 
a lower level the activity of mind consists' of the organismt:s response 
to objects of desire to satisfy a need •. Th~re is thus no gap to be 
bridged from thinking subject to an external world; for the two are al-
ways joined, and mind is the consciousness of them:: '"There is no tran-
sition to be effected from Mind to Matter, because Mind, as we know it, 
is consciousness of an enviromnent 1-rhich is in one aspect material. tt4-
1. See ibid'!, pp .• 146-147, 150, 217-218; also Mens Creatrix, p. 51. 
2 •. Mens Gxeatrix, P• 51. 
3 •. T.emple, Nature, lVfan and God, p. 126. See also ibid., pp. 151-
152. 
4.. Ibid •. , p. 218. See also Mens Creatrix, p. 50. 
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T}lus the embryo exists first in relationship to the mother, so 
that for the child the lfhabit of' organic self'-adjustment, and of' using 
the environment for sell-maintenance, is already well established11 before 
the child is born.;t. The child 1 s first awareness is of' the mutual rela;-
tionship shared with the mother. It is the response of affection. 
Hence, the individual is never isolated witqin himself' but rather begins 
a'corporate existence •. The child1 s "rudimentary consciousness is not of 
objects as such, but of' this actual process,of' responsive adjustment~u2 
.Although the mind possesses Hat all stages of' its grm.rth a numerical. 
unity as subject of' its experiences, 11 it only attains a full unity 
I 
through its contacts -vlith other minds.3 It is false to suppose that 
the mind t s unity from the start is such that by organizing discrete 
impressions which it receives it can infer from them that some originate 
from other minds like itself'. The distinction of' itself' from other 
selves is a gradual process made possible by the locus o:f sensation 
which the body provides and through intercourse T•Ti th other minds. The 
earliest distinction -vmich the child makes is that between self and not-
sel:f and not between subject and object. 
1. Nature, Man and GOd, p. 122. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 126. The problem o:f the unity and identity of' the 
self' is raised explicitly and Templet s solution proposed in the next 
chapter. 
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. c. The real ~ororld as given in experience •. Furthermore, the union 
o£ subject and object in the act of thinking is confirmed when one ex-
amines his own concrete experience. T)i~ varied distinctions which are 
elaborated by the mind are in the first inS:tance given in conscious ex-
perience. They are part of the nndifferentiated continuum and are dis-
! 
tinguished from the unity by analysis., To consider some object beau-
tiful, for example, does not mean that its extension in space was per-
oeivsa.d -separately from the quality beauty. Rather, the mind in per-
ceiving discovers them both "and it discovers them because they are · 
there. ttl'-
The fact is that everything is contained in the initial experience, 
and knowledge is not built up by inference from onets subjective states 
to supposed objects in an external world. Rather, it is discovered by 
analyzing the contents of the experience as onets interests direct and 
I 
by building it up piece by piece into a meaningful pattern.. From the 
child's gradual nnderstanding of himself and his world to scientific 
I 
' 
and artistic kno~orledge, all is part of the initial undifferentiated da.,... 
tum. ~s Temple states: 
' 
.AlD.. thisflis given in the initial 1experience, though it 
is not ~1 rec~ived. But the reception of_all the rich-
ness of-.._ the gi:tt is not achieved by inference from initial 
percepts, but rather by the direqtion of attention to the 
different elements in the initi~ datum as practical interest, 
·and later theoretical interest a~so, may require. •. • • All 
that scientists have learnt, all that artists have perceived, 
is there from the outset. We build up the fabric of our knm.rl-
edge by taking to pieces the datum of experience.2 
1. Natu.re, Man and God, P•: 125. 
2 •.. ]bid., p. 128 •. see also Mens cTeatrix, PP• 51, 74, 76. 
d.- Knowledge as~ built up--gradually. rn thinking, then, the real 
world is apprehended. However, it is not always apprehended in the same 
way or correctly., Ideas are the mind 1 s apprehension o£ reality and not 
some intermediary between a mind and something external to it •. l But 
though the ideas apP-rehend reality, they are not always an adequate 
apprehension:· -''Mind is always apprehending reality, but it may misap-
prehend it. rr2 What is an internal organic disturbance may be apprehended 
as existing externally, which is what occurs in a hallucination, but 
i 
this is no basis £or doubting all o£ one•s apprehensions •. 
Nonetheless it must be acknowledged that the "'first apJ2rehension 
is always precarious, usually de£ective:; and sometimes erroneous.n.3l 
The mind is not a mere receP.:tacle £or ~he £acts o£ eXJlerience upon which 
theorie:s may later be. constructed. It. is not possible to start with 
simJtle £acts rmde£iled by the theorizing o£ the mind. futh always occur 
together. The £acts cannot be rmderstood without a £rame o£ re£erence 
in which to.£it them. The mind even at the lowest levels selects among 
the objects o£ its environment based on organic needs. At higher levels 
practical and theoretical interests m~rge to constitute a principle o£ 
se~ectivity, so that interpretation and apprehension occur together as 
one activity o£ the mind in its grasp.o£ objects. Mere particulars in 
1. s:ee Nature, Man and God, P.•, 217, and Mens Oreatrix; PP• 50-51. 
2. Nature:, Man and God, p:~ 146. 3. Ibid., P• 147. 
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abstraction from any generalization are not grasped, for no sensation is 
. pure... There is always the selection and interpretation of it by mind. 
This point is clearly illustrated by reference to the organism's 
response to its environment in terms of some object either of desire or 
of affection. If the response is desire, then some kind of object is 
sought which will satisfy a need; and any particular object is p.erceived 
in terms of its capacity to satisfy this general character. I:f the 
response is affection, then the object sought is not only individual 
but also universair; it is not a mere particular. In the former case 
the object perceived is first un~versrol.and then a particular, and in 
the latter instance it is distinctively individual, combining both 
universa.li ty and particul.ari ty. 
Mind, therefore, from its inception as a resp0nse of the organism~ 
to its environment to the higher stages of speculative thought operates 
within the world which it apprehends. What it apprehends is always.the 
real world and never merely its own subjective states. However, at times 
the mind misinterprets the real world, so that reality is fully appre-
handed only at the end and not at the beginning of mental process. It 
must be built up.1 
The problem error poses is considered by Temple a:s one aspect of 
the problem of evi1. 2 This would seem to~' be significant in that Temple 
does not take error to be of sufficient imp0rtance to deal with it 
1. This contention is directly related to Temp:I.-e 1 s view that the 
facts are kno'W!l only after intellectual inquiry and not at the begin-
ning. See Mens Oreatrir, p:~ lb .. 
2~ See below, Ohap•· VII. 
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extensively as an epistemological problem. The for.m that error takes: 
for him is that of falsely equating different objects. Thus, error 
occurs only in the act of synthesis. Hit is a mis-taking one thing 
for another.ul One cannot make a mistake ~f he is content simply to 
analyze his experience. Ob.e aspect of the: epistemological problem is 
hence by-pass:ed. 1femple never questions h0w one knm.rs that at any 
I 
moment what 'he is apprehending is, in fact~ the real world. He assumes 
i 
that onec ali--rays apprehends the real -vmrld, : and the only question is 
I, 
I 
whether it has been fully apprehended •. 
The error of naive realism is evident 1 at thls point since it 
I 
claims that the real world is not only gra~ped 'in the act of thought 
' 
but also adequately understood in onets ap~rehension of it~Z Thus, 
I 
knolvledge of reality is equated vnth man 1 s :apprehensions of the \vorld~ 
The mind is held to have direct knowledge 6f reality. This is too ex--
. I 
travagant; but it is more correct than fal<ke, for it states unequiv-
. i 
ocally the relation of mind with the real world. The qualification 
which must be made is not a rejection of t4is affirmation but an add-
ing to it of a proposition. This consists 
1 
in acknowledging the neces-
sity for the mind to build up its knowledg~ of the vrorld, based on its·, 
apprehensions but not fully evident or understood in any one apprehen-
sian. 
1. Temple, Mens Greatrix, p. 27 4. 
2. Temple does not explicitly refer ~o the er~r of naive realism 
in this way, but it would seem to follovr frrom his analysis. The same is 
true of the analysis which follows to the ~nd of the section. Though 
Temple does not explicitly bring together His discussion of the episte-
mological problem in the vray suggested, it 1:seems implicit in what he 
does state. see Nature, Man and G0d, p. 126~ 
Sl 
Descartes may also be viewed in his proper perspective now. The 
problem which Descartes posed of how a mind confined to its own ideas 
can be assured that its ideas refer to a world beyond is a false one. 
Tb start from mind and ask how one can get to matter is itself the 
blunder; for mind is one of the elements given within the totality of 
experience •. ACcordingly, Temple concludes:· 
We do not have to ask how Mlnd effects a transition 
from its own ideas to an objective world, because we 
see Mind first appearing as the consciousness of processes 
which had been going on in the physical world before 
that appearance.~ ' 
Descartes 1 error is more serious than that of the medieval thinkers 
since he separated the mind from the world •. ', However, he was correct in 
acknowledging the need for the mind to build, up its knm.Jledge of the 
1-Torld. The diffe-rence between the synthesis and the anti thesis at this:; 
point is that granting that kno~rledge :must b~ built up, it is not con-
structed 1Y.ith ideas distinct from external objects but with ideas which 
themselves are the apprehension of real objects. 
The synthesis T.emple proposes is thus based upon the joining of_· 
t-:toro propositions which taken separately constJ.tute the thesis and- an-
tithesis respectively: 
Those propositions are: first, that what the mind 
apprehends, even 1-1hen it apprehends m:i_stakenly, is reality; 
secondly, that the true apprehension of reality is at-
tained not at the beginning but at th~ end of the menta:l 
'process.2 
1. Ibid., P• 217. 2.' Ibid • ., pp. 147-148. 
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4-. Knowledge, Truth, and Realitr 
a. Kno-v;ledge distinguished i'rom truth.' Mental activity has its 
origin in the course of the World-Process in' the interaction of the 
orga..l'lism with its enviromnent. "When mind em~rges, it does so as the 
organism11s apprehension of' the world of which it is a part., In mental 
i 
activity the world itself is what is apprehended •. Knowledge is built 
I 
up by relating and integrating these apprehe~sions .of the real· world 
into a system of explanation 1ilhich will sati~fy the practical and 
' 
theoretical interests of man. When this is ~chieved, one is said to 
Hknow the truth. n This expression, though :meaningful and even appropri-
ate at times, is not fully accurate. To be fi-CCurate one should say, 
tii have a true apprehension of reality, tt or ,'fhe apprehends reality 
truly.!!2 These are :more accurate expressions, for -what the :mind ap-
prehends is reality and not some mental entity or idea standing between 
mind and the world. 
C.oi!llllon usage refers to the mind 1·s CI!lest1 for truth rather than 
the quest for knowle¢lge. This is well.,..found'ed because the former 
expression correctly conveys the impression that 1mat the mind enjoys, 
in knowing is what it discovers and not :merely the act of discovery, as 
significant as the act is:: liThe great and lasting joy is not in the 
1. Bee Chap. IV in.Mens Greatrix, pp• ,.44-51. The material f'or this 
section, hoi?ever, is drawn from many SO'UJJ(it§S and not restricted to the 
single chapter. 
z~. See Nature, Man and God, P• 150. 
discovery of' reality, it is in the reab_ity discovered. 111 
It is in this sense of providing the mind with an understanding 
of reality that truth makes a claim OI,l one and is conceived as inde-
pendent of the knower. Truth is, therefore, a discovery of reality, 
of something which is there to be dis.covered and not merely the ac-
tivity of mind constructing a world aut of its ow. mental activity •. 2 
When truth is discovered, the discoverrer, rather than possessing it, 
fee:ls pessessed by it.3 
The distinction between knowledge-and truth implicit in the above 
e.JCRosition needs to: be made explicit. Knowledge and truth may, o£ 
course, be used interchangeablY without loss of clarity, and no abso-
lute distinction between them can ~;made. But knowledge may properly 
be designated as the mind 1 s activity in knowing and consists in the 
meaning which objects have for the mind. Truth also is an act o£ the 
mind in so far as it is repre:sented in p_ropositional form.. Individual 
minds formulate: propositions held to. be true. But in so far as truth 
is a quality of propositions, it eXists equally for all minds and there-
by gains indep_endence from any one mind. Thus Tem.JF.e states: 
2. Whom TemJ!le has in mind is not clear; not even Kant held that 
the mind spins ·a world out of its, ow. activity. 
J. See Nature, Man and God, p-• 153!. Value arises for TemwJJe:: 
when the mind in app_rehending the world recognizes: a kinship·; with it-
self; see ibid., pp_. 135, 149, lQ3·;. This is considered in Chap• IV 
of the presBnt study. 
K:i:wwled,ge is an attribute o:f mind J.tsel:f; -whereas 
Truth, though properly a quality of propositions 
and therefore existent in mind rather than in its 
objects, is yet relatively objective when considered 
in relation to any particular minO;. 1illi.en the mind 
adequately grasps the objects o:f fts experience it 
is said indifferently to know theni or to know the 
truth about them; :for the true propositions are 
conceived as at least possibly e~sting in some 
other mind before our own minds st;tcceed in :framing them.l 
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Knowledge and truth can be distinguished in still another sense.2 
Knowledge is the broader term, and it encompasses the total apprehension 
o:f reality by all the activities o:f the mind• Truth is the goal o:f in-
tellect, one o~ the primary activities o:f' the mind but not the only 
The theoretical aim o:f the intell~ot in knowri_ng is to :formulate 
a.system of propositions which renders :fully intelligible all of ex-
perience. Wlien this is achieved, the ideal o:f scientific truth would 
be :full'illed. The truth or :falsity of particular propositions could 
then be determined on the basis of their. :fitting into the system of 
propositions.3 The cogency o:f this syst,em, hovrever, depends on pre-
cision of definition; and this is procured at the expense o:f relevancy 
to the real world where process and continuity reign and absolute 
distinctions cannot be·made. 
1. Nature, Man and God, p. 150. 
2• T.em.ple does not explicitly refer to such a distinction, but. 
it vmuld seem to follow from his discussi.on of the limitations of intel-
lect and the need :for the intellect to unite with imagination to gain 
a complete grasp of reality. S.ee Mens Greatrix, p. 51. 
3. See ibid., p. 50. 
b. A twofold criterion of truth. Templet s criterion of truth 
be.comes. evident at this point and would seem to involve two facets. In 
regard to ·any particular o bj act the mind', apprehends, its truth is 
grasped when the mind discovers· in the opject the same principles op-
erative within itself •. 
When the mind, having apP-rehended the object in all 
its parts, so grasps these as to find the principles 
of its own nature exem:glified inj the object, if: is 
in p~ssession of truth concerning that object. 1 
As a number of interpreters of Temp:I.:e:; haye. ·pointed out, Tem:g:le does 
not make clear how this empha-s-is on the mind t s finding itself in its" 
I 
I 
abject is related to his contention that what the mind knoMs are ob-
jects and not its own ideas. 2 
In order to discern the.se princip;:Les in the object the mind must 
discipl1ne itself so as to concentrate on the object and what can be 
I • 
observed regarding it, as well as refrain from too hasty a formulation 
of the princip:I.:eswhich explain it. The 'philosophic method as a com-
bination of induction and deduction is thus necessary in which o·bser-
vations of the object are·: fitted into- a scheme of interp_reta.tion sug-
' 
gested by the knower who· in turn modifies his scheme in light of the 
' 
demands of the object. Obly by continuatly reformulating one 1 s sys;.. 
tematization based on one's observations ,of the object can the truth 
I 
of the object be obtained. This is so because there is no ~ priori 
1. Nature:, Man and God, P• 166. 
2. See the discussion of this point in Chap. I,and belbw, 
Chap. VII. I 
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scheme of truth in the form of a system of propositions to which one 
can appeal and from which deductions can be made regarding the valid-
ity of particular propositions. Such a scheme of truth is the ideal 
of mathematics and provides absolute cer~ainty but does so at the ex-
pense of relevancy to the actual world characterized by time and change. 
Thus any system of truth relevant to the • real war ld must be built up~-
gradually on the basis of objects of thiS world and even when fully 
formul'ated can only command a high degree of probability. One of the 
illusions of the Cartesian method was its false promise of logical 
I 
certainty in regard to matters of fact. But no such certainty is 
possible-with respect to a world in process.1 
But if this is so, then how can on~ determine the truth of 
i 
_Rropositions about the real world as_. a whole? The second aspect of 
TemJ!le t s criterion of truth operates at ~his point. The mind does 
not merely submit to the object to determine its characteristics; it 
also brings to its observations a standard of its own, and that stand-
ard is the unity of all the data ili a co:P.erent system. In this way 
the mind resists attributing greater significance to one aspect than 
is warranted when the totality of experience is considered. The mind 
thus possesses its own standard of judgment. 
Its standard is that of totality,-the embrace of 
all relevant reality in a comprehensive unity--and 
1. See Nature, Man and God, pp• 84-87, and Mens Creatrix, 
p~. 20. 
by this it must guard i tsel.f from prejudice, from 
inaccuracy, and from acquiescence in partial ap-
prehension.l•. 
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The mind1 s O"W.D: appeal, then, is to coherence. But this cannot be 
-
merely logical consistency or a necessary system of ideas; for what is 
to cohe~e are the obje;ats of the real world apprehended by the mind • 
.An hypothesis interpreting the real world would be held to be true, in 
the sense of a 11igh degree of probability, vfuich best embraces all the 
relevant facts.2 
It is at this point that the distinction is most evident between 
the quest for truth motivated by theoretical as opposed to practical 
interests.· Whereas the practical man is, apt to stop his reflection 
and search for evidence as soon as he comes upon facts which tend to 
support a dogma he already believes, nth~ philosopher is engaged in 
testing that very dogma, not only by the 'intellectual criterion of 
I 
self-consistency, but also by the practical and empirical criterion of 
applicability to the facts. n3 
l. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 166~ 
2. There is a· definite similarity here with the criterion of 
systematic coherence; see Edgar Sheffield Brightman, .ll:iJ. Introduction to 
Philosophy (Rev •. ed.; New York:; Henry Hol~ and Gompany, 1951), pp. 68-73. 
However, Temple refers to an hypothesis embracing the facts; whereas 
Brightman means by coherence that hypothes,is which most adequately ex-
plains all the relevant facts. 
3., Temple, Mens G.reatrix, p. 9. 
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The truth which coheres is not some logical harmony which may be 
equated with the absence of contradiction, ,but whatever harmony the ac-
tual facts ~orarrant. Hence Temple states: nwe begin to give content to 
our principle of coherence; it passes from the mere absence of contra-
diction into the concrete harmony of different elements.n1 
· The ideal of knowledge which governs mathematics, in which one 
starts with self-evident premises and every proposition is related to 
every other in the system by logical necessity, must be replaced by the 
recognition that the areas of knowledge where logical certainty is pos-
Sible are few. Thus what must be sought is a system which enables one 
I 
to distinguish between degrees of probability.2 
Temple presents a cogent argument for accepting as probably true 
that hypothesis which relates most coherently the relevant facts. How-
ever, in his o'Wll evaluation of the adequacy of a philosophy he tends to 
; 
emphasize inner assurance and practical g0idance for living, even if 
a coherent account of the facts is lacking. 
c. The inability of intellect to comprehend reality. The limita-
tion of the intellect taken as one activity of the mind is now apparent. 
This is not to diminish the signii"icance of intellect, for it operates 
at all levels and realms of experience and cannot be excluded from any 
l. Ibid., p. 22. Temple would seem to be purposely distinguish-
ing his view of coherence from the abstract harmony of F. H. Bradley to 
whom Temple refers in Mens Creatrix, pp. 66, 68. 
2.. See Temple, Nature, :Man and God~ p. 84. 
! 
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one:; USo soon as any part o:f experience pecomes matter o:f reflection it 
enters the sphere of intellect, and must be handled by the principles 
o:f intellect.ul The same universality applies to reason. No area o:f 
experience, including religious experience, can arbitrarily be labelled 
11out o:f bounds 11 to reason: IIThere neii:;her is, nor can be, any element 
in human experience which may claim exemption :from examination at the 
bar o:f reason~u2 
Nonetheless, though the intellect,. pervades all of experience, it 
does not in itself encompass all experience. This is illustrated by 
the procedures and goal of science. EVery act of apprehension is ~ 
unity of mental activity, concentrating on the content and neglectipg 
the mental counterpart, thereby :failing to deal 1vith the :full partie-
ularity o:f the facts of experience. 
Scientific truth ••• is a system of contents--or, as we 
may express it, a nexus of relations; but we cannot sup-
pose that Reality is a nexus of relations, for a relation 
at least implies related terms.3 
Truth exhibits the s80le relation with Reality. It is one element 
in reali~y, representing as it does app~ehension of reality and not 
some intermediary bet-ween mind and reaJ.i;ty called idea. But Reality 
includes something besides truth. Thus 1mowledge of Reality must en-
compass more than intellectual activity :with its goal of truth.4 
l;., T.emple, Mens Creatrix, p. 68. 
2.. Temple, ;[ature, Nan and God, p. '17. 
3.. Mens Creatrix, p. 68. 
4.. Truth is conceived as scientific truth here; see ~., p. 50. 
The result is that truth cannot provide the complete system vhich it 
seeks and which would correlate all of' e:xperience into one necessary 
system: 
Truth cannot be a complete. system in itself' because 
it has got to make a complete unity with other modes 
of' p~rsonal life. Here then, as it seems to me, we 
reach an ultimate dualism which scientific thought 
as such cannot solve, but which finds solution when 
thought passes into imagination.l 
The will to know operate·s as an impulse to transcend the par-
ticularity of' the individual 1 s pia.·ce and time in the world so as to 
grasp. the world a:s a whole and thereby discover one •-s place and status 
in it. 2' But on the basis of' intellect alone the whole arrived at iS' 
the physical world on the one hand and a society of' intellects on the. 
other, complementing and correcting one another as ea:ch strives to 
comprehend the world.3 This is so because each mind apgrehends th9.l 
world f'rom its own perspective. Thus, even a. mind which encompasses. 
' 
the whole universe could do so only by f',ocussing the world in terms 
of' its particular historical and geographical location and its indi-
vidual conditioning.4 An individUal can only secure relative independ-
ence of' his environment. Even at the highest levels of' life in the mind 
of' man, the f'actors operating within and without that gave rise to a1 
1. Ibid., p;, 71. 
2. See ibid., pp:• S5, 72, and Nature, Man and God, P• 202. 
3. See Temgle, Mens Oreatrix, p• S6. 
4. See ibid •. , R:<. S2~ 
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particular individual help to determine him and his outlook.l 
d. Beyond intellect in quest of an explanatory concent. Still 
a f'urther difficulty must be noted in man 1;s quest for an adequate under-
standing of the universe. Though the philosopher is obliged to seek the 
most coherent explanation based on all the relevant facts, he shGuld not 
be misled into believing that this task:is ever completed or even entire-
1y possible. The attempt to gather all the relevant facts is itself an 
impossible task, and to think that one has done so is deceiving. The 
philosopher is, therefore, thrown back to his own resources, interests, 
background, training, and personal experience in order to discover what 
appears to him to be an adequate principle of explanation. Though his 
' 
choice of an explanatory concept need not, and indeed should not, be 
arbitrary, neither is it purely rational nor empirical. In regard to 
such ultimate concepts everyone is and can only be an intuitionist. 
I 
That is, when con:fronted with something: held to be of ultimate value, 
one either responds sympathetically to it or he does not. Argument on 
the issue is of no avail. Thus, Temple states: 
The highest good can never be justified. T6 justify is 
to approve as righteous by reference to some external 
standard; righteousness itself, therefore, which consti-
tutes the standard, cannot be justified; we can only 
describe it and ask--Do you lfi:e it or not?,2' 
1. This is consistent with Temple's emphasis on the historical 
method and the necessity for vievr.ing mind in terms of its origin and 
development in the World-Process. ' 
2. Plato and Christianity (London:: Macmillan and Go., Ltd., 1916), 
pp. 71-72; also see ibid., pp. 38-.39,and Nature, Man and God, p. 250. 
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Having decided on some ultimate concept, ,then, the philosopher proceeds: 
to explain all the facts in accordance with that principle and, in turn, 
to justify the particular principle he has chosen on the basis of the 
facts.l Though it seems inconsistent with the inductive-deductive meth-
' 
od Temple has advocated, he does not suggest that the principle employed 
should itself be subjected to critical analysis or the possibility of 
' 
' its·being modified in the process of relating it to the facts. 
Hence, whereas the intellect culmin~tes only in a physical world 
and a society of intellects seeking to comprehend the world, it could 
accept as explanatory of both vJorld and intellect another principle if 
I 
suggested and supported by other activities of the mind, though not it-
self demanding it. The intellect merges ~~th the imaginative activities 
of the mind in this way to arrive at a complete comprehension of reality. 
Herein reside the significance of art, morality, and religion, for they 
may suggest an explanatory concept which encompasses all the activities 
of the mind which the intellect alone could not discover but which it 
can accept S-Dd submit to.2 Partic~arly 1 pertinent in this connection 
is religion, and hence there is a necessity for exploring the relation 
of philosophy and religion. 
1.. Concerning the justification :for using a pregnant metaphor as 
a principle of explanation, see Le\v.iS White Beck, Philosophic Inquiry 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), P~· 247-252. · 
2. Thus for Temple the intellect w9rking alone does not lead to 
a theistic God who is transcendent as well as immanent. But if these 
other activities of the mind lead to the belief that the universe is the 
result of the purpose of a Transcendent Will for the sake of realizing 
value, then the intellect could acknowledge and accept it as completing 
its own demands. See Mens Creatrix, PP• 86-89. 
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C~ Philosophy and Religion 
1. Tensions between Philosophy and Religion 
a. Methodological differences~ Philosophy as the effort of the 
mind of man to comprehend all of experience probes of necessity into the 
articles of faith held by religious people. The primary difference be-
tween philosophy and religion is apparent at this point;. for starting 
from experience as philosophy does, it seeks to formulate a coherent ex-
planation of experience without assuming be£orehand ~hat the nature of 
this explanatory concept must be. Its only assumption is in regard 
I 
to reason 1 s validity to make the quest and, thus, that the ~orld is suf-
ficiently rational to be capable of rational explanation.l 
The existence of God is for philosophy one of the questions at 
issue; and if belief is affirmed, it is as ~he conclusion of an argument •. 
The nature of God in such a case is deter~ed by the demands of the 
argument to explain what can only be explained by reference to him. Thus, 
Temple states: 
If it [i.e., philosophy] reaches a belief in God at all, 
its God is the conclusion of an inf~rential process; His 
nature is conceived in whatever 1.'lay the form of philos-
ophy in question finds necessary in order to make Him the 
solution of its perplexities.2 . 
Temple! s own position is not philosophical in this sense -vlhich he calls 
Scientific Philosophy. Rather, he starts vdth a conception of God and 
seeks to explain the world by reference to it, which is the method of 
1. See Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 2. 
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Theological Philosophy. The implications of this distinction are explored 
in this and the next section. 
What philosophy may reach as a conclusion of a long process of rea-
soning, namely God, becomes for the religious man the basic affirmation 
of his faith and hence the starting point of all his endeavors, theoret-
ical and practical. God is held to exist for such a man:, not because 
philosophical discourse has shown the need to infer his existence to ex-
plain the universe, but because in his own personal experience he has 
felt grasped by the being of God. 
Thus, -whereas philosophy starts with a problem to be explained and 
strives on the bas~s of the most coherent ~terpretation of the facts to 
find a solution, religion begins with the belief that God is adequate to 
solv~ ru1y problems that may arise.l- This methodological difference be-
tween philosophy and religion Temple ~~~izes in the following state-
ment: 
The orimary assura.-r1ees of Religion are the ultimate 
questions of Philosophy. Religion finds its fullest 
expression in absolute surrender to the Object of its 
worship. But the very existence of that Object is a 
main theme of philosophical disputation.2 
b. ggderstanding versus devotion. The difference in method used 
by religion as opposed to that employed by philosophy arises from a still 
more basic difference between the two fields, namely, the different 
1. Temple, Mens Oreatrix, p. 3. 
2. Temple., Nature, Man and God, p. 35. See also Christianity in 
Thought and Practice, p. 2S. 
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attitude or mood which each fosters in its devotees. The aLm of phi-
losophy is to enable people to understand the world; the knowledge it 
seeks is for the purpose of increasing one's understanding. The aim of 
religion is to promote a more intimate fellowship between man and God; 
i 
the knowledge it seeks is for the purpose of improving and assisting 
man in his worship of God. Hence, philosophy and religion are sep-
arated by two contrasting attitudes, one of understanding (philosophy) 
and one of devotion (religion).l 
Thus,though in terms of the conclusion& which philosophy and 
religion might separately reach there is no conflict in principle since 
truth is one and they must ultimately coincide,- it does not follow that 
at any stage in man 1 s apprehension of truth they will, in fact, coincide.2 
Present evidence would suggest quite the opposite. In any case the dif-
ference in the method by 1-rhich the ultimate principles of explanation 
' 
are reached remains different. Philosophy tends to work from the part 
to the whole, or from the outside (the world) toward the center (God); 
~mereas religion works from the whole to the part, or from the center 
outwards~3 
Furthermore, the mood and attitude of the philosopher as opposed 
1. See Temple, ~ature, Man and God, pp. 30, 39. 
2. See. Temple, 1-funs Creatrix, p. 3. 
3.. Temple has employed both methods (up to a point) in separate 
works on philosophy and theology respectively; viz., Mens CT'eatrix and 
Christus Veritas. 
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to the religious believer remain disparate. Though both live by faith, 
their faiths are quite different; for the philosopher lives by faith 
in reason vri.th knovrledge of the world as .his goal. The religious be-
liever lives by faith in God with intimate fello~orship with G0d as his 
goal. For Temple the security man seeks is ultimately rooted in faith, 
not knowledge, whatever path is chosen, and it is won by personal loyal-
ty not by rational discourse; the test of such security resides in the 
experience of life, not in logic~l Hence, though T.emple has given up 
logical certainty as a legitimate goal, he replaces it 1.J:i.th a demand for 
psychological certitude. 
2• Values and Disvalues of the T.l3nsions 
There are, therefore, tensions between philosophy and religion 
which cannot easily be dismissed. SUch tensions can be fruitful for the 
development of each discipline but may also be detrimental to each •. Re-
ligion provides philosophy with some relevant data that should be given 
careful scrutiny, 1-1hile offering hope of rendering the service of ex• 
plaining the nature of the universe. At the same time philosophy serves 
by purging religion of fallacious dogmas too readily accepted on scanty 
evidence and too hastily given universal application. 
Hovrever, religion renders philosophy a disservice when it tries t0 
dictate to philosophy the interpretation it must give to the religious 
data it offers.. In the same way philo~ophy renders religion a 
1. See Temple, Mens Creatrix, p., 4· Once again an affinity with 
Tillich is evident in the latter1 s notion.of verification in terms of 
llefficacy in the life-process of manlcind. 11 See Tillich, Systematic 
Theology, I, 105. 
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disservice if it seeks to shift the nature of an acceptable solution 
from that which increases fellowship with God to vrllat is most reason-
able, independent of God and a relation wit.Ji Him. The significant dif-
ference involved here can be illustrated by reference to the Book of 
Job and the nature of the solution proposed by the author to the prob-
lem of human suffering. The ansvrer provided is not a philosophical ex-
planation of evil in the world but is rather experiential; the solution 
lies in Job 1 s own relation to God. For lfin! his fello-vrship with God he 
has found that nothing matters in compariso:p. -vlith that fellowship. u1. 
The real solution, then, is not an answer at all in the sense of an 
intellectual explanation. This is, in fact, left u.nsol ved. The real 
solution in Job is uthe atta.imnent of a state of mind in which there is 
no desire to ask it. tt2 One might ask Temple -whether or not reasons are 
sought for the truth (or falsity) of the state of mind attained. Other-
~se, how does one know he has not been deceived? 
3. Scientific Philosophy versus Theological Philosophy 
Such tension, Temple contends, necessarily exists between religion 
and philosophy. What is involved can perhaps be ·clarified by distinguish-
ing between two types of philosophy, namely, Scientific Philosophy and 
Theological Philosophy. 
1. T.emple, Nature, 1~ and God, p. 43. see also Qhristianity 
in ~ought and Practice, P• 33. 
2. Nature, ].fan and God, p. 43. 
Religion always proceeds to explain the facts of experience b.r 
reference to its assurance of God and the fellowship-, shared with God; 
whereas 1 philosophy proceeds by inquiring into the data of experience, 
seeking to derive an explanation on the basis of them. The latter 
procedure· tends to foster the scientific explanation in which the 
higher is always explained by reference to the lower. This approach 
Temlfi-e ca:lls Scientific Philosophy and signifies "any philosophy which 
takes its start from the departmental sciences, ra.riging .from Physics 
to Epistemology or Ethics, as distinct from a philosophy which takes 
its start from the deliverances of religious e-xperience as formulated"\ 
by Theology •. nl To seek to a:ccount for the facts of experience b.r 
referena:e to· the nature of a Suprelll.e S":gi.rit held to exist, UP.on whom 
the inq~irer recognizes his dependence and with whom he maintains 
fellowship' is to p}!Irsue what Temple. calls Theological Philosophy. 
He acknowledges that it is for him the only a:p:proa:ch that can hope to 
be adequate. 2' 
Some reconciliation, however, between the two ap;Rroache·s can be 
sugge·sted at least in principle. The· effort must be made to separate: 
1. ~~, p,•· 44, n. 1.. For Temple tension between religion and 
philosophy would remain even if all the departments of philosophy were 
combined, including philosophy of religion, in an effort to. comprehend 
reality.; This is the case with metaphysics since it is still not the 
standRDint o.f a religious believer who starts with God. 
2. s-ee ibid. , P•· 44, and Ghristiani ty in Thought and Practice, 
P.P.• 32-34· The full significance of this acknowledgement for Templet s 
conception of p]lilosophy is explored in the next section. 
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the chaf'f from the wheat in regard to the doctrines of religion. VJhat 
is truly central to religious belief needs to be distinguished from 
. ' 
what is merely incidental. MOst important, those doctrines ~mich are 
held because of personal sentiment, but which have negligible spiritual 
value and have scientific evidence agains-t{ them, must be discarded. 
Scientific Philosophy must also make some concessions in bepalf 
of reconciliation with religion. Primary•here is the recognition that 
while it has the right to use the lower categories of experience to ex-
plain the higher, it does not have the right to deny the application of 
the higher by other disciplines. A corollary to this would be that 
science recognize that there are areas of • experience where its own math-
od is inapplicable arid that one of these, namely the realm of personal 
relations, is that which best exemplifies the type of experience with 
which religion deals. Is not the conception of a philosophic method 
already noted adequate to this task? The problem may be due to Temple 1 s 
narrow conception of SGientific Philosophy for which the only alternative 
is Theological Philosophy. 
To tL~derstand another person one must become related to that 
person and, indeed, assume an attitude of ~pathetic understanding.l. 
In these relations between human beings bound together by intimate ties 
of friendship and love are to be found the closest analogies to -vrhat the 
religious believer experiences in his relation to God. Thus, to under-
stand religion and what its devotees experience one should not look to 
1. SUch a relationship has been made famous by Martin Bubar in 
his I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor S:!hith (Edinburgh: T. & T; Clark, 1937). 
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astronomy or mathematics, for nthe heart of religion is not an opinion 
about God such as PhilosoP..by might reach as the conclusion of its argu-
ment; it is a-personal relationship-with'God.nl 
Tensions between P.hilosopby and religion do exist and should con-
tinue to exist, for they are inseparable from the tasks each has to 
fulfill and the attitude and method each employs. The tensions could 
be overcome only by a capitulation by one to the demands of the other, 
resulting in the assimilation of philosophy by religion, or religion 
by p_hilosopey. 2 
D. Conclusion; A Christian Philosophy 
1.. The Need of P..hlloso_2hy for Religion 
Throughout the dis cuss i0n of T.emp1e 1 s conception of philosophy it 
has become apparent that the aim of philosophy to-render a coherent ac-
count of all. of experience caimot be fulfilled. Particular philosophic 
disciP.liine's· (e.g., ethics and philosopp.y of religion) promise a: unity 
and fulfillment which cannot be satisfied. Even all of the departments 
of philosophy joined together by the metaphysician in an attempt to com-
prehend reality falls short of comp:Lete' intellectual satisfaction. The 
knowledge venture, thus, when pursued under the impetus of the theoret-
ica:l will to know, leads only to a society of intellects united together 
to correct and supplement e&eh other's apprehension of reality. But no 
assurance is given that the knowledge gained is fully accurate; nor is 
l. Nature, Man and God, P• 54· 2. See ibid., P• 9;:5. 
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a principle o~ unity produced such as each demands. A sceptic can still 
contend that this supposedly coherent acco~t provided by a combining 
o~ all the minds and ~ields o~ endeavor is a delusion since it ~alls 
short o~ certainty. 
The very necessity ~or philosophy to weigh all the evidence, 
balancing one area o~ e~~erience with another renders impossible the 
attaining o~ theoretical certainty vdth re~d to experience as a whele.l 
~hus, as with all inductive methods, the co~clusions reached remain ten-
tative and subject to revision. 
Frustrated at every turn to discover a fully adequate principle 
of explanation to account ~or an ordered universe and ~~icient to 
satisfy the mindts demand ~or coherence, the philosopher ~inds both the 
need and justi~ication to turn to religion. For in man's religious con-
I 
sciousness o~ a Supreme Spirit whose will controls the universe ~or the 
sake o~ .gq9d: ."au .. hypothesis is o~~ered which meets the requirements •. 2 
The GOd o~ religion supplies the lack philosophy exhibits. 
BUt ~or the philosopher to accept belie~ in GOd as an hypothesis 
which best explains the ~acts is to develop a philosophy o~ theism in 
which God is and can onJ::y be an hypothesis subject to the abundance (or 
its lack) o~ evidence in ~avor o~ the hypot~esis. In such a case the 
1. See Temple, The Universality o~ Christ (London: Student Chris~ 
tian Movement, 1921), PP• 44-45. 
2.. see Temple, Mens. Creatrix, P• 259. This is not intended to 
represent Temple's argument ~or God which is presented in Chap •. VI o~ the 
present study. . A"t this point the concern is to indicate how and why the 
philosopher can make use o~ the concept o~ God. 
102 
philosopher may decide on the basis o$ the evidence as well as on prac-
tical grounds that though the existence of God cannot be proved phil-
osophically, he vdll nevertheless accept God and act on that basis. With 
theoretical certainty lacking, such a ,con~lusion is quite rational and 
justified. Blit what needs to be emphasized is that as a philosopher one 
is committed to accept only what is established as being probably true 
by the greatest amount of evidence in its favor. Philosophy must, 
I 
therefore, be unrelenting and even ruthless in criticizing all beliefs 
which assert more than the evidence 1~rants. 
Is philosophical theism adequate? Does it provide the principle 
of unity and practical guidance that a satisfactory explanation of the 
world and man1:s place in the world require?_ It certainly is more phil-
osophically sound than >vhen the attempt is made to explain the universe 
apart from any reference to something beyond man. BUt religion rooted 
in and tested by huma..11 experience and a philosophy taking its cue from 
religion are still incomplete~l Human ,religion, conceived as one ac-
tivity of the mind, aspires after a Mfillment in an object worthy of 
love and devotion and upon whom the entire world is held to depend. But 
an hypothesis that God sustains the unity of the world, though intel-
ligible, remains inconclusive on the basis of philosophical speculation 
alone. Taken by itself religious experience may be doubted as lacking 
I 
authenticity. G:0d is subject to the uncertainties of inference and thus 
1. see ibid., p. 259. By religion is meant, in this context, to 
convey what is usually referred to as philosophy of religion; see ill£, •. , 
PP• 352-354. 
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cannot provide the assurance and guidance life commands. He too can 
be· doubted; chance may rule the world. Indeed, when one considers the 
evil evident in a world supposed to be operated by a Supreme Will for 
the sake of good, it is difficult to avoid scepticism; and the entire 
intellectual structure of' a philoso:Qby of theism crumbles under the 
weight of' this contrary fact. Something more is needed; something 
personal and particular so as to be capable of providing individual 
assurance and specific guidance, but at the· same time universal so as 
to illuminate the entire World-Process. 
Thus, Te~le forsakes the ppilosophical ideal of' discovering an 
adequate principle of explanation of the Universe on the basis of an 
empirical investigation of experience. The demand for a coherent a:c-
' 
count of the facts is replaced by the demand for practical guidance in 
living; likewise, thecdemand f'or logical certainty has been relinquished, 
only to be replaced by the demand for inward religious certitude. In 
this way Temple makes a shift from the.< approach of philosophy to the de-
liverances of religion, from the conclusions of a philosophical theism 
to the commitments of the Christian faith without justifying adequately 
the transition and, apparently, without being aware of the ambiguities 
involved. 
2. The Christian Faith as Supplying the Need 
Where, then, is the ppilosopher to turn f'or a clue to the complete-
ness life demands and for which philosophy yearns but cannot provide? 
The alternative is not a partial turning to religious data::- interpreted 
by the philosopher, but a complete surrender. The philosopher must place 
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his tools at the disposal o:f religion, and :for Temple this means to the 
service o:f the Christian Faith. 
A.philosophy :founded on general religious principles though :formal-
ly correct :fails to supply sufficient content to deal with the partie-
ularity o:f actual living involving both good and evil. To procure such 
guidance philosophic theism must become Christian philosophy. 
A vague theism is futile. Tlie cutting edge o.:f 
:faith is due to its definiteness. The kind o.:f 
dei:ty established (if any is at all) by the various 
lfproo:fstl-ontological, cosmological and the like-
is completely insufficient; it is usually little 
else than the rationality o:f the world presupposed 
in all argument about the vrorld. The Christian has 
made a decision :for God ~ofno has spoken-in nature, 
in history, in prophets, in Ohrist.l 
How.: can the Christian philosopher hope to succeed where so many 
others have failedZ' The answer lies in the intimate relation with life 
itself, in the practical guidance and historical specificity o:f the 
Christian :faith •. No mere :formal solution is provided :for the perple:K-
ities o:f life, but a concrete :faith rooted in specific events o.:f an 
historical :figure •. The intimacy 1dth life' that philosophy lacks and 
which thereby hinders it :from providing the guidance and assurance need-
ed .:for daily life is dramatically demonstrated in the life o:f love Ghrist 
lived and :for which he died. When these events are viewed as revealing 
God t s loving purpose :for man and the world, a m~taphysics is evident. 
1. William Temple, nwnat Christians Stand :for in the Secular 
World, u reprinted in William Temple, Religious Exoerience and other 
Essays and Aa.dresses, collected and ed. with an introduction by 1!.. E. 
Bru(er (London: James Clarke & Go., Ltd., 1958); p. 2~~. 
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For if the universe represents the purpose or expression of goodness.· 
of a Supreme Spirit whose essence is sacrificial love, then man who 
understands and ff.YIDpathizes with such a purpose is satisfied.1 Thus 
what man by reason could not achieve is discovered by faith to be 
revealed in the person of Christ: 
Though from the point of view of human science the 
dogma of the Incarnation is mere hypothesis, yet it is an 
hypothesis which explains all the :facts, and there is no 
other such forthcoming. Reason cannot prove it; we live 
by faith and not by demonstrative knowledge; but Reason 
welcomes it as the needed completion of its own work.2 
When such a stande toward the world and its explanation is taken, 
then scientific philosophy, or even philosophy conceived in its broad-
est sense as metaphysics is replaced by theological philosophy, indeed 
by Christian philosophy. The presence of ,evil in the "WOrld is resolved 
when one sees in the life, death, and resurrection of Ghrist the s~c­
rificial love of God, taking the evil of the world on Himself so as to 
serve as the dramatic and actualized event which can elicit from man 
the love he needs to win him to goodness•3 The tentativeness of a phil-
osophical explanation of evil in the world is replaced by the certainty 
of GOd's love as experienced in fellowship with Him.4 Herein lies one 
1. Bee Temple, Nature, lVJan and God, p. 219; also see Christianity 
in Thought and Pract,ice, PP• 62-64. 
2. Temple, Mens Greatrix, p. 253. 
3. See Mens Creatrix, pp. 290-292. 
4. See Temple, Nature, Man and God., P• 43 •. 
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of the significant differences between philosophical theism and a Cpris·,,..... 
-eian philosophy. 
3. The Justification of Christian Philosophy 
Hence, Temple ''s conception of philosophy is put at the disposal of 
his own mission as a Christian so as to make him a Christian philosopher. 
The justification for this approach has in part already been noted by 
the failure of philosophy to provide the completely coherent system which 
the intellect seeks, and by the fact that an individual, even a philos-
opher, cannot transcend his particular culture and heritage to survey 
all time and existence. li.~ totally impartial evaluation of all the facts · 
is not possible even if all the facts could be gathered. Indeed, the 
facts can only be understood in light of a theory which provides a 
frame of reference for interpreting them. · The mind itself, rooted as it 
is in the evolution of the species in the organism's response to its 
environment, and though at the highest levels able to transcend partially 
its limited vis~on, can never fully escape. from the factors which condi-
tion it. 
Nor is sufficient emancipation provided if God is accepted as the 
legitimate conclusion of a philosophical argument. But the situation is 
significantly altered if one starts •vith the assurance of God as the Su-
preme Spirit and strives to explain everything from the vantage point of 
fellowship 1vith Him.l Thus, the tensions between philosophy and religion 
noted in the previous section are temporarily resolved by the 
l. Bee ibid., P• 44. 
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capitulation of philosophy to religion. Temple acknowledges that there 
are dangers involved in this approach and notes that if fantasies are 
to be avoided, then Theological Philosophy must be 11constantly checked 
by a purely critical Philosophy which makes its approach from the other 
end. 11:r. This is a noteworthy aim.~ but one >Vb.ich is not actually carried 
out by Temple. At no crucial point (e.g .• , the problem of evil) does he, 
in fact, check the deliverances of Theological Philosophy against the 
conclusions of critical Philosophy. 
Thus, the Christian philosopher begins his quest for a comprehen-
sion of reality from the perspective of the Christian faith. He strives 
to apply the principles of Christianity to the problems of life and to 
see if insight into them and guidance for living in reference to them 
are provided. If insight and guidance follow from the application, then 
the principles are vindicated. Tf:tough the principles of the Christian 
faith are not completely vindicated, all problems yield to its insights; 
and thd.s justifies employing the Christian faith and following it 1-Jher-
ever it leads •. When the philosopher st~rts with the Christian faith~ 
he is able to offer a more comprehensive syst~m of explanation·for the 
universe. TG this extent, then~ the Christian faith is philosophically 
superior to all other alternatiyes which proceed without giving priority 
to it. Hence, though the granting of priority to the Christian faith 
and thereby the assumption of its authenticity from the start is less.~ 
sound than the :m.inimal assumptions of philosophy in beginning its quest~ 
l. 1.12i9.· 
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the gre~ber comprehensiveness of the solution which the Christian faith 
provides justifies the initial assumption.,l 
Therefore, Temple concludes, as tempting as theoretical certainty 
would be when based on a completely comprehensive philosophic world-
view, it must be relinquished as impossible of achievement and replaced 
by the more modest but fully adequate practical as~arance which a Chris~~ 
iii:an philosophy affords. 
IVJ:i.ile I recognize that there would be an intellectual 
attractiveness about the completely comprehensive scheme 
worked out on scientific lines alone, I entirely despair 
of anyth:Ll'lg of the sort being produced; while on the other 
hand it seems to me that we have actual ground in the work 
of theological philosophers of the present time [i.e., 
1936] for .hoping that a Christian philosophy can- be offered 
viliich does for us the practical s~rvice of which I have 
spoken.2 
Temple seems unduly concerned about the priority he grants to the 
Christian faith, but insufficiently concerned about how he makes use 
of the priority ~omen it is granted. ']b.at is, the philosopher need have 
no qualm about granting such priority so long as it is vindicated by 
offering a coherent account of experience, and so long as the original 
assumptions are modified in accordance with the facts as both emerge in 
the process. SUch a procedure 1<10uld be in accord with Temple 1 s dia-
lectical method. But when a body of doctrine is assumed to constitute 
the Christian faith Which does not itself undergo critical evaluation 
a."Tl.d modification, then this is not philosophically justified and is 
. 1. see Temple, Christianity in Th~ught and Practice, pp. 32-34. 
2~ ~., P• 34. 
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inconsistent with the philosophical method Temple advocates •. Hence, 
insofar as Temple 1 s method is to accept certain doctrines of the Chris-
tian faith as final without subjecting them to modification even when the 
facts of experience require modification, then he departs from the role 
of philosopher (including that of the Christian philosopher) and takes 
up the cudgels on behalf of Christian apologetics.l 
1. There is, :perhaps, significance in the fact that Temple calls 
his app~oach Theological Philosophy as opposed to Philosophical Theology, 
as expolinded by F. R. Tennant. 
CH.APTER III 
TEMPLE'S CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY 
The aim of this chapter is to expound the status of personality 
in the World-Pxocess~ to analyze the conception of personality, and 
to explore the various facets in "rhich the concept of personality is 
operative in the thought of William. Temple.. TJ:':ms, in many ways this 
chapter presents in survey fashion what is taken up in detail in the 
succeeding chapters. However, this chapter also aims to present the 
main dimensions of personality according to Temple. 
A~ Process and Personality 
The structure of reality exhibits various levels or grades, of 
1ib.ich personality is, for T.emple, the highest. In light of this it 
is germane to examine these levels as they have emerged in the World-
Pxocess before exploring the main dimensions of personality. 
1. The Temporal Priority of Matter 
Any attempt to understand the universe must recognize the signif-
icance of two facts: first is the fact that man is capable of apprehend-
ing the -vrorld; second, man himself arose within the World-Process and, 
hence, the physical order existed prior to anyone 1 s apprehension of 
it.l These two facts must constantly be kept in mihd. The danger of 
1. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, pp. 111, 217~ 
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lll 
any interpretation of the universe is to emphasize one of them to the 
exclusion of the other, resulting in either Idealism or Materialism.l 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that when man 
strives to understand the process of which he is a part, he begins 
with both facts already accomplished and thus he is not able to observe 
the process by which the one led to the other. FUrthermore, as po-
tential knower, man is inclined to choose as a starting place himself 
isolated from the rest of the ~rmrld and to build up his knowledge of 
everything else on the basis of his ideas as if they were separated 
from the world. This was the error of Descartes and leads nowhere. 
A·. clue to the procedure to be follm.Jed is to be found in the view 
which science presents of a material order existing and changing long 
before man came on the scene. Here the proper perspective for under-
standmg all that the processes of physical change have produced a.'ld 
the logical place to initiate an inquiry into the World-Process are 
both provided: 
For we start with the picture which Science gives 
us of a world undergoing modification through the 
interact~on of its constituent parts while as yet 
there is, apparently, no mind within it to observe 
its process .. 2 
The temporal priol~ity of the physical world, or of matter, must 
be acknowledged. In this sense every ·philosophy is materialistic. 
Fttrthermore, this fact of the priority of matter in time is significant 
for an understanding of all that follows. It mea.'ls that matter is the 
1. See ~·, PP• 475-477 • 2... Ibid., p. 198'. 
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necessary condition for everything else~ though it does not follow that 
it is the sufficient cause. Further, what emerges is related to that 
.from -vmich it arose; and since matter is temporally first, this means 
matter is basic to everything else. Matter is, therefore, real what-
ever else may be discovered about its ultimate status. Finally, it 
signifies that there is continuity in the world, and the differences 
which are evident stand in causal ~onnection to one another.l 
2. The Levels of Reality: Matter, Life~ Mind, Spirit 
Matter is the necessary condition o.f everything in the universe, 
even as it is temporally prior to all that appears. BUt matter is 
not all that has appeared. other levels of reality are also evident 
which are not reducible to matter, though not conceivable in human ex-
perience apart from matter. 
Four such levels may be notefu. Matter~ Life, Mind, and Spirit • 
.All of these strata occur within the World-Process; each is, in fact, 
one episode in that process:• As such, to refer to .four levels is mis-
leading in that it suggests discontinuity in what appears as a contin-
uous process. Nonetheless, distinctions can and must be made even 
though they should not be taken as precise lines of demarcation in the 
process itself but as abstractions within the process as a whole~2 But 
1. See ibid.~ PP• $7-$B, 490-491. 
2. See T,emple, Cbristus Veritas, p. 5. The primary sources for 
.for this section are 11Symbolism as a :Metaphysical Principle, n reprinted 
in Religious Experience ••• ; Chap. I of Christus Veritas; Lecture 
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if the distinctions which do occur are not to be blurred, then it is 
necessary to note each level and the characteristics each exhibits. 
Matter, representing the so-called inorganic realm, is character-
ized by action and reaction of chemical and physical elements with one 
another.l This is the realm of the material universe and operates 
under the impetus of efficient causation. Liittle if any initiative 
other than the resistance offered due to inertia is evident at this· 
level. 2 What occurs can be accounted for on the ba'Sis of stimulus-
response in light of' the components of each chemical compound or 
physical entity. 
It should be noted at this point that Temple is neither explicit 
nor consistent in his interpretation of matter. He does refer to the 
changed view of the atom. The older view held that the atom consisted 
of tiny, irreducible particles; whereas according to the newer view, 
it consis~s ltof' revolving centres of electrical force-a kind of minute 
solar system. n3 At times-particularly in Nature, Man and GQd-the term 
process is employed in a way which almost replaces matter. Process~ 
signifies the more dynamic view of the material world exhibiting con-
tinuous change and givri_ng rise to new entities related, but not 
XIX of Nature. Nan and GQd •. k.K. Baker in William Templet s Teaching 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1951), ~· 52, attributes this 
conception of the universe to the influence of 8amuel Alexander. 
1. S.ee Ghristus Veritas, p. 4. 
2. See:·Nature, Man and Gri>d, pp. 478, 489~ 
3. Nature of' Personality, p. :x:v-. 
reducible, to previously existing entities.1 However, Temple continue~ 
to refer to matter at other times as inert, unconscious Hstuff,n or 
even as.ndead matter.n2 It is this latter view: of matter which seems 
to be employed at this point since it is the inertia of matter affi 
contrasted with life that is emphasized. 
At the level of Life a different principle reigns, for the organism 
acts as a whole and, though analyzable into physical components and 
chemical elements, these parts must be understood in terms of their 
relation to the viliole organism. Further, vath life self-movement is 
evident that is more than mere inertia. Though the power of self-
motion is only explicit at the animal level, the beginnings of motion 
are evident in the vegetable world:· 
As we pass from the purely physical and chemical 
world to the vegetable world, we find the begin-
nings of self-motion in the phenomenon of grovrth. 
There is in the vegetable a princip1e which deter-
mines its reaction to enviromnent, so that from 
the same soil and the same water two plants draw 
the nourishment of quite different forms of 
foliage and the like.3 
What has occurred up to this point in the world was due to an 
external stimulus producing a corresponding reaction in another 
1. A. critical discussion of Temple 1 s views of matter is presented 
by William D. Geoghegan in Platonism in Recent Religious TI1ought, 
PP• 94-95, 105-106. 
2. Temple, 11Some Implications of Theismrt in .J. H. Muirhead ( ed.), 
Contemporary British Philosophy (New York:: The Macmillan Company, 1924), 
I, 426. 
3. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 51. 
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objea:t. Movement in this sense can be described as a push from 
behind. But with life there is direction from within the organism 
tov1ard something outside. There is movement which can best be 
described as pull from in front, or attraction towards. With life 
occurs determination by attraction, then, and not simply efficient 
t . l causa ~on. 
The p~incipleo of self-direc...tion based: on needs of the organism 
as a whole takes,, on an additional quality when Mind appears:- in the:, 
development of organic life. The responsiveness· of the organism to 
its environment for the sake of fostering adjustment to it· is the 
occasion for the appearance of Mind. ~~d is the extension of this 
process. But, Mind enhances self-direction by enabling the organism 
to envisage various means toward the end of adjustment and to select 
among the alternatives those means most appropriate to the desire~ 
end. 2 
Mind ~oras, -when it f'irst emerged, restricted to the demands of the 
organism to survive. It was limited in ;its apprehension to -vThat was 
directly available in the environment which corresponded to the. 
organisml's needs, and the power of' selection was confined to the actual 
alten1atives it directly encountered. Gradually, however, as life 
developed, Mind was freed f'rom seeking means to the end of' survival 
only and developed a life of its O\olll by which it considered alternatives· 
1. See~ Nature, Han and God, p •. 478. 
2. See ibid., p •. 492. 
and courses of' action not immediately concerned 1vi th adjustment. 
In this -vray Mind produced ideas which do not directly refer to any 
object in the environment but to a possible end that might be attained. 
To percepts are added concepts, or t1free ·ideas. ul 
When the direction of' the organism is ·in terms of' some object 
in the future which it conceives to be good, then the level of Spirit 
has been reached. The distinctive characteristic of' Sp:Lrit is in the 
direction it provide's for the sake of a felt obligation 1-Jhich at its·. 
highest finds fulfillment in the fellowship of' shared love. 2 
3.. The Supremacy of Spirit 
An analysis of' the s·Gructure of' the world thus reveals that 
Matter is prior in point of' time to everything else but that other 
levels do appear. Further.more, when these levels do emerge, each 
one exercisesJsome control over the one before it. The living organ-
ism ma.kes:..~use of' the chemical and physical elements composing it for 
the sake of its o-vm total adjustment a~d then develops a life of it$ 
own. Finally, with the :emergence of Spirit the initiative of the 
organism becomes most complete, and the direction it seeks is for the 
Sru(e of a good it envisages~ 
The conclusion to be dra\{.U from this twofold relation between 
the lower and the higher is that while the•lower is the necessary 
l. See ibid., pp. 202, 212, 492. 
2. See Christus Veritas, p. 5. 
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instrument for the realization of the higher, the lower finds its 
fulfillment in the higher. Thus, Spirit, though last in temporal 
sequence, is first in terms of significance; and Matter, though 
temporally prior, is of least significance. Matter is the necessary 
means to the end which is Spirit, but it is only a means. Spirit, 
dependent on Matter, is nevertheless supre~e over it. 
The morlern scientific view affords an apprehension 
of the world as existing in a series of strata, of 
such sort that the lower is necessary to the actu-
ality o£. the higher but only finds. its own fullness 
of being when thus used by the higher as its means 
of self-actualisation~ Without the mechanical basis 
in matter, there could be no life of the kind that 
we know. Without living matter-bodily organisms--
mind, as we know it, does not arise. Without animal 
mind (seeking means to an end presented as good) 
there could be no spirit such as we know (choosing 
between ends by reference to an ideal standard of 
good}.l . 
The full significance of Mind as an occurrence in the process is 
now apparent. When once it appears, it alters the entire·~ course of 
the process, for something has been produced which doe:s:. not merely 
respond to other parts of the process as dete~ined by its comRnnent 
parts, outside stimulus, or mere adjustment to the environment. 
Instead, Mind initiate:s' activity, making use of what is availablel for 
the sake of its own ends and even of ends which arffinot yet evident 
but which ar~ ideals it has pDsited. It is this fact of control over 
the organism and environment which entitle:s Mind, when it attains the 
level of S:girit, to its supremacy. 
1. Tem:gl.e, Nature, Man and God, PP•· 474-475. See also Christus 
Veritas:, pp. 5-6. 
SO soon as the distinctive nature of.mind is admitted, 
nothing can check its predominance, just because it is 
moved from vrithin by appreciation of apparent good (its 
ovm self or kin presented to it from without) and not 
only from without by conquest of its inertia.l 
liB 
Herein is revealed the essential difference between Matter and 
Mind (or Spirit). It is the difference between a response to stimuli 
by an object to 1vhich the object contributes only inertia and the 
response of an organism Hhich itself initiates the action taken for 
the sake of a desired good.2 
Thus, though the starting place is the materialism science 
conveys, the conclusion is a rejection of materialism as inadequate 
to account for Mind and Spirit in their supremacy over Matter and Lif'e. 
But Idealism is equally false since the apprehension of a mind cannot 
be separated from the process it apprehends arid from which it arose. 
The activity of mind is part of the World~Proeess, and a rudimentary 
consciousness is evident in the organismts response to its environ-
ment for the sake of adjusting'to it. l~ntal states are, therefore, 
in13epa:rable from the objects of the enviro:nment which· compose these 
states.3 
The alternative to both Materialism and Idealism is to join 
Maditer and Mind without blurring ·the distinctive characteristics of 
each. }~tter is real but secondarY; it is the me~~s for the 
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 488. 
2.. 8ee ibid., P• 489. 
3. See ~., PP• 201, $7-490. 
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realization of' Spirit which is supreme. Thus, while an identity of' Mat-
ter and Mind must be rejected, a unity of' the two must be affirmed. 
ML11d does not exist as far as human experience is concerned apart from 
Matter; though when mind existsJ it exercises control over Matter. 
The expression of' spirituality, therefore, entails not the denial .of' 
the material but control over it. 
For as it is true that matter is the necessaEY 
condition for the actuality of' life and th;s also of' 
spirit, so also is it true that, in our experience 
at least, soirit arises within and as part of an 
organism which is also material, and expresses its 
api±i tuali tyi not by ignoring matter but by con-:-
trolling it. 
The emphasis on control of' ~~tter by Spirit seems to be Temple 1 s 
essential point. However, what is not clear is the precise relation 
of' Matter and Mind in a way >-rhich does not eliminate either one and 
which does not identify them. This ambiguity becomes especially evi-
dent in Temple's discussion of' the relation of matter and mind in man. 
4. Man as a Psycho-physical Organism 
The unity-in-diversity of' Matter, Life, Mind, and Spirit provides 
the clue for an adequate understanding of' man. In man all the levels 
of reality are present as a unity in one composite being. It is for 
this. reason that man is taken to be the fullest expression of reality 
yet attained in the evolutionary process. 
In our bodies we belong to the physical, chemical, 
vegetable, and animal worlds; these bodies are largely 
directed by our minds or intelligences; our minds 
are capable of being directed by spirit, 
l. Ibid., P• 477. 
or, in other woTds::, of exert~g themsel ve:s in 
the fulfilment of oblig&tion. 
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Man is thus a~psycha•physi~ 0rganism; he is a combination of 
matter and miild united in a living organism. Man too- is continuous 
with the entire) ~lorld-Proce:ss from which he emerged. Consciousness 
in man, though far removed from its rudilllenta:ry countergart as:; mere 
res:g.onse to the environment, is nonethele:ss one with man's totaill. 
nature-. Consciousne·ss in man is the P.Sycho~_ghysicall. unity' which 
constitute:s; man a:s1 an organism •. 
l:tf consciousness is no.t something els·e within the 
entir~organism which is mocself, taking note of the 
relations of that organism to its environment; my 
consciousness is itself that organism. being not 
only ph.ys:iC8il.. but psych~physicrol, ffS related to its 
environment, namely to the universe of which it is a 
part, though as the.spiritual elements in the organ-
ism become predominant, the concomitant pbysicail. re-
lations become relatively less important and may 
finally drop-away.2 
a•· Mind and body as~ organically one. In this way is resolved the 
p_er.Q:Lexing mind-body problem which has plagued ,2hilosophy for so long. 
Mind and body are not two separate entities which interact with one 
another; nor are they two separate but parallel series in·which simul-
taneous events occur. The mind and body are one, for man is a _Qsycho-
ppysical organism. The direction the organism takes is provided qy 
non-physical activity but operates through a physical organism. Mind 
is thus the principle of control, and the body is the medium through 
1. TemW.e, Christus Veritas; p·. 49. 
2. Temp-le, Nature, Man and God, p. 487. 
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which it executes its p1ans:· "Where mind is £ound, it is £ound as 
potentially, and always in some degree actually, the principle o£ 
unity o£ that through which it is active. nl 
Bony and mind are not, however, to be viewed as two distinct 
entities, one physical and the other mental; they are organically one. 
Further, no transition o£ a p-lan o£ action envisaged by the mind and 
communicated to the body £or execution is discernible. The will to 
move-- some part o£ the :body is to act in a way that re:sults in the 
movement. 
There·is no trace.o£ a causal transition, a-s; 
though will moved the limbs as the cue moves 
the billiard-ball--by impact. In a healthy or-
ganism the movement is the bodily expression of 
the volition. The two, though distinguis~ple, 
are inseparable; they are organically one. · 
The mind, then, provides the unity and direction for the organ-
is.m as a whole·; for mind and body are one and to the extent that mind 
is active it is dominant:: ''Where Mind is actively present with Body at 
all Mind and Body are one thing, o£ which the dominant character is 
Mind so far as Mind is active. 113 
It is ~uestionable whether Temgie has done any more than rephrase 
the mind-body problem. The fundamental issue which is not answered is 
the relation of the non-physica31. activity of the mind to the physical. 
activity of the body. Furthermore, he refers to mind and body as organ-
ically one, though the mind is dominant~ But, can a single organism be 
1. Ibid., P•· 201. 2. Ibid., P• 200. 
3. Ibid. , P:• 201. 
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upresent withn or "dominanttt over itself? 
b. The unitv and identity of the self. The problem of the unity 
and identity of the self may also be solved along these same lines. 
Manrs unity is at first formal only~ rooted as it is in the numerical 
identity of the individual as distinct from everything else; but also 
from the start the self is a conscious flowing stream. of diverse ac-
tivities and contents.l The soul-substance view is rejected in which 
an underlying ego is posited as the ground for the unity and diversity 
experienced on the conscious level. The identity of the self persists 
in and through change, and there is no other self: 
The self is the self-conscious system of experience. 
• .. .•. k cha.11.ge in my experience is a change in me; but 
this does not destroy my personal identity, because 
this consists in continuity of grm~rth and not im-
mutability.2 
Hence the unity which is the self consists in the total psychic. 
life of the individual. Three distinct ways in which this unity is 
revealed may be noted. First is the unity provided by the physical 
organism itself. The bodily organism, though a part of the physical 
order, is also distinct from it and serves as the particular medium 
through which the self is expressed. As an organism it operates as 
1. see Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 65 •. 
2. ~., pp. 65-66. There is an affinity here with the Person-
alistic position referred to as self-psychology. SSe Brightman, 
Introduction to Philosoohy, pp.. 202-211. However, Temple includes 
bodily activity within the unity and identity of the self, and Bright-
man does not. The distinction involved is explored more fUlly below; 
see Chap. VII. 
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a -whole; and though bodily parts change, there is continuity and iden-
tity of the body as a physiological organism~l 
A second unity is evident in conscious experience which consti tute:s 
a linity of activities so that certain objects are selected ru1d atten-
tion fixed on them to the exclusion of others. This unity of the self 
is incomplete, for many impulses from within and stimuli from without 
seek to dominate the activities of the conscious self •. 
A potential third unity, however, is evident at this point vrhen 
the self achieves a harmony of interests as a result of integrating its 
activities and impulses in the service of a purpose which it seeks to 
fulfill. The personal unity of the self which is only potential at 
the start is then realized.2 Temple swa~arizes the threefold unity 
which constitutes the person: 
So a man is one person partly because his body is one, partly 
because his t1soul 11 is a distinguishable group of psychic 
forces which can only be all active so far as they combine, 
but most of all because there is possible for him a unity 
which it is his life 1 s business to achieve. In achieving 
it he reveals the full nature, not only of his psychic 
endowment, but also of the bodily organism which is its 
physical basis.3 
5.. Man as a Personal Being. 
When man attains the full unity of which he is capable, the dis-
tinctive traits of a personal being or of personality become evident .. 
l. Bee Temple, Christus Veritas, PP• 64, 67. 
2. The integration of the varied activities of the self under the 
guidance of a purpose also reveals true freedom. Tr-is is developed in 
the sections below. 
3. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 6S. 
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Matter, life, mind, and spirit have been united together so as to act 
as one entity under the supervision of spirit but by means of the 
activities of mind and through the physical elements composing the 
body (matter and life). The function of mind is no longer merely that 
of responding to the environment for the sake of adjustment only. The 
rrd_~d itself initiates activities of its own and even uses the environ-
ment for its own ends such as a goal it envisages in the future toward 
which it directs the organism. 
The significance of this capacity of the mind to escape partially 
from the bondage of its particular location in space and time needs to 
be noted further. 1 The entire knowledge venture is made possible in 
this way, but also, an insight into the process itself is gained in the 
capacity of the mind to form tlfree ideas. 11 The mind is enabled, by 
projecting itself beyond the fleeting moment, to detach itself from the 
successiveness of the temporal ,process. The present moment i·rhich the 
mind experiences is not some hypothetical mid~point between the past 
and the future; it is itself a time-span. Arising as the mind does 
out of the flux which constitutes the World-Process, the mind is a con-
sciousness of that process. And at any particular time-span this means 
a consciousness of a portion of that process: tiThe present is so much 
of the empirical process as is immediately apprehended.tt2 
The mind1 s experience as covering a span of time and its ability 
1. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 202. 
2. Ibid • ., P• 203. 
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to detach itsel~ ~rom the ~lux through memory o~ the past and anticipa-
tion o~ the ~uture enables the mind to attain some permanence in and 
through the changing world. It can by observing the order o~ the change 
which occurs postulate unchanging principles 1-rhich describe the change. 
This is the ~oundation and procedure o~ science. Another permanence 
is attained in the mind's capacity to hold be~ore it in conscious 
awareness a period o~ time extending through a number o~ successive 
events in time. This is the basis and method o~ art.l 
The most signi~icant characteristic o~ mind does not, however, 
reside in its ability to apprehend the existing world and to ~ormulate 
principles to describe it or even to hold be~ore itsel~ a sucoBssion 
o~ events, as important as these are. What is more amazing still is 
the purposive character o~ the mind by means o~ which an anticipated 
goal in the future is envisaged, and the past and present are directed 
toward :making the vrorld con~orm to that goal. This tendency o~ the 
mind to be lured on by the ~uture constitutes the primary and distinc-
tive trait o~ the mind o~ man. 
Jr shi~t in Templet s view o~ mind and its relation to the physical 
organism seems to have taken place. His analysis o~ mind now 8uggests 
that mind has a more independent status within the human organism than 
was allowed ~or in the previous discussion o~ the organic union of mind 
and body. A,. separate or even an entitative state ~or mind seems to be 
implied here. 
l. S.ee:: ibid., pp.. 204-206. 
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Man as a union of the physical and the mental and as directed by 
and tov1ard an apparent good is thus a personal being. The transition 
has been completed within the World-Process .from a physical world 
constantly in flux through the interaction of one part with another to 
the ~ororld of personal beings able to bring some permanence out of the 
change and to act themselves upon the world from which they arose; 
it is the movement from process to personality. 
Man is thus a person, and his true nature is l.~evealed in the mean-
ing and potentiality of personality. Each of the marks o.f personality 
noted so .far warrants more careful and extensive elaboration. E detailed 
analysis o.f the various dimensions of personality as the highest level 
which emerged in the World-Process is imperative. The remain~er of the 
chapter is directed toHard this end. 
B. Difference between Personal and Sub-personal1 
In order to clarify the meaning of personality, Temple distin-
guishes between a thn1g, a brute, and a person. These distinctions 
correspond in a general way to the levels of reality already noted, 
namely inorganic (matter), organic (life), and personal (mind and 
spirit). For an understa..11ding qf Templet s position it is essential to 
examine each of these distinctions. 
1. The material .for this section is based primarily on Lecture 
I of William Temple, The Nature of Personality, also Christus Veritas, 
PP• 50-52. 
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1 •. A. Thing 
What is commonly referred to as nthing 11 is most diametrically 
opposed to rtperson. u 1£. Thing makes no claim on anything else; t'here-
fore, how a Thing is treated is of significance only to the individual 
b.im.seli' unless what he does will affect other individuals. When one 
kicks a football_, for example, there is no need to view the effect of 
this action on the football or from the perspective of the football. 
What this implies needs to be made explicit; that is, a Thing does not 
feel or think. .As such, a thing is neutral in terms of value and dis-
value; nothing is good or bad for it, and it is neither good nor bad 
in itself. 
2.< .fiJ. Brute 
k:, rttb.inglt simply is; it does not experience value either in its 
own existence or in the existence of other things. It exists as an 
object only, never as a subject. However, when one refers to something· 
as a Brute, he means that 'What happens to it does make a difference to 
it. TJius, animals experience pleasure and pain and to that extent are 
involved in good and evil. A, Brute, therefore, does have feelings. 
It is aware of itself as a distinct entity and so .far as this is the 
case is a subject and not just an object. 
However, the experience of pleasure and pain is limited to the 
present and to the sensations of the present. What consciousness a 
Brute has is a consciousness o.f events of the present moment. Learning 
takes place in a cat, for example, not through memory but through its 
o1m reaction to the conditions imposed on it. If' it is beaten vrhen it 
chases a bird~ then the beating is not so much remembered as the desire 
to chase the bird is lessened. ii.s Temple states: 11It does not remember: 
it simply does not wish to chase.rrl 
Temple realizes that the category which is labeled Brute may not 
in f'act apply f'ully to one particular animal, such as the cat used in 
the illustration. His point is, however, not dependent on such an 
empirical identity of' definition and existing object. He means the 
term Brute to apply to an animal which can be defined as indicated, and 
any animal (including the cat) may be called a Brute to the extent. 
that the definition is applicable to it. 'l:he term "brute" is a g~neral-
iz~tion·f'or the sake of classification, and its merit is its clarity 
of' meaning; so that when the term is used, the meaning is evident .. 2 
3. A-Person 
When the category of personality is reached, mere existence as 
object has been superseded, but so has consciousness confined to present 
experience. A living creature is personal when he is aware of' his 
existence in the present moment, but also remembers his past existence 
and anticipates his existence in the future. It is this awareness of' 
the continuity of' one's existence that is distinctly personal.3 What 
1.. Temple, Nature o~ Personality, PP• 5-6. 
2. See ~·, PP• &.7 • 
3. There is a definite similarity here vrith the views of the 
self in both Bergson and Bowne, though no references are made to either 
one on this point. 
has happened and what will (or could) happen have value as 1.;rell as 
what now is happening. It is because this is the case that a person 
is morally responsible .for '.Jhat he has done. He is capable o.f remember-
ing what happened and o.f identifying the actions with the same person 
who is remembering. Not only the present but the past and .future as 
well are o.f interest to the person,. and this is so because he is con-
scious o.f himsel.f as the same sel.f who was, nm.; is, and soon -vrl.ll be. 
It is because o.f this awareness of one 1 s continued identity, o.f 
a sel.f who ~ a past (even though in the present) and who looks .for-
~ to a .future (also in the present) that a person has ce:ttain rights. 
A person is legally defined in terms o.f his rights, but the fact that 
a person has rights clarifies the meaning of Personality and distin-
guishes it .from Thing and Brute. To have rights it is necessary to be 
~-subject and not an object merely, and so a Thing has no rights, per 
se. 
Even a B1~te who does .feel and hence has a perspective o.f its own 
can make no moral claim on us; nor can it be held morally responsible 
.for its actions since its subjectivity is restricted to the sensations 
o.f the passing moment. As such the Brute does not, indeed cannot, o~ 
ganize its sensations and direct its action toward a goal it shares in 
common with .E.ersons. A: Brute cannot be a member o.f society. But a 
Person can be a member o.f society precisely because he is a~r.are in the 
present of his past and possible future action and can direct his 
actions tovr.ard a goal he is consciously seeking and which he shares with 
other persons. In a word, a Person is purposeful. He is, therefore, 
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responsible for the purpose chosen and the execution of it. 
~emple concisely summarizes the distinctions between the three 
levels of existence: llA thing has no consciousness; a brute is con-
scious only of and in the present; a person1 s consciousness surveys 
past, present, and future.ul 
c. Rersonality and self-determination 
.An essential meaning of ttpersonn is one -who is a subject of 
rights. When one has rights he makes a claim on another1 s treatment 
of him. To have rights one must be conscious of them, which in turn 
entails memory and expectation. Now another d:i.mension must be added. 
&person not only is the subject of rights: he is also the subject of 
duties. In fact the former necessitates the latter. Rights m1ich one 
has against another must be recognized as rights by both concerned. 
Hence, one can appreciate rights only if he also has rights. Bilt then 
his rights are anothert s duties, even as the rights of another are his 
duties. What it means to be a subject of duties and the significance 
of this for personality must be further explicated.2 
1. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. ll. 
2. The material for this section is based primarily on Lectures 
II and III of Temple, Nature of Personality, pp. 11-36~. However, see 
also Mens Creatrix, Chaps. JITII and XIV, and Ghristus Veritas, 
PP• 56-62. 
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1. External yersus Internal Determination 
It is only in and by means o:f conduct that one can f'ul:fill his 
duty. Conduct, in turn, consists o:f one 1 s reaction to the circum-
stances in which he :finds himsel:f. For there to be a reaction, there 
must be something to which he can react. To this extent one is indeed 
determined by external circumstances. But the extent to which any 
particular reaction is specifically dictated by the circumstances is 
also dependent on the individual involved. 
Gomplete determinism defined as 11the thaory that everything is 
constituted by its relations to other things--that it consists in fact 
o:f these relations, 11 is held to be :fallacious.l- To reduce an individ-
ual 1s behavior in the present to behavior in the past or to his present 
environment is to fail to account :for the particular individual himself 
whose behavior is in question. What 1-1as it that determined him--his 
past behavior or his environment? Furthermore, where is the end o:f 
such regression? It would seem to result in an und.if'ferentiated sub-
stance which itsel:f cannot account for the differentiated being that 
is the issue. But to admit differentiation is to reject complete ex-
ternal determination. Thus Temple concludes! 1t.Ai:J. individual is what 
it is in virtue of its relations; that is true; but we are not justified 
in concluding that apart :from its relations it is nothing at all. u2 
1. Temple, Nature o:f Personalit~, p. 12. 
2. ~., p. 15. In a :footnote referring to this passage Temple 
indicates that his position conflicts 11with very high logical author-
ities.11 
132 
For T.emple, then, no fact in the universe can be defined by ref'-
erence to any number of' generalizations about it; each fact is in 
addition something in and of' itself'. A\particular cannot be deduced 
from some universal principle. The extent to which anything can be 
explained by reference to other things or resists such reductionism 
indicates its degree of' individuality.l This concept of' individuality 
warrants separate consideration. 
2. Gomplete Individuality as the Ideal 
TI1e difference between the personal and sub-personal levels of' 
existence is evident here. The individuality :~· Thing possesses may 
be almost completely ignored and certainly is irrelevant f'or most pur-
poses. A Thing thus is externally dete:r:mi..11ed. This is what is meant 
by matter, the chief' property of' vmich is inertia. Though even here 
T.emple cautions that such a description refers to an ideal limit and 
not to any actual entity. But the point is, 11at the purely mechanical 
stage, whether it is real or not, individtuality counts for nothing, and 
the motion of' a body--the only activity open to it--can be calculated 
from a knowledge of' its mass and the force acting on it. 112 
Individuality, however, gains in importance as organisms become 
l. TJiere is a definite similarity here with F. H. Bradley1 s view 
of degrees of' truth and reality. see AppearancEt and Reality (Oxford:: 
The Clarendon P~ess, 1930), PP• 431. 
2. Temple, Nature of' Personality, p. 16. 
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more complex until in civilized man individuality is equal in signif-
icance to universal and generic qualities.l Here the ideal limit is 
reached at the other extreme from external determination in the in-
dividual. who is completely self-determined. But for man (as was the 
case with matter) the ideal limit is never attained in fact. 
The fullest meaning and eA~ression of the term personality is 
reserved for a completely self-determined individual~2 However, the 
term personality may also be applied to anyone in whom individuality 
is as significant a factor in determining conduct as are the ext'ernal 
and universal qualities which it embodies and that constitute its 
environment. What is proposed is little more than a tthazy outlinell of 
the meaning of personal existence, rather than a careful definition 
from which deductions might be made.3 This is as it should be since 
individuality would defy such deductions anyway. 
The procedure has been to suggest t-vm types of experiences and to 
examine each as it applied to the Thing, to the Brute, and to the Per-
son. The first vras the significance of interest, and the second was 
the degree of self-determination as opposed to external determination. 
The Thing possesses no interest and is set in motion by forces outside 
itself; the Brute has an interest and likewise is capable of determining 
1. See Nature, Man and God, P• 116. 
2. For this reason GOd alone is fully personal, according to 
Temple. This point becomes more evident as the chapter proceeds and 
is developed below in Chap. VI. 
3. See T.emple, Nature of Personality, p. 17. 
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its reactions but only in the modified sense of the present moment; the 
interest of the Person spans past, present, and future, and he can de-
termine his actions at least as much as anything else which acts on 
him. This notion of freedom must now be examined. 
3. Formal ~eedom 
Freedom is attributed to anything that deserves the name individ-
ual:: "We may say that Freedom-underived essence--is a :factor in every 
individual object; but it is a negligible :factor in the case of mechani~ 
cal objects, and by no means so in the case of human beings. 111 Exactly 
how much any individual contributes, on the basis of his individuality, 
to the course of things in the universe can never be calculated, though 
the efficacy of such action cannot be denied. It is this contribution 
made by the person in any situatJ.on that forms the basis of moral 
responsJ.bility and distinguishes it from legal responsibility. 
Continuity of the self through personal identity alone is necessary 
for legal responsibllity. That it was this man, before the judge now, 
who committed a crime is sufficient to pass legal judgment despite the 
extent to -vrhich the circumstances determined his actions. However, to 
pass moral judgment on a criminal act it is necessary that the person 
be capable of mal{:ing himself a criminal. Despite the circumstances it 
is the way a person chooses to react to them that makes him morally 
responsible. ThJ.s again is an ideal limit, and no one J.s fully 
1. Ibid., pp. 18-19. See also Ohristus Veritas, p. 56. 
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responsible even for his reactions. BUt that he is to some extent 
responsible makes moral responsibility a fact, and the extent to which 
he is indicates the degree of moral responsibility. 
For Temple.~ Hevery individual has in h:iln some rmderived element 
·which assists in the determination of his conduct; if it were different, 
he and his conduct would be different. To whatever degree this element 
a!'fects his conduct, he is morally responsible.nl Temple calls this 
formal fxeedom and views it as a mixed blessing. Freedom in the full-
est sense and as the pearl of great price for which one is to sell all 
is still to be discussed. 
C.ombining formal freedom ·with the individual t s interest in past, 
present, and future results in the conditions that make possible the 
distinguishing marks of any person, namely, character and purpose. 
4. Character and Purpose 
The development of personality requires an awareness of one's 
identity through time. Though all that has happened to anyone cannot 
at any time be remembered by him, it is essential that some of these 
past events be remembered as constituting his life. In this remembrance 
of past events as part of one 1 s life is to be seen the difference be-
tween orga...l1ic growth (e.g., a tree) and personal growth. A man does 
not merely go through a number of stages; he is always relating the 
present stage to those previous and to those anticipated in the future~ 
1. Nature of Personality, p. 20. S.ee also Christus Veritas, p. 
57. 
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Actual events in the past ar:e: related to an ideal future, and conduct 
in the.present is sha~d by this comp~ison. 
The chief elements constituting the distinction bet~een Personal 
and Sub-personal existence are now evident.1~ Summing up the charac-
teristics of Personal existence as they have been noted so far, Temple 
states: 
The Person is aware of and takes interest in 
Past, Present, and Future; is self-determined 
in approximately as great a degree as externally 
determined; and is consequently a centre of con-
tinuous conscious and deliberate activity: this 
is what we mean by attributing to Persons char-
acter and purpose.2 
It should be noted at this :g0int that Tem]l:le has a tendency to be 
vague in his use of terms. He has been correctly criticized at this 
point • .J Temple himself is disdainful. of systems which build on clear-
cut definitions; what is gained in clarity is sacrificed in relevance 
to actuality.4 Such an extreme view seems unwarranted and is inconsis-
tent with his own definitions of Thing, Brute, and Person, which he 
rightly recognizes do not ap:gly directly to any existing obj~ct, but 
which facilitate a careful analysis of the difference between personal 
1. There is one exception, and that is the principle of society 
which is examined in the next section. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, P• 22. 
3. See Brightman's criticism of Temple for failing to be rigorous 
in the use of terms: Review of Mens Oreatrix, The Philosophical Review, 
XXWII(l9:L9), 210;;,.212. 
4. See' Natur~, Man and God, P•· viii. 
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and sub-personal levels of existence. T.emple 1 s usual procedure, in 
aucord 1¥-ith the dialectic method which he follows, is to expound on a 
subject at one level and then move on to another issue without indicat-
ing clearly what the conclusions are at the first stage on which he is· 
building. Thus, in the present connection, he never does state ex-
plicitly what is meant by character. Character would seem to mean the 
personality as a whole organized in the present in terms of past in-
fluences and future aspirations.l· .As such, character is constantly in 
the process of formation throughout one 1 s life.2 
What is clear 'is that the terms character and purpose must be 
further developed as they apply to personality, and it is necessary 
to turn now to an analysis of the difference in ilp.tiative bet1·men 
living creatures and mechanical things. 
5.. SOurce of Initiative in Living C:reatures 
a. Apoetition as the basis of will. At the lowest levels of life 
initiative is based primarily on appetition. Thus in man there are the 
basic drives for food and drink. Not pleasure is sought, but objects 
that will satisfy this hunger and thirst.. FUrther, individuality is 
revealed in oners tastes. What.is chosen and liked depends on the in-
dividual., Temple affirms unequivocally that though one 1 s taste may be 
developed, there is no disputing that what is desired at any time is 
1. Seeibid., p. 237, and Christus Veritas, p. 61. 
2. See Nature of Personality, p. 33,and Mens Creatrix, p. 171. 
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£or that person a fact.l Initiative, then~ is rooted for man in his 
desires. 
b •. Vol~tion as purpos~ve desiring. Tb understand conduct it is 
important to recognize that reactions to external forces are "not only 
of a conscious but of an appetitive seu.u2 Some o£ the desires iorhich 
initiate actions may not be present in conscious awareness at the 
moment; however, purpose is conscious., Hence, the desires constitute 
the material on which intellect and imagination operate to mold the 
resulting purpose. Purpose, therefore, consists of desires, imagina-
tion, and intellect.3 
Will as a separate faculty of the self is rejected.4 However, 
volition is signi£icant since one's character is expressed in the activ-
ity of the will, and when fully developed volition becomes pu_~ose. The 
question is not whether man has a iorill which is free, but as Locke right-
ly stated: "Is man free? 115 Furthermore, the issue concerns specific 
1. There is a striking similarity here with Brightman 1 s view of 
value-claim as ~orhat anyone likes, desires, or approves •. SSe Brightman, 
APh;losophy of Religion, p. 88. 
2.! Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 21~. 
3. See ibid., p. 24. 
4. See ibid., p. 25; also Mens Creatrix, p. 167; Christus Veritas, 
pp. 60-61; Nature, Man and God, pp. 231-237. It should be noted at this 
point that most of the material in Lectures III, IV, and V of Nature 
of Personality are incorporated verbatim into Mens Creatrix, Chaps •. 
XIII and XIV. SBe Mens G:reatrix, p. 167, n. 1. 
5.. See Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 26. 
instances of choice. 
Choice for Temple is best explained by reference to lfri·stotle 1 s 
. conception of choice as a uniting of intellectual and appetitive func-
tions. Plato has best expressed the ideal toward which man aspires, 
namely, that the many functions become unified into one.l· However, 
the fUnction of reason is not limited to discovering the means to some 
end that desire has already established, for reason may itself eval-
uate possible ends proposed by both appetite and aspiration and decide 
which ones relate most harmoniously to those already chosen or an-
ticipated. 2 
To choose in this manner does not necessarily mean that it was a 
purposive act. Purpose entails more than reflective choice. It means 
a deliberate act has been performed after consideration of the con-
sequences to which the person gives full consent. A. choice might be 
made to which one does not fully give consent.3 In fact choice and 
purpose are sufficiently distinct so that one often chooses what runs 
counter to his purpose. Shch inconsistency in conduct--emphasized by 
Aristotle--and helplessness in character expression--stressed by St. 
Paul--warrant further elaboration.4 
1. Ibid. 
2.. In terms of Brightman1 s value theory noted above this repre-
sents an advance from empirical value to true values. See A. Philosophy 
of Religion, PP• 91-93. 
3. See Temple, The Nature of Personality, p. 2.7. 
4· Ibid.~ P• 2.8. 
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a.. Self-limitat-ions in character formation.. FOr Temple the mass 
of chaotic impulses that constitute the natural and rtbriginal11 ·state 
of man cannot be termed either good or bad in themselves.l Rather~ 
these interests and impulses are t}:J.e raw material, so to speak, out of 
which one forms his virtues or vices. Thus, just as these natural 
impulses are not to be condenmed or denied, neitb.er are they to be ac-
cepted as tb.ey are. It is only by dint of discipline that they can be 
molded into anything resembling an ideal human life.~ Building such a 
li:fe is :further complicated by the :fact that left alone no man can bring 
t}:J.e chaotic impulses into a meaningful unity. 
The :first task of character :formation is that of unifying these 
natural impulses. It is, in the first instance, t}:J.e responsibility of 
otb.ers. The discipline necessary to integrate the chaotic impulses 
into a coherent moral li:fe cannot be managed by the individual alone, 
1tfor he is just the chaos of impulses. 113 SOciety must educate and dis-
cipline tb.e individual •. Only w)len the self is t}:J.us trained and his 
activity unified so that he operates as a single self is he truly free. 
6.. True Freedom as S8lf-6ontrol 
l!f._ distinction must now be made between iorhat was previously called 
formal fre~dom and what is here desi~1ated true :freedom. Formal 
l. Original Sin in this meaning of the term is rejected. 
2.. Original Sin defined in t}:J.is way is affirmed, t}:J.ough }:J.ow man r s 
natural impulses can legimately be called sin is not clear. see 
1\emple, Nature of Personality, p. 29. 
3., ~·~ P• 30. 
freedom signifies that the self contributes something distinctive (i.e .. ,. 
its individuality) to an act of choice. True freedom, however, means 
that the whole man is acting as one. . All the various facets of his 
self are unified into one coherent totality 1-rhich as a whole directs 
the choices made by the self. SUch freedom is based upon formal free-
dom but surpasses it. Freedom in this sense means liberation from in-
ternal compulsion as well as from external control. Simply to be able 
to (or have to) say, TII did it and not anothern is not necessarily 
true freedom.. This may be bondage to something within the self from 
which one seeks release.l Only when one can say, Tti did it and I am 
gl1:1d, and I would gladly do it again,"' is he truly free.2 
The key to true freedom, then, is found in an over-all purpose 
which unifies and guides one 1 s interests, passions, and aspirations •. 
Without such a guiding purpose the self finds itself in continual inner 
conflict ~dth first one part and then another commanding the whole. 
SUch a disintegrated self is exemplified in the most extreme form in 
Plato1 s description of the despot i]), the Republic.3 
Discipline and even external restraint are not, therefqre, 
1. Temple has in mind here an evil act committed by the person 
for which he is sorry but.from which he sees no escape in the future. 
In this way he interprets St. Paul t s confession: nwretched man that 
I ami: Who will deliver me from this body of death?n Rom. 7:24(R .. S .. V .. ), 
Bee Nature of Personality, p. 31; Mens Creatrix1 p.· 170; Nature, Man 
and God, p. 240; 
2. T.emple, Nature of Personality, p. 31. 
3 •. Ibid. 
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antithetical to freedom but are necessary for the operation of freedom. 
To posit as truly free the man whose 1.rhole being controls and directs 
the diverse functions that make up a self' is to suggest another ideal 
limit of' personality. As Temple states: 
We thus reach another ideal limit for the scale 
whose lowest term is the mere Thing and whose summ:it 
is Personality-the ideal namely o:f a spiritual li:fe 
which is self-determined, not only in the sense of' 
being determined by nothing external, but in the 
sense that the whole Being controls all the several 
f'unctions.l· 
In the perfect personality reason rules, guiding all the diverse 
impulses and uniting them into one self'. Temple exalts the ethically 
free man whose acts are al-v7ays in accord with a supreme purpose that 
motivates his entire life. SUch a man alone is truly free-. 
When regarded :from within, the freedom not to sin 
is :formal only; the self-centred will must choose 
selfishly •.••• Freedom of' choice is a necessary 
pre-condition of' morality; but it :falls short of' true 
spiritual f'ree~om. 
True spiritual freedom would be the state of' a man 
who, knowing an ideal Vlhich completely satisfied all 
aspects of his nature, always in :fact conformed to it and 
could perfectly trust himself so to do.2 
However, the completely unified person does not exist. MOst people 
find themselves dependent on the environment that surrounds them, dis-
covering that they do not, and cannot, always control the forces within 
them that vie for supremacy. Hence, the most apparent exercise of' will 
is in restraining certain passions, and one's purpose is too often ex-
pressed in such inhibitions rather than in positive acts which 
l. ~., p. 32. 2. T.emple, Nature, Man and GOd, p. 242. 
concretely embody the ideal. 
There are times also when one 1 s actions belie his general purpose. 
This is best explained by understanding the process by -which character 
is formed. A.S already noted, instincts and impulses must be controlled 
and co-ordinated. But this unification of the self' is never completely 
achieved and as long as one lives must ahra.ys remain incomplete. What 
happens is not merely that will and desire are in conf'lict and desire 
sometimes wins; rather, the 1-rill is itself divided and thus may support 
two incompatible desires at the same time.l 
Still worse is the person in whom one passion gains supremacy. 
Reason now does not become a guide of desires or evaluator of proposed 
ends, but is itself made subservient to the satisfaction of the single 
passion. A:, lack of imagination is to blame here. The individual is 
unable to visualize in suf'ficien~ly clear and concrete form either the 
harm that will be done by the act or the good that could result if' 
another goal were sought. SUch a person cannot be deterred from his 
course by reasoning, for his reason is actively engaged in search of 
means for gaiiCU1g the satisfaction desired. Only an encounter with the 
ideal which has been violated, embodied in a concrete existence, can 
1. See Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 34. Also see Temple, 
liThe Divinity of Christ, tt in B. H. Streeter, William Temple and 
Others, Foundations, A_ Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of 
Modern Thought_: By Seven Oxford Men (London: Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd., 1912), P• 237; Nature, :Man and God, PP• 240-24l; Christus 
Veritas, p. 58. 
pFovide the power necessary to detach him from his course and set him 
on another.l Here is revealed Templets Christian conviction regarding· 
the operation of, and necessity for, grace, as ~rell as the significance 
of Christ as savior. 
Now is it clear that freedom when conceived as good must be equated 
with self-control. This freedom is not gained except by struggle and 
even then not by the individual alone. An external power must opBrate 
on and with him if he is to become .fully free. 2 In this -vray can be seen 
the significance and necessity of social groups (e.g.,family, school, 
state) for the development of human personality, and indeed, the social 
dimension of personality itself. 
D. The Social Dimension of Personality 
1. Doctrine of Original Sin as a Clue to Moral Duty 
In order to grasp the role which society necessarily plays in the 
development of human personality one must be aware of the predicament 
in which man finds himself when he relies solely on his o-vn;t powers,. It 
is in this context that the doctrine of original sin can be profitably 
1. See Temple, liThe Divinity of Christ, n in Foundations •.• , , 
pp. 254-256. There is a similarity here with the position of George 
F. Thomas, who views Christian ethics as a supplement to, and correc-
tion of, the limitations of moral philosophy; see Christian Ethics and 
:MOral Philosophy (New York: Charles Seribner 1 s Sons, 1955), pp. 370-
372, 390-393. 
2. See Temple, Nature of Personality, pp. 35-36; also Nature, 
Man and God, PP• 243-245. 
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examined for what light it sheds on the nature of man.l 
The formulation of the doctrine which makes all mankind gqilty 
because Adam.1 s sin has corrupted man 1 s nature is dismissed as nonsense. 
Even if man 1 s nature is corrupted, all that this proves is that he is 
evil by nature. By this very fact, then, he cannot also be guilty of 
the evil. More important, however, the doctrine suggests that one is 
not morally good by nature. Further, if he is to become morally good, 
he must work at molding the diverse impulses that have been inherited 
into something distinctly }J.ttman. In place of .Allam.1 s fall may be put 
mants long evolutionary descent originating in non-human ancestors, 
and the evil of society into which each generation is born. To assert 
these modern versions is not, however, to remove the insight contained 
in the doctrine of original sin that man needs to recognize how far 
from being good he is by natural inclination, and that alone he cannot:. 
achieve a ne~or nature. As Temple puts it: 
There may never have been a Fall; but we are fallen at 
least in the sense that if we stay where we are, we are 
in a very bad way, and also that of ourselves we can do 
nothing but stay '~ere we ~e.2 
It is necessary to point out that again Temple has failed to define 
carefully his terms. Exactly what is meant by morally good or bad is 
not clear. However, in the context 1-mat seems to be meant is that man 
1. The material for this section is based primarily on Lecture 
IV of T.emple, Nature of Personality, pp. 37-49. 
2. Ibid., P• 38. 
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does not begin with a unity of purpose:, but is composed of conflicting 
impulses .from within and is confronted by, at least partial, social 
disintegration from without. Hence, man caiLnot hope to achieve any 
goal without first being organized into some unity, and he cannot will 
his o'\om unity. In one sense, then, Temple means no more than a unified 
self by good and a disorganized self by bad. However, it is also ap-
parent that he imports other distinctly ethical connotations into 
these words "Without stating explicitly what conceptions are meant or 
the justification for their use. 
It is the belief that an individual by his 01-111 effort of the 1.nll 
can be good or bad (the Pelagian heresy) which .for Temple is the only 
intrinsically damnable heresy. The emphasis in this view is on man t s 
complete .freedom to effect whatsoever he chooses. Augustine 1 s struggle 
and the resultant reply he made to this view is definitive for Temple.;l 
It is not enough to say to one caught in the .folly of his own choice 
that he needs only to choose differently. E6r to be able so to choose 
is precisely what he cannot do. Thus, though the body is moved by will-
ing it so to move, it is not so easy to will differently.. Temple sue-
cinctly statE?s the dilemma: 11The seat of the problem is in the will 
itself. We could be good if we vmuld, but we won 1t; and we can 1t 
begin to -will it, unless we will so to begin; that is, unless we already 
will it. u2 Thus, the will and the self are not separate entities but 
1.. 8ee i.:~ihd., pp. 38-40. 
2. Ibid.' P• 39. see also Temple, "The Divinity of Christ, II 
in Foundations ••• , PP• 234-237, 256. 
one and the same. It is the self' who 1-Tills and who has -.Tilled to do 
certain things over a period of' time until these choices and the de-
sired effects become habitual. And so, though reason in a 11cool 
momenttt may command him. to do othenrise when confronted with the pos-
sibility of' so acting again, his entire nature (including desire, will, 
and reason) .is, already determined to continue acting in the manner to 
"Which he has become accustomed. The implication is that while -vdll 
and body can be distinguished, will and the self' "Who wills cannot: 
Our -wills move our bodies, but the will cannot 
move itself'. 1~ will is just myself' as a practical 
agent--an individuality largely consisting of' 
inherited tendencies ~~d shaped by ciraumstances 
of' one sort and another.l 
How then can one 1 s atti~des and behavior be altered? 
2. Alteration of' Behavior and Character Transformation 
The possibility of altering one 1 s attitudes and behavior is con-
tingent upon a transformation of the self'. The self' who has previously 
liked certain things must become the self' who now likes different 
things; and in this process it is not merely the likes which are changed, 
but the self' 1..Jb.o likes is changed: r'Being what I am, I like this 8.-TJ.d 
dislike that; and the only way to change my likes and dislikes is to 
\ 
change me.n2 
1.. Temple, Nature of' Personality, p. 40. 
2. Ibid., P•. 40. 
It is true that some things vihich once were liked may turn out 
not to be satisfying after all. But this is not because the likes 
have changed; rather the object desired has changed. The fact is that. 
an individual in any particular moment cannot change his likes and 
dislikes.;;. What can be done is to choose to subject oneself to in-
flnences which over a period of time may be able to alter his character 
significantly so that new likes replace the old.1·. 
The difficulty is further complicated by the fact that no one1 s 
personality is ever completely unified. There always exist certain 
tendencies which are not integrated fully with the purpose unifying 
the other tendencies. The minority tendencies not integrated remain 
active and ever ready to exert their supremacy wnenever the opportunity 
arises. As a result a person may find himself doing things which he 
knows are wrong and which even run counter to his o-vm best interests. 
Rather thm1 destroy this one tendency he 1~11 often sacrifice the 
entire self.. As Temple observes: 
It is no use trying to find reasons for doing this: 
reason is all on the other side, as we knoH quite 
well when we act. We do not even think the present 
good greater than the more remote. We do not think 
at all. We just say "Here goestnQ 
As a result of such experiences there can be little doubt that 
1. See i!2if!.. .!Uso see Temple, "The Divinity of Christ, n in 
Foundations ~ •• , pp. 236-237. The role of education is significant. 
in altering one1 s character according to 'Ilemple •. 
2. Temple, Nature of' Fersonality:, p. 42. 
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for all practical purposes the self at any given moment is not unified. 
T.emple concurs fully ·with Plato 1 s emphasis that man begins as a multiple 
being of diverse and competing impulses and that the problem man faces 
is to attain a unified self. The threefold unity of the self noted 
above is relevant here. Bodily continuity and identity are given. Hm-r-
ever, a unity of impulses under the guidance of a purpose which one 
approves is not given. It is the achievement of this personal u..Tlity, 
only potential at the start, which Temple is emphasizing at this point. 
To solve this issue it is necessary to return to the notion of true 
freedom and develop li ts meaning more fully. 
3. Pttrposive Action as Free Ection 
Tb be truly free means that the self is directed in its actions 
by the totality of its nature under the guide of a purpose which it 
has, as a whole, affirmed and which it strives to actualize in each act 
of choice. Thus, "to be free is to have a PUrpose, in following which 
we satisfy every function of our nature, and which He pursue undeviat-
ingly •. ttl 
In any particular situation this may mean arbitrarily and stumnarily 
denying a particular desire, for to allow it to be satisfied even once 
is to encourage it to strive to become ruler once and for all., The man 
of strong will who can resist the lure of desires not in accord vT.ith 
his total self and the truly free man who acts as a unified self are 
l.. Ibid., pp • 43-44~ · 
one and the same. Hence, tttrue freedom manifests itself in constancy 
and stabllity of character. uL 
Nor is it correct to attribute such freedom and self-control to 
the consistently evil man (e.g., the despot in Plato 1 s Republic); for 
in his case it is not the totality of his being that is operating in 
the choices made, but first one impulse and then another gains control. 
And if one gains supremacy, then his actions are compulsive not free:-. 2 
Nor can it be granted that such a man is happy, in the sense of sat-
isfying his total nature •. True he satisfies a single desire continually 
but at the expense of eSther desires that are also a part of his nature. 
Also, to satisfy this desire he must increase the dose. 
Restraint, therefore, far from being antithetical to freedom, is 
absolutely essential to true freedom. It must even be added that in 
the beginning, if not ahrays, the restraint is external. SUch ex-
ternal restraint is not to be taken as merely negative in effect. In 
fact, part of the reason why the self-indulgent man is neither free, 
nor happy is because man is not an isolated self but is essentially 
social. This is not to suggest that man• s desires are naturally social 
or that they naturally promote the welfare of society. Many are to 
the detriment of society. Nonetheless, man does possess~ a social 
1. Ibid., p. 45; see also Mens Creatrix. p. 172~ 
2. Here as elsewhere Temple employs philoso~hical rather than 
psychological language (e.g •. , compulsive behavior)· to express his 
meaning though the insight attained is psychological. 
151 
instinct exemplif'ied in his strong desire for social approval. If' 
this is the case, then~ the selfish man ah1ays frustrates this aspect 
of his nature. To satisfy the desire to be approved by onet:s fellows 
necessitates acting in accord with the welfare of society, and to this~ 
extent selfishness is replaced by morality. MOral and social conduct 
a:re, therefore, closely related for Temple. 
4. PUrpose of Society as the G0al of the Self 
Temple acknowledges a change in position regarding the relation 
of moral to social conduct. In earlier writings moral conduct is 
identif'ied with socially oriented conduct.l He held that the terms 
nauty,tt ttobligation,tt and "oughtrt could never be employed in reference 
to an individual completely isolated from others. "T.he isolated in-
dividual may be wise or foolish; he cannot be moral or immoral. n2: 
Tb refer to an obligation to oneself is meaningless since the content 
of obligation can only be defined as a relation existing between 
persons. The same is true of duty. The meaning of duty to self is in 
terms of service to others.3 
1. See e.g., Nature of Personality, pp. 49-53; Mens Oreatrix, pp. 
181-183. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 51; also Mens Greatrix, p~ 
49. Dorothy Emmet challenges T.empleTs assertion that all obligations 
are social obligations, apparently failing to realize that he has 
changed his position on this point. S6e Emmet, 11The Philosopher 11 in 
Iremonger, William T.emole ••• , pp. 535-536. 
3. S:Se William Temple, The Kingdom of God (London: Macmillan and 
Go., Ltd., 1912), p. 48. 
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However, Temple came to realize that he was basing tfduty too ex-
elusively on social relationships. 11L One 1's obligation is not exl::tauste.d 
by the relations he shares with others, even as the self is not ex-
hausted by his relations. The latter is the error of determinism 
already rejected by Temple. Each individual brings something dis-
tinctive to the relations he shares 1~th others. The potentialities 
of the self need to be realized, including a unified self. However, 
just as this unity of the self cannot be attained apart from society, 
so too onets obligations are best defined in terms of his relations to 
society. 
If the chief means for expressing personal morality is through 
one 1 s service to society, then it is essential that the meaning of 
society be made clear. 1fo. soc:iety consists of a group of individuals 
joined together by a non-physical bond. ~is bond is in each case a 
purpose 1vb.ich the members share in common. Hence, for Temple, 11the 
essent:ial basis of a society is community of purpose.u£ 
Th:is definition is equally applicable to a nation, though the 
precise purpose cannot be formulated. It is, for instance, easier to 
recognize the negative factors binding a nation together than the pos:i-
tive ones. So too in morality, one tends to grasp more quickly the 
type of behavior he does not want included in the ideal person than 
he is able to descri'kl.e the i¢J.eal person he wishes to become. However, 
1. Ghr:istus Veritas, p. 28, n. 1. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 53; see also Mens Greatrix, 
P• 186. 
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positive factors are evident even on the national level., Anation 
possesses traditions and concrete attitudes o:f conduct 1'1iJ.ich influence 
its citizens.l This does not mean that the purpose of any nation is, 
in fact, clearly defined or even consciously affirmed, nor that the 
conduct of its citizens is greatly affected by the "nation's character,n 
though the nation does exert some influence on the conduct of its 
citizens. 
In this respect society is no different from an individual where 
conflicting interests vie for supremacy and where no one single purpose 
unite~ and controls the rest. Further, to propose that a society is 
united by a common purpose does not mean that there is a social ~l 
transcending and combining in some suprapersonal way the individual 
wills of each member. Temple affirms unequivocally the primacy and 
self-identity of each individual: 11There is no evidence whatever for 
the view that there is a social consciousness anY1ihere in society other 
than the consciousness of the individuals that they are members of the 
social body.n2 
Society, then, consists of individuals each of whom consciously 
chooses to cooperate toward a common goal. The members are thus con-
sciously related to one another, each one willing the relation shared. 
The simple formula by 1-Thich to express this unity-in-diversity that 
1. See Nature of Personality, p. 55, and Mens Oreatrix, p. 186. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 58; see also Mens Oreatrix, 
P• 187. 
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society exhibits is the f'ollowi_ng: HOne purpose, many wills. nl 
However, a further dif'f'iculty arises in that though the members 
consciously choose to af'f'irm their relationship one to a_11other, the 
purpose w]::t..ich they share in common is not necessarily consciously 
aclmoHledged. Nor is Temple willing to resolve this issue by relegat-
ing the shared purpose to a subconscious level. Granted that there are 
influences operating on the individual of' which he is not aware that 
help to determine vroat he does, and that part of' the problem both f'or 
the individual and society lies in this f'act, this does not warrant 
positing a subconscious purpose that binds members together. Rather, 
what it signifies is that these influences have not been integrated 
into the person1 s conscious purpose, and to that extent he is not act-
ing as a unified self'. The point is, that whatever consciousness of' 
a common purpose that exists in society resides in the conscious 
awareness of' each individual and not in some group consciousness trans-
cending the members or within each member at a level below· the threshold 
of' conscious Awareness.2 
The primary meaning of' morality as essentially social is now evi .... ____ _ 
dent •. Tb.e individual submits his total self', including conscious aims 
and subconscious influences to the Purpose of' the society to which he 
1~ Temple, Nature of' Personality, p. 59. 
2. At this point Temple indicates his unwillingness to tluse the 
idea of the subconscious as an explanation of h~unan affairs; it is so 
obviously a receptacle f'or all inconvenient problems.tt See ibid. 
belongs, and ultimately to the whole human race. 
The fact that this :Eu.rpose to which one submits is not clearly 
defined means that absolutffi certainty in moral matters is imDDssible. 
What is more. signif'icant, it means that one must take as his guide the 
moral experience of' the race •. l Where it is found that some convictions 
though long held are no longer applicable to the circumstances of the 
present, then they may be rejected. However, in rejecting them one 
appeals to the principle on which the convictions were based. 2' 
5. Personality as a Principle of Fellowship 
The significance: of this analysis of' the social nature of morality 
is that the social dimension of human personality is also discovered 
in this way. 
Personality as we meet with it is amongst other 
things a principle of fellowship) in a common pur-
pese, and that it requires the individualts ac-
ceptance of' this ~ammon :g:urp_o:se though he cannot 
tell what it is.3.) 
Morality in the sense of duty to society is thus one dimension of' 
l. See ibid., p. 60; and Mens Creatrix, F• 193. The methodological 
justification for the authority of social conventions has already been 
noted, as well as the similarity in views of Temple and Bowne on this 
point; see above, Chap. II. 
2. A. Campbell Garnett shows the significance of this appeal to 
principie.as it ap.:gll.es to the historical develop;ment of conscience 
in The Meral Nature of Man (New. York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952), 
3. Tem:g:J..e, Nature of Personality, p• 61. See also Christus 
Veritas, pp~ 53, 69-73. 
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personality, but f'or this to become f'ulf'illed the individual would have 
to know and to work toward the goal of' ma.nkinqr. Such Imowledge is, of' 
course, impossible. And yet, it is precisely this purpose, the goal 
of' mankind, which binds all men together and when conceived as such 
constitutes the ideal toward which each man works in f'ellowship one 
with another. 
The essentially social nature of' personality is thereby revealed. 
To be cut o:ff' f'rom society means to that extent man cannot become 
human. ttPersonality is inherently social; only in social groupings 
can it mature, or indeed f'ully exist. ul Both the ideals and tempta-
tions that man possesses, as well as the worth attributed to human 
personality, are derived f'rom the relation a man has to the society of' 
which he is a member and to the human race itself'. There is no doubt 
that other human beings play the most signif'icant part in the develop-
ment of' one 1 s personality. 
From his parents he derives the body, which is the 
physical basis of' his being; f'rom his f'amily--its 
traditions, outlook, circumstances, hopes, f'ears--
he derives the main direction of' the impetus which 
carries him out into lif'e; f'rom his country • • • 
he receives the inf'luences which either modif'y or 
stereotype that direction. His whole being is a 
condensation of' society. He is his f'ellow-men 1 s exp~: 
rience f'ocussed in a new centre.2 
1. 11Wb.at Christians Stand :for in the Secular World, u reprinted 
in Religious ExPerience ••• , p. 246. See also Christianity in 
Thought and Practice, pp. 59-60. 
2. Temple, Ohristus Veritas, p. 71. 
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Temple would still seem to be overemphasizing the social dimension 
of personality. What about the privacy of individual consciousness_antt 
the unique element 1vhich constitutes the essence of individuality? 
FUrthermore~ do not individuals mold society and, at times, resist 
societal demands on moral grounds? It is not clear whether Temple 
means that personality in the sense of a self with some degree of unity 
and purpose cannot exist apart from society, or that a certain type of 
personal unity can only mature in society. The di$tinetion involvffd 
here is blurred by Temple. It is one thing to affirm that a certain 
type of personality (e.g., as found in a civilized society) can only 
develop in human social groups; it is quite another thing to claim 
that an individual could never attain any self-unity apart from human 
society •. An ideal conception of personality is operating in Temple 1 s 
thinking as a standard of judgment without being made explicit. 
E. The Temporal llimension of Personality:ll. 
The significance of time for personality has already been noted. 
The Parson moves beyond both the Thing and the Brute by its interest 
in past and future as well as present. However, the three dimensions 
of time are not o:f equal interest •. The distinctive :feature o:f person-
ality in terms o:f its relation to time is that the :future holds the 
1.. The material :for this section has been drawn from many o:f 
Temple 1 s writings, but the outline :followed is based on Lecture VI, 
Nature of Personality, pp. 65-79,and Mens dreatrix, Chap. XIII, pp. 
:165-177~ 
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greatest significance. The more fully developed personality becomes, 
the greater is the role p;kayed by the future, and the lesR: important 
are past and present. 
1. PUrpose, Time, and Moral Goodness 
The reason for this priority of the future over past and present 
for personality is that the primary characteristic of personality is 
purpose.l Though the past serves as the basis for the purposes en-
visaged and provides the initiative to realize them, it is not to the 
past that one looks for their realization but to the future. What is 
good in the past acts as inspiration and guide for the future (e.g., 
heritage of a nation) •. The value of the past in the present is 
precisely in terms of what it enables one to achieve in the future. 
a.. .1U teration of the meaning of past events. EVen past evil 
finds its meaning and value (as well as its resolution) in the future~ 
What has occurred is finished and in this sense cannot be altered. But 
what can happen is that the value attached to a particular event in the 
past may be significantly altered in the future. This can be illustrat... 
e.d in drama by reference to a play which is sad and depressing in the 
early acts but culminates in a happy ending, thereby illuminating the 
meaning of the previous act and leaving the audience with a happy feel-
ing. For Temple, lithe value then of any event in time is not fixed 
1. Nature of Personality,) P• 65; Mens Creatrix, p. 172. 
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until the series of which it is a member is over--perhaps, therefore, 
not to all eternity. uL 
Past events, then, cannot be vdped out, but their significance 
can be altered. In the future there remains the hope that what was 
regarded as evil may come to be viewed as a necessary condition for 
a:" greater good. 2 In terms of the individual, what plagues him is not 
simply, or so much, a guilty conscience of what he has done, but being 
the kind of person he is that he may do it again. In this v1ay the past 
is feared, and what is needed is to realize that the future may serve 
to alter the significance of that past event. The future offers hope 
at least. The more complete one 1 s personality is, the more fully 
purposive he is; hence the more significant is the future and the less 
interesting is the past. 
Recognizing that purpose is the distinguishing characteristic of 
personality and that in order to fulfill this purpose the individual 
is directed beyond himself to the good of society, it is necessary to 
examine the nature of morality. 
b. Moral good...11ess an irreducible term. For any fact to have moral 
value it must, first of all, be an object of someone 1 s conscious aware-
ness. Secondly, ·the value of an action always refers to persons, ei":" 
ther the agent or those affected~ Finally, there is no ~ priori 
1. Nature of Personality:, p. 68. See also Mens Creatrix, p. 17.3.:} 
Nature, Man and GOd, pp. 209-212; below.;Chap. V. 
2. It is questionable whether this would still be true if time 
is metaphysically real. This issue is dealt with more fully in Chaps. 
V and VII. 
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criterion by which a fact or act can be determined good or bad. The 
appeal must always be to one's o~m. moral judgments.l 
Moral goodness ca:rmot be defined in terms of' anything else. It 
is itself an irreducible term. Utility and goodness are not to be 
confused. What is useful is not valuable because of' its usefulness 
but because of' the result that it helps to bring about. Utility 
has instrumental value but is not prized for its own sake. 
c. Intrinsic moral value as intuitive. When a shift is made from 
objects considered valuable for the eXperiences they may help to produce 
to objects held to be valuable in and of themselves, that is from 
instrumental to L11.trinsic moral values, the tastes of the individual 
are decisive and definitive. If' one differs with another as to what 
is valuable, then each can but examine his tastes again. No other 
appeal is feasible since "about intrinsic value there can be no argu-
ment: one approves or not and there 1 s an end.rre Hence, 11all value-
judgments are in their nature intuitive, and they do not admit of' 
argument. The faculty of' intuition may be trained by practice, but 
in the moment of approval and disapproval there is no question of' 
argument. tt3 
1. See Nature of' Eersonalit;y:; pp. 71-72; Mens Creatrix, pp. 178-
179. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 72. See also Mens Creatrix, 
P• 179• 
3. Temple, The Kingdom o:f God, p. 43. 
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This does not mean that value-s are simply accidents or that a 
man nhas a right to re-st content with his instinctive value-judgments 
at any moment. nl Though no one can imp0se upon another a set of' values, 
and what any one decides is valuable f'or him dcre.s indeed constitute~ 
his values, the-se values do not occur and are not chosen in a vacuum. 
The individual is a member of' society. More. than this, he is by 
nature social, and thus the relativism to which such an individualis-
tic conception of' moral value·would seem to lead is avoided by the 
social nature of' man. Furthermore, since man can only develop his 
humanity by means of' the society of' which he is a member, each person 
will make his own contribution to the whole grouw as he. strives: to 
realize his place in society. In a passage reminiscent of' both 
Bradley and Royce, Temple af'f'irms : 
Each man is a unique and irreplaceable member of' 
the system with his own bit of' the value of' things 
to~ realise; and in developing his moral f'acul ties, 
his devotion to the public good, he will reaeh the 
right value-judgments.2 
Thus, though a man cannot be criticized for failing to· adopt 
or to recdize a set of' values· af'f'irmed by another, he can be· judged.;o 
by whether or not he achieves thevalues peculiar to him and to his 
1. Ibid., P• 46. 
2. Nature of' Personality, pp:o 72-7 3. See F. H. Bradley, Ethicai 
Studies (New York: The·Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1951), p. llJ, and 
Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York:: The Macmillan 
Company, 1899-1901), II, 2B6. 
16.2? 
membership in society.1 
Temple 1 s argument seems to be that vrhat is intuited is strictly 
private, but because man is a member of society there will be general 
agreement •. However, does this do more than replace individual rela-
tivism -vrith social relativism?: The meaning of intuition is not clear 
as Temple is using it. It is purely subjective and, yet, it can be 
cultivated objectively. Finally, if man is expected to reach value 
judgments which are rightJindependi:mt of his ovm judgments~ then a:. 
distinction needs to be made between the values being affirmed in 
each case and a standard developed for distinguishing between them. 
The difficulty seems to be due to a shilt in meaning on Temple 1 s part. 
from moral values in the descriptive sense--that is, any object 
liked by someone-to moral values': in the normative sense--that is, 
what Temple considers to be the proper objects one should value. 
d. Definit;on of morally good behavior. What, then, consti-
tutea an act morally good?;' In answering this basic ethical issue, 
Temple combines Kant 1 s view of the good will with the utilitarian 
stress on good results. 11For an act to be morally good, it must have 
both good results and a good motive • .n2 Circumstances do help to 
decide particular cases. Only by the defining of some act as intrin-
sically wrong can there become a universal command not to commit that 
act. (e.g •. , murder is defined as 11Unjustified killing, t1 but killing 
l. See Temple, Kingdom of GOd, pp. 46-4 7. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 73. A complete discussion 
of Temple 1 s ethical theory is presented in the next chapter·. 
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under all circumstances is not held to be wrong). 
In fact any act is both particular and universal. In so f'ar as 
one individual does it and in light of' the circumstances operativ~ 
at the moment, it is a particular act. But since others perform the) 
same type of' act c~.g., shooting a person and killing him), then the 
act has a reference beyond itself'. 
Morail action is not Simir.lY the mo.vements of' the body, but it in-
cludes the total compJex of' events initiated by the person, including 
his motives in acting and the consequences that re:sult for him and 
others. An act to warrant f'ull moral approval must be done for the 
right motive and lead to good results. A person is not blamed mor-
ally for an act initiated with proper intention but leading to a bad 
result which coula not be foreseen. However, if' the latter results 
could have been foreseen, then da.spite the good intentions the act 
is condemned. In Temnie r:s own words:: "We f'ind moral worth, then, in 
a person who wills the good and really looks for the right means to 
realise it. Moral worth is found in the will regarded in relation 
to society •. nll 
To be moral--in the normative sense~is to be concerned about the 
good of' other peonie. But when one wills the good of' others, he loves 
them.. Hence, the supreme moral principle is contained in the second 
commandment of' Jesus:: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself' •. 11 ' 
Particular conduct is not itself' equal to morality no matter how 
l. Nature of' Personality, p:. 74. 
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right the results, since the motivation for it can always be pride.l 
Morality must properly be conceived in terms of the individual r s·: 
character "Which,. being >mat it is, will produce virtuous action. 
The building of this character by willing right results becomes the·. 
highest good for man as judged by man 1 s own sense of value.2 
2.. The Moral Man 
Employing his own ideal conception of the moral man, T~mple 
affirms that man is moral >.Jhen he has developed character which 
in all its expressions seeks the good of others. The spirit of 
servic~ to others is the spirit of life itself:: 
Biology, Ethics, Politics, all teach the same lesson; 
a species has significance through its assistance in 
the evolutionary process; moral advance means widening 
the boundaries of the sphere.of our service till all 
humanity is included; political progress is the grav~h of 
insistence on the duty of each to serve all.3 
To: serve others is to seek their welfare, bu·b what is their.· 
welfare?.. What is good for others and for society?,' The highest good 
for an individual is to love others and help them realize their good, 
1. Temple explicitly aligns himself with the Augustinian 
tradition on this point; see Temple, 11The Divinity of Christ, 11 in 
Foundations .•• , pp. 235-237, 256, and Nature of Personalit~, p. 74. 
2. Temple 1 s emphasis on character and will would seem to be 
consistent with his vie~or of the ideal personality as one who ali-Jays 
acts in accord with a supreme purpose resulting in a constancy of 
behavior; see above. 
3. Temple, liThe Divinity of Christ, 11 in Foundations ••• , 
P• 256. 
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but to do this he must know what their good is.l Kant's view that 
each person should seek his own perfection and the happiness of others 
is a tempting answer. 2 However, if one is commanded to love and, 
hence, is to make the expression of love to others the aim of life, 
then ill loving the goal is to enable others also to love and be 
loving. In this sense the will that wills itself is the good will, 
for it wills its own universalization. For Temple, then: 
Love is the supreme goal of personality; at that 
we aim for ourselves; and having acquired it we 
seek to pass it on to others.. If we \?aut to find 
the right thing to do, l'ie must ask what will do 
most to increase the volume of love. Love alone 
has absolute moral ~ue.3 
Human personality is confronted with a dilemma at this point. 
It is by loving that personality is fully realized; but since love 
means forgetting one 1 s self, it is impossible for anyone to acquire 
it by his o~ effort. To seek self-forgetfulness as a good for the 
self is a contradiction and thus cannot be reached. To attain it 
1. By stressing the need for the self to seek the good of 
others and not merely jumping to their side, Temple avoids the self-
effacing emphasis of Paul Ramsey; see Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 101-103, 114-116. 
2. See Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 75. It should be noted, 
however, that Kant distinguishes bet1'!een the supreme good (deserving 
happiness by virtuous living) a_~d the complete good (enjoying happi-
ness). The highest good for any individual would include both; see 
Immanuel Kant, Cri tigue of Practical Reason and other Writings in Moral 
PhilosoPhY, trans. and ed. vuth introduction by Lewis White Beck 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), ppo. 214-215. 
3. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 76. 
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1vould mean to destroy the self in the very attainment. 
It should be asked at this point whether Temple has forgotten 
that one can love another only by being the best self he can and by 
kno-,;v.ing the good of another! Otherwise, he would have nothing of 
value to contribute. Temple 1 s own stress on character seems to be 
violated. 1 Furthermore, o~_ly an abstract conception of the self 
makes it impossible for one to forget himself in an act of loving. 
However, Temple insists that love cannot be attained merely by 
seeking it; it must be stimulated by the love of another ~>Those acts 
of love elicit the response of love. 11Love can only be produced in 
us by the love or need of another calling out our love .••• Still 
the ideal of life is univeJ.•sal love. n2 To attain a state of univer-
sal love would require a community in which individuality is transformed 
into the common c?nsciousness of a universal being. It is not enough, 
therefore, to claim that the self is realized through self-sacrifice 
for Itself-sacrifice is self-realisation.u3 Once again, Temple seems 
to have forgotten his own emphases on the uniqueness and primacy of 
individuality.4 
1. See Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 368-369, 375. 
2. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 76. Such a response toward 
the world and persons is the ];-Thou attitude of which Martin Buber 
speaks. For Buber no· one enters into a relation merely by seeking it. 
It is a meeting but one into which each person must step by choice. 
One is chosen and yet he chooses~ See Buber, I and Thou. 
J. Temple, Nature of Personality, p. 77. 
4. See ibid., p. 58. 
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F~ Sunnna.ry and Oonclusions3 
The analysis of Temple 1 s conception of personality developed in 
this chapter has ranged over a wide variety of subjects, some of 
which will be developed more fully in the succeeding chapters. 
However, it will facilitate a more adequate analysis of the role 
personality plays in Temple 1 s philosophy if the chief characteristics 
of human personality noted throughout the present chapter are su:nnna.":J-
rize_d, at this point. Also, it is important to present the conclusion$ 
Temple reaches regarding the limitations of human personclity when 
compared with what he takes to be the ideal personality. 
l. Chief OharCJ,cteristics of Human Personality 
a. Purpose. The primary characteristic of human personality is 
purpose. This fact has been made evident at several places in the 
preceding discussion. In the emergence of the various levels of 
existence, the stage of Mind is reached when the organism itself 
initiates~action by choosing among alternative means to a desired 
1 end. When Spirit arises, however, a new initiative is possible in 
the choice that is made among available ends to be sought. Herein 
resides the distinctive element in personality.2 Furthermore, the 
P.Brson is not restricted to ends presently available in experience. 
1. 8ee Temple, Nature, !-Ian and God, p. 489. 
2. Ibid., p •. l90, n. 1. 
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As·; one who is aware of his continued existence in a vTaY not possible 
to the Thing or the Brute, the person can, through memory of the past 
and anticipation of the future, identify himself with ideal goals. 
Thus, the future takes on greater significance for the person than 
for other living creatures. What has occurred in the past can be 
utilized in the present for the Sake of an end envisaged in the future. 
The same is true in regard to the unity and identity of the self. 
As a physical organism man's body persists through temporal sequences? 
and by means of memory one is linked in the consciousness of the 
present with his experience in the past. However, full psychical 
unity is attained only when the competing impulses of conscious: 
experience are integrated and directed tm.re.rd the realization of an 
end to which'the total self is committed. True freedom also is revealed 
in the purposive action of the person whose every choice reflectruthe 
goal toward 'Which he is striving. The meaning of person is to be 
viewed in this context:: "A.. 1Person 1 ••• is a self-conscious and self-
determining system of experience, and human persons are in process of 
achieving the complete unification of the experience which constitute$ 
them.uL Personal action, therefore, is purposeful action in which 
the total conscious life of- the self is organized so as to achieve some 
end. In such a case the body is the medium through which one 1 s 
purpose is expressed in the physical world. The personal level of 
existence is attained, then, to the extent that one 1 s total being, mind 
1. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 68. 
169 
and body, is unified around some end apprehended as good. 
However~ this unity cannot be attained by the self alone, just as> 
the self cannot exist by himself. Persons need the fellowship of 
other persons if each is to attain the full stature of personal 
existence. 
b. Fellowship. The second characteristic of human personality 
is fellowship. To be a person is to be a unified self always choosing 
in accord with one 1 s purpose. However, the self begins life disorgan-
izeQ and dependent on others for survival. What regularity his life 
exhibits is largely due to the order imposed by others. Such external 
restraint is absolutely essential if the individual is to achieve 
some measure of self-unity and relative independence. The social 
aspect of personality must not be minimized. HPersonality only comes 
to itself, only becomes "What it is capable of being, through its:· 
development in the reciprocal relationships of society •••• Person-
ality is always a social product. ul 
The individual needs society for still another reason. The 
purpose which each one requires to unify his various tendencies must, 
be able to encompass his total nature. One aspect of that nature is 
the desire for the approval of others and the need to be joined in 
fellowship with them. Hence, only a purpose common to the interests 
and vTelfare of all mankind is adequate to satisfy the individual 
person and to unite persons together in a bond of universal fellowship. 
1. Temple, Christianity in Thought and Practice, pp. 59-60. 
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Fulfillment of the self is possible only in and through service 
to others. To discover one 1 s own good he must also discern the good 
of others and devote himself to realizing it. But 1vhat is the good 
that one should seek to realize both for himself and for others?:· 
What is the good of society? In attempting to answer these questions 
the third dimension of personality becomes evident. 
c. Love. The third characteristic of human personality is love. 
ACcording to Temple, love for another always t~ces two forms: 
11Concern for his welfare ~rrith desire to serve it, and L7lsight into 
his needs so that I may judge wherein his welfare truly consists. nl 
The unity which the self seeks and the purpose which supplies, 
the impetus and goal by which integration of the impulses:· is attained 
are now seen to reside in a community of persons bound together by 
love. In the expression of love for others the highest manifesta-
tion of personality is attained. To realize oneself means to sacri-
fice self in service to others. 
~pose, fellowship, and love constitute the chief characteris-
tics of human personality for Temple. A person is one whose unity 
resides_ in the purpose he has to promote universal love •. Ho1vever, 
in the course of the analysis of human personality certain deficiencies. 
have become evident. It is worthwhile to take stock of them at this: 
point, making explicit the limitatio~s involved, and noting what type 
of being would be required to satisfy the ideal of personality. 
1. Ibid., p. 59. 
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2. Divine Personality as the Completion of Human Aspiration 
a. The limitations of human personalit;y:. A Thing, it has already 
been noted, has no interests and a Brute only has interest in the 
present; whereas a Person has interests which encompass past, present, 
and future. Nonetheless, the Person is plagued by a limited vision 
intellectually and'emotionally. The ideal of a Person whose concerns 
are those of all mankind is never attained .. , The interests· of an 
individual arbitrarily stop short of this ideal. 1 
The same is the case in regard to human freedom. The· completely 
external determination (for practical purposes, at least) of a Thing 
is replaced by the determination of a person rooted in his individu-
ality coupled with external forces:~ But this too falls short of the 
ideal of £U1l self-determination. 2 What Temple fails to consider, 
however, is \.Thether it is the ideal that is faulty. Could any person 
be uninf~4enced by other persons and hence completely self-determined? 
It was noted that insofar as a person is gtrlded by a purpose he 
()perates as a unified self, but all impulses are never totally 
integrated. The ideal of a self directed entirely by a single dominat-
. . al. d 3 lng purpose rema1ns unre lze • 
Furthermore, Temple argues, personality entails subjecting one 1 s 
will to the good of the human race without ever knowing for certain what 
the good is or being able fully to submit to it. Finally, the goal of 
1. See Temple, Nature of Personality, pp. 62-63. 
~. See ibid., p. 63. 3. Ibid. 
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personality has been found to be love. But to love another necessi-
1 tates forgetting one's self and this the self cannot do alone. To 
fulfill itself demands moving beyond the self in a way which is no·t 
possible on the human level. 
b. God as the fully developed personality. Temple concludes 
that only in Divine Personality are all of these requirements of 
personality fully ma.fl.ifested. tluman personality is, and must always: 
be, imperfect and incomplete. The ideal noted in each instance if 
ever fulfilled would extend beyond the human domain to a Supreme 
2 Being, namely God. Only in God is the fully developed personality 
to be found. Concerning such a Being, Temple states: 
At the end of the scale most remote .f'rom the Thing 
we have the conception of a spiritual Being to whom 
all time has a value, and to t~om therefore, in some 
sense, all time is present, but for whom the future 
is always the governing element in time; a Being 
determined by Himself alone and in His action always 
guided by His whole Purpose, never by any single im-
pulse or caprice; a Being moreover whose Purpose is 
absolutely self-less--a Being who realises F~self 
in spending Himself for others. But this Being is. 
the God of Christian Theology. If, then, there is: 
such a Being, He is the true norm and type of 
Personality.~ . 
Temple 1 s conception of Divine Personality and the justification 
for belief in such a being are analyzed in Chapter VII. However, 
some comments are in order at this stage of the investigation in 
1. Ibid., p •. 76• 
2. See ibid., pp. 63-64, 77f-79. 
3. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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regard to Temple 1 s conception of the ideal personality. It is 
important to inquire whether the ideal which Temple has proposed is:: 
properly conceived in each instance. That is, do the empirical facts 
of personality justify the ideal conception suggested? How does one 
get from ~mat is experienced about personality to the ideal conception 
of what a person ought to be, from human personality with its· limita-
tion&: to Divine Personality minus such limitations?: Rather than 
starting with the most ideal conception of personality conceivable 
(the ontological approach), should not one ask what further extension 
of personality is necessary to account for what is experienced?' Or,7 
if one begins with an ideal conception of personality, then he sho~ud 
be willing to modify the ideal as the facts of experience demand. 
Temple 1 s conception of the emergence of human personality in the 
World-Process and the distinguishing characteristics of personality, 
especially in comparison with sub-personal levels of existence, have 
now been presented. What remains to be explored is how Temple employs-. 
the concept of personality to solve some of the major philosophical 
problems. In the next chapter Temple 1 s solutions to the problems-of 
personal and social morality are examined. 
GH.ill'TER IV 
PERSONALITY, MORALITY, .AND SOCIETY 
The present chapter contains an exposition of Temple's moral and 
social philosophy as it relates to his concept of personality. Ah 
analysis of Temple 1 s views on the nature and function of the political 
and economic orders from the perspective of personality is also 
presented. 
The conception of philosophy and the conception of personality 
worked out in the two preceding chapters are now combined and applied 
to the basic theoretical and practical problems which have plagued 
moral philosophers. Personality is shovm to be the central concept in 
solving the problems of personal ethics; it is also operative in 
society determining the nature and function of the state and of the 
economic order. In this way the relevance of personality as an ex-
planatory principle in Temple's moral and social philosophy will become 
evident. 
A. Significance of Personality for Value Theory 
1. Pxocess, Personality, and Value 
In the course of the unfolding of the World-Process various levels 
have been noted, each of which exhibits distinctive characteristics. 
These levels have already been designated as matter, life, mind, and 
spirit. The movement, thus, is from a material world in which actions 
l74 
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and reactions occur more or less mechanically without a human mind to 
observe them, to the development of living organisms that gradually 
come to an a-vrareness of the process from which they have arisen. These 
organisms, aware of their existence, are able to select among the means 
offered by the environment those which best satis:fy their own demands. 
When the stage of spirit is reached, the ends sought are also selected 
by the living organism, and the level of a personal being is attained. 
The distinguis):ling trait of man as a personal being is the fact that 
he is guided by an ideal which he envisages and toward which he strives. 
It is at the stage when personal beings arise in the development 
of the World-Process that Value also appears.l In the broadest sense, 
value resides in the way all things fit together in the universe, but 
the mindts capacity for consciously appreciating this relation is 
unique and warrants restricting the term value for this special ex-
perience.2 Speoliic values are produced vlhen mind finds satisfaction 
i-~ certain objects that are. apprehended. Thus the fitting together of 
mind tdth its environment constitutes value. 
1~ This does_not_mean that Value is of secondary importance, only 
i;hat like. personalJ..ty J.t appears later in time than matter. The status 
~~ value =:-n the World-Process and its significance in ~xplaining the 
~ocess mll be discussed in Chap.· VI of the present study. 
. 2 •. Se~ T~mple, Na~ure, Man and God, P• 165. Temple seems to be 
USLI'J.g. nund J..n uh~ ~ener::-c se~se in this context, and means by it a mode 
of be~g and actJ.VLty WJ.th dJ.stinctive characteristics. See the inter-~reta~J.o~ rend~red by V. P. Thoma,s, "Christian Theism and Absolute ~dealJ.stJ.c MonJ.sm ••• , 11 P• 36; also above, Chap. I. 
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The fundamental condition for the actualization of value is the 
mind1 s discovery of something akin to itself in its object.l Temple 
notes two aspects to the experience of the mind 1 s discovery of' llkin-
shiptt with its object: flFirst, that it finds the counterpart ot' the 
principle of its own activities;· ••• secondly, that with this dis-
covery goes a feeling of' being at home 1~th the object, not lost or 
bewildered in presence of it.u2 
Value becomes actualized, then, when a conscious being, capable 
of apprehending the "1-Torld in which he lives, selects certain aspects 
of that process as objects of appreciation and worth. Temple summarizes 
the characteristics constituting any value-experience: 
We find, then, that for any actual Value or Good 
there must be two factors in a certain relation-
ship- the Hvaluable 11 object and the apprehending 
and appreciating subject; and these must meet in 
an experience which ttsatisfiesfl or is fit for per-
manence.3 
Man apprehends the world and discovers in that apprehension certain 
features with which he :feels a lcinship; as a result he experiences a 
sense of satisfaction. The recognition of this sense of satisfaction 
by the individual constitutes value. Further, whenever anyone claims 
to experience a sense of satisfaction:in regard to certain objects, his 
l. See Temple, Nature, l>fan and God, p •. 208. 
2.. Ibid., p. 165. The notion of the Ukinshiptt of mind with real-
ity is also fundamental to Temple • s argument for God in Nature, Man and 
God; see below, Chap. VI. 
3. Temple, Ghristus Ver~tas, pp. 32-33. Good here is synonymous 
with value and is not to be confused with moral goodness 1.Jhich is con-
sidered below. 
claim is final and indisputable. 11To every man his o1om. sense of value 
is final •. ul Likewise, if one finds no satisfaction in regard to certain 
objects held to be valuable by others, it is useless to argue with him. 
If' a man says that he does not see w'.o.y he should 1-rant 
to know the Truth, or to appreciate Beauty, no argu-
ment can persuade him; if a man says he does not see 
why he ought to be good, no argument can persuade him. 2 
The subjective factor involved in value is therefore essential for· 
the actualization of value. This does not mean, however, that value 
is~ entirely relative to every individual or that an agreement on values 
is not possible. ~at one claims to be valuable he alone can determine 
based on his own intuition. BUt one t s taste in all areas of life can 
be developed, and through constant experience vrith certain objects one 
can begin to appreciate them so that they come to be regarded as valu-
able. The influence of others is paramount here. If someone vmom you 
a~mire enjoys Beethoven, you may decide to listen to Beethoven1 s music 
and gradually learn to appreciate it. It is of utmost importance in 
this regard for one to be rigorously honest with'himself as to what is 
t~y enjoyed for itself and what is enjoyed as a means to some other 
end.3 
The social nature of human personality also serves as a check on 
any relativistic conception of value. }~1 s membership in society 
1. Ibid!, P•· 24•· Of. also Nature of Personality, p. 72, and Mens 
Creatrix, p. 179. 
2.. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 26. 
3.. S.ee Temple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 179-lBO •. 
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places upon him the obligation of realizing certain values appropriate 
to his position.l 
MOre significant than any of these factors in ruling out a subjec-
tive view of value is the recognition of the significance of objects 
in value experience. The sense of satisfaction one feels is necessary 
for value to be recognized, but it is the object which is appreciated 
and which gives rise to the sense of satisfaction that is held to be 
valuable •. 2 The objective nature of value is thus evident in the very 
experience of val~e. Indeed, the satisfaction one receives from the 
objects appreciated is proportional to his concentration, not on him-
self or his satisfaction, but on the objects themselves:, 
The self is capable of complete satisfaction in 
proportion as it is left outside the field of its own 
attention. Value exists for subjects; but the sub-
ject finds the value only vmen completely absorbed 
in the object.3 
Actual value, then, is alvJays a relation to mind. It resides 
neither in the object held to be valuable nor in the subjective ex-
perience of satisfaction; rather, value as actual belongs to the sub-
ject-object relation itself.4 However, what is considered valuable 
1. See iQiQ.. , p. 180. This point has already been developed in 
terms of its significance for an understanding of human personali:ty in 
the preceding chapter. Its significance for ethical theory vrill be 
explored further in:the next section. 
2. See Christus Veritas, p. 25. 
3. Ibid., PP• 28-29. 
4. See Temple, Nature, !>:Ian and God, p. 208. 
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is not the sense of satisfaction one experiences, but the object ap-
prehended and appreciated. Hence, it is in the object that value 
primarily resides. An appreciating mind actualizes the value an ob-
ject possesses, but once actualized the value is objective.l 11And 
the Value once found is in some measure independent of the occurrence 
in which it is found. 112. 
Temple 1 s conception o:f value is far from clear. A value is 
actualized only vrhen an object is appreciated by mind. However, 1.Jhen 
mind appreciates an object, it evidently finds something that was valu-
able all the time. If this is true, then, the subjective appreciation 
has no effect on value. On the other hand, if an object is not valu-
able until appreciated, then it was only potentially valuable prior 
to the experience of appreciation. In another connection Temple 
suggests a distinction that is in accord 1f-Lth the latter alternative: 
Till Mind appeared as an episode in the world process, 
all other episodes had value in potentiality only, not 
in actuality--so far at least as the process itself sup-
plied the condition of its actualisation.3 
However, he does not develop the notion o:f potential value or relate 
it e"xplicitly to his theory of value. Hence, the relation of the 
:feeling of satisfaction to the object in which mind finds satisfaction 
remains ambiguous · in T.emple 1 s value theory., 
l. Ibifr., P• 165. 
2... Ibid. , p. 2.08. 
3. Ibid., P• 364; see also ibid., PP• 412-4].5. 
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2 •. The Three Forms of Absolute Goodness 
Vhlue consists in the interaction of mind with its environment 
resulting in the mind1 s feeling of satisfaction with what it discovers 
in the environ.m.ent.l The three chief forms of satisfaction customarily 
referred to as absolute values are truth, beauty, and goodness.2 TeillJP:il:.e 
summarizes the nature of value and the occasion for the appearance of 
each of these three values in the following passage: 
The essential condition for the actualiaation 
of Value is the discovery by ~Sud of itself or its 
own principle in its object. 
When Hind makes this discovery in the activity of 
contemplation, the form of Value actualised is Beauty. 
When Hind makes this discovery in the activity of 
analysis and ~thesis, the form of Value actualised is 
Truth. 
When Mind makes this discovery in the activity of 
personal relationship the form of Value actualised is 
Goodness.3 
These three values are not to be regarded equally. Thus, not all 
of them are absolute in the sense that it would ah1ays be best to pursue 
them. For a value to be absolute it "ought to be one which is good in 
all conditions whatsoever, not only a value which has in itself no 
1.. SSe Temple, Christianity in Thought and Practice, p. 23. 
2. Here goodness designates moral goodness or goodness of charac-
ter. See Nature, Man and God, p. 135. 
3.. Ibid •. , p. 164. Truth has already been discussed in Chap. II, 
and Templet s views on moral goodness -vlill be e:x:pounded at length in the 
next·section. His views on beauty are not sufficiently germane to the~ 
subject of the present study to warrant separate treatment. His de-
finitive statement on the subject is found in Mens Creatrix, pp. 93-
152. At this point a brief statement of each of the chief values suf-
fices. 
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negative element. uL It is, for instance, not necessarily good that all 
individuals strive to gain all the knowledge that their capacities per-
mit. liTo forgo the opportunity of acquiring some minute and probably 
unimportant fraction of knowledge in order to give pleasure to others 
might he permissible or even obligatory. n2. The same is the case with 
beauty. There is no gainsaying the intrinsic value of beauty. But 
at the same time something which is beautiful may have an adverse ef-
feet upon some one insufficiently mature to appreciate its true worth. 
In each case the defect is not due to any evil inherent in either 
truth or beauty, but to the fact that the perfection of each one can 
have negative effects. 
With regard to moral goodness the situation is different. Goodness 
is the only absolute value in the sense that it is alvrays better for 
man to be as good as he can be and never better for him to be worse than 
he can.3 Also, the supremacy of goodness of character over the other 
values is implicit in the conception of value itself. If value arises 
in the World-Process 1-ilien mind feels a kinship I·Iith ~orhat it apprehends 
in that process, then it follm.rs that the fullest possible satisfaction 
can be attained and the most adequate standard of value is revealed only 
1. Temple, Nature, r.fun and God, p. 136. 
3. S.ee ~·, p. 138. The validity of Templer s point hinges on 
his establishing the supremacy of personal development. If the origin 
and nature of the World-Process is for the sake of the fullest realiza-
tion of personality, then his view of the supremacy of moral goodness 
is well taken. The justification of this position has in part been 
presented in the t1.ro preceding chapters and will be fully expounded in 
Chap. VI. 
when mind discovers another mind to which it feels related.l 
Temple is confusing in regard to the status of truth, beauty, and 
goodness. He refers to them as absolute values, but, then, indicates 
that what he really means is that 11there are three forms of absolute 
value-intellectual, aesthetic, and moral. t12 Love is held to be the 
absolute value 1-rhich is best expressed through truth, beauty, a.11.d good-
ness. Love ttuses each of the three as its channel to reveal and com-
municate itself. tt3 "What is the manifestation of value evident in 
each of these specific values? With the above discussion as background 
a brief analysis of truth, beauty, and goodness as relatively absolute 
values is in order at this point.4 
Man 1 s ability to reflect upon the proce·ss of which he is a part 
has already been analyzed at some length. It is sufficient to note 
here that man can think correctly or incorrectly about what he appre'"" 
hends. Aproper apprehension of the world_results in the value called 
truth. That truth is desired by man, at least as a means, is evident, 
for only in this way can he fulfill whatever plans he has. But truth 
can also be sought as an end in itself, and then what is desired is 
"the perfect correlation of' mind to Reality .. n5 Truth in this sense is 
1. See T_emple, Nature, Man and God, pp. 167-16S .. 
2. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 261 n. 1. 
3. Ibid., P• 27. 4· See ibid., pp~ 27-28. 
5. Ibid. , p. 27. 
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the ultimate goal of man1 s intellect and one of the supreme values of 
life. 
Beauty is also one of the supreme values of life and it bears a 
close relationship -vlith truth. Thus, flbea:uty is the perfect (i.e., 
truly adequate) expression of the value of any trutP. or fact. ul The 
difference bet1.Jeen truth and beauty is that the former appeals to man 1 s 
intellect, vihereas the appeal of beauty is to man 1 s feeling. When 
beauty is pursued for its own sa..'i{e.r the goal is rta perfect correlation 
of feeling with the various values of what is apprehended by con-
sciousness. tt2 Feeling connotes here not merely a subjective state of 
the artist, but the artist1 s expression of that state in some form. 
The intellectual and feeling aspects of man vThich truth and beauty 
each emphasize respectively are both involved in man 1 s quest for moral 
goodness• The total self is correlated with the environment in the 
realization of this value. Thus Temple states: 11Goodness (of character) 
is the perfect correlation of all the elements of personality into 
one -vlb.ole, and of that whole with its env:l.~onment, especially its per-
sonal environment.u3 
Goodness is a distinctively human value which man himself creates. 
Whereas truth is apprehended but not constructed by ma..11, and beauty is 
both appreciated and produced with appreciation predominating, goodness 
is predominantly a htu~ achievement. The distinctive life each in-
dividual lives represents llan original contribution to the scheme of 
2. Ibid., P• 28 •. 3. Ibid. 
tb.illgs. nl. ~at contr~but~on a person snoULd make constitUtes one of tne 
fundronenta1- proble!llS of etJ:dcS con:fronting eacn ind~vidUJll• 1ffi e:&>-
pl.orat~on of tbis issue must now be made. 
B. Personal. EthicS 
... TI'e mora1- le%1.• :Man nas tne capacity for botll melllDr:f a:nd 
1.. Man as a Moral. Being 
allticipat~on. Jle can form concepts of types of experiences W.icn are 
not actuallY present to ]:ds senses. In tnis ~Y man formulates a type 
of experience ;W.icll )le woULd ll]<e to )lave and to"""'d w)licn ne str~..,s, 
namelY, idea1-s.i' Principles are tnus fornrola:ted and accepted as guideS 
to one's cona:uct. T)le s~gn:if~cance of tne ruture for persona1-~ty is 
once again apparent. T)l~s capac~t:Y of man to conceive of, and be 
directed by, ~deals a:nd princ~pleS entitleS n;i.In to rignts aS a persona1-
being in a society of persons, and at tbe same t;i.Ine places upon n;i.In dut~es wnicll will preserve and foster personality.3 T)lis means rurtner 
t)lat tne mora1- level )las been attained; for ends can be cnosen .,)lien 
z... See ibid., PP•· 52-53· 
3. Man t)l:us moves beyond clai:mS and counterclaimS appropriate at 
tne level of tlle brute or witn regard to tne relat~on of a person to 
a; brUte. Since an an:llnal experiences pain, it Jl)akes a claim upon man 
not to cause it to suffer ;ndiscr:llninatelY• Rignts and aut~es now-
ever, involve a rec~procity betveen t)le part~c~pants .,)lien dem~d a 
degree of self-s"""'eness an:J_nlals do not seem to )lave. 
1... lb:i.d., P• 32· I 
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guide the individual and i-Thich are not merely means to a determined 
end.1 .. Finally, it signifies that man1 s actions are his mm, revealing 
at once his individuality and the basis of moral responsibility.2 
Each individual is, therefore, unique, but this does not mean 
that he is independent of his environment. Growth in both body and 
mind requires reaction to something else and nourishment £rom another 
source. It is for this reason that the influence of others, partic-
ularly society, .:t.-s· so significant. :Man is moved to act upon, a...Dd 
to interact vrith, his environment (iDcluding other persons) by desire~ 
One of these desires at the level of huma...D nature is for the approval 
of others. In order to satisfy this desire the individual must be 
concerned vrith the needs and wants of others. Tb act in this vray is 
to seek the welfare of society which is the primary expression of 
morality, since morality can best be defined in terms of one 1 s social 
obligations.3 The terms peculiar to moral value--namely, duty, 
obligation, and ought- need to be understood in terms of the personal 
relations shared by members of society; but before this can be done, 
it is essential to understand the nature and content of the moral ob-
ligation man feels. 
1., · See Temple, Nature, 1Jfa.n and God, p. 517. 
2... Bee Ohristus Veritas, p .• 57 .. 
3. As noted in the preceding chapter, Temple changed his position 
in this connection. In Mens Cxeatrix, p. 182, he tends to identify 
morality with social obligation, but in Ohristus Veritas, p. 28, n. 1, 
he views obligation as more basic than social responsibility. The 
bearing this has on his interpretation of obligation will be noted in 
the discussion which follows. 
b. Sense of' moral obligation as uniqu~. An analysis of' hnnan 
conduct reveals the f'act that at times individuals f'eel an obligation 
to perform, or not perform, a certain act. ~his sense of' obligation 
is not to be confused with the con·bent of' obligation, that is, "What 
one feels he is obligated to do. The imperative which one feels to do 
(or not to do) something is unconditional, though that which consititutes 
the obligation is conditioned by his culture and spciety.l Hence, the 
sense of' obligation is unique and represents a dimension of' hum~~ per-
sonality; the content of' obligation is derivative, reflecting as it 
does the various i.nf'luences of' the environment on the self'.2 
c.. Content of' obligation as derivative-. 1vf.m1, thus, experiences 
an obligation to do something, and this feeling is integral to his 
nature as a self-conscious being; but 1.Jb.at he is to do or to be is not 
determined by his nature alone, but also by his experiences in the 
social context which constitutes his environment. In this vray one ca:o. 
understand both the universality of' moral obligation as an experienced 
fact of' human personality and the variety of' moral codes I.Jb.ich dif'-
f'erent cultures have evolved. The fact of' moral obligation as unique 
and inherent in self-consciousness must not be blurred or discarded 
because of' the many dif'f'erent types of' conduct to which it becomes 
attached. Like~use, the f'act that the content of' obligation does vary 
to such a wide extent from culture to culture must not be explained 
1.. The experience of' absolute obligation is f'or Temple the e%-
perience of' C~d, see Ghristus Veritas~ p. 95. 
2., See Temple, Nature, Han and God.r pp. 168-169. 
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away because constant throughout is the sense of obligation. 
Only when both of these facts are taken together can personal 
morality be adequately understood a..11d guidance in ethical living provid-
ed. The sense of obligation makes morality possible, but it is dis-
cerning the nature of the sense of obligation and what constitutes the 
legitimate object of one 1 s feeling of obligation which poses the moral 
problems. It is necessary, therefore, to ask what the consciousness' 
of obligation in itself me~11s and, further, what is the proper goal of 
moral obligation? 
2~. EUnd81llental Moral Principles 
a. The obligation to be conscientious. An analysis of the ex-
perience of obligation itself provides only the most formal solution 
to the problem of a choice of the proper object of obligation. F'or 
what is commanded by the sense of obligation one feels is to do what 
he considers to be right. As such, the command is absolute: one is 
to -vri.ll the right. But no guidance is provided in the command as to 
what it is that is right for one to do.l-
However, this absolute command to will what one considers right, 
though devoid of specific content, is nonetheless significant. Thexe 
is a universal sense of obligation but different interpretations of 
1. See ibid., pp. 178-179, 405. For a similar vie-vr of moral 
obligation see Peter Anthony Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosonhz 
of Religion (New York:: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 239. HovTever, 
Temple confines the imperative of the experience of obligation to do 
what is right, whereas Bertocci does not specify. 
the content of' obligation. The sense of' obligation which :man feels as· 
absolute and unconditional is not to be attached to any particular co~­
mand but rather is a command to the person himself' al1-re.ys to do 1.rhat 
is right. Man 1 s obligation, then, is to be conscientious in the choices 
he malces and the actions he performs. Obligation in this sense is the 
correlate of' the e::;,.'Perience of' value, that is, llabsolute obligation of' 
absolute value.nl However, such obligation does not specify what par-
ticular acts in any situation it is right f'or him to do. 
Absolute obligation therefore attaches not to the 
act, but to the will.. It is m:y absolute duty to 
wall the right; but there is no act which it is my 
absolute duty, independently of' circumstances, to 
do or not to do •••• Thus as vre search f'or the proper 
subject of absolute obligation we are driven back 
f'rom act to agent, f'rom conduct to character.2 
Just what is meant by referring to obligation as the correlate of' 
value is not clarified. Perhaps, '.rremple means that onet s absolute ob-
ligation is always to express love, the one absolute value. This wo1.:t:Ld 
be consistent with his emphasis on love of neighbor as the only valid 
form of' the moral law. Ho-vrever, Temple does not make this connection 
and, hence, "Yrhat he intended is uncertain:.. 
b. Tne optimif'ic princ;ple. To discover the proper object of' 
of' mants sense of obligation it has been necessary to distinguish be-
tween the imperative one feels to do what is right and any specific act 
l. Temple, Ohristus Veritas, p. 28; n. 1. Temple 1;s change in 
position is made evident at this point. 
2. Temple, ·Nature, Man and God, pp. 178-179. 
he takes to be right in a given situation. Thus~ obligation is more 
a matter of a man 1 s character than his conduct. But character and con-
duct cannot be separated in practice, and it is guidance f'or the lat-
ter that is needed. vfuat principle should constitute the basis f'or 
determining -vmat it is right f'or an individual to do in a particular 
situation? 
The solution to this problem is stated f'ormally in what G. E. 
Moore ref'erred to as the optimific principle, namely, 11the new that 
those acts are right ·which are productive of most good.trl In view of' 
this principle one must always consider the total consequences of' his 
actions in terms of \~ether or not the ef'fects produced are, on the 
whole, the best for all concerned. 
bur duty is alvlays to do the right thing, and • ... • 
the right thing is the a.c:t or dif'ference made i-l"hich 
contains the greatest possible good, so that part 
of our duty is to ascertain what this is.2 
c. Lack of certainty in ethics. What is right, then, in any 
situation can be stated in principle to be whatever tends to produce 
the greatest good. But this criterion is inadequate 1t1hen one strives 
to apply it in actual concrete situations. In the first place, all 
the consequences of any act cannot be determined. Secondly, the cri-
terion noted fails to give guidance in distinguishi~g between dif'-
ferent kinds of good. As an example of' the dif'f'iculty involved Temple 
1. Ibid., p. 406; see also ibid., p. l80. 
2. ~·, P• 182. As will be brought out below, what is right:, 
for one to do is identical Vlith what is the good f'or all. 
offers the following dilemma:. 
Most will agree that it is in general better to 
p_ursue knowledge than to pursue p;J..easure, to es-
cape: from ignorance rather than from pain. But 
few would admit that it would be right to choose 
a course of action that would lead to an increase 
of knowledge rather than one which would deliver 
a man (still more a multitude of men) from great 
suffering, if both could not be PNrsued together.1 
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Ohe'·s choice of a scale of values is involved here; and how is 
one to know which particular value should have priority in any given 
situation? To be able to decide this would necessitate knowing the 
total effects of the P.0ssible alternative:actions, but no such knowl-
edge is forthcoming. There must always be~a lack of certainty in re-
gard to the rightness o:f any specific action taken. The individual is 
called.uppn to do what is right, but he can establish that he has ful-
filled his obligation only by the risk of action taken which at the time 
he is not certain is right. Such is the adventure of moral living?21 
Such adventurous action in the moral reaim cannot be and shou]d 
not be eliminated. It is part and parcel of the mature moral life. 
But for the constant and conflicting choices which confront man, more 
concretffi guidance than is offered in the utilitarianism evident in 
the optimific princiP.le is essential if morality is not to degenerate 
into subjectivism. 
To affirm conscientiousness as. a universal obligation indicatss 
the moral dimension of man's nature, but only serves to pose, not solve, 
1. Nature, Man and God, P•· l$J. 2. See ibid. 
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the practical moral problem of what one is obligated to do in a specific 
situation. Even to suggest that one's obligation is always to produce 
the greatest good in light of the total consequences is but a formal 
resolution and contains little specific guidance in determining what 
course of action offers the best chance of producing the best results. 
What these analyses have revealed of special significance in solv-
ing the theoretical problems of ethics is the necessity for placing the 
emphasis not on human conduct but on human character. Similarly, per-
haps a solution to the practical problem ethics poses of knowing what 
acts are best in a given context can be solved by concentrating not on 
the action to be taken but on the agent who must decide. An exposition 
of the roots of obligation, both as a unique faculty of human person-
ality and the derivative aspects in regard to the content of obliga-
tion, may provide the clue that is sought. 
3. Practical Principles of Guidance 
a.. Social significance of origin of obligation. Moral obliga-
tion may be seen to have three primary bases in the emergence and 
development of human personality in the World-Process.l First is the 
fact of mants status in the universe as one center of conscious aware-
ness.in the universe. lis soon as the individual becomes conscious of 
his own consciousness and hence self-conscious, he likewise is made 
aware that he is one of many such self~conscious centers which the 
1.. See Temple, Christus Veritas, pp. 69-71, and N_ature, Man anQ, 
QQ.g,, pp. lg5-1B9. 
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universe has produced and, therefore, that he shares this fact in com-
mon with others. A bond more profound than the clash of commercial 
interests binds men together. 
In the second place as soon as a plan of action regarding him-
self and his own interests is formulated, it becomes apparent to him 
that others have a claim upon him Hhich he recognizes as binding. And" 
finally, to achieve the integration of self which he desires he must 
submit to a purpose which can utilize effectively all his energies. 
SUch a purpose to be fUlly satisfying cannot be one directed only to 
himself, for woven into his own being is the influence and guidance of 
others. He is a social being by birth, training, and inclination, and 
can thus gain full satisfaction of his entire self only by dedication 
to a social purpose. 
b.. Membership in society as a clue to right action. The importance 
of an analysis of the actual development of an individual 1 s sense of ob-
ligation, both in regard to its uniqueness as an absolute command to 
do the right and what is considered to be right by him, is that it re-
turns the discussion to the concrete realm of individual choice. The 
content of obligation, since it involves the influence of the individ-
ual1 s total environment, must be viewed in the perspective of the in-
dividualrs relation to society. What one feels obligated to do does 
not develop in a vacuum. From the start each individual is a member 
' 
of some society.l His survival and the realization of any plan he 
1. ·· Temple 1 s epistemology noted above in Chap. II is significant 
at this point. Man r s lmowledge of the world and himself is from the 
beginning based on his interaction ~r.ith his environment. 
-- - - -- - -- -- -- - - ---- -- - I - - -- - -- - - - -- -
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has is to a greater or lesser extent dependent on the other members of 
that society.L The responsibility ~.Jb.ich is his, then, is likewise to 
a great extent determined by his membership in society.2 Herein 
resides the cogency of F. H. Bradley's famous essay on 11My Station and 
Its Duties. 113 The actual obligations ~orhich are placed upon one depend 
on the role he has to play in the Social structure of which he is a 
member and on the nature of that structure. Thus, the sense of ob-
ligation as it is actually manifested in any individual's life may'be 
defined as follows: 
That sense of obligation is the spontaneous 
reaction of a person who is a member of society 
towards acts or suggestions •iliich conform to or 
contradict the standards of conduct which under 
the influence of experience have come to be ac-
cepted in his community.4 
The theoretical problem of ethics regarding one 1 s duty is thus 
solved formally by the recognition of one's membership in society and 
the contribution one can make to that society. As significant as this 
solution is, ho•rever, it fails to answer the questions of how one 
determines what his place in society should be, and hence how he is 
to go about making his contribution. 
1.. See Temple, Nature, J:.fan and God, PP• 185-187. 
2. See Temple, l-Iens Creatrix, pp. 180, 193, 195. 
3. See F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies. In Temple see Nature, 
Man and GOd, p. 189. 
4.. Temple, Nature, Han and God, p. 188. 
I ,' 
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To this issue it will be-necessary to return, but for the present 
another consequence of conceiving obligation in terms of membership in 
society vrarrants explication. The question -which such a contention 
raises is Whether or not such a position fosters a conservative, even 
reactionary, attitude toward the existing social order so that ~orhat is, 
is held to be right. This does not follow, however, except in the ex-
treme and negative form which states that it is always -wrong to take 
action 1~ch would eliminate any society whatsoever. Only the avoid-
ance of anarchy can legitimately be inferred as an unconditional 
obligation from the necessity of mants membership in society. Indeed, 
the obligation of individuals to society is to seek constantly to 
. 1 improve J.t. 
It is particularly pertinent at this point to note that what one 
feels is his obligation will be influenced by the training he receives-. 
Though a sense of obligation cannot be cultivated, the content of 
obligation can be. In terms of one 1 s loyalty to society, this train-
ing should consist in expanding his conception of society to widen· 
and wider.· communities, encompassing more and more peop:Le until all 
mankind is recognized as having a claim upon him. 2 
Erogress, in the form of a change in the existing social order, 
may also occur by the reflection of an individual member on some of the 
1. See Temple; Mens Creatrix, pp. 207, Zll. This would seem 
to have been Socrates' position in the Orito. 
2. See Temple, Nature, Man cu~d God, p. 187. 
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basic principles accepted by the society and by the application of 
them in a way not previously done. In this way Wilberforce success-
fully opposed slavery in England.1 
Thus~ though one 1 s membership in society determines his actual 
obligation, this does not impede progress or foster stagnation. No, 
society is perfect, and the appeal of the sense of obligation al1·rays 
to seek what is right extends beyond the existing social order in 
quest.of a still better one. This sense of an absolute obligation 
independent of any one social structure, though always operating 
through some one society, reveals mants inherent value and worth. 2 
"To have a sense of absolute obligation is implicitly to claim in-
herent and ultimate value.n? 
It is the recognition of the intrinsic value of personality which 
provides• the proper perspective from which personal relations are to· 
be vie1..red. In so doing one recognizes another as a person and recog-
nizes the principle of personality each shares. When one become~ 
aware of himself as a person and respects others as persons also, 
the basic principle of morality has been made explicit. As Temple 
puts~ it:: 
1. See ibid., p •. l76, and Mens Creatrix~ pp •. l97-19S. 
2. This would seem to convey the significance of Temple 1 s 
change in position already noted in which obligation is more basic 
than social responsibility and is the source of it. 
3. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 190. 
The principle of morality is that we should behave 
as Personffiwho are members of a Society of Persons~-­
a Society into ~orh.ich Personality is itself a valid 
claim of entrance. We are to treat all Persons as 
Persons, and all as fellov1-members ·with us in the 
Society of Persons. Actual duties will depend upon 
actual personal relationship;: there is a special 
duty of parent to :Child: and child to parent.l 
196 
The primary concern of each person is the best and highest develop-
ment of the personality of all. Personal goods_, have priority over 
all non-personal goods~ 2 Society too is for the sake of personal 
development even as personality cannot fully develop apart from 
society.3 
c;; · Love of neighbor,· as the absolute moral lav. These consider."'-
ations lead to the conclusion that the one expression of the moral 
law w.hich is truly rmi versal and rmcondi tional is contained in the· 
commandment:~ HThou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. n4 Each 
p:erson is to cormt himself as one and only one. The acceptance of thiS3 
fact and its implications in terms of one 1 s mm loyal:tiea> and interest$ 
constitute the prima~ moral task for each indi~idual. To love another· 
1. Ibid., p. 191. The influence of Kant is evident here 
especially in the second and third formulations of his:Oategorica:l 
I:inperative, or 1-rhat are referred to as the practical imperatives~ 
In the third formula-tion Kant states:~ rtEvery rational being must act~ 
as if he, by his maxims, were at all times a legislative member in thff-
universal realm of ends.n' Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of 
Moral$iri the Critique of Practical Reason and other .•• , tr~~s. 
Beck, p •. 95. 
2"! See Temple, Nature, Nan and God, p. 193. 
3. See Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 211. 
4· Ibid., p •. 206;, Ohristus Ve:dtas, p. 215;: Nature, 1:4an_ and God, 
PP· 195, 406. 
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as one loves himself is the essential practical problem of personal 
ethics:~ Each individual is called upon to be conscientious~: in his:~ 
pursuit of' what he considers to be right but guided in what is right 
by his feeling of' love f'or others. 
Can such concern for others be realistically asked of' the 
individual?: Indeed, does not the fact of self-conscious awareness:; 
make it inevitable that what each one considers right and good both 
for himself' and f'or others vrl.ll seem more correct than what others; 
af'f'irm'C Can it be any other way if man t.s individuality as a f'ocus of' 
conscious awareness is to be maintained?.· Temple succinctly states:the 
dilemma confronting each individual:~ t'He is a being particular and 
f'inite called to live by a principle universal and infinite;: and his~ 
particularity distorts his vision. 111 One is lifted out of his partie-· 
ularity by loving another as himself' and thus he is commanded to love. 
Bt1t love cannot be commanded; it can only be elicited. 
d. The failure of' f'ormal solutions. Thus the solution of the 
practical problem of' ethics is only provisionally solved by the command-
ment to love one 1 s neighbor. For if' this could be accomplished by the· 
self alone, then ethics ~orould pose no problem. Bt1t it is precisely 
:tnan 1:s f'ailure to love -vlhich causes the problem. Hence, the practical 
problem of' ethics becomes:: Ho1tr can individuals come to love one 
another?': As long as this issue remains unsolved, practical ethics 
is:; rendered impotent. 
1. Temple, Ghristus Veritas, p. 215. 
The situation is the same with regard to the theoretical problems 
of ethics. 1~ has the obligation to do what is right, and this means 
to promote the greatest good. However~ no help is provided by these 
principles for deciding what is~ in fact, right to do in a given situ-
ation. And though the solution was proposed that membership in 
society provides the clue to right action, this too is only a formal 
resolution and the guidance most needed was not forthcoming. How is 
one to determine vrhat his particular membership in his particular 
society com..rnands of him? Furthermore, to know that one 1 s .station in 
society determines his duties is important, but what one also needs 
to know is what his place is in his society. 
The failure to resolve these issues indicates the inadequacy 
of ethics to solve the problems which are raised by ethics on the 
level of ethical science alone. To solve them adequately ethics must 
submit to the insights of religion. 11For the problems of' Ethics arise 
out of the relations of finite spirits to each other, but can only 
be rightly determined by reference to the relation of those finite 
spirits to the Infinite Spirit.ul 
Pi/ comment is in order at this point regarding Temple 1s approach. 
Is the alleged failure of ethics to solve its ovro problems due to 
ethics or to Temple 1 s statement of the problem and the solution he 
vrlshes to impose? Temple has a definite ideal for man in mind; and 
when philosophical ethics fails to measure up to the ideal, he 
1. Temple, ~ture, Man and God, p. 172. 
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criticizes it. But it is questionable whether such an approach is 
legitimate since he is un-vrilling to modif'y the ideal in accordance w:i th 
the demands of experience. Tne content of the ideal Temple is employ-
ing becomes evident L~ the follovnng section. 
c.. The Need of Ethics for Religion 
1. Conversion as the Solution to Practical Ethics 
It is well before proceeding in an attempt to solve the theoret-
ical and practical problems of ethics to state more carefully what 
man1s moral situation is. This entails bringing together in a dif'fer-
ent way material already presented in the present chapter as well as 
previous discussions in the two preceding chapters. 
a. l~1 s moral situation as a self-centered being. Man emerges 
in the World-Br®cess as the culmination of the process, containing 
within himself all four levels of reality: matter, life, mind, and 
spirit •. He is a psycho-physical organism. Combining as he does 
many desires, needs, interests, and aspirations, man possesses a unity 
which is at first only partial and is always precarious. It is rooted 
in the unity provided by the physical organism. But part of his 
natural tendency is to strive toward a fuller unity under the guidance 
of a purpose to vrhich the total self can respond.l' .Also, one desire 
man has is for the approval of others, and hence the attitudes and 
a:ctions of others exercise a significant influence on the individual. 
1. See Temple, Ohristus Veritas, PP• 66, 213. 
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But what significance and vTho in particular will influence him are 
the individual 1 s choices. 
Furthermore, each individual is a finite center of self-con-
sciousness and of value-realization. Value existed only potentially 
until mind appeared in the process capable of appreciating what it 
apprehended and thereby actualizing the value of 0bjects.l ~fum not 
only experiences :pleasure and pain; he is aware that he is experienc-
ing them and is able to select among objects presented to him which 
ones he chooses to pursue and to enjoy. Be is able to deterw~e the 
direction of his attention and action by his awareness that he is a:t-
tending and by his selection of some objects among those available for 
his attention. This places man on a moral level, for he can choose not 
merely-the means to a predetermined end but the end itself.2 
Herein lies the source of both the grandeur and the misery of 
man.3 · .Pis a center of value-realization man has inherent worth and is 
able to engage L11 the quest for truth, beauty, and goodness; but as a 
finite center of consciousness, man possesses a limited vision of the 
process of which he is a part and which he partly transcends by his 
1. SSe Temple, Nature, ~..an and God, P• 364• As noted above, un-
fortunately Temple does not relate the notion of potentiality indicated 
here to his theory of value. 
2. see Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 517 • 
.3. Gf. David E. Roberts The Grandeur and Misery of Man (New York: ~Aford University Press, 1955), especially PP• 14.3-151. 
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a1rrareness of' his status in it. He apprehends the world and appreci-
ates values; but because it is ahmys his apprehension and his ap-
preciation~ he is prone to place more importance on himself' than on 
another as apprehender and appreciator and more importance on his ideas 
and aspirations than those of' others~ even when his prove unworthy or 
-wrong. 
Morally this means that each individual directs his lif'e by •·That 
appears to be good to him, that is, by what T.emple calls the apparent 
good .. l It could not be any other 1.;1ay than this since each individual 
is a self-conscious center of' value experience. But the remilt is that~ 
each tends to care more f'or what he takes to be good than what others 
do, and to assume that the apparent good f'or him is the true good f'or 
So he becomes not only the subject of' his ovm value 
judgements, vmich he can never cease to be, but also 
the centre and criterion of' his ovm system of' values, 
which he is quite unf'it to be.2 
Thus the sin which is man 1 s is the constant tendency to exag-
g~rate the importance of' vlhat is his because it is his, quite apart 
f'rom its actual value as contrasted with what belongs to others.3 To 
do this is to act directly contrary to the ethical goal f'or man which 
1.. See:· Temple, Nature, :Man and God, p. 362. 
2.. Ibid.', p •. 365~ 
3., S.ee ibid;., p. 370, and Christus Veritas, p. 215. FOr Temple 
this is the true meaning of' original sin. 
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commands him to love another as he loves h:iJ.nself'. Man 1 s s:U1 is thus 
his self-centeredness -vrhich tempts him to give priority to his ·Own 
concerns, whether justified or not. 
It is important, however, to recall that it is in the self and 
the self1s activ~ties that the possibility of any realization of value 
resides. Hence, nit is self-centredness tha.t is evil, not selfhood. 
Selfhood is a precondition of all true good.ttlL The destruction of 
the self is not at issue, but rather a recognition and acceptance by 
the self of its subordinate status in the entire process and the need 
to place the Spirit of the Whole at tbe center of its life. But tbis 
the self cannot do of itself', for of itself' it is and must remain its 
m:m center. 
b. The self1 s bondage to itself.. This same dilemma that man 
faces can be stated i."Yl terms of freedom and in so doing l'rill point 
up the ;,ray of resolution. To be free does not mean that something is 
uncaused •. The lattel~ 1-rould make for chaos. Thus the real question 
concerns the mode of determination and not whether an event is deter-
m:iried or not.2 
In the course of the World-Process the transition from physical 
particles to personality is evidenced by an increase in the significance 
of individuality for the results produced. Movement of physical parts 
1. Temple, Nature, 14an and God, p. 376. 
2. See ibid., p. 229. 
is :for all practical purposes determined by external :force and only in 
a small ·Hay by the particularity o:f the part i tsel:f •. Hmvever, at the 
level o:f personality the contribution o:f the character o:f the person 
is paramount. The reason :for this, making it possible :for the self"' 
to deterniine itself', is rooted in the capacity :for :free ideas.l In 
this way the mind is able to detach itself' in a limited but significant 
way :from the needs o:f the organism so as to contemplate possible ends 
toward 1wich it can choose to work. Once having chosen them it is 
determined by them in what it becomes.. Hence the :freedom which is 
gained resides in the sel:f 1 s choice o:f "VThat will nourish its body. 
S1nce decision in any given moment is determined primar1-ly by one 1 s 
character at t~_at moment, and character itself' is determined by what 
ideas and ideals one :fixes his attention on, the real :freedom man has 
is in the choice of' ~is attention. 2 Or, to state the same idea in 
another '!tray, the primary choice made by each individual is in terms 
o:f what he will permit to influence him.3 
Thus, man chooses ivhat to him is his apparent good, which in turn 
determines what he will be and do. Such :freedom can be bondage o:f the 
most extreme :form i:f what is chosen as apparent good is not, in f'act, 
the true good; :for th~ s~lt is the source o:f action, but f'rom the self'. 
there is no escape.4 
1. See ~·, p. 230. 2. See ibid. , p. 384 •. 
3~ See Temple, Ghristus Veritas, p. 219. 
4~ Of'. Temple, b~ns Greatrix, p. 141~; Ghristus Veritas, p. 58, 
and Nature, Man and God, pp. 241, 385. 
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c. Quest fo-r values as a means of partial escaPe from self.. The 
bondage vlhich is man t s due to his freely chosen apparent good may be 
partially alleviated through the quest for truth, beauty, and good-
ness.+-
The emphasis in both t1~th and beauty is on the object perceived, 
and submission to it is essential i:f its truth is to be discovered or 
its beauty revealed. However, escape is partial in that only an aspect 
of man's self-centered nature is involved, not his total self. ff'Eruth 
and Beauty draw the self from its sel:f-centredness, but only in respect. 
to certain functions. The deepest springs of life are not yet 
tGuched •. n2 
In goodness, however, the obligation placed upon the individual 
is ,to love another as himself -.;.fuich -vrould mean deserting self-
centeredness itself.~ Here one reaches the core of the problem.. For 
man can proceed by gradual steps to concern himself more and more 1nth 
others, taking their needs into account even as he does his own. But 
this is still not enough; for no matter hovi 1.-Jide the circle becomes and 
even if it includes all manki.n.d, the individual self is still its 
center.4 It is the same with the effort of the individual to-t.rard dis-
interested love. That disinterested love is a possibility for the 
self is evidenced in the feeling of affection which the child has for 
1. See- Temple, Nature, ]ff..an and God, P• .385., 
2. Ibid._, p • .387. .3. Bee ibid., P• .3$8. 
4• See ibid., p. .394· 
the mother and J.n the willJ.ngness of persons to gJ.ve theJ.r lJ.ves and 
themselves to the servJ.ce of others.. But J.t must be noted that cine 
loves only one person (or at most a few persons) in thJ.s way, and to 
thJ.s person one :feels a close affinity. The relation is one of lover 
and beloved with each belongJ.ng to the other. Thus, 1tA loves B :for 
being B. Yet thJ.s love is rooted n1 the special appeal ~rl1ich B has 
for A.lfl 
Hence, though real progress is made both in ~~dening onets area 
of loyalty and in effectively loving another :for the other1 s sake, 
the self is still at the center. Indeed, if one concentrates on 
delivering himself from self-centerecL11ess, that is procuring his ov.m 
salvation, then he is apt to be proud of being delivered from his 
pride and thereby never fully loses it.2 
d. God as the center of the self. The only conclusion which 
can be drawn J.s that if the self is to forget himself in servJ.ce to 
others, then something beyond the self must take hold of the self 
which means an abrupt break with his own spiritual progress, or ~orhat 
religJ.on calls a conversion. The self as one locus of conscious ap-
prehension and appreciation ~~thin the World-Process can apprehend and 
appreciate adequately only if at the center of J.ts actJ.vities J.s the 
1.. Ibid., p. ~93. 
2. Cf. ~., p. 390, with the :fourth temptatJ.on in T. S. Eliot, 
M..lrder i...11 the Cathedral (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), 
p. 44· fThe last temptation is the greatest treason: to do the right 
deed :for the wrong reason.n 
Spirit of the Whole or God.:L But to make God the center of one's 
attention is not mant s to do. 
What is ·quite certain is that the self cannot by 
any ef'f'ort of' its own lift itself' off its m-m self 
as centre and resystematise itself about God as its 
centre. Such radical conversion must be the act of' 
God, and that too by some process other than the 
gradual self-purification of' a self-centered soul 
assisted by the ever-present influence o:f God dif-
fused through nature including human nature. It 
cannot be a process only of' enlightenment. Nothing 
can suffice but a redemptive act. SOmething 
impinging upon the self' from without must deliver 
it f'rom the ftreedom ~iliich is perfect bondage to the 
bonda~e which is its only perfect freedom.2 
But man cannot beoonverted against his will any more that he can 
will to convert himsel:f.a Man must find that the good he seeks is 
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only attained through surrendering himself' to God. Sacrificial love 
alone is capable of eff'ecting this result .. 
The one hope, then, of' bringing human selves. 
into right relationship to God is that GOd 
should declare His love in an act, or acts, of' 
sheer self'-sacri:fice, thereby 1-.r:inn:ing the 
f'.reely of'f.ered love of' the f'in:i te selves -vrhich 
He has created .. 4 
One f'inite center of self-consciousness must become the focus of' God 
himself', which when adopted by others as their center frees them from 
1. Of. Temple, Ohristus Veritas, p •. 220, and Nature, Man and 
God, p. 376 •. 
z.. T.em.ple, Nature, lYfa.n and Ged, p •. 397.~ 
3. See ibid., p. 401; of'. also Church and Nation (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1915}, P• 27. 
4. 11&9: .. , p. 400. 
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partial and incomplete visions. For Temple God 1va.s f'ocussed in a 
finite, human center of conscious awareness in the person of Jesus 
Christ.1 If man is to IDEUce his apparent good the true good, then he 
must surxender himself to the God revealed in Jesus Christ. 
Even :for man to surrender to Ghrist is possible only because God 
has so constructed man that he can respond and because God t~~es the 
initiative to elicit the response from him. Pfun1 s contribution to 
this process, known in religious ter.ras as grace, is the need for de-
liverance; the rest is God1 s doing.2 
A solution to the practical problem of ethics which commands that~ 
each person love all others in thesame way he loves himself is, there-
fore, attainable only -vmen ethics passes over to religion, only 1-i'nen 
moral philosophy becomes Christian ethics. Conversion of the self 
from the self1 s quest for the good to his be;ng possessed by the good 
which is God, alone suffices to resolve the practical problem ethic~ 
poses. 
e. Conten·t distinguished from motive of morality. Thus, for 
Temple the content of morality is to be distinguished from the moti-ve 
of morality.3 Han1 s capacity to recognize the good and his duty is 
independent of religion. Man can even know that he ought to love 
though not be ~oving. It is the motive to love which religion supplies 
1. See Temple, Christus· Veritas, pp. 217-219. 
2. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p •. 401. 
3~ See Temple, Kingdom of God, p. 64. 
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in the example of Jesus Christ, his love and sa-crifice. Christ sho>-TS 
to ~1 the depths of his sin and elicits a response of love from man, 
thereby changing his :vlill.l In this i?ay the individual feels different-
ly. Though man does not learn the difference between good ~~d evil from 
Christ, what does occur is that his will is changed so that he does not 
want to do the wrong thing.2 Bence, though man's moral sense is in-
dependent of religion, representing as it does a dimension of human per-
sonality, it needs religion to nurture it and make it effective in the 
world.3 
Temple sho,.rs a keen- sensitivity to the moral problem confronting 
man •. Has he, hmrever, in his concern to point the way by which man 
can escape from an unjustified concern for himself lost tho self he 
strived to save? The account of conversion tends to deny the efficacy 
of man 1 s 1-Till, rendering him incapable of cooperating in his o'WD. re-
demption, in which case human personality is negated., Can man's vdll 
be changed independent of man 1 s :vTilling it without sacrificing in-
di vidual integrity and moral worth? 
2. Vocation a:s the Solution to Theoretical Ethics 
A similar situation arises with regard to the theoretical problems 
of ethics. In the discussion of the fundamental moral principles it, 
1.. See ibid •. , PP• 57-59. 2. See ibid., p. 66. 
3. See ibid., pp. 101, 103. Also of. the discussion of the 
limitations of moral philosophy in Thomas, Christian Ethics and Moral 
Philosophv, pp. 370-372 •. 
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was proposed that man be conscientious in 1-rhat he lvills so as to will 
always -what is right, and that the right is ~>That produces the greatest 
good.. To this was added the view that one 1s particular duties are 
determined by his place in society._ These solutions, though sound in 
principle, fail to provide adequate guidance in practice. If' each in-
dividual has a speci.fic vocation to fulf'ill 1ib.ich will when realized 
develop his capacities to the maximum and at the same time render the 
greatest good to society, then the problem is solved in both theory 
and practice. An ethics of vocation offers, then, the clue vThich is 
sought._ Thus Temple affirms: 
As the chief practical problem of ethics is solved 
not by volition but by conversion, so the chief 
theoretical problems are solved not by reference to 
a Categorical Imperative but by reference to Voca-
tion.l 
The individual can by a careful examination of his capacities and· 
the opportunities society affords determine what his vocation is. Th~G 
it may also be determined by consciously aligning oneself with the 
Spirit of the Whole, or GOd, is the testimony of religious believers.2 
These points need to be explored more fully .. 
a. Right and good as identical. Tne apparent distinction between 
an act, as the consequences following from an indiv-idual 1 s choice, and 
1.. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 407.. The doctrine of divine 
wri-11 ogsrating in history and deternLL~ng the events of history in-
cluding the individual 1 s vocation implicit in this vi.ew will be briefly 
considered in -what .follows and examined more thoroughly in the next 
chapter. 
2.- See Temple, Nature, !1an and God, pp. 407-40g~ 
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an action, as the choice itself including the reasons for initiating 
the consequences, may be removed. In practice one caJl..not decide i·rhich 
act is right by examining the total effect of the act and choosing 
that one 1-rbieh produces the best possible consequences, for such cal-
culation is impossible.l 
Each one must rely upon the logic of his m:.:m. nature, being what 
he is and the possible consequences being what they are, to guide him 
to choose what is best for him to do in that particular situation. 
What is right for him to do and what is good for all merge· so that 
what is right is his obligation and what is good is the fulfillment 
of the obligation. ttR:Lght is the Good as presented to mind practical; 
Good (as applied to an act) is Right as presented to mind contemple-
tive.n2 
b. Man 1 s inner logic as guide. Another clue to the actual prob-
lem confronting the individual as he attempts to live morally is the 
recognition of how he must go about fulfilling his obligation. For 
though man1 s obligation is to the entire human race, in practice he can 
only fulfill his obligation by serving particular men living in 
particular societies. What he can and must always keep in mind is how 
his service to limited groups will foster mankind as a whole. 
1. see ibid., p. 408. 
2. ~., p. 409. The identification of right and good in this 
;,.ray presupposes that history is the unfolding of a divine purpose. 
This issue is developed further in Chap. V• 
A man must in practice serve his family, b-is city, 
his firm, his trade union or what not; the over-
riding obligation to the entire spiritual fellow-
ship can in practice only be expressed through the 
prohibition of any service to the narrower unit or 
structure Which involves injury to the wider.I 
That is, he must check each na.TTo~or loyalty by the wider one. 
2ll 
However, the claims made upon the individual a.D.d his own demands 
on himself must remain divergent unless there is a Supreme :Mind order-
ing the various structures without and within the moral agent. If there 
is such a SUpreme Hind ordering all that exists, then the individual 
can discover what it is right for him to do through following what ful-
fills his own true na:bure. This follows because there ~orould be a 
logic of conduct immanent in each individual as part of the Divine 
ordering of events assuring him of the rightness of his act. There-
fore, conscience defined as lithe spontaneous verdict of a man 1 s moral 
nature, n2 though not c.ompletely reliable, should be followed since it 
is more apt to reflect the inner logic of his being. Ho1v-ever, in fol-
lowing conscience one should be gLlided by the total effect his choices 
have on others• Conscience provides the source of right action; the 
actual production of goodness provides the test.3 
By following the inner logic of one r-s own being a person is re-
lieved of the impossible task of trying to discern which act is right 
by examining the supposed consequences of each. The time such a 
1. Temple, Nature, Han and God, p. 409~ 
2. Ibid • ., p. 179. ;3. 8ee ~·, p. L,J_O. 
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procedure ~ould entail renders it impractical for most choices L~ any 
event. But this does not mem1 that one can or should fall back on a 
mere subjective interpretation, the1·eby fostering fanaticism. For a.'ll 
objective check is contali1ed in the obligation to pursue that course 
-which, in fact, produces the best results. The point is, an in-
dividual 1 s best means of determining 1.Jhat he should do is by reference 
to his own conscience; but the test of the choice resides in the total 
ef.f.ect that results. Hence, man1 s nduty is both to intend and to ac,_ 
complish the good •. HL 
The task o.f the moral philosopher, then, can only be to present 
the general principles of goodness, never to suggest what is good for 
any individual in the many specific situations he faces. No deductions 
regarding a specific choice can be made from the general principles 
proposed. Each individual must seek his ovm solution, a.'lld even the 
gt1idance o.f a sympathetic friend should never be considered definitive. 
There is an element of hazard and adventure to the ethical life 
vlhich cannot be eliminated. BUt this may nov.r be viewed as the risk of 
a confident faith of one 1mo strives to discover and to fulfill his 
place in the Divine Purpose. Ethics once again is supplemented by 
religion, and the speculation resulting L'll understanding is supplement-
ed by religious practices cultivating a deeper personal devotion. 
As the general ethical problem finds its solution 
in general religious principles, so the personal 
problem of each individual finds its solution in 
l. Ibid. 
personal religious practice. In the life of 
personal devotion to God, known as Righteous 
love, the answer to problems of conduct other-
wise unanswerable may be found.l 
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Temple has made a shift in the mea~ing he gives to moral obligation 
without indicating that a change has been made or offering a justifica-
tion for it. Before, he defended a non-cognitive theory in i.J"hich the 
experience of obligation did not provide the content of what one ought 
to do. He novr affirms a religiously oriented cognitive theory of ob-
ligation in -which man can knoi-J what it is right for him to do and not 
merely that he ought to do what is right. 
D. Personality and Society 
Thus for Temple the problems of personal ethics ·can be fully 
solved only from the perspective provided by the Christian faith. The 
same is the case with regard to the problems that arise when the person 
is viewed in relation to society.. In tris case Templet s own under-
standing of Ghristiani ty leads him to aclmowledge certain basic social 
principles which are applicable to any social structure. Three su.ch 
l. Ibid., p. 411. The significance of a Fpecial vocation for 
each individual who in this ._ray contributes something distinctive to 
the total scheme of things is the basis of personal immortality, 
according to Temple, and joins individuals together in a Comm.omrealth 
of Value under the ruler ship of God. This issue is developed . in 
co~~ection w~th the e~~osition of the mear~ing of history for per-
sonality in the next chapter. 
Christian social principles are a:f:firmed.l An exposition of these 
social principles 1-muld seem to be the logical place to begin an 
analysis of Temple 1 s views on personality and society, :followed by the· 
application o:f these principles to the tvm r:J.aj or social orders of 
society, namely, the political and economic orders.2 
1. Basic Social Principles 
a. The sacredness of personality. When man is conceived in 
Christian terms, then there is an inherent worth in each man based on 
the :fact that he is a child o:f God, created by the love o:f God and 
:for the sake of communion With GOd •. TI1e notion of personality itself, 
Temple argues, is derived :from Christian thought about God and man's 
relation with God.3 Each person, therefore, is to be respected simply 
because he is a person and quite apart from any usefulness he may have 
to society. Temple is unequivocal in his assertion of the primacy of 
personality over society and the institutions of society: tiThe person 
l.- See T~mple, Christianity and the Social Order (HarmondS1.Jorth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1942), pp~ 61-74. In earlier writings 
on the subject four principles were noted; cf. Ch·dstus Veritas,_ pp. 
203~207; Personal Reli ion and the Life of FellowshiP (London: Long-
mans, Green and Co.~ Ltd., 1926 , pp. 6~6S; Essays in Christian Pol~ 
itics and Kindred Sub5ects (London: Longmans, Green and Go., 192~ 
pp •. 9-lS. The difference involved will be noted below. 
2. No attempt is made in what :follo1•7S to present an exhaustive 
treatment of Temple's views on social issues 1-Jb.ich would be beyond the 
scope of the present study. What is offered is an exposition of the 
significa_~ce personality has upon Temple's social thought and some of 
the applications he made to crucial poiitical and economic issues. 
3. See Essavs ..... , p. 79. 
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is primary, not the society; the State exists for the citizen, not the 
citizen for the state.ul 
Certain consequences follovT from this emphasis on man 1 s inherent 
-vmrth. In the first place Y each person is to be provided with the op-
portunity to develo,Rhis capacities to the fullest possible extent. 
This means the best possible education for each child.2 Having aided 
its citizens to fulfill their capacities, the society must then provide 
them l.vith every possible opportunity to determine for themselves hou 
they vTill live their lives •. rTor is this simply a matter of not inter-
fering uith them; more than that it entails respecting their thoughts, 
words, and deeds • .3. Citizens should, so far as possible, be free to 
choose their p~rsonal activities and at the same time be held respon-
sible for the choices made. ~reedom and responsibility are thereby 
encouraged, 1·Thich in tu__-rn allovrs for the unfolding of personality: 
nrt is the responsible exercise of deliberate choice •·Jhich most fully 
expresses personality and best deserves the great na.L"le of freedom. 114 
Only as one is free to express himself is he able to realize him-
self as a person. The goal of the political order of society is thus 
clear:: it must establish and maintain .freedom for the citizens: -vTithin 
•t d . 5 ~ s 0~  Such .freedom does not imply simply the absence of 
1. Temple, Christianity • ' P• 61. 
2. See Temple, Essgys • . . ' p •. 9. 
.3.. See Temple, Personal Religion • , p •. 66 • 
4. Temple, Christianity .•. , p •. 61. 5. See ibid. 
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external restraint, or a freedom from something.. This type of freedom 
too readily leads to slavery to oner s momentary impulses. The indi-vid:_ 
ual needs to be freed from his o~om impulses as well as from those of 
others which would hamper his O\olll best development. As previous· 
discussion has sho•m, true freedom requires,the ability to formulate 
and execute a purpose to which the whole individual is co:mmitted. Per-
sonal freedom in this sense entails restraint both externally and 
internally since it involves control, determination, and direction by 
the self. flTo train citizens in the capacity for freedom and to give 
them scope .for free action is the supreme end o.f all true politics. ul 
Furthermore, man as a finite center of self-awareness thinks:· and 
acts .from his o1oro perspective of the world, and hence it is to be 
expected that he will not ahays:,: use his freedom in a 1'1ay that fosters, 
the .freedom o.f others:. 2 1·fan 1 s self-centeredness thus points.· up the 
necessity for, and significance of, law in society. 
The function of lmr is primarily negative in that it puts 
restraints on certain acts which infringe on the freedom of others. 
Hm,rever, the real value of la•r is in the liberty which it makes 
possible for everyone. In thi,'3 respect the restraint vrhich law 
encourages may also have a positive e.f.fect on the individual by 
guiding him into channels of conduct that develop certain potential-
ities and thwart the development of others~3 In this way the person 
1. Ibid., p •. 62. 2. See ibid., pp. 62-63. 
3. See Temple, Church and Nation, pp. 70, 65-66. 
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is stimulated to realize those q1l8.lli:ties which foster fellowship; 
another basic social principle. 
b. The principle of fellowship.. A. :gerson must be free~ from 
unnecessary restraint so as to fulfill his own nature-. Each one is 
to be·. reSIJected as a person in his own rights• But then it follows: 
that one must respect others.· as· persons too, and the use each make:$ 
of his freedom should be·for the sake of all and not himself alone.l 
Fellowship:) must be freely chosen and thus cooperation presupposeS> 
freedom. But unless persons who areo: free, do choose to cooperate>..,. 
their freedom readily results in anarchy and the eventual loss of 
freedom for all. Hence, if freedom is to be effective, then each 
individual needs to exercise it for the sake~of the common good.2 
On th~ positiva side, fellowshin~has been shown to be requisite 
for the development of p~rsonality itself.3 Man is naturally and 
necessarily social. Iris existence begins in the social unit of the: 
family, and his life is Tived in and through other social units such 
as the school, community, state, church, trade or p_Fof'E~·:Ssion. The~ 
individual is, in fact, largely determined by the influencejof these> 
groups and constituted by his relations to them. This does not mean 
that he~ contribute'S nothing himself, for that is the error of 
l. See Temple, Christus Veritas;, p_-.. 204, and E.ersonar 
Rei.igion • • • , P• 67. 
2. See Temple, .. ;:;:E::::.s~sa::::.Y~S~:_..::..:_:: .. ;,_t p;.. 1'2'. 
determinism; but it does mean that to remove the particular social 
relations is to eliminate the individual who act-ually exists .1 
The freedom -vrhich an individual enjoys must, therefore, be vie1>1ed 
in terms of the social units in which he participates. The family is 
the basic unit since in this fellowship the individual is born and 
nurtured. This being the case, a responsibility falls on the communi-
ty to make available adequate housing, health, wages, and leisure for 
its families so as to afford the proper conditions for family living. 
Industry too is to be viewed in terms of public service and not profit 
O!l~y. 
Temple approves of Haritain1 s distinction betvreen individuality 
and personality. 2 Individuality indicates that each one is distinct~ 
from everyone else, but personality relates the members one to another 
since one can become a person only through social relationships. 
Accordingly, if the state is to fulfill its function, then it must 
promote the social units in which its citizens are grouped and see 
that they become agencies for the development of personality. The 
richer an L~dividual's personal relations are, the more fully personal 
he can become. Thus, society is for the sake of personality even as 
personality finds its fulfillment in. society.3 There is, then, a duty 
L See Temple, Christia..11i t:v • • . , p. 64~ n. 1, and above, 
Chap. III. 
2. See Jacques }furitain, Scholasticism and Politics, trans. ed. 
by Hortim~r J. Adler (New York:: The l-fac.rnilla..11 Company, 1941), pp. 
56,..67. In Temple see Christianity •••. , p. 67~ 
3. See Temple, I1ens Creatrix, p. 211. 
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on the part of everyone, both individually and collectively, to serve 
the welfare of all. 
c. The duty of service. So long as man is not simply an 
individual distinct from others but is also a person vlho needs and 
desires the f'ello~>Jship of others, then he must live his life so as to 
serve society. The primary means by which this is accomplished is 
through one's chosen vocation, though the use of' one's leisure in 
voluntary service is also signific~~t. 1 
The relevance of vocation i~ solving the theoretical problem of' 
personal ethics has already been noted. What needs to be stressed at 
this point is the service rendered to society tlrrough vocation. The 
individual is called upon to choose as a vocation that which not only 
develops his capacities to the maximum but also renders the greatest 
good to society. ttA man must choose his life-work by considering •mat> 
he can do that 1-vill most serve the community. n2 It does not follow 
that one's vocational interests are to be ignored; vmat does follow·is> 
that the choice itself should be deten~ed by the principle of 
service to society and not merely on the basis of personal satisfac-
tion or monetary reHard. 
The practical difficulty vThich such an obligation poses is that 
not everyone can choose an occupation. Circumstances beyond the 
control of the iTldi:vidual (e.g., the labormarket)·too often dictate 
1. See Temple, Qp~ist;anity ••• , p. 69. 
2~. Temple, Essays • . • , p. 16. 
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what work one will do, if any. This places an obligation upon society 
so to order the economic life of the community that such a situation 
will not arise. Thus, not only individuals but the social units of so-
ciety have the duty to serve society as a whole. This means that the 
narr.ower loyalties which one normally serves (e.g., family) must be 
checked by the 1vider loyalty (e.g., nation) culminating in mankind it-
self.l 
Suppose one is caught in the practical problem noted above, so 
that there is not available to him a vocation which fulfills his 
capacities, and the only work offered is dull and distasteful? If 
this is the case, then the person might accept the job and perform it 
as an act of self-sacrifice so as to serve society and in such a way 
that he fulfills himself through the sacrifice. However, Temple has-
tens to add: 110f course, this does not justify an order of society 
which offers to many men only such for.ms of livelihood as require a 
miracle of grace to appear as forms of true vocation.n2 
The relevance of self-sacrifice as a basic ~ocial principle needs 
to be carefully examined. When it is not possible to serve society and 
also fulfill one's own needs and aspirations, the power of self-sacri-
fice to transform both self and society must never be minimized. Sacri-
fice is, in fact, the only true means of gaining victory in any dispute. 
For to win by subduing another by force is to elicit his bitterness 
toward you; whereas sacrifice of oneself for another, even an enemy, .is 
to elicit a response of love from him and convert him to a friend.3 
The willingness to serve society even to the point of self-sacrifice is 
the highest value as illustrated by Christ on the cross. 
• • 
However, self-sacrifice cannot be proposed as a separate social 
1. See Temple, Christianity • • • , pp. 71-72. 2. Ibid., P• 71. 
~. See Temple, Ohristus Veritas, P• 206, and Personal Religion 
• ' P• 68. 
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principle.l This is due to the impossibility of applying self-sacrifice 
as a principle, inasmuch as no one fully accepts it for himself and be-
cause social groups are even less prone to accept it. The difficulty 
is most apparent when one (e.g •. , a father) strives to impose on others 
(e. g., his children) standards -vrhich are not accepted by them. In such 
a case the result is that the children become alienated both .from their 
father and .from the standards he sought to impose. Self-sacrifice by 
its very nature can never be imposed on others. It is one thing to 
choose to do something 1vhich vdll result in the loss of one 1 s life be-
cause of a principle believed in; it is quite another thing to act .. in 
i:;his way when the lives of others are also at stake.2 Sacrifice o.f 
self, to be sacrifice, can only be self-imposed. The ideal of self-
sacrifice needs to be set before men, but it is .for each to decide if 
and when the ideal is to be actualized. 
We see then why a man cannot vdthout more ado take 
as his guide .for the treatment of his fellows the 
Christian standard that service to the point o.f 
self-sacrifice is our truest welfare. Let him live 
by t}:l..at as far as he can;~ and let him. invite others 
to join him in that enterprise; but let him not force 
that standard on his .fello\oTS, and least o.f all on those 
dependent on him. · They will always have the opportunity 
to act on it if they are so minded.3 
1. In earlier works Temple does propose it as the fourth prin-
ciple, but in Christianity ••• , pp. 72-74, he combines sacrifice 
10Jith service •. 
2.. The problem this raises when the state is threatened by war 
will be discussed belo·w. 
. ·~ ., 'I pp. 73-74. 
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There is problem enough to get oneself and one's groups to acknowl-
edge the du·ty to serve society as a ~-Thole and not merely their own self-
interests. Hence, to establish justice in the sense o.f nthe securing 
of rights and interests o.f individuals in the most equitable mannerul 
is, perhaps, as high an ideal as can be expected to be realized on a 
social level. This is not to .fors~ce sacri.ficial love as the ultimate 
ideal, but it is to recognize that justice is the necessary means by 
which love is expressed on a group level. Thus Temple asks: His it 
not the .fact tp~t in problems concerning the relations of corporate 
groups o.f men, the way o.f love lies through justice? 11 2 Love in this 
case becomes the motive po1-rer for the establishment of justice.3 
Freedom, fellowship, and service constitute the t~_ree .fundamental 
principles on which any social order must be .founded, and .for Temple 
they are rooted in a Christian understanding of man as a child of GOd 
created for eternal fello-vrship ~-lith Him. The a:im in principle o.f a 
Christian social order has now been sugeested through the realization 
of these pri.11ciples and is summed up by Temple as consisting in lithe 
.fullest possible development of individual personality in the Hidest 
and deePest possible .fellovrship. 114 But these are general principles. 
1. Temple, Citizen and Churchman (London: Etre & Spottis-vroode, 
L.td. _, 1941) _, P• 76. 
2. Ibid., p. 78. 3. Bee ibid., p. 79. 
4. Temple_, Christianity . •·· • ' p. 100. 
How is a state to be viewed both in origin and present practice so 
as to make possible personal development and social fellowship? What 
type of economic order is consistent with these aims? These and other 
questions must noH be explored. 
2. The Political Order 
a. Society as a natural product. There are basically two theories 
regarding the origin of society.l;_ According to one, man i,'3, as Aristoi;..;. 
le affirmed, social by nature and, therefore, the development of a 
government in some form is a natural outgrm·rth. The other theory holds 
that man is essentially selfish by nature, and hence society itself is 
constructed on the basis of a contract agreed upon by the individuals. 
These two theories need to be examined. 
Hobbes is the classic exponent of the latter theory. According 
to Hobbes the origin of society is identical Hith the origin of 
government. In order to gain protection and security from the pre-
datory instincts within each individual leading him to desire every-
thing he can get, men agree to restrict these natural rights and to 
place power in the hands of a sovereign ruler who vdll enforce the 
laws agreed upon. Hence, the sovereign comes into povrer through the 
contract which is made by the parl:;icipating members but is not him- _ 
self bou_~d by tt.2 
1. See William Temple, Christianity and the state (London: Jvfac-
millan and Go., Ltd., 1928), PP• 43-44:. 
2. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. with an introduction 
by Her-bert W. Schneider (Nevr York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953}, Chaps. 
XIII, XIV, Xi!. In Temple see Christianity and the State, pp .. 46, 61-65. 
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As ingenious as this theory is, it is patently false. It rests 
on a viev.r of man as an isolated individual, but the facts of the evolu-
tion of the race and the individual 1 s ow.n development point to his 
necessary interrelation with his enviromnent, particularly fellaH 
human beings. Further, there is no indication historically that men 
ever actually took the steps of forming a contract leading to an ab-
solute sovereignty as the theory suggests.l 
These difficulties are ~voided in the view which takes society 
as a fact of huma.._11 nature and govermnent as a fact of human history. 
Man is essentially social, and hence there is no need for a contract 
to bi...11d him to others. The form that society takes need not be spec-
ulated on, for one need but examine I·Jhat forms actually developed. 2' 
However, though the contract theory renders an inadequate account 
of the origi...11 of society, there are some basic truths in it which need 
to be incorporated into an account of the state 1 s origin and function~ 
There is a necessity for restraint within the state not only to 
protect one from the conduct of others, but to protect oneself from 
one 1 s o-wn conduct tJ:;tat would not be beneficial to society.. nwe are 
all of us tacit partners to the compact that rJe vdll not do injuries 
in order that we may enjoy security against suffering them.u3 Further, 
the contract theory rightly perceives that there arises the need from 
1. Bee Temple, Christianity and the State, pp. 84-85. 
2. Ibid., P• 85. 
3. Ibid., p. 1~7. 
2Z5 
time ~o time to alter or even abolish the existing form of social 
order; and if the state is viewed as a construction by its members 
and rests on their consent, then they have the right to change it. 
This leads to still another insight of the contract theory: namely, 
the chief political problem vdthin the state is discovering a proper 
balance between the obedience of its citizens to the law and the 
fostering of their individual freedom.l 
Nonetheless, the social contract theory is inadequate and in-
accurate •. To agree to live in society is not a contract made ex-
plicitly or ~plicitly by man; it expresses a dimension of human 
personality~. 11Society is actually rooted in human nature. n2 
Society can only be explained if man is social by nature •. But if 
social unity is to be maintained, then some means must exist for 
perserving it; and some officials must be designated whose function 
is to employ these means so as to guide the society tovrard the aims 
which it professes. When these means are sufficiently developed 
and the officials pl~ovided with sufficient power, then both law and 
the state come into being.3 
The error into which man has been led historically is the as-
sumption that the geographical boundaries of a state were essential 
to its operation so that the exclusiveness of the state became inter-
twined with its function as a unifying agency •. Previously this 1o1as 
1. see ibid., PP• 86-90, 92. 
2. Ibid., P• 92. .3.. Ibid~, P• 99~ 
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the case since suf£icient means of communication were lacking to bind 
peoples together except those geographically related. But the means 
of communication do exist today linking peoples across territorial 
boundaries.l 
The starting point, then, of any political theory is mants es-
sentially social nature. Man is always £ound in some communal or-
ganization. This social £act of man is apparent in sexual union which 
gives birth to the individual, and in the necessity of an extended 
period of parental care for the young. Hence, Hthe family is the root 
fact, and however far civili&ation advances, it grows like a tree £rom 
that root. rt2 Each individual from the start is conscious of his unity 
with the group which prote.c.ts and cares for him, and of the difference 
between his group and other groups. ll!fb.us the sense of coiDlll.Uili ty 
gro-vrs £rom within and is strengthened £rom without. u3 
Ks a matter of historical fact the real problem has been not that 
of isolated individuals relinquishing some of their freedom for the 
sake of banding together; rather the social solidarity of the group 
to which one belonged was so complete that little, if any, freedom 
was permitted the individual. 
There has never been any problem how to generate 
society out of a number of free and ind~endent 
individuals; the problem has always been how to 
find room £or the freedom and independence of 
individuals within the actually existing social 
group.4 
2. Ibid., p. 101. 
4- ~·, PP• 101-102. 
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It vias the differentiation of the individual with- h-is own rights 
as distinct from th-e group and its rules that had to emerge gradually: 
This movement was fostered by th-e developing complexity of the group 
and hence the need for specialists in law~ religion, merchandising, 
and so forth.. In this way associations grew up -vr.ithln tb.e community 
but distinct from the state. This fact requires that society be 
distinguished from the state. Too often the state is identified l-Tith 
society so that all which th-e latter accomplish-es through, and some-
times despite, the state is attributed to the state.l But if state, 
associations, and society must be distinguish-ed, then the nature of 
each and ~heir relationship one with another have to be explained more 
fully. 
b. The state as the necessary organ of society •. Temple, com-
bining the views of Unwin and Maciver, interprets society (or the com-
munity) as the basic and natural development of man 1 s social nature.2 
Society represents the natural groupings in wl:rl.ch men are joined to-
gether. A· consciousness of unity per-vades such groups fostered by 
mutual need and ties of affection. The family represents the primary 
example of such. a community. S0ciety, then, is prior to both the 
state and to any association. Further, because associations of in-
dividuals develop with the society, the life of the society is more 
1. See ~., p. 106. 
2. Of. R. M. Maciver, Community: A Sociological Stud~ (2d. ed. 
rev. ; London: lvfacmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920) and The Modern State (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1926); George Unwin, Studies in Economic 
History, ed. with an introductory memoir by R. H. Ta>IDey. (London: Mac-
millan and Co.; Ltd., 1927). In Temple see Christianity and the State, 
PP• 109-110. 
than the state and independent of it. Moreover, the distinguishing 
feature of the state is not the fact that it can use force to main-
tain social unity; this is a right it has by virtue of its unique 
function as the special organ of the community from which one cannot 
readily remove himself. If one is opposed to the requirements which 
the state places upon him, only two alternatives are open: (l) that 
of becoming a citizen of another state, (2) separating himself from 
civilization •. The state thus exerciSes a universal authority over 
its citizens which is carried out by means of the force entrusted to 
it. Law not force, therefore, characterizes the state. 
The distinguishing mark of the State, then, is 
not its possession of force, but its self-ex-
pression through Law, which employs force as the 
guarantee of that universality wr-ich is its es-
sential nature .. 1 
Tb.e state can now be distinguished from an association. lt.s-
· sociations represent the forms taken by the social life of the co~ 
munity as the society develops. The state is not such a development, 
for it is integral to the coDLmunity itself and serves as the neces-
sary instrument of the society. The only accidental qualities of the 
state are its geographical determination and hence its extension. 
National sovereignty is the necessary means by which both liberty and 
order are possible. Sbcial life itself, then, is dependent on the 
law and order the state affords though_ it carries on a life independent 
1. ~emple, Christianity: and the State, p. 114. Here Temple dis-
agrees -vrith Unwin; see ibid., p. 110. 
of' the state. The state, :may now be defined as follows: 
The state· is a necessary organ of the national 
community, maintaining through Law; as, promulgated 
£1 a government endowed to this end with coercive 
power the universa.:L: external conditions of social 
order.I 
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The state, then, is to bffi conceived as the necessary organ of the 
community, its existence derived from and its authority conditioned qy 
the community. Ultimate pplitical loyalty, therefore, is not due th~ 
state but the community itself, though the. state is, under normal con-
ditions, necessary; and hence loyalty is due it.2 Nonetheless the pri-
ority of' the community must be maintained since; a state can be adminis-
tered improperly, resulting in the necessity to alter it. No particu-
lar type of state is required to serve as the community's unifying or-
gan •. However, when the citizens of' a community are; capable of' it, 
representative democrauy is advocated as the best form of government 
because of its educative eff'ect on personality by :fostering both 
freedom and resP.~nsibility • .J 
It must be remembered that it is for the sake of the community of 
persons that the state·, exists. Though man is social qy nature, he is 
not merely social, and still le:ss is he merely }:?Olitical., He seeks; 
truth, enjoys beauty, and asJ?..ire:sgoodness. The pursuit of these 
1.. Ibid., pp; 12.3--124. Cf. Maciver, The Modern State;, p. 22~ 
2. The ultimate loyalty of the individual is not to any his-
torical order for TemJ?..le, but to the Kingdom of' Go-d Vlhich is beyondi 
history. See Christianity and the State, P~· 174. 
3. See ibid~, P• 120, and Personal Religion ••• , PP• 56, 5S. 
values cannot be prescribed by the state. The state, in fact, exists 
as the indispensable means for the maintenance of man 1 s social lif'e, 
but it is the means for the attainment of these ends, not the ends 
themselves. 11The higher values of that life are established upon the 
foundations which it provides, but are themselves beyond its cogni-
sance.111 Thus the state, acting as it does through law :for the sake 
of preservi_ng the conditions o:f Hell-being, has universal jurisdiction 
over its citizens but only in respect to these conditions and not to 
the total life of its citizens. 
The state is sovereign, then, but only 1·rith regard to law and even 
then only so :far as it fulfills its :function of maintaining peace and 
justice. The state is to provide the conditions which make possible 
the fullest development o:f its citizens. 
In terms of the basic social principles enumerated, the principle 
o:f fellowship provides the basis :for the state 1s origin; and the prob-
lem which a state poses is the preservation and promotion o:f the prin-
ciple of freedom by encouraging its citizens to serve the best in-
. terests of the entire community. If the state fails to guard the 
rights of its citizens and even hinders their expression in the as-
sociations formed, then the individuals and the associations must rise 
up against the state. lfFor in such a case the state is impoverishing 
the common life which it exists to preserve and to foster. 112 The state 
cw..not dictate to its citizens vrhat to believe or hm·T to vTOrsb.ip. The 
1 •. · Temple, Christianity and the State, P• 126 •. 2.. Ibid. 
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individual citizen can, in fact, be free only in and through the social 
units of' society.l Thus, if his actual liberty is to be preserved, the 
state must promote and protect these associations, allo1v.ing them free-
dom to develop a life of' their own. 
At the same time the associations formed must be made responsible 
for their activities and need to be regulated by the law at those 
points where the well-being of' the state is at stake.2 Particularly 
pertinent here is the relat:?-on of the state to the economic groups 
operating within but also extending beyond its borders. This will be 
taken up in the next section. But the point to be understood at this 
stage is that the associations within the state possess power and are 
responsible for the exercise of' that pm·rer. More than any other group 
within the state, voluntary associations develop the social life of 
the citizens, thereby aiding the state in fulfilling its function of 
fostering the development of personality. But associations, like in-
dividuals, can act for selfish purposes so as to infringe upon the 
freedom of non-members. The task, then, is to make these associations 
responsible agencies for the welfare of' the total community, that is, 
agencies of' service. Thus, Temple espouses a doctrine of' :Functionalism 
in regard to the structure of' social 1; f>e in a society: 11Wi thin human 
society we must aim at establishing that relation of' the various func-
tions or activities to one another 1-lhich corresponds to their 
1. See Temple, Christianity and the Social Order, pp. 65-66. 
2. This is true of' a church when, for example, it owns property~ 
See Temple, Ohr;stian;ty and the State, P• 127. 
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contribution to the general 1..rell-being. nL 
Thus the state must strive not only to promote freedom but to 
encourage its citizens to exercise their freedom in service to society,' 
both individually and through their collective organizations. In this 
wa:y all three social principles are taken into account in the analysis 
Gf the state 1 s origin and .function. 
Such a scheme;"as has been outlined gives the fUllest 
possible scope to Personality; for this reveals it-
self' largely in special affinities and in the as-
sociations which embody these. To increase the scope 
of these associations is thus a potent method of 
fostering the growth of Personality. The same 
policy plainly recognises and rests on the Fact of 
Eello1-rship, for fellowship is chiefly realised 
through those same affinities and associations. 
But above alLit stresses the Duty to Service; 
for it takes associations orginally self-centered and 
sometimes even selfish; and bids them take counsel 
for the Cbillffion good.2 
SUch is the role of the state within its own borders. BUt what 
is the responsibility and function of the state to other states and t0 
the total community of mankind? 
c. T}le international co:mmu..Tlity. In order to understand adequately 
the relations which should prevail between states it is imperative to 
keep iJ+ mind the nature and .function of the state just noted. Each 
state exists for the sake of acting on behalf of the 1..relfare of all its 
citizens, past, present, and future.3 
1. TJ:ie Hooe of a New World, P• 67; see also W~ G~ Peck, "Willi81ll 
2Jemple as SOcial Thinkeru· in William Temole: Ah Estimate ••• , p •. 74. 
2; Temple, Christianity and the State, pp. 132-139. 
3~ See ibid., p. 152. 
4333 
At this point a dif'i'erence must be noted between the disputes in-
dividuals have one -vrith another and disputes between nations. The 
interests of the citizens which the state exists to serve cannot be 
sa;crificed in the same way one might choose to sacrifice himself and 
his ovm interests. And Hhile it is quite true that what is morally 
wrong for the state to do cannot be politically right for that same 
state to do, it is not necessarily the case that what is morally 
right or 1vrong for an individual to do is the same for the state. 
The agent and the circumstances must always be considered in any 
ethical choice.l 
A state must, therefore, be certain that it reflects the will of 
its people when it acts, for example in a time of war. It cannot take 
lightly its role as trustee to the community it represents and to the 
·world-wide community as well. Confronted by the threat of 1·Tar, the 
nation can choose to capitulate to the demands, thereby avoiding war, 
only if such a course is the will of the community it represents and 
such a course of action 1.vould serve the best purposes of the wider 
comnruni ty. 
Trustees have no right to inflict self-sacrifice on 
their clients. • • • Furthermore, not only is the 
State a trustee for the community, but each national 
community is a trustee for the 1vorld-wide co1IlillU11ity, 
to which it should bring treasures of its own; and 
l. Bee ibid., pp. 150-153. T~mp1e is being consistent here 
with his view of vocation as a special calling of each individual, 
and thus what is right for one individual to do may be wrong for 
another. 
to submit to political annihilation may be to 
defralAd mankind of what it alone could have 
contributed to the general wealth of human ex-
perience.l 
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Hence, there are essential differences in the problems that arise 
between individuals and between nations, and in the way they can and 
should be handled. T.o blur these differences hinders the promotion of 
peace and justice. Not only are the disputes of a different nature, 
but so too are the aims and purposes quite different. The pririciples 
on which a nation acts within a_~d without its borders can_~ot be equated 
With those that motivate and guide li1dividuals.2 
The internal function of the state is to foster the fullest devel-
opment of individual personality consonant 1-lith maintaining social 
unity and social fellmrship; its external function is the development 
of a community of nations while retaining the integrity of each 
separate nation. Thus, the problems and aims of a national state ex-
ternally are the reverse of those internally: 
Within the nation, unity (broadly speaking) is given; 
the problem is to foster independence; among the nations, 
independence is given and the problem is to foster unity.3 
However, the unity of the national states and the function they 
serve must not be lost even in the movement toward internationalism. 
The mutual relations of one state to another can best be understood by 
reference to the origin and development of the state itself.4 The 
1. Ibiq., p. 156. 
3. Ibid., p. 157. 
2. See ibid,~., pp. 156-157. 
4• Temple again ma_~es use of the historical method. 
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guarantee of any state is law, not force, a~d the foundation of the 
state is the desire and necessity of its people for a community.l 
Force is the state's means of maintaining laiv. 
The sovereignty of the state may be considered in regard to two 
main issues: (1) the right of the state to ask its citizens to die, 
if necessary, in the fulfillment of its commands; (2) the supremacy and 
full sovereignty of the state illustrated in its relations to other 
states since each one admits no superior beyond itself.2 The first of 
these two points Te~le accepts; the second he rejects. 
Since the state is the necessary means for preserving the com-
munity, if the state collapses, then the life of the community is also 
endangered. Though man 1 s intellectual and cultural interests and all 
those activities comprising his social life are more precious to him 
than his political interests, nonetheless the latter are the indis-
pensable conditions for the for.mer. 
Therefore the State is, in principle, ••• justified 
in calling on its citizens to die, and even to kill, for 
the preservation of what is necessary to it as the in-
dispensable instrument of the nation 1 s life. 3 
1. What :Maciver (inverting Rousseau) calls the General Will for 
the state, see The Modern State, p. 11. See Temple, Christianity and 
the State, PP• 119, 159. 
2. Temple, Christianity and the State, P• 160. 
3. Ibid., p. 162. Tlie individual ca..~ be called upon to kill but 
not to hate; see ibig~, p. 175. Also see Hope of a New World, p. 81. 
Temple defends the right of the citizen to refuse to participate in 
war as a result of personal convictions, though he does not agree, for 
the most part, with such a vie1·T. 
The second point, h01.rever, can be defended only :from an exclusive-
ly nationalistic perspective. Even as the nation arises :from, and ex-
ists :for, the community of' individuals who comprise it, so too the na-
tion :fulfills itself' best externally by cooperating with, and operat-
ing through, a community of' nations. Temple concisely and cogently 
sums up the issues at stake: 
The State is an organ of' community; community has 
mainly been territorially demarcated into nations; 
therefore the State has been national.. Community is 
become very largely international; therefore the 
state must become international also.l 
Thus, the staiie 1's mm logic points beyond itself' to an inter-
national organization. This vrould mean consciously and historically 
establishing a real social contract such as Hobbes noted; however, 
the contract vmuld not be bet1-reen individuals :for the sake of' :forming 
a society but between nations for the sake of' establishing an inter-
national organization as the organ :for the already existing inter-
national community.2 
Evidence of' the existence of' an international community is most 
noticeable in the economic realm where territorial borders become 
secondary to the needs and demands :for the interchange of' goods and 
services~.3 The role of' economic groups in their relation to the state, 
the :function of' the economic order itself, and the relation of' this 
1. Christianity and the State, P• 171. 
2. See~ .. , PP• 171-:'172.- 3', .ThiS·, PP• 128-129. 
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order to the social principles affirmed must no-vr be stated. 
3. The Economic Order 
a. The necessity for economic freedom! The state is the guar-
antor of law and order in the society for the sake of fostering the 
personality of its citizens. As such, it regulates the lives of its 
citizens. But there is litt~e direct personal contact between the state 
and the citizen. For the most part the state when .functioning properly 
has an indirect effect on the people. It is quite the opposite with 
regard to the economic order. The work vlhich individuals do to earn 
their livelihood directly controls their daily life. The regulations 
which accompany their particular jobs llinvade their very homes and 
tell them when they may get up and when they may go to bed.nl Further-
more, whereas in a political democracy the citizen now has some voice 
in the regulations enacted through duly elected officials, for a long 
time the worker had no representation in determining the economic 
regulations that controlled h~ Even with the development of unions, 
the workers can affect the regulations over them only through the 
threat of a strike.Z 
What is at issue here is not merely the wages workers receive, 
important as they are, but rather the tendency to treat workers not 
as persons but as Hhands." llA. hand is by nature a 1living tool', 
1 •. Temple, Mens Oreatrix, p. 222~ 
2. 8ee ibid., PP• 222~223; Church and Nation, P• 82. 
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>.rhich is the classical definition of a slave. 11l The labor vlhich a 
man. renders has been separated from the man t s total nature as a per-
sonal being •. This is an unwarranted abstraction, for the labor a 
man performs is inseparable from him as a person: rr:r may sell my 
coat and another man :ma:y buy·it without in any way affecting my per-
sonality; but I cannot thus sell my labour for my labour is simply 
myself' labouring. n2 
Such injustice cannot be rectified by charity, for this misses 
the point which concerns the total personality of' the "\.Jorker and his 
right to be recognized as a rational and responsible being. The 
root of' the difficulty is that the economic order still claims a 
sovereignty which the political order has relinquished. The state, 
though no longer ruled by the crown but by duly elected representatives 
of the people, may still be dominated in its economic life by the 
private capitalist.3 
To treat a worker as a Hliving tool" is to defy the principle 
of' freedom and the sanctity of' human personality. Furthermore, to 
grant a man political freedom does not insure the full freedom 
necessary for the expression of one 1 s capacities if economic freedom 
is denied. One must be free to order his life if he is to become a 
fully personal being; and this means being able to choose a vocation 
1. Temple, Christianity and the Social Order, p. 87. 
2. Temple, Mens Creatrix, P• 223. 
3.: See ~·, PP• 22.3-224. 
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consonant with his abilities and the social needs; it means further 
having a voice in the work to which he becomes committed. Despite 
the increase in living standards and improvement in working conditions, 
there is still this one great lack in the economic life, namely, the 
absence of worker representation in the policy of the company for 
whom he labors mos·b of his waking hours. The case for political free-
dom is now widely accepted, but full freedom for the worker cannot be 
said to exist until economic freedom is also a reality.l Ail evolution 
of industrial freedom 1d th responsibility must take place in which the 
workers have a fair share not only of the company's earnings but also 
in the formulation of the companyt s policy. "Before we can be said 
to have a free society it will be essential that the control of in-
dustry shall pass largely into the hands of those immediately con-
cernea.n2 
Similarly, too much i•rork o:ffered to a person today is monotonous, 
and far from stimulating his faculties, it actually deadens them. Nor 
is it justified simply to reply that one gets out of something just 
what he _,P.;uts into it. Some labor is degrading and dehumanizing. The 
person must be willing to serve his fellowman, but in so doing he 
should also have the possibility of fulfilling himself. If a person 
is to find a vocation which will both develop his capacities to the 
maximum and render the greatest good to society, then the labor market 
1:· See Temple, Christianity and the S0cial Order, PP• g7, 95-96. 
2. Temple, Mens Creatrix, P• 222~ 
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must make such opp0rtunities available to him.l Particularly per-
tinent would be the provision ~or ~ruitful labor at times o~ enforced 
and extended unemployment. 2 
But what are the implications o~ granting economic ~reedom to 
the worker and o~ taking an active interest in his vocational op-
portunities, in terms o~ the purpose o~ the economic order and its 
relation to the other orders o~ society? 
b. Economic nroductivity as a means to cultural productivity. 
Te:rnple turns to the notion o~ natural law ~or the light it sheds on 
an understanding o~ the orders o~ society and the proper relations 
between them. By natural la1-T is meant 11the proper function o~ a 
human activity as apprehended by a consideration o~ its own nature. nJ 
With the application o~ this de~inition to economic activities, the 
proper function ~1ggested by an analysis o~ their nature indicates 
that "the reason v1hY goods are produced is that men may satis~y their 
needs by consuming those goods. !14 
Accordingly, production does not exist merely or even primarily 
for the sake o~ the pro~it it can bring to the producers but to 
satis~y the needs o~ the consumer. This does not mean that pro~it 
is wrong but that pro~it is one result, in the ~or.m o~ monetary 
rewards, o~ meeting consumer demands. 
1. See Temple, Christianity and the Social Order, PP• 96-97. 
2. SBe ibid., PP• 97, 105. J. Ibid., p. 77. 
4• Ibid., p. 78. 
But it is poasible none the less £or these two 
to get into the wrong order, so that the consumer 
is tre-ated, not as: the :person whose interest is 
the true end o£ thewhole process, but only as• 
an indispensable' condition o£ success in an es~ 
sentially pro£it-seeking enterpris·e.l~ 
The dlificulty involved is in no small measure due to a false: 
conception of the economic process as an isolated and independent 
spl:lere of activity to be. judged on its own principJJe:sJ (e.g., pro-
ductivity and profit). This runs directly counter to its natural 
function in the scheme o£ things.. "The economic process is not an 
end in itsel£; it and all its parts are primarily a means to something 
that is much more than economic-the' life· o£ lll8.Il. u~? 
The economic cn·der is to be .. judged not only on the basis of pro-
ducing and distributing goods--though even here it may succeed in the 
former while £airing in the latter--but also on the e£fe.ct such _pro-
duction and distribution have)on the personality 0f those concerned 
and their relations with one another. 1m economic system which is 
ef£ective in the production and distribution o£ goods, but which in,that 
very process dulls the individual 1·s fa:culties: and fosters hostilities; 
among the citizens, must be condemned as morally inef£ective~3 
In actual practice both the nece:ssity o£ producing £or consump-
tion· and the necessity of making a profit if one is to continue t~ 
groduce must be.' considered, and a reasonable; balance between them 
maintained. The dif£icul ty in maintaining a proyer balance is that 
1.. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p• 79. 3. See ibid., p_~ SO. 
the indispensable condition for production is that the producer make 
a profit.l Goods can be produced even vrhen the consumer's interests 
are not taken into account or are artif'ica.lly stimulated, but these 
goods cannot be produced if' there is no profit. This leads Temple 
to formulate a general principle stating the proper relation between 
consumer needs and producer's profit: 
For economic production there must be profits, there 
ought to be regard for the consumer's interest, and 
it is wrong to sacrifice that interest to the increase 
of profits above a reasonable figure~2 · 
What is reasonable in such a case is not made explicit.. Hoi-rever, 
in a.11other connection Temple suggests that industrial disputes be 
settled by an impartial tribunal, and this would seem to be the 
reasonable approach he has in mind.3 
In the same 1~y the economic order is to be related to man's 
cultural life. .Just as the state exists to foster man 1 s personal 
life but is the necessary means for :maintaining the freedom and order 
requisite for such a life, so too the economic life is the sine gua 
QQB for providing the physical and mechanical means that make possible 
a fUll personal existence. Poetry cannot be written or appreciated 
if men are starving. Nonetheless, economic production is a means to 
the end of cultural productivity. 
1~ It is for this reason that the state might do well to sub-
sidize certain commodities so as to keep the price at cost or less 
and within the economic reach of most people. See ibid., p. 81. 
2. Ibid., p. 82. 3. See ibid., PP• 76-77. 
The whole equipment o£ life with food, houses, 
clothes, £urniture, and so £ortb is for the sake 
o£ the personal life, the £amily life, the cultural 
development, the human fellovrship which is thus 
made possible •• •- • The means (industry, commerce, 
etc.) is to be judged by its success in promoting 
or £acilitating the true ends o£ human life--re-
ligion, art, science, and above all, happy human 
relationships.l~ 
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At stake here is nothing less than the development o£ personality 
itsel£. I£ the person and the unfolding of his capacities are sacri-
ficed £or production and profit, then for whom are the goods produced 
and £or 1.Jhat purpose is profit procured?; It is to pervert the natural 
priority evident in the reason £or the existence o£ both the person 
and his economic activity. BUt i£ the proper perspective is to be 
attained, then certain specific steps must be taken. 
If the development o£ the person and not the gaining ·of pro£it is 
the true goal of the economic order, then the £amily which gives birth 
to and nurtures the person is the primary social unit. This means that 
£amilies should be provided with adequate housing for their needs and 
within their financial means, and that ample leisure time be afforded 
so that they can pursue activities of interest. In particular this 
requires that the worker be given days of£'with pay at regular intervals. 
The state should further assist families by providing allowances (e.g., 
food, clothing), supplementing wages when necessary due to the size of 
the family.2 Basic bodily needs o£ the young must be oared for, 
1. Ibid., p. 82 •. 2. See ~., PP• 85-87, 104. 
including diet, exercise, and education. 
Respect for the sacredness of personality in all 
citizens will lead us to demand that no child 
shall be condemned to grovr to maturity with 
faculties stunted by malnutrition or by lack of 
opportunities for full development.! 
Other specific steps can and must be taken before an economic 
life consonant with the basic social principles already enumerated 
can be said to eXist.2 But basic to the changes that must be effected 
is a clear grasp of the natural order that prevails in the relation of 
the economic order to the total life of the person. Es the previous 
discussion of this indicated, the problem is that the means and ends 
involved have become inverted. 
It is clear that, in the natural order of things, 
God•s order, the object of all industry is the 
supply of men 1 s wants. • • • But in our world, 
goods are produced, not primarily to satisfy the 
consumer, but to enrich the produced. The profit-
motive predominates over the service-motive; and 
this inversion of all that is right is gone so far, 
that now finance controls production instead of 
production controlling finance, and the consumer, 
for whose benefit alone production really goes on 
at all, becomes no more than an indispensable 
condition of successful business enterprise • .3 
Not until the priority of personality and its fullest development 
1.. Ibid., P• 88. 
2. Temple enumerates specific proposals which he feels can serve 
as a start in the right direction and as a basis for further investiga-
tion. The limitations of the present study do not warrant exploring the 
details of his exposition of this issue, as significant as some of them 
are. Of. e.g., ibid., PP• 99-1001 101-121; The Church Looks Forward 
(New York: The f.iacmillan Company, 1944), PP• 146-169. 
3. Temple, Hope of a Hew World, P• 17. 
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are accepted in the economic order more radically than is now the case, 
and expanded politically beyond national borders to an international 
organization, will the aim of a Ghristian social order be possible of 
realization. 
However, in this quest for a just social order the end for which 
it is sought must not be forgotten. ~· social order founded on the 
principles proposed is desired for developing man's spiritual nature. 
FUrthermore, there should be no illusion about the type of social 
order that can be attained on earth: it can never be perfect or 
I 
permanent. But more important is recognition of the fact that the 
social order, no matter how ideal, is never an end in itself. This is 
so because man's true destiny is beyond any temporal order, residing 
as it does in the Kingdom of God beyond history. kny social order 
constructed on earth is to be judged in.terms of its adequacy in 
preparing man for eternal life. This was Plato 1 s insight in The 
Reoublic and separates social theories into those which take into ac-
count man t s immortality and those 1o1hich do not.l 
E.. Summary and Conclusions 
Before considering the role that Temple 1s conception of personal-
ity plays in his philosophy of history it is worthvThile to sunnnarize 
the basic argument of the present chapter, indicating briefly Temple 1 s 
value theory and the solutions he proposes to the problems of personal 
1. See Temple, Christianity and the State, pp. 3-12; also cf. 
Plato and Christianity, PP• .32-37. 
and social morality. 
1.. ACtual Value as a Relation bet~oreen Mind and Object 
The fitting together of everything in the universe constitutes 
value in the widest sense, but the special correlation bet~oreen . mind 
and its environment warrants restricting value to. this relationship. 
Hence, Temple's fundamental conception of value is the mind1 s discovery 
in its object of something akin to itself. Actual value is the rela-
tion between appreciating mind and valuable object. Implicit in 
Temple 1 s theory of value are two different conceptions of the meaning 
of value without a clarification of the relation between them or an 
attempt to synthesize them into one coherent value theory. On the 
one 'hand, he affirms an objective interpretation in which objects are 
valuable independent of mants appreciation of them; on the other hand, 
he suggests a modified objectivist theory in which values exist only 
potentially until man actualizes them in his own experience of satis-
faction. A similar ambiguity resides in Temple 1 s analysis of the 
practical and theoretical problems of ethics. 
2.. Ethics as a Life of Devotion to God 
As a center of value realization in the world man is guided by 
his apparent good. He is free i-~ that he is not determined by forces 
outside him or momentary desires; he is not free in that he is deter-
mined by what he considers good. True freedom and full value realiza-
tion could be attained only if his apparent good were, in fact, the 
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real good, only if God and His will motivate the individual's action 
and the goal tovlard vlhich he strives. But hm.r is man to idll that 
the real good become his apparent good? Similarly, the absolute form 
of the moral law states that one should love his neighbor as himself. 
But how can one will to shift his center of concern from self to 
another? 
Thus, the practical problem of ethics is held to reside in man1 s 
will and not in his actions. It is a problem of character and not 
conduct. One can know what he should do but not idll to do it .. 
:Further, he cannot begin to 1dll it until he wants it, and he cannot 
want it until he Hills it. :Man must be presented with the real good-
the ideal of love of neighbo~~-in a form which 1vill elicit from him 
a response of love. That is, man needs to be converted. It is Ghrist, 
the human embodiment of God, who provides the dramatic expression of 
love which man needs. By surrendering his will to God t s •rill as 
manifested in Christ man is enabled to love as commanded.. SUch a 
transformation of character is an act of grace to vrhich man contributes 
only the need to be transformed. 
The theoretical problem of ethics concerns man 1s obligation to do 
1.Jhat is right. What promotes the good of all m:ankind constitutes 
the definition of what is right. How is one to knovr vThat will best:.. 
serve mankind? In discerning i.Jhat is the good the individual has as 
the basic principle of guidance the assurance of a Divine plan for 
each individual and for history as a whole. Discovering one 1 s specif• 
ic vocation in the Divine scheme and fulfilling it provides the solution 
to theoretical ethics. The individual can .find out what he ought to 
do by examining what fulfills his own true nature. Hence, a cognitive 
theory of moral obligation is affirmed, rooted in one's personal 
relation to God regarding specific acts, though ·:the only absolute 
obligation one has regarding all acts is to 1vill vJhat is right. 
Ethical decisions are to be made from the perspective of one's 
personal relationship -vrith God in the attempt to discern God• s w:i!ll 
for him in a particular situation. As a check on one's subjective 
inclinations, Temple affirms the need to be guided by the actual 
consequences of actions taken in promoting the ·welfare of society. 
However, the basis of decision remains in conscience ~~d not in the 
consequences. 
3. Society as the Means for Spiritual Development 
Temple analyzes society and the institutions of society .from the 
perspective of' three Christian principles: freedom, fellowship, and 
service. The primacy of personality over society is affirmed. The 
political and economic orders exist for the development of personality, 
which means that the individual must be free to realize his potentiali-
ties. The :function o:f law in the state is significant in protecting 
one's rlghts and checking his destructive impulses. kperson can 
develop to maturity only through social relationships; and hence, one 1s 
freedom should be exercised in terms of the .freedom of others and the 
fellowship they share together •. Necessary in society are the specific 
social groups which .foster the .fell01vship of its members. At the same 
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time, each individual should strive to serve the welfare of all. Soci-
ety is essential for personal development, and the richer the society 
the greater the opportunity for personal fulfillment. Temple 1 s emphasis 
on vocation is relevant here. 
Society is viewed as a natural product. Its source is the social 
nature of man, and its goal is the fulfillment of each of its members. 
The state is the necessary organ of society enabling it to fulfill its 
function by maintaining peace and justice,. Force is necessary at times 
in order to preserve 11..11.ity within and to resist aggression without •. 
However, it is laVT ~olhich is the fundamental characteristic of the state. 
Since the state is necessary to preserve the unity, peace, and justice 
which are essential for the development of personality, one should be 
loyal to the state. But ultimate political loyalty is reserved for 
the community, and any particular state may be so ineffective as to 
require being replaced by another form of government. FUrthermore, 
because the state is founded upon society, when the relations among 
persons extend beyong national borders forming an inte~ational com-
munity, then the state is obliged to participate in An international 
organization. 
Nowhere are the principles of freedom, fellowship, and service 
more in need of application that~ in the economic order. Political 
freedom in the form of government by representation l~s been secured 
for many people, but economic dictatorship or a benevolent monarchy··: 
still ~oridely prevails in 1.rhich ·Harkers have little or no voice in the 
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regulations that control them. TILe sacredness of personality is defiled 
·by the treatment of workers as lfhands 11 rather than as persons. 
Each individual has the responsibility of serving his society, but 
this means that society has the responsibility of providing the op-
portunity for fruitful labor. The dif'ficulty is that economic produc-
tivity is too often regarded primarily as a means to make profit rather 
than to satisfy the needs of consumers. This is to pervert the natural 
order in which the satisfaction of needs is vie~ored as the end and the 
economic process is the necessary means. 
Ah economic system can be judged by its success in producing and 
distributing goods; but there is also the obligation to evaluate the 
economic system on the basis of what it does, or fails to do, for the 
development of human personality. To achieve the latter goal may re-
quire more direct intervention by the state i.Yl economic affairs than 
has been the case previously. Temple does not hesitate to make specif'-
ic proposals aimed at improving the material and spiritual status of 
the individual and directed toward regulating the social order in ac-
cordance with Christian social principles. 
Society exists for the sake of fostering the Epiritual develop-
ment of man. The personal level of existence, though last in temporal 
sequence, is prior in value, and its signif'icance is independent of, 
and extends beyond, the historical order. But if' man 1s ultimate des-
tiny is beyond the present historical order, then it becomes imperative 
to examine the meaning of the historical process for personality and 
the signific~Ylce of eternity both for history and personality. 
I', 
CHAPTER V 
PERSONALITY -~D THE HISTORICAL PROCESS. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to set forth the role l·rhich 
the concept of' personality plays in Templets interpretation of' history. 
An examination is made of the historical process itself', of' the task 
which confronts the historian in his attempt to understand this proc-
ess, and of the human forces which operate within history. 
The historical order, however, can only be understood in ter.ms 
of' its relation to the eternal order; hence the meaning of' eternity 
and the mutual effect of' eternity and time on each other are ex-
p0nnded. Ad'inal question is posed and a tentative ans-r.rer suggested 
regarding the possibility of' individual personality surviving both 
death and the end of' history. 
A. Significance of' Personality for Philosophy of History 
In order to clarify the issues to be discu13sed in this chapter it 
is necessary to begin by bringing together several strands of' Temple's 
thought presented in preceding chapters dealing vdth the relation of' 
personality to time and to value. 
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1. Personality and Temporal Sequencel 
A person, as distinct both from a thing and .from a brute, is char-
acterized by the capacity .for conscious experience which encompasses 
more than the present .fleeting moment. The person is aware of' his ex-
istence in the present but also remembers his existence in the past 
and anticipates his existence in the future. He is, thus, conscious 
o.f the continuity of his existence. Furthermore, the present ex~ 
perience o.f a person is itself' a time-span involving duration. 
The person is capable of being a&rare and of retaining in his aware-
ness a series o.f events extending over a period of time.. In a drama, 
for example, there is a succession 0.f scenes and acts, but the audience 
grasps the series as a unit in the course of the play• s unfolding so 
that at the end of the play the beginning is also "present. 112 Art in 
this way provides a clue to the conception of an "Eternal Now" by 
giving to man 
in a selected and deliberately ordered portion of 
experience, an illustration of 1.rhat might be extended 
over the whole of' if, if our faculties ·were sufficiently 
developed.3 
Similarly, the .future is anticipated by man in the present to the 
extent that he is lured 0n in the present by a goal 1-:rhich he is striving 
1. see· above, Ghap. III. 
2. See Temple, Nature, Ma.n and GOd, PP• 204-206. 
3.. Ibid •. , P• 205.-. The influence of Josiah Royce is evident here; 
cf'. The World and the Individual, II, 145: !lin our own experience of, a 
time-span of consciousness -vre have the analogy of eternal consciouness 
vrhen expanded indefinitely. " 
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to realize in the future.- The most distinctive trait of personality 
is revealed in such purposive~ activity. 
2. The Value of Historical Events 
With the emergence in the World-Process of the person conscious 
of his existence and capable of selecting certain objects for appre~ 
ciation, value also appears.l When a :g:erson finds satisfaction in 
objects which he apprehends, then he has experienced value. Also, the 
value; which is experienced may become partially independent of the: 
situation in which it occurred so as to influenca the evaluation of 
other events: 
The Value once possessed is in great measur~ 
retained; the mind which has found itself at 
home in one situation of terror, as in a trag-
edy, can afterwards face other situations of 
terror without--or at any rate,: with less-
dismay.2 
In like fashion one can often gain new insight into the meaning 
of past events as a re.sult of viewing them from the perspective af-
forded by the lapse of time from when the event occurred. Thus, 
though an event which transp2red sometime in the past cannot be al-
tered in regard to the details of the event, the interpretation of 
the event and the value (or disvalue) attached to it may be:, altered. 
That is, vie-wed from the pre:sent context one can apRreciate the past 
event in a way not possible at the time and thereby elicit from it 
1. See above-:, Chap. IV. 2. T.em:gl.e, Nature, Man and God, p. 208. 
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a character not previously discerned. In this way something that was 
evil may come to be interpreted as integral to a series o£ eYents· 
which is good. The,evil event in the past is not now good, but it is 
conceived as a necessary element o£ what is considered good. 
Thus, £or Christians the crucliixion o£ .Jesus o£ Nazareth was: 
evil but in the perspective' o£ the ensuing events has come to be in-
terpreted as an integral element in God's redemptive act which is good. 
Apart £rom the truth o£ this particular instance, ho:wever, the prin-
ciple involved remains valid: 
That principle is that the £uture does not merely 
disclose in the past something which was alw~ys 
there, but causes the past, while retaining its 
own natur&, actually to be, in its organic union 
with its~ consequence, something which in isolation 
it neither is nor was.~ 
Nor daes this mean that only the instrumental value and not the 
intrinsic value (or disvalue) o::f a pas::t-~ event can bre altered in this 
way since such distinctions are" not, in £act, ultimate:. Bo:th :Qast and 
:g:resent are': real only in re-lation to the whole of whi-ch they are:· sue-
ceBsive moments. Thffivaluffiof a past e~ent when considered in separa-
tion £rom the p,;re:sent and the £uture--: is not its real value-:, since this 
can only be· determined in light o£ past, present, and £uture, that is, 
until the compl:etion o£ th63 series o£ which it is but one moment. The:: 
series may in principle, Temv.le contends, extend to)all eternity. If 
this is the cas~e:;, then, "the evil thing remains in itsel£ evil, but 
whereas it~ a bad thing that it should hapgen it is a good thing 
that.it did happ:en.n2 
1. Ibid.'. piv 210:o 2. Ibid., n. 1. 
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Is this more than a rhetorical alteration of the past as Temple 
himself confesses?l Because good results follow from an event does 
not alter the character of the event, whatever that may have bee~ no 
matter hovJ long a period of time is included. If it does, then the 
event had no distinctive character at the time it occurred; and if 
this is extended to include all historical events, then the reality 
of the process is destroyed. Eternity alone becomes real. 
Nonetheless, for Temple, the past is alterable so far as its value 
is concerned. The significance of this insight for the present prob-
lem is that whatever meaning history displays can only be determined 
in reference to Eternity. So too with the person; as an episode in 
the historical process the events of his life are part of the histori-
cal order, but his true destiny can only be known in light of his 
relationship to, and significance for Eternity. 
Granting the emergence of the personal level of reality in the 
course of the World-Process as distinct from the levels of thing and 
brute, the question vrhich arises is the meaning of the total process 
and man's status in and beyond the historical process. Before these 
questions can be answered, ho>·rever, another one must be considered: 
How is man, standing as he does within the process of history, to ap-
prehend the meaning of:,the-process as a -whole? 
1. See ibid., P• 209. 
B.. Tb.e Historical P:tc;,cess 
l. The Interpretation of History 
a. The historical method. Temple notes that historical aware-
ness as it is now known is a recent developm~~t. Contemporary events 
have been recorded by man throughout the: .gtges. However, an attempt 
to record and grasp an understanding of any large block of time can 
perhaps be dated only back to Gibbon 1 s work. The Darwinian theory of 
evolution vr.i..th its ew.phasis on viewing present species in terms of 
their develc;,pmental history gave added impetus to the importance of 
historical sequence. 
Today the historical method is accepted procedure in all fields 
so that an event or idea is not held to be understood until it is 
viewed in its historical context and in light of its historical 
antecedents. One of the changes wrought by this emphasis on historical 
method has been the attitude toward change it~elf. Whereas stability 
was assumed by former generations, change is taken for granted now 
and is held to be essential to life. The latter attitude is ac-
companied by a wide-spread belief in progress.l The content and valid-
ity of this belief 1~1 be noted below. 
The historical method is the logical conclusion of an awakened his-
torical consciousness on the part of man. It aids him in his under-
standing of events ·within history. But how is history itself to be 
conceived? 
1., See ~ .. , PP• 428-429. 
b. Objective and subjective views of histoEY• Temple offers 
both an objective and a subjective definition of history. Objec-
tively vie·wed, history consists simply in the totality of all the 
events in history. What has actually occurred in the historical 
process,~ constitutes the content of history. Rm:·rever, if man is to 
understand what has occurred in history, ·then he must apprehend and 
interpret these events. It is the interpretation and apprehension of 
. history which constitute the subjective conception of history.l The 
two views are, of course, inseparable so :far as man is concerned and 
pose the problem which confronts the historian. 
c. The historian's task. All understanding o:f the events of 
history, particularly when the events under consideration are those 
1.rhich involve man• s ~or.ill either through initiation or modification, 
necessitates a combining of all three o:f the basic activities of the 
mind, viz., the.~intellectual, the aesthetic, and the ethical. That 
is, the historian must dra-vr upon all three of these disciplines. His 
use of the evidence must be scientific. Accurate and careful recording 
are basic and essential. But a mere listing o:f events even in se-
quential order is not the extent of the historian's task; :for he is 
also obligated to bring together these events and relate them in such 
a way as to constitute a meaningful whole. It is not the recording 
of the occurrence of events alone that makes history, but render-
ing their occurrence in such a manner as to show their significance. 
1. ill£., P• 4Z7. 
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Thus the historian is led to the aesthetic activity of the mind, 
both in regard to apprehension and expression of the events and their 
significance. 
However, it is an impossibility inherent in the historian's task 
to be able to gather and record all of the events which occurred in the 
period which he is studying. Even if he could, the recording itself 
would become so massive as to render the task meaningless. Hence, he 
is forced to select. But what is to be selected and how1 Some stand-
ard or criterion is necessary. S-ince; such a governing princip:l..e wili: 
be used to pass judgment on the relative merits of human activities, 
the historian has moved into the rea:J.m of ethics. Thus Temple con-
clildes that, 11science, art and morals are all involved in the study of 
history.nr Nor can such an investigation avoid philosophy, nror the 
princip~e of selection among events, and the suggestion or articulation 
of the significance of those selected, can hardly be detached from ul~ 
timate questions concerning the nature·. of reality.w2· 
2. The Forces~ Operating in Htiman History 
a. Personal and universal fellowship:. Turning to an analysis of 
human history, two basic unitary princiP.i'e·s may be~ seen operating as 
the goals of human action, viz.' personal and universaa fellowshi~:.. 
Temple describes the history of man as "the effort of men to achieve 
individual unity, and the groping of men, sometimes conscious, mor~ 
l •. ~' P• 428. 
2'.. Ibid. For a similar interP.retation on this point cf. W. H. 
Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (London;: Hutchinson • s 
University Library, 1951), PP• 16-17. 
often unconscious, to-vrards the unity of' universal fellowship. ttl 
Here is the struggle between the liberty of individuals and the 
order of' society already noted. Much of' history certainly reflects 
the effort to achieve some balance between these tioJO principles. A 
hasty survey of' history seems to indicate that there is a force 
operative in the historical pJ;'ocess itself which will eventually 
produce these two unities through the formation of some interna-
tional organization joining the nations of the world .. 2 Tovlard this 
end man must certainly -vrork. But if' the goal of' history is identified 
with the achievement of' such an international organization, then all 
who died before its appearance have no enjoyment of it and do not 
share in historyt s goal. FUrthermore, can S.l::\qh a goal of' history be 
claimed reasonable when it is made contingent on man t s success.: or 
failure in 1·rorking toHard this end and on the planet 1 s continued 
existence until it is attained? SUch an interpretation of human 
history would not seem to penetrate deeply enough into man's nature 
·either in terms of' motivation or aspiration. 
b. Self-interest. The struggle ~orhich the history of man ex-
hibits is not merely between individual liberty and social order, but 
first and foremost within the individual himself in an attempt to 
determine and to satisfy what is to his own ~elf-interest. 
FollmoJing Plato t s analysis of the soul in The Reoublic, Temple 
finds three principles operating 1•Jithin every man; desire, pride, and 
1. T~mple, Christus Veritas, p. 76. 2. See ibid., p. 85. 
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reason.l Each one has a necessarf place within the life of the individ-
ual and society, but the difficulty is maintaining the proper harmony 
between them so that each f'ul:fills the function for w·hich it is in-
tended. In order for physical life to be sustained certain basic de-
sires of the organism must be satisfied (e.g., hunger, sex, thirst). 
Since the satisfaction of these desires is necessary, one might as ivell 
satisfy them in a way that is enjoyable. But it is one thing to eat 
in order to live and in so doing to eat what one enjoys; it is quite 
another thing to live in order to eat so that the choice of food is 
diot~ted solely for its pleasure. Desire in this case has become lust 
or evil desire. In terms of the relations bet1-1een individuals, seek-
ing the satisfaction of one's desires would lead one simply to ignore 
others, rather than either cooperating or competing vrith them.2 
Self-respect or pride also serves to· foster the interests of the 
self by curbing desires which are detrimental to the total interests 
of the self' and by "claiming for the individual his right to live his 
· own life and to find scope for the exercise of his abilities. 113 The 
necessary emphasis of the individual on himself and his abilities leads 
to the relationship of competition between individuals, which in turn 
1. See ibid., PP• 79-81. 
2. Ignoring, competing, and cooperating constitute the three 
possible relations between human beings for Temple; see ibid., pp. 
7S-79. 
3. Ibid., p •. so. 
may become a battle for positions of honor, fame, power, and wealth. 
No longer is each interested in the reco~Lition due him based on his 
abilities; the impulse nmv is to get for oneself all he can. 
The satisfaction is different ~>rith regard to reason; for the 
rational principle involves the whole personality in the quest for 
absolute values (e.g.,truth, beauty, goodness). Furthermore, in 
satisfying the principle of reason on~ cannot ignore others, for they 
are helpful partners in the same quest; nor need he compete with them, 
for success in this realm by one means the success of all. The true 
status of the lll:d::h'V:idual as a member of the community is hence made 
evident, and each cooperates with one another. However, life requires 
more than reason alone: 
But reasonableness; while always a good, is not a 
sufficient equipment for the perfectly good life; 
there must be the energy of desire and the as-
sertiveness of Pride--both directed and controlled 
by Reason-:--if the full richness of human life is to be 
realised.1~ 
All three principles, therefore, serve essential functions within the 
life of the individual. 
There is, then, a psychological ;stratification ·within the in-
dividual similar to the stratification of reality. liDesire (like 
Matter)is the indispensahle foundation; but it does not display the 
purpose of its own being until we see it organised by Pride and con-
trolled by Reason.112 Once again the higher level requires the lower 
2. ~., P• 61. 
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for its existence, but the significance of the lower is only evident 
when controlled by the higher. 
It is the interaction of these principles as worked out among 
both individuals and nations which provides the actual history of the 
human race. The external struggle evident in history for individual 
unity and universal fellm.;ship is, therefore, rooted in, and a mani-
festa:tion of, the internal struggle within man and its resultant con-
sequences for the relations among men. Hence all the forces operating 
within history which might lead to the realization of the two unities 
are rooted in self-interest•l 
Thus, when an individual learns to be a responsible citizen, he 
is motivated by the realization that his own existence is dependent 
upon the welfare of his family and nation. There ~ other forces also 
at work. Unselfish love is manifest in certain acts by parents toward 
their children,(and vice versa). The sacrifice of self for others 
(e.g., a so:lpier in \vartime) and the promotion of values in which all 
can share do exist. The tJ.ta:~:;Lt,s of personality reflected in such acts 
could become dominant so that the possibility for the realization of 
the two g0als of unity cannot be eliminated; but all the while the 
interest in self remains, even when the other-regarding motives operate. 
This self-interest is never overcome. Nor can it be overcome by 
the self alone, for it is rooted in the basic fact which makes human 
1. See ibid., pp. 81-82. 
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history possible, viz., that man is a conscious center of apprehension 
and appreciation. Values are thereby made possible but can only be 
actualized in the individual t's own experience. This means, further-
more, that each one 1-Till seek his -mvro values and tend to underestimate 
those sought by others. There is, therefore, an initial bias tm.rard 
self-seeking and pride. Nor is this the end of it, formants aware-
ness:' of b.is actions means that he knows vrb.en he is seeking his own 
interest to the detriment of the interests of others.~- At one point, 
in fact, Temple conceives the real meaning of history--so far as 
Hits politics, its diplomacies, its Hars, its intrigues, its aspira-
tions tl are concerned-in terms of ttthe conflict of God t s love vri th 
man t s selfishness. 112 
Temple concludes that man1 s progress on earth does not exhibit a 
movement from self-interest to dis-interested love, but rather the 
progress is Hthe substitution of enlightened selfishness for stupid 
selfishness. n3 He goes on to state; llOf any emancipation from self-
ishness itself, or any attainment of perfect fellowship in self-sur-
render to the absolute good, our historic progress hitherto gives no 
Temple, Personal Religion .. , ; 
3~ Temple, Ghristus Veritas, P• 88. 
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promise whatsoever.trl 
Therefore, though education is necessary and valuable, the goal 
to "'lvhich man is directed demands more than education; he needs c0n-
version as well. The same is true in regard to political progress 
and social reform. Both are necessary and Eles:trable, but man needs 
redemption more. And more than peace and security, man needs eternal 
life. 1~ and history taken alone or together are incomplete; they 
need the indwelling presence of God for their completion.2 
This leads to the basic question for a philosophy of history: 
What makes history intelligible? 
c.:. History and Eterni ty3 
1. Process and Result 
Temple reasons that the meaning of any process is to be found 
either :in the process itself (i.e., in the course of its unfolding or 
development) or in the result at which the process eventually Si!Tives~· 
1. Ibid. Tbynbee seems to agree at this point; cf'. .Arnold J". 
T.bynbee, CiVilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press; 
1948), PP• 260-26.3. A:J..so a similar view is p!t'SS&nted by J"ohn 
Baillie, The Belief' in Progress (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1951), PP• 211-220, 227-2.35. However, both Toynbee and Baillie 
conceive of' history as revealing a greater unfolding of' grace, at 
least in the sense of' general influence and wider opportunity. 
2. See Temple, Christus Veritas, PP• 88-89 • 
.3. "History and Eterni tytt is the title of' Chap. V in Christus 
Veritas, PP• 75--91. What follo~ors in this section is based .mn a 
number of' sources, however, end not only on the 0ne chapuer from 
which the title has been taken. 
Both of these views are, in fact, necessary with regard to the meaning 
of history. To look only at the re~lt of history for history's mean-
ing is to make precarious the rationality of history at any given 
point in history. Further, if the result proves to be some concrete 
event in history, then all vTho died prior to the event are deprived of 
participating in its significance. This renders the historical proc-
ess morally irrational. .Ahd yet, if' meaning is to be discovered in 
the historical process, then the apprehension of it must be made from 
a perspective which transcends the process as a whole.l 
Temple does not make clear why those who died prior to the result 
of history cannot share in its significance. Granted that they cannot 
share in the result itself as an historical event, there is no ~eason 
why they cannot share in its significance through anticipation of the 
result. Also, to the extent that they contribute to the realization 
of the event that gives meaning to history, they are participating in 
its significance. 
Temple is led to conclude that history can be rendered meaning-
f'u1 only in relation to eternity and, similarly, that history must be 
a part of the content of eternity. 
History is fully intelligible only in the light of 
eternity. But, on the other hand, eternity must be 
conceived as requiring the actual historic process as 
part of its ovm content; for otherwise we render his-
tor"J unmeaning by the very means through which it is 
thought to secure its significance •••• ~s we must 
l. see ibid., P• 89. 
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regard history in the light of eternity, so we 
must conceive eternity in the light of history. 
History and eternity must be so conceived as to 
interpret each other.l 
What, then, is meant by eternity, and how can man conceive it? 
2. The Meaning of Eternity 
a. Eternity defined. B;r Heternal" Temple does not mean .simply 
everlastingness. Rather, he defines eternal as a "unitary synthetic 
apprehension of the whole process of Time and all that )lappens in it. tt2. 
SUch an experience is an extension to the point of perfection of what 
man experiences in his own consciousness as a partial transcendence of 
time. 
Various other interpretations of t)le eternal and its relation te 
t)le changing temporal )lave been offered. In muc)l of Oriental philos-
op)ly the eternal is emp)lasized to the point that change becomes an il-
lusion and the temporal, meaningless.- This is the inevitable outcome 
of an exclusive emphasis on the eternal.. However, the reverse emphasis 
made by materialistic views is equally false. It is, in fact, more 
disastrous; for, at least, the eternal has meaning for the mystic, 
,.mereas t)lere is no meaning for the materialist. Meaning cannot be 
found i_~ the mere succession of events.3 
Human experience is, in fact, more than merely the apprehension 
of a series of discrete events; "it is alvrays a unitary app:rehension 
1. Ibid., PP• 89-90. 2. Ibid., p. 187 ~ 
3. See Temple, Nature, Man and GOd, PP• 429-430. 
of a successive manifold. ttl Not only does each event taken in succes-
sion comprise a unity when apprehended, but also, 11there is a non-
successive unity in the life of any organism •••• This unity finds 
expression in the successive events; it is not fully expressed in any 
of them separately, but only (if at all) in the whole series. n2 
b. lin illustration from poetry. An analysis of the nature of 
these unities is best made in regard to human thought processes. T.he 
poet perhaps offers the best illustration. It is in the act of writ~g 
the poem that the poet best apprehends his own thought. Further, the 
meaning of the poem is not to be discovered until the entire poem is 
finished. .Thus for the reader to discover the true meaning of the poem, 
it is necessary to read the entire poem. BUt there is a sense in which 
it is equally true for the poet. F.or the thoughts of the poet are 
apprehended by him only as he articulates them. Hence, the mea..11ing o:f. 
the poem even for him only becomes actualized during the process of 
its composition. T'nus Temple reasons, 11here is an. instance of a 
rational unity of the successive '..rhere the unity and the successive be-
come actual together.n3 
SUch a unity is evident in man • s experience. Temple feels that 
an important conclusion is to be drawn from this analysis: 
It means that there exist series of successive 
parts, so ordered that when regarded forwards 
no necessitating ground is discernible, but 
l. ~., p. 430. 3. Ibid., P• 431. 
which are· seen to· be·, governed by an immanent 
necessity when regarded backwards, f'rom the 
view.;..point of' the completed series.I 
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Thus in the poem referred to above it is evident that no line (or 
lines) must be. Not until the end of' the poem is the necessity of' 
ea:ch line present, but then necessity is appa.rent:: "In order to be 
that poem, and expre-ss that meaning, it had to consist of' exactly 
that series of' words arranged in that order, with that rhytbm .. n2 
c. PUrpose as immanent in historical process. This same prin-
cipl'e is to be seen to operate in the live:s. of' some people. Though 
many choices are present along the way and in each instance it is 
never possible to predict precisely what will follow, when viewed 
from hindsight a definite unity is discovered. This is due in such 
instances to certain constant elements in the person's character.-
Here, also, is to be discovered the meaning of p;urpose:: "This self-
expression of a constant and constantly developing character is what 
we have called P:urpose •. n3 
This is true as well in the life of a nation, though in a more: 
inco~~ete·way. Hence, a poem, a man's life, and the history of a 
nation all illustrate this same principle of the unity of' the succes-
sive. The conclusion to which Tem:glie is drawn is that "there is found 
l. ~~ 
2. Ibid., P• 432. This analogy of' the poet or dramatist may 
also be found in Mens Creatrix, pp• 357-360, and Christus Veritas, 
pp:• lS7-lS9. 
3. Temp-le, Nature·, Man and God, p. 432·. 
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as a :feature of history an element which may properly be described as 
in immanent purpose. nl One basic task of the historian, then, is to 
make evident the immanent purpose in regard to the period of history 
or the movement 1vi th Hhich he is dealing. 
He is not called upon to formulate the immanent purpose of' 
a nation's life, or of a civilisation or a culture. But 
he is rightly expected to set :forth the facts which he 
narrates in such a vtay that they are felt to express a 
more or less constant tendency which gives unity to them. 
He must not be content to compile a chronological table; 
he must make a story of' it, and a story must have, at 
least, coherence, which is a f'orm of unity.2 
3.. Significance of the Temporal f'or the Eternal 
Keeping these important considerations in mind, an examination 
of' the meaning that history has f'or eternity can now be made. Temple 
suggests three main vie1.J's which have predominated in this regard •. 
All three~ present partial truths taken separately, and thus Temple 
proposes still a :fourth vie1.r in which he strives to bring together 
the truths of each of the other three while eliminating the falsities. 
It is essential, then, to examine each view separately. 
a. Time as the image of eterni~. Fi:V_$t is the vie~or generally 
attributed to Plato and best summed up in the Platonic dictum: 11Time 
is the moving image of Eternity. 113 The temporal process is conceived 
as proceeding f'rom the Eternal vrithout, however, aff'ecting the Eternal~ 
Such a view ultimately assigns to history a meaningless status. Ho1-1, 
1. Ibid.; P• 433. 2~ Ibid., PP• 433-434• 
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:in fact, can history itself be explained and accounterlt for? The move-
ment of time is alone explained, but the temporal world rema:ins a 
mystery. 
There is a sense, Temple affirms, in Hhich this view is true. For 
the vTOrld is not necessa.r-.r to God in the same way in which God is nec-
essary to the 1.rorld. This is illustrated by a very simple mathematical 
formula: liThe World - God = 0; God - World= GOd. trl Eowever, the ob-
jection to the view in question is the fact that it stops after hav-
ing stated this formula, failing to see that there is another sense 
in 1~ch the world is necessary for God. For if the formula is all 
that man can affirm regarding tb.e relation of history to GGd, then 
Temple concludes, 11History is metaphysically unmeaning. n2 Phil-
osophically, then, this view must be discarded as inadequate. The 
only meaning which history has is that which is derived from the fact 
that it is an expression of, and flows from, the Eternal. However, 
from the standpoint of the Eternal, history is itself meaningless. 
Religiously considered, such a view is still less adequate. Any 
religion which has )lis:b,®mell roots o:f any sort is, of course, rudely 
uprooted and its foundation destroyed. Thus Buddhism and Islam are, 
in part, undermined. However, the blo1-1 dealt Ohristiani ty by sucl,J: a 
view is much more severe. For Christianity claims that God acted 
specifically and finally in the conf:ines of history. The Ohristia.11 
faith is founded upon a historical person through whom God has acted. 
1. Nature, Man and God, P• 4.35. 2. ~-
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But not only is God 1's act regarded as significant; so too is the event 
in time itsel£'. 1 Thus for Christianity history can never be considere:dl. 
as meaningle-ss to God, or God as com:Q]:etely unaffected by history. 
Though TempTe rejects this view. and acknowledges the inadequa-cy 
of the sim:gie~ formula that if the world is subtracted from God, God 
remains the same, he contends that the formul'a contains the significant 
truth that God is self-sufficient. How coherently he is able to main-
ta'in the self-sufficiency of God while at the same time stressing the 
meaning of history for G0d warrants careful consideration. 
b. Eternity as the totality o:f temporal process. This leads to 
the second interpretation of history in relation to Eternity. Here. is 
set forth the op:g0site extreme' of the first view., and instead of reJ-
garding time as "the moving image of Eternity, ftl the latter is con--
ceived as "the integral te>tality of Time •. n2' Thus Eternity become.s-
"just the sum-total of the tempe:ral simultaneously apprehended.113 His-
tory is frankly acknowledged to have eternal significance. Man himself 
is caught up in the historical process. The future and what it may 
p_roduce cannot be determined on the basis of the past or the p;re:sent. 
Further, the past and pre·sent cannot be properly interpreted either, 
1. Soren Kierkegaard criticized P~atonism for failing to rea21..ize 
that a moment in time can be decisive for e.ternity; see;Philosophica21.. 
Fragments, trans. David F •. Swenson (Princeton:: Princeton University 
Press, 1936), P• 46. 
2. Temple, Nature, Man and God, P• 437. 
3. Ibid., P•· 434· 
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since. they can only be· seen as; discrete movements and events and not 
as a connected whole. It is quite conceivable. that fJther63 may be3 
rectifications of' va:lue· which will be brcrught about in the f'uture, and 
which will :QrOf'oundly mo:dif'y the: judgement on past and pre:s:ent which 
our pre-s~ent kno:wledge make:s inevitable. nl It is no) wonder, then, thatt 
therffi are~ so many problems which are. unsolved in the world; it i.s> 
simpily because the future is unkno~ to us. 'I'b.ey will be-; soLved at a 
later date. Though the past and p~esent viewed from ma.n•s present 
point in history (i.e., any particular p<Dint) do seem to. reflect evil:, 
this is because: of' his. partial and i.Jn.Rerfe:ct gerspecti.ve. When all of 
the parta arffipla~ed together and areviewedlaiDa whole, then the~true 
meaning will be reveaft:ed; and what s.eemed evil;, when viewed as: sep-
arate parts, now becomes; good when the) whole is grasped. In this way 
both religious hope; and moral judgment. axel P.re:served ... 
What dif'f'icultie-s; accrue from such an interpretation'!' Essentially 
the abo::ve) vi~ is an ap:gea3.. to ignorance.~ What evidence is there f'or 
supJ.!fGYSing that the unkno~ future, will produce good?. Actuailly, a.5l..Jl. of 
the empirical evidence p0int to the contrary since the past and present 
exhibit an unbalance between evil and good in the world at any time: •. 
.And if it is supposed that this obst~cl9-; is hurdLed by proposing that 
1. Ibid!, P•· 43)7:. 
2.. Tempi'e· stati:r.s the' difficulty cleEEr'ly and coge-ntly at this p0illlt, 
but still prop0se:s3 a strikingly similar soLution to the p~o blem of evil:; 
see': belbw. 
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God 1illl con~ect the situation through an act o:f di-vine intervention, 
then the :freedom and responsibility o:f man which seemed so real and 
essential sugdenly become an illusion. The entire historical process 
is reduced to a projection of the nature of God. Hence, one has re-
turned to the :first view which concei-ved time as the reflection of 
eternity. Thus T.emple concludes: 
For i:f every tb-ing a:fter all is thro'l-m back upon 
God, and God is conceived as Himsel:f altogether 
outside the process, then the process is not in 
an ultimate sense constituti-ve o:f eternity at all 
but wholly episodic in relation to it.l 
c. Time -versus eternity. Tlie third view of history freely 
acknowledges that hist0ry is nothing more than passing episodes in 
relation to Eternity. In this vieiol both history and Eternity are ac-
cepted as llprimitives.lt Neither one can be derived :from the other; 
rather a relationship is established between them.2 Temple calls this 
nthe naive religious vie'l-7. n3 God has brought time and the world int0 
existence simultaneously. Similarly, they 1dll be brought to a 
decisive end together. However, spiritual beings who lived in the 
world will at its termination resume their existence conditioned by 
the li-ves they led in response to their opportUl1ities. 
Such a view Temple considers to be more mythological than 
1. T.emple, Nature, :!Ylan and God, P• 438. 
2. For a lucid and persuasive exposition of a more sophisticated 
variant of this view· see W. T. Stace, Time and Eternit;z (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952). 
3. Nature, ¥..an and God, P• 438. 
philosoRh1ca£r.. Thinking is manif'e:s_ted in terms of' picture'S. rather 
than carefully worked out thoughts. Ce-rta-in advantages; ot: this vieloli 
must not be overlooked~ The) suRrem.a-cy of' the Eternal is clea:rl!y evi-
dent, and here there:• is agreement with the first woposail~ In kee:g'li.ng 
with the second alternative, history and man 1s choices are~ conceived! 
as p,Dssessing ultimate_· signif'icance. Man's conduct qualtl.f'ieS> (or dis~ 
<iua:lif'ie:s;) him f'or eternal lif'e• Still another advantageous J?Oint is 
not merely that the:progress of' history isconceived,as;inf'inite. tem-
:RIDrality, but that a::def'inite clima.x: is. a:f'f'irmed at which time a nev. 
order is ushered in. 
'l1his last Q0!llit · Temmte.: f'ee:ls adds a ne.w, dimension to the meaning 
of' history. Fo·r according to-- this view" histoxy not only exhibits. a:n 
ever· wider apJtll.cation of' the EternaLprinciR:i'e.s, extending bey<md~ 
earthiLy existence into~ lif'e immorthl.:', but· a:I!so history Re-int's toward 
another and different community of' P.ersons. Entrance into this fel-
lowshiir is determined by one:1s earthly :nfe-. 
Defe:cts ar9!, however, no:.t absent from this vie:w.. · The relation 
. which histoxy and the Eternal share: is entirely external~ No adequate 
rea:s.on is offered why histoxy wa:s. initiated by the Eternal• Further, 
the Eternal enjoys only an incomR~ete suprema~ over history:: "The 
_Rro:cess o£ History has f'or its own denizens an ultimate; im~:xta:nce, but 
n0::t, apP.:a.rently, f'or God •. "n The third view, then, attern._pts a-1 synthesis 
of' the :first two but is a f'ailnre: because it ends in cancelling out 
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both in the synthesis proposed. Temple 1 s own belief in the complete 
supremacy of God over history is m~de apparent in his criticism of 
this theory. However, just why the Eternal1 s incomplete supremacy 
over history is. invalid is not suggested. Als~ Temple fails to in-
quire as to what the facts of experience require. 
d. A synthesis. Temple propo~es to synthesize the significant 
elements of all three views i~thout succumbing to the above fallacy. 
No final or absolute conclusions are to be expected in such an endeavor: 
The essence of the enterprise is that we who are 
finite are seeking to comprehend the infi.11i te, in 
order to deftfie its relation to our finite selves. 
In such an attempt apparent success must be certain 
failure. Further, our method must be one of analogy 
and not of demonstration; for the Eternal ever eludes 
us, and we cannot without certain error form a 
definition of it which might be the starting-point 
of logically cogent argumentation.l 
The diffi.culties encountered by each of the views in attempting te 
understand the Eternal from the perspective of the temporal is to some 
extent inherent in that very effort itself. Man is not capable of 
conceiving of the relation between the temporal process and the Eternal 
except by analogy. Thus it is necessary to turn again to analogies 
drawn from human experience. First, hmrever, the elements .of truth 
which the above three views present need to be made explicit. 
1. Ibid., P• 4Lrl• See also Temple 1 s criticism of Hobbes for 
presenting an apparently complete system; Christianity and the State, 
P•· 61. 
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(l) Truths of each view. Despite the failure o:f the three 
views noted, each one contains significant elements which must be in-
corpora ted in any true view·. Thus the strengths o:f each view are as 
follows: 
In the first, the complete and all~controlling 
supremacy of the Eternal; in the second, the 
ultimate importance o:f History and its moral 
choices; in the tbird, the expectation of a 
climax of History inaugurating a new world-
order.l 
Nonetheless, each viet-r is inadequate as it stands, and a synthesis 
which combines the best of each one needs to be agnstructed; to this 
~ask Temple directs his attention. 
(z) The analogical method. The creative artist at work 
provides the best analogy of the relation of the eternal to the tem-
poral, as is offered in the experience of a dramatist 1rriting a play.2 
For here history is seen in a miniature form. Once the characters 
have been created and placed in the drama, the author no longer has 
dominion over them. The action of each one is based upon his person-
ality as created by the author. Tnus, the conduct of the characters 
is in one sense beyond the dramatist's control once created. However, 
he can at any moment destroy them simply by ceasing to write. The 
play is entirely dependent upon him ill this sense, while he is in no 
wise dependent upon the play (i.e., for his existence). But he can 
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. MJ.. 
2. CT. Temple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 359-360; Christus Veritas, 
PP• 90-91, 187-189, 275-277; Nature, :Ma..."tl and God, pp. Ml-443. 
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remain a dramatist only by continuL11g to vTrite plays, and thus the 
play and the characters are in a real sense important to him. \'Jhat 
~emple fails to recognize is that if the dramatist must continue to 
vTrite plays, then he ;!;§ dependent upon the play for his existence as 
a dramatist. Temple is involved here in the fallacy of logical ab-
straction. 
Another analogy is that of a human father and his children. The 
latter owe their existence and most of their environmental iPJ:luences 
to the father. They respect and obey him. However, the control of 
the father over his children is not through coercion, but tbrough love. 
The children are free to disobey. " 
Both analogies are, of course, incomplete. In the first the 
characters have no real existence, and in the second the father is 
himself subject to the same finite conditions as his children. How-
ever, taken together they offer penetrating insight into a true under-
standing of history. 
(3) Necessity of a personal Gog. Temple affirms that the 
beginning of an understanding of history is God, Eternal and Perfect 
in His being. FUrther, he affirms that ~od creates and that he has 
created the world. If the world were not created by G0d, then there 
must be another supreme Being to account for God plus the world. But 
it is personality which offers the explanation for the world and God•s 
activity in it. T}iat is, the world is viewed as being grounded in 
===========~,! 
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the ~~ll of God.l It is God 1 s purpose which constitutes the meaning 
of history.2 The fact that God is creator indicates something about 
his nature. He is such that he can and does create. By relating this 
inference to the analogies above, Temple connects creation "'~o!ith the 
sheer satisfaction of creative activity ••• and with the desire for 
self-communication. rr3 
The inorganic -vmrld becomes, then, the expression of God on the 
level of quantitative relationships. 
He looks upon His own creation and finds it nvery 
good", and therein also finds the fu.lf'ilment of 
the purpose with which He made it. It is His -vmrk, 
and in it He finds the counterpart of His own mind. 4 
On one planet GOd 1 s creativity expresses itself in another form, 
so that beings are brought into existence who have additional po1.;ers 
such as self-consciousness, reflective thought, and love. Through 
these powers, these new creations may enter into the mind of their 
Creator and appreciate His work. Such beings are a part of nature but 
are not wholly determined by it. They are, rather, guided by what ap-
pears good to them, that is, 11by that in which they find themselves 
as God seeks to find Himself in them. u5 They are dependent on God, but 
1. The argument .for this position and the full exposition of it 
will be presented in the next chapter. 
2. See William Temple, 11Christianity as an Interpretation of 
Historyll reprinted in Religious E:x:perience • • • , pp. 259-260. 
3. Nature, Man and God, p .. 443., 
5. Ibid. 
I 
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He controls them quite differently from the natural order. For they 
must be controlled by means of, and according to, "the lai'T of their being 
which He has imposed on them; He must control them through I'That appears 
to them good and their power to appreciate i~that is, through their 
unforced affection and -vTill. rtl 
Hence, in regard to these beings God as immanent in history does 
not know prior to any choice what response will be made. However, like 
the dramatist God is not entirely in the action of his players but als0 
transcends them and as such He is certain of lrnm.rledge (past and fu-
ture). 
To Him the contingent is still 00ntingent, as not 
being compelled by its own past; yet the whole is 
necessary, and therefore also all its parts; and the 
whole is the expression of His will. So He knows 
the contingent as contingent and yet knovrs it With 
certainty.2 
There is a basic ambiguity here which Temple does not resolve: 
if the contingent is kno'Wil as certain, then it must be necessary; and 
if necessary then it cannot be contingent. Temple acknowledges that, 
on this issue, one is led to something which for finite minds is im-
possible to penetrate. However, he argues, the difficulty occurs just 
vThere it is to be expected since man is finite, namely, ma...11 1s attempt 
to comprehend the nature of God. The interpretation which Temple 
1. Ibid. 
2. .ThiQ.' p. 445. 
offers suggests a form of Christian trinitarianism.l God as the Eter-
nal Being of the univ-BTs~-' communicates Himself; indeed, the Word; 
which is the self-expression of His mind, is co-eternal with the Being 
of God. God's self-expression takes the form of the created universe 
just as Shakespeare's self-expression takes the form of the poems and 
plays i·Ib.ich he wrote. In the case of God, the 1orord vras not a single 
utterance for all time but is continually being uttered "in the radia-
tion of light, in the movements of the stars, in the development of 
life, in the reason and conscience of man. rr2 
With the emergence of life in the created universe a ne1or develop-
ment took place. The transition was made from the activity of an ob-
ject based only on efficient causation to the choices of an organism 
based also on final causation. Self-determination arises rooted in 
what the organism takes to be its apparent good. What appears to be 
objectively given as the actual good consists in the activity of the 
Divine Word as the expression of God1 s mind and affords to man the 
reality which he is constantly striving to apprehend more adequately 
B-l1d :is always partially apprehending. 
Man 1 s response to the Divine Word recognized as the good is itself 
1. see ~., pp. 445-447. Of. also the sermon on liThe Holy 
Spirit and the Blessed Trinity" in Fellowship -.dth God (London: Mac-
millan and Co., 1920), PP• 130-144; and the final chapter of Ghristus 
Veritas, 11Love Divine: The Blessed Trinity, u PP• 274-285. Tne case 
for, and explanation of, a trinitarian conception of God will be presented 
in the nezt chapter. 
2. Temple, Nature, J.'.fan and God, p. 445. 
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the operation of What Christians call the Holy Spirit within man, en-
abling him to respond to the Divine Word, became explicit for the 
Christian only after the Word was fully expressed in history in the 
person of Jesus of Nazareth. With his appearance a more adequate re-
spouse to God t s Word by means of the Holy Spirit was made possible. 
However, man's response to the Word, though itself made possible 
by the activity of God in man, is not mechanically evoked.l!. Hence, 
Temple affirms that man is free and that God operates through him, but 
the rational justification for both assertions is not indicated. Until 
the organism makes its response, there is uncertainty about its ovm 
course of development, resultli1g in the blind alleys of certain lines 
of development which the evolutionary process reveals. Furthermore, 
the good vn1ich one organism seeks may sacrifice the good of another. 
When this occurs, God as immanent in the temporal process is disap-
pointed. But God t s bei..'Ylg is not exhausted in his self-expression in 
the created universe--anymore than Shakespeare's personality is ex-
hausted in what he wrote--or in the activity within man enabling man 
to respond to the Word. God is not just SOn and Holy Spirit, but alsm 
Father, 
the fount of Deity and therein of all else, with 
whom a thousand years are as one day, and whose 
Love--that is, giving of self to rejoice in the 
self-gift which ~sw~rs--is fulfilled in Word and 
Spirit, with all that in redemption and sanctifica-
tion issues from the eternal creativity.2· 
1. The problem of man• s freedom and universal salvation is devel-
oped below. 
2. Temple, Nature, }fan and God, PP• 44~447. 
If tb.is is the ease, then what effect, if any, does history have 
upon the Eternal'? That is, is God as the Eternal Being unaffected by 
vJhat occurs in the temporal process which he has created? 
4• Effect of the Temporal on the Eternal 
a. if.. double interpretation necessary. Two ans1:.;rers must be given 
to the question of the effect history has upon the Eternal. There is 
one sense in which history makes no difference to God. This is in the 
sense that history consists in successive events; whereas there is no 
succession for the Eternal. However, from another perspective history 
does affect the Eternal, for it indicates wh~t the Eternal is. If 
history were otherwise or were not, then the Eternal would be different 
from what He is. 
History does not make a difference to God in the 
sense of making Him different at one time from what 
He was at another; but· it does DUL~e a difference to 
Him in the sense of being so vitally united to His 
eternal essence as its inevitable self-expression 
that if it were annihilated, or even changed, that 
would involve a difference in Him ~s compared with 
what, as author, over-ruler, and f'ulf'iller of History, 
He is.l 
Putting this double interpretation in terms of the Christian 
faith, the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ did not add (or 
subtract) anything to God, but t):lrough these historical events and 
the historical person of Christ God ioTaS provided a new channel by 
which to deal wi tb. man. TJ:lus a new relationship was made possible 
throug}:l divine love. But the love of God remained the same. Tllis is 
1. ~., P• 447. 
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not to take l'ightly Ohrist•s. earthly existence, ho::wever, f'or it was 
made necessary by God 1s nature. If' history were~ not or if' it were: 
devoid of' Christ•s love, then God's nature would not be what it, in 
f'act, is.-
The eternal is the ground of' the historical, 
and not vice versa; but the relation is nece·s-
sary, not contingent-essential, not incidental. 
The historical is evidence of' the eternal • • • 
as a nec~ssary self'-exnression of' a Being whose 
essential activity is at once self'-communication 
ar;d self'-~iscovefl in that to which He commu.:.... 
n1.cates Hlmself'. · 
Despite Tem:g:le 1 s ingenuity, f'undamental quesJtions remain un-
answered in his interpretation of' the ef'f'ect of' the dJe¥t_R0ral on the 
Eternal.. Must there not be:; succession in God just as there~ is sue.:... 
cession in history, if history is to be meaningf'ul?. Likewise, if' 
the ontological reality of' time is denied, then is not history ren-
dered devoid of' meaning?. 
b. A commonwealth of' value. Tempi'e is led to concli.lde that 
though an understanding of' human history must remain partially veiled 
to man, certain principles of' interpretation may be noted based on the 
natur~ o£ value which has been presented. Fence, f'or Temple the mean-
ing of' human history. is to be tlf'ound in the development of' an ever wider 
f' ellowshipc of' ever richer personalities. The goal of' History, in short, 
is the Commonwealth of Value.n2"' The Commonwealth of' Value is, as al-
ready noted, Temp:le •s attempt to solve the~ :groblem o£ ethics by sug-
gesting an ethics of' vocation. From the· standpm'int of' traditional 
1. ~·, R• 448. 2. Ibid. 
Christianity the Oommomrealth of Value is akin to the f'ellmvship of 
saints •. 
It is a Harm<:my of Harmonies, for it takes into 
itself all lesser loyalties and fellowships •••• 
It is the peace of eternity, wherein all suc-
cessiveness is comprised and all discords are re-
solved. We have called it the Commonwealth of 
Value; its Christian name is the COmmunion of' 
Saints; its perfection is in eternity:, nut to 
bring its divided and warriBg members into that 
Harmony and Peace wherein alone it is actual is 
the purpo sa vmich give meaning to History ,.1 
Thus Temple has preserved the deepest intuition of religion, 
-vrhich was noted in the third view above, in which history is con-
ceived as culminating in a new order. This new order supplants the 
old, and yet the old is a necessary condition to the new. The transi-
tion from the historical order to the new order beyond history pro-
vides an illustration of "one of those unities vlhere the principle of 
unity is in the vrhole, n2 so that what came before can be fully under-
stood only in light of what comes after. Man1 s life is much like a 
play of which God is the author and man the character He creates as a 
result of His love. Through His love, God guides these finite persons 
from their initial concern for self into the fellowship of cooperation, 
that is, the Commonwealth of Value. 
Such is the meaning which histol'"IJ displays for T.emp;Le. 
The end is not predictable from the beginning; 
and the beginning can only be understood in the 
light of the end. Consequently our apprehension 
of -the Meaning of History is ver;r meagre. But we 
1.. Ibid., P• 426. 2. ~., PP• 450:-451. 
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eX&~ple, may vary; but if there is an eternal order, then the present 
historical order must end. It meanfi further that nothing (including 
the winning of a world--v,rar) is as significant for man as is his rela-
tionship to that -vrhich characterizes the eternal realm. Not -what 
presently prevails but the qualities which Eternity e~hibits are the 
important ones. Eo:r Temple this means that love is the sovereign 
power in the universe. The love which is supreme in history is con-
ceived in terms of the sacrificial act of Christ on the cross, so that 
the cross of Christ as the manifestation of God1 s love in history 
constitutes the focus of history.l Thus Temple states: 
The eternal Spirit is love; the eternal goods are 
love, joy, peace, loyalty, courage, wisdom, beauty, 
knowledge. These are the true goods; that man is 
truly successful, that nation is truly great, which 
has these things in abundance. 2 . 
If, then, history is the unfolding of the purpose of the Eternal 
Spirit, what will eventually prevail in history must be in accord with 
that purpose. Selfishness cannot succeed, therefore, in a universe 
operated by eternal love. Service is rooted in the ground of history~ 
Tllls does not me~ that the individual (or nation) choosing to serve 
will necessarily profit from it on earth; only that the opportunity 
to serve vTill ahrays be available. In fact, service may entail suf-
fering for the server; but if it is done in the spirit of love, then 
1. See Temple, "Christianity as a.11 Interpretation of History,u 
reprinted in Religious Exper~ence , • • ~ p. 263, 
2. Christus Veritas, p. 190. 
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one? can rejoice that he. is considered worthy to be called upon to 
suf'fer.1 
To: claim that lovel is the sovereign pOMer in history will seem 
to some better homiletics than philosophy, but for TemHle it is sound 
philosophy as.well as persuas~ve p~eaching: 
Philosophers s:eek to know the nature. of reality 
and the right way to live; Christianity o:ffers 
the answer to· both enquiries in one word--Love; 
and if we accept the hyp0.th~sis, it works both 
in theory and in practic&., in the sense, not that 
it makes' alL clear, but that it p_rogre:ssi~ely, if 
never com:g:letely, reduce:s> chao·s to order. Z 
b. Tracing love in history. The objectici!;>.h which immediately is 
raised against such a view. is the difficul:ty of finding traces o:f divine 
love: in the historical p):"'cess • .3'· The animaL world, for exanrg·JJe, seems 
to display much suffering which can onJ.Y bee; described aSJ :fruitie-ss= .. 
But is this imwe:ssion justified? Tem~e; thinks not. Suffering indeed~ 
exists, but it is not to be~equated with what man might suffer under 
the same· conditions; for the memory and anticipation ·which man exp:eJ-
riences are not the same for the animal. Furthermor8", fierce comp~ti-
tion is not the lflaw. of the junglen as it is so often deJ:P_cted to be; 
1. Temp:Le, seems to betray a cali'ousness here in regard to human 
suffering. Of. also Nels Ferr4, EVil and the Christian Faith (New. 
York: Harper &:. Brothers, 1947), p:. 1'0JZ1 nT.c:> accep:t suffering as a' gift 
:from G0:d to· be used for others is hard, but suffering so·accented 
o-pens the door to a new.; world and to the red. God. n: 
2. Christus Veritas:-., pg:.. 190:..192'. 
,3. The answer which follows; to this objection is based primarily 
on the material in ChristusVeritas, pp• 191-200. 
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rather, cooperation fosters survival and progress in the animal kingdom 
as e1Se1·rhere. Hence, the evidence suggests that the animal -.rorld is 
predominantly a happy one.L 
It is~ however, man and his life on earth that is of primary con-
cern. Though man continues to learn more effective contr0l over the 
natural order, there is no hope that he can completely control it. Ac-
cidents which are beyond the domain of his powers and which destroy his 
plans will always plague him. But if this is true, then how can it be 
' 
maintained that the universe reveals the unfolding of a loving purpose? 
Part of the difficulty involved is the tendency of some to refer 
any event not readily explainable by scientific knowledge to a special 
act of the Eternal Spirit. In one sense this interpretation is correct.~ 
since 11a11 that exists is the self-utterance of G'ci>d's Will.112 But it 
does not follow that the particular event is a special act of will • 
.A:nother difficulty arises in regard to the meaning of accident in this 
connection~ Temple defines accident as follows: 
An accident is an interference 1vi th human 
purposes due to the action of natural forces, 
1. Though the implications of this view are interpreted quite 
differently from Temple, see the similar position regarding animal 
·suffering developed by Charles E. Raven, Natural Religion and Christian 
Theology, Vol. IT: Exoerience and Interoretation (Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1953), p. 116. 
2.. Temple, Cbristus Veritas, p. 192. 
lmown or unknmm., but incalculable in their bearing 
on the purpose interfered with.l 
Nonetheless the sceptic might reply that God could intervene at 
those times when the natural lavr is I.·Torking counter to the purposes of' 
man so that the good might be ac~Jleved. It is Temple's conviction that 
God can and does intervene in specific incidents, though its occurrence 
cannot be proved beyond question, and hence no philosophic world-view 
should be built upon it.2 cHe admits further that such acts on G0dts 
part are exceptions and tihat the problem is intensified by the convic-
tion. If God does intervene on one's behalf occasionally then why not 
always? 
What is at issue when the question is stated in t)lis way is one t s 
scale of values. It seems unfair at first blush to think. that God 
vTould spare the lif'e of one boy in battle because i{h~ boy• s father 
prayed for him and allow another to die because the latterts :father 
failed to pray. But this is to misconceive a number of factors in-
volved. If it is really best .for either boy to return home safely, then 
the father's 11prayer might be the condition needed for the realisation 
of this best result.n3 Perhaps, more significant is one•s attitude 
1. Ibid., p. 193. The problem of accident constitutes one aspect 
of the problem of natural evil. Human suffering not due to accident 
is considered' in the next chapter when the problem of evil is raised 
in its ·entirety. For a complete discussion see Skelton, 11The Problem 
aaf,., Evil in the Works of William Temple. It 
2. See. Ohristus Veritas, P• 195.. See also Lecture VI, UGod in 
History,tt in Church and Nation, PP• 140-161. 
3. Temple, Ghristus Veritas, P• 196. 
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toward death. If death is viewed as the greatest evil that can befall 
man, then, of course, the death of one boy and the continued life of 
the other will seem unfair. But to v-iew life and dea:Bh on these terms 
is to fail to interpret earthly existence in light of eternity. The 
real tragedy of untimely death falls upon those who survive the lost 
loved one, not the one who dies. Finally, the supposed unfair-.a.ess in-
volved does reveal one example of the fact that each person gains or 
loses as a result of environmental influences, particularly the home 
il1 which he grows up.l Thus the one boy must suffer for his father 1 s 
fa;ilure to pray quite apart from 1.Jb.etb.er he lives through the war or 
not. Such, at least, is the case if eternity provides the re~ meaning 
of temporal history. 
However, only a partial answer is provided in this way. What must 
be added is the very purpose of human history itself 1.zhich has been 
shown to be the fullest development of personality in a fellovrship of 
persons bound together by mutual love and under the guidance of the 
Eternal Spirit. It is toward this end that the evolutionary process. 
moves. Therefore, the fundamental problem confronting each individual 
is that of detaching himself sufficiently from the temporal so as to 
become aware of the Eternal.. Accident plays a major role in dramatiz-
ing this fact to the individual and disciplining him to take cognizance 
of it.2 
1. It is because the environment is so significant for personality 
development that the state should strive to provide the proper condi-
tions for the development of its citizens, as was noted in the preceding 
chapter. -
2. See.~ Temple, Christus Veri tas, p •. 197. 
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God does not, then, choose to destroy life through widespread 
devastation; rather he has created a world in which such accidents are 
incidental to the orderly process. When accidents do occur that frus-
trate the purposes of man, GOd stands ready to ~urn them into an oc-
casion for i'urther spiritual growth. Goodness:, it must be remembered, 
means service to, and love of, G0d, so that nothing which happens in 
the natural order can prevent the individual from serving GOd and thus· 
from being good. 
Ai. fal:se conception of God may also be at fault. Though God is 
personal, indeed the only perfect personality, man's relationship to 
Him is not to be conceived in the same 1~ay that one person stands in 
relation to another person. God is the source of all life and His 
love the source of all love. Only in Him, then, does one find his 
t:rne nature and the proper relationship with others. It is in this: 
perspective that the love which the death of a friend elicits must 
be viewed. 
The call to a deeper love of G0d 'vhich comes through 
the death of a friend is not the call to forget the 
friend and to love God instead; it is a call to realise 
more deeply 1.fuat our love for our friend really was 
and is-an activity of GOd in us-and to rise from the 
temporal relationship of a llnatural 11 friendship to an 
apprehension of the Eternal ~ve in which that friend-
ship lives on in spite of the friend's death.l 
If, then, what is best for man is not happiness defined as what 
makes him comfortable, but participation in a universal fellowship, this 
1. Ibid., P• 199. 
can be attained by the individual only through his choosing it. An 
individual centered in his own self-interest must be shown ~-That is to 
his own best interest. W'o.at survives in the long run in history 1.;ill 
be that w'o.ich is in accord vlith the purpose of God in history. .Judg-
ment is, therefore, evident in history. 
c. God's judgment in historz.l The judgment of God in history 
is a fact of history, but it is not to be conceived as signifying the 
destruction of all those individuals and nations who fail to fulf'ill 
His purpose.. G0d1 s aim and actions are for the sake of saving man and 
history, though the actions of man do produce destrUction at times. 
There i$ judgment, nonetheless, in the sense that individuals and 
nations who live by principles contrary to divine purpose will be 
dest~oyed:; ULove is shown to be King by the fact that what offends 
against lGve destroys i tsel.f. n2 The Kingdom of' God is present when-
ever this occurs. However, neither the sovereignty of' God, nor the 
reign of His Kingdom are ever fully actualized in this way. .Judgment 
in such cases is for the sake of' eliminating the offense and disciplin-
ing the offender so as to lead him to mend his ways. It is to win men1 s 
hearts to the acceptance of His love that God aims. 
It is because there are various ways of organizing one 1 s life and 
1. See ibid., pp. 199-211; ¥so the sermon on 11The Divine .Judg-
ment11in The Kingdom of God, pp. 1.31-144. 
2~ Temple, Ohristus Veritas, P• 202. Temple sees providential 
guidance of the course of history in the lives of AleY~der the Great 
and Napoleon. See Appendix V, ~·on Providence in History, 11 in Church 
and Nation, pp. 201 ... 204. 
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the society of which he is a part that it is so important to discover 
principles of guidance which are in accord with the purpo:se of the 
universe. The basic social principle:s proposed in the, preceding chap-
ter are~ to be viewed in this light. The principle-s., of freedom, fellow-
ship; service, and sacrifice of:fer guidance in the kind of life ex-
pressive of God's purp_crse in history. 
The·way a society is ordered is rooted in the qualities dominant 
within the individuals who com)I0se it, but once established the social 
order then tends to elicit :from its citizens the qualities on which it 
is based.r It is for this reason that the basic social principles; 
noted above need to become embodied in the law o:f the land. But the 
individual's life cannot be transformed in accordance with these 
princip,les by legislation alone; only a conversion o:f the individual; 
can fully accomplish this end. The most pptent force here is the 
recognition o:f eternity and its. significance.-. :for the temporal order •. 
What occurs in history must always be seen in terms o:f its p;:La:-ce in 
eternity. The choices individuals make and the character which each 
:forms are·his for a11·.eternity. Though the .. value in each case may b~ 
altered, the occurrence cannot. Eternity is ever :gresent in time and, 
when so accepted, means a reconstruction of onets values based on their 
relevance to eternity. 
1. This is :for Temple one of the penetrating insights o:f l?lato's 
Republic in which p:oTitics is subordinated to ethics; see Temple;, 
Elate and Christianity, PP• 32-33• 
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The final question to be raised in this context concerns the 
finality of judgment which occurs in history. That there is such 
final judgment with regard to the elimination of nations from the 
historical scene is evident from history itself. The nation of Israel 
is a case in point: lllifo 1restoration of the Jews to Palestine' can no-vr 
affect the finality of the judgement of which the armies of Titus were 
the instrument.ul 
Similarly, if fellowship with God freely chosen by each individUal 
is the purpose of human life, then the person's right to refuse must b& 
real; and if he persists, his decision must be final. This would seem 
to entail a failure on G®d 1s part which is inconsistent with His power 
·and love, but to state otherwise would make a mockery of both human 
freedom and responsibility~ 
Because He is love, He made us free; because we 
are free, we may choose to perish; it is belief in 
His Love which leads us to believe in the possibility 
of "eternal loss.u2 
This does not mean that God inflicts eternal to:rment on any in-
div:i.dual who refuses to accept His love. That 1-Tould indeed be a con-
tradiction of His nature.. Tb.e point is that though such an indiviftual 
survives physical death, he does not enter into the eternal life of 
1. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 208~ 
2.; Ibid •. , P• 209. As T,i:lm.ple notes, this vievT represents a change 
in positi~rom the universalism proposed in Mens. C~ec:trix, PJ?• 290, 
357; see Christus Veritas, p. :209, n. 4•· The possJ..bJ..lJ.ty_rem~J.Us, of' 
course that man's f'reedom and G0d1 s love will both be maJ..UtaJ.Ued; see 
Nature: Man and God, p. 470 •. This issue ~ill be ~iscussed in the next 
section along \>ri. th the bases of' personal J.llliD.ortalJ.. ty • 
universal fellowship. Part of the difficulty involved is due to the 
Greek notion of the indestructibility of the soul; but such a belief 
has no foundation in the New Testament and no support in philosophy, 
once the objections to a soul-substance view of the self1 s unity are 
presented. 
A. further question concerns not only whether an il1dividual 1 s· 
life ever ends, but whether time itself will end. Human knowledge· 
yields no definitive answer to this.question. That there are rela-
tive ends to so-called'periods in history (e.g., the ancient world), 
there can be no doubt. But if history be conceived simply as the 
succession of events, there is no .:reason presently evident ~orhy such 
events must ever end. However, there is every reason to believe that. 
human history as knmm on earth will come to an end. At that time the 
Kingdom of God will be fully established and all of those who respond 
to God1 s love will participate in it. That some will not, due to 
their desire for another kind of life, must be maintained in principle, 
though the details cannot be worked out in practice. 
The establishing of that kingdom on earth is not the issue which 
confronts··;man. It exists whenever and 1.Jherever an individual views; 
the temporal in terms of the Eternal, taking as his values those of 
eternity. One must live in time as a citizen of eternity. Only in 
eternity are to be found the external unity for which history seek~ 
and the internal unity which the individual seeks-; and the latter is· 
the necessary foundation for the former. 
Man's meaning, then, is not to be found in the World-Process 
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from which he arises and in which his earthly life is lived. His 
true meaning demands a new creation in which a ne-w order is ushered· 
in.. So far as man in history becomes a new creature and shares in 
the new order, he is already to that extent a citizen of the Kingdom 
of God beyond history. 
Personality which has its origin in the World-Process has its: 
completion in a realm beyond the process. This is the conclusion to 
1vhich an analysis of history leads. But the conditions which make 
possible one 1 s entry into life eternal have yet to be made explicit .• 
2. Personality and Eterha'li. Life1 
a. The imperative of immorta.li ty. ']here can be little doubt. 
about the et~~cal imperative of life after death for man if personality 
and its fulfillment are held to be central to the purpose of history. 
To call upon man to seek what is true, beautiful, and good, to ask 
that he be willing to serve society even to the point of self-sacrifice. 
when all for which he has worked v.D.ll eventually come to naught in the· 
dissolution of his earthly abode, is to render his actions meaningless:. 
and to command the irrational. 
If at the end there is to be nothing but cold dead 
cosmos--which might as well be chaos--then, though 
their presence shines like a jewel in the prevailing 
gloom, yet it were more creditable to the Ieterminer 
of Destiny that virtue 8lld love had never bloomed~2 
L see Temple, Nature, Ma..11. and God, Lecture XVIII, PP• 452-472; 
also "The Idea of Immortality in Relation to Religion and Ethics 11 · 
reprinte~ in Religious Experience • • • , pp~ 112-123. 
2. Temple, Nature, Man and God, P• 45.3. 
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To 'have virtue a..11d love make an appearance upon the historical scene 
in the life of a personal being as the culmination of a process 
which began with inanimate things, only to have the process reverse 
itself again so that personal beings and their concerns are irrelevant, 
is to make a mockery of the total process. Furthermore, it directly 
contradicts the ethical ideals of man to l·rhich the process itself 
gave rise. 
Similarly, the religious aspirations of man are defied if the life: 
of love to which he is called terminates ~oritb. his brief span of 
existence on earth. He has been led to believe that love manifested' 
in and through personality is the governing principle of the universe, 
only to discover that his own personal existence is but a means in the 
furthering of some end beyond him, or simply the sport of a deceiving 
deity. 
If, on the other hand, the ethical ideals and the religious, 
aspirations of man are not to be cruelly discarded, then persons in 
whom these ideals and aspirations have become manifest must have at 
least the possibility for eternal life. Such is the hope of man for 
eternal life. But what, then, is the basis of such hope as man does-·. 
have for continued existence after death, and who can rightly expect 
the fulfillment of this hope?. 
b. Faith in God as the basis for immortality. Man 1 s interest. 
in immortality if:l varied. The ethical and religious imperative of 
immortality noted above carries with it an authentic note vrhich reaches: 
to the very depths of man 1 s nature. But it must be recognized that 
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o:ften man 1's lenging for continued existence is not based on such lofty 
motives. For many eternal life is d~sired because they simply do not 
wish their present lives to end. In such cases religious aspiration 
is secondary (if' it exists at all); to the desire .for life as it is 
presently known and enjoyed. Still others wish :for immortality 
because they 1-rant to be with loved ones :from whom they are no~or sepm-at-
e:d: by deai!h. This is a motive more consonant vii th the religious and~ 
ethical imperatives already noted, but still :falling short of them. 
The only adequate basis for eternal life is that which is consis-
tent with the purpose of man in history, namely, to serve and glorify 
God. It is faith in God which constitutes man 1s real hope for 
immortality even as service to God is his purpose. However, when this: 
approach is made to the issue, then it becomes evident that God v1hose 
essence is the union of' power and love would not allow man in whom 
love is most .fully expressed to perish. The immortality of man isc:. 
1 
thus a corollar-.r to f'ai th in the Eternal love of God. 
G0d can only be known by man through his relations to man and 
the ~ororld. Hence, if He treats man as a thing without feelings or 
purposes of his own, when man has in fact both f'eelings and purposesc 
requisite to the level of a personal being,- then God cannot be 
conceived: as the union of' perfect love and po:vrer. Hence, though man 
on his own right has no claim on immortality, nonetheless, when he· 
places his trust in God 1 s love, immortality follows as a necessary 
1. See ibid., p. 457. 
consequence. Such is the paradox of religious faithr. 
We must spiritually renounce all other loves~for 
love of God or at least so hold them in subordina~ 
tion to this that we are ready to forgo them for 
its sake; yet ~orhen 1-re find God, or, rather, when 
we know ourselves as found of Him, we f:i.nd in and 
with Him all the loves which for His sake we had: 
:forgone.l 
To desire eternal life because the contemplation of death is 
distressing or because the thought of separation from friends is-
depressing is but an example of onefs self-concern wb~ch immortality 
could only exaggerate further. But if one desires God and desires: 
to be used for God 1 s glory, then immortality provides a greater 
opportun.i_ty -for service than this life affords and hen(;}e is justified. 
When these considerations are recognized, then it becomes 
evident that experimental proof of man 1s ~ival after death for 
which psychical research affords. some hope is both urmecessary and 
undesirable. The hope of continued existence i-Tould in such an event 
become a matter of intellectual perceptivity, and the life of faith 
which is man 1 s essential business on earth and in heaven would be made 
all the more difficult. 
It is worth noting at this point how far Temple has moved in such 
a pronouncement as this from the aim o:f philosophy to understand the 
nature of the universe. It is one thing to analyze the evidence of 
psychical research and conclude that it is insufficient to prove man's 
survival of death; it is quite another thing to hope that such evidence 
1. Ibid., p. 458. 
300 
is not forthcoming. The latter may be sound religious faith, though 
that is debatable, but it is clearly antithetical to the philosophical 
attitude. Though Temple does not urge that psychical research be 
stopped, his confession that he hopes for its failure reflects quite 
the opposite of an open-minded approach to man's knowledge of the 
1o10rld. Since the statement occurs in his two major discussions of 
eternal life, one of which is his Gifford Lectures, it must be taken 
seriously.1 
Telllple finds another basis for immortality in the ethical life 
of man. Be is called upon to seek the good quite independent of what 
benefits he might receive. Indeed, the highest good is that of' 
sacrificial love. One best finds his ovm true self by losing him-
self in service to others. 
Immortality is not justified for one who does good deeds in order 
to avoid being punished in hell, or for one who does good deeds with 
the expectation of' being rewarded in heaven. Fear of' puniahment and 
the hope of rewards are not devoid of moral value as Kant supposed, 
since they may serve a disciplinary function; but they can be only 
preparatory steps to the stage where the good is sought for its·. own 
sake. 
In ethics too the problem has been shown to be that of shifting 
the center of interest from concern for self to concern for the good; 
1. See liThe Idea of Immortality in Relation to Religion and 
Ethics !I (The Drew Lecture for 1931), reprinted in Religious Experi-
ence ••• , PP• 115-ll6, and Nature, Man and God (The Gifford 
Lectures:.for 1932-1933, 1933-193A), PP• 458-459. 
and fear cannot accomplish this since it is a self-centered emotion. 
Hence, one cannot get to heaven by striving to avoid going to hell. 
Nonetheless, when the good is done for its own sake, then immortality 
becomes a necessarf corollary of such goodness in aworld which is 
under the control of a good God so that there can be a proper balance 
bet-vreen goodness and happiness.1 
One final strand needs to be woven into the fabric of faith 
which constitutes man1 s hope :for immortality. It is based upon the 
uniqueness of each individual as a center of conscious experience 
making possible a variety of values to be realized in the world, and 
also on the distinct vocational calling of every individual by 1.,rhich 
he actualizes certain values in his life. 
Inasmuch as the solution to the theoretical problem of ethics 
resides in one's discerning what type of work offers the best 
combination bet-vreen his abilities and the needs .. of society, this means; 
that to the extent this is achieved a contribution is made to the 
totality of value in the universe which no one else (including God) 
co1.:tld make. 2 If :mch an individual does not attain eternal life, then 
his unique value experience and the distinctive contribution he makes 
to the tL~verse are lost. But it is the purpose of God in creation 
that just such individual fulfillment through semce should occur 
and that value should be actualized. To permit the loss: of value which 
l. See Nature, Man and God, PP• 459-460. 
2. See ibid., P• 413. 
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the finite spirit alone embodies would, therefore, be self-contra-
die tory. 
When you bring together the Purpose of God and the 
uniqueness of each individual soul, the doctrine of 
immortality follows as a necessary corollary; for 
it is impossible that God should alloH the universe 
to be impoverished, and it is certain that the destruc-
tion of a unique, and therefore irreplaceable, spirit 
could be nothing other than its impoverishment.l 
Furthermore, since each individual makes a unique contribution 
to the total value of the universe, each one needs the contribution 
of the other for his own perfection.. Eternal life thus takes· on the 
character of a community of selves each enriching the life of every-
one else by means of his ovm distinct individuality and his own 
unique value experience, and at the same time each being enriched by 
the individuality and values others contribute. 2 
Man's hope for immortality is thus both dependent on, and 
subordinate to, his faith in God. Man is not immortal by nature, nor 
does immortality necessarily follow for the individual who has attained 
a certain level of ethical achievement. It is, and ca~ only be, a 
gift~of God. But as a gift it is a necessary corollary to faith and 
to God's purpose for good in creation~3 It is in making explicit·~the 
implications of these conclusions that the character of eternal life 
becomes evident. 
l. Temple, The Faith and 1'Iodern Thought, pp. 16&-167. 
2. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, pp. 420-424. 
3. Ibid., PP• 457, 466. 
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c. Eternal life as fellowship with God. Temple accepts the 
Christian doctrine regarding eternal life which emphatically affirms 
man 
1 
s resurrection from the dead and not the innnortality of the soul. 
It should be noted that Temple so inten1eaves philosophical discourse 
~Qth Christian affirmations on this issue that it is not always 
evident to which he is appealing. However, in regard to the nature 
of Eternal life he is clearly asserting 1-rhat he considers to be 
Christian doctrine based on New Testament teaching. 1 Whereas non-
Christian religions seek for ways to enable man to escape from the 
evils of earthly life, Christianity seeks to transform the evils of 
this world so as to make them the occasion for good. 
Though Temple explicitly distinguishes between resurrection and 
immortality, precisely v1hat he me_a"tls:; by the distinction is not clear. 
He does indicate that life after death is not the mere survival of 
man
1 
s rational soul. Eternal life involves the transformation of man 
in entirety so that he can enter into a new ol~der as a nev1 being. 
Presumably this means the elimination of man 1 s self-centeredness. 
However, Temple nowhere clarifies what he means by resurrection or how: 
this would differ from innnortali ty, and he continues to use the two 
terms interchangeably. 2 
1. See Faith and MOdern Thought, pp. 165-172; and Nature, ~hn 
and God, pp. 460-466. 
2. See Nature, Han and God, pp. 452-472. .Also, he retains as 
the title of a lecture, WL'he Idea of Immortality in Relation to 
Religion and Ethics" though in it he affirms resu...-rrection; see 
Religious ExPerience .... , p. 117. 
Man 1 s life on earth is viewed by Temple as preparation :for the 
new life lived beyond this terrestrial existence. If man merely 
survives death without transformation, then there is no guarantee 
that he might not eventually be annihilated. The point is, that man 
is called not to survival merely, but to a quality of. life which is 
characterized as fellowship vr.ith the God revealed in Jesus Christ. 
Suffering and death take on a different meaning in such a view; for 
sacrifice, even self-sacrifice, becomes the means by which one realizes; 
his true self. 
The divine life, to which -v;e are called t}l..rough 
Christ, is not then a life of enjoyment purchased 
by temporary sacrifice; it is the sacrifice; and' 
there is no reward beyond except the triumph of 
the cause for which the man is sacrificed. • • • 
The Divine Li:fe is the Ghrist Life; Heaven is the 
Oross.l 
Heaven is not to be thought of as a place where revmrds are 
bestowed upon those who have been faithful and punishment meted· out 
to the unfaithful. It is, rather, the type of relationship, one shares 
both with God and one 1 s fellowman; it is a quality of life in which 
the intrinsic joy of love and the inherent misery of selfishness are 
both experienced for what they are. 
Indeed, objectively regarded, Heaven and Hell may 
well be identical. Each is the realisation that 
Man is utterly subject to the purpose of Another 
-of God who is Love. Td the godly and unselfish 
soul that is joy unspeakable·; to the, selfish soul 
1. Temple, Faith and Modern Thought, pp. 111-112. 
it is a misery against 1vhich he rebels in vain. 
Heaven and Hell are the two extreme terms of' our 
possible reactions to the Gospel of' the Love of' 
God.l 
Eternal lif'e, collectively considered, is a Kingdom of' love in 
which f'inite spirits who love are united together l.Ulder the rulership 
of' the Eternal Sj)irit, the source and goal of' love; it is the 
Commonwealth of' Value. 2 
But granting that the ultimate conditions f'or eternal lif'e 
reside in God al1d that the Ch--ristian conception of' this lif'e suggests 
a ne"~<J order in vrhich a nevr being enters, the question remains whether 
any philosophical basis f'or such a lif'e can be discovered in man • s 
nature. That is, does the interpretation of man as a p~cho-physical 
organism provide any possibility of his surviving death?. What are the 
conditions:; within human personality which make it a possible candidate 
for eternal lif'e ?. 
d. Capacity of man f'or eternal life. Tbe characteristic of 
man which distinguishes him f'rom all other living organisms was f'ound 
to be his capacity f'or forming concepts (or 1tfree ideas 11 ) independent 
of sensoJCJ impressions. In this way he is able to gain a partial 
detachment from the World-Process and secure a life of his own. His· 
conduct can then be directed by ideals which he has f'ormed of future 
goals to be realized and toward which he strives. TI1us Temple states: 
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 466. 
2. See ibid., PP• 423-426~ 
The mind of a human being increasingly organises 
itself and its o1m world apart from the processes: 
1-lhich for the most art control the bod within 
which and at first as a function of which the 
mind has collle into being. As mind increasingly 
take:a1 control of the organism. so it becomes;. 
increasingly independent of the organism as 
physiologically conceived. 
Two common experiences man has illustrate this independence. 
One is his capacity to concentrate his attention so completely on 
some object that he becomes detached from the circumstances of his 
environment and the conditions of his own body. Similarly, the 
experience of obligation occurs independently of the organism's 
own interests so as to call at times for sacrifices of one's interests. 
Further, it must be recalled that the ideas one has are not 
independent of the World-Process, for they arise as a result of the 
interaction of the self with its environment. It is not that the 
spiritual man thinks of different objects from the materially minded 
man, but that he thinks differently about the same things. 
Consequently the ideal attainment of human nature 
would be a lifting of the physiological organism 
itself to the status of a free vehicle of the 
completely spiritual mind. But short of that there 
is at least indicated the possibility of life for 
the mind in independence of the physiological fUnc-
tions: of the organism. fiJan is not in his mm nature 
immortal, but he is capax immortalitatis.2 
Hence, while it is quite true that man is not immortal by nature, what 
must be added is that man does have the capacity for immortality. 
1. Ibid., p. 467. 
2. Ibid., P• 468. 
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Therefore, the development of the spiritual elements within the 
psycho-physical organism of human personality by responding to, and 
sharing in, the fellowship,of God makes possible God's gift of 
personal immortality to othervnse mortal creatures. 
Thus, wherever human personality exists, it survives bodily death 
since it is diff'icult to conceive of' anyone descending to such depths· 
of degradation as to lose the capacity f'or f'orming concepts. But if 
this is true, then the problem arises of whether everyone enters into 
eternal life. If not, it vmuld seem to indicate that God 1 s love a.11d 
power have failed; but if so, then it would seem to indicate that man 
is not freely choosing according to his own apparent good. 
Such a dilemma does not admit solution under the conditions of 
earthly existence. But there is one type of conduct 1trhich can be 
acknovrledged to of'f'er a solution in principle so as to preserve both 
manls freedom and God's supremacy. That occurs when one chooses to 
act_,in a way which will p:roduce pleasure for a loved one. The act is 
freely chosen, but what is chosen to be done is determd11ed by the 
pleasure of another. Such a union of f'ree choice by man and an act 
of grace by God in determining what is chosen points the vray in 
principle to a resolution of the problem of universal salvation and 
human freedom. 
Now the Grace of God is His love made knovm and active 
upon and vrithin us;· and our response to it is both 
entirely free and entirely due to the activity of His 
love tm-Tards us. .All that we could contribute of' our 
own i-lOVld be the resistance of our self-will. It iss 
just this which love breaks do'Wil, and in so doing 
does not override our freedom but rather calls it 
into exercise.l 
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Nonetheless, the consequences of one's choices must be retaineu. 
God does not lightly cast aside what man has chosen to do on earth. 
Whatever act one performs, he must be held responsible for it; ~~d 
if it is an evil act, then he must repent of it. The hope that every-
one:, will be saved · cannot be readily dismissed, and the possibility of 
its realization has been stated; but at the same time the quality of 
eternal life to which man is called cannot be forgotten and even less 
can it be compromised. Man has the capacity for eternal fellowship! 
with God; the realization of this capacity, and this alone, is what 
God offers to man. On t.rhom it is conferred must remain a mystery, 
though that it is received is man's legitimate .faith. 
In conclusion Temple summarizes the basic contentions of his; 
position regarding life eternal: 
Man is not immortal by nature or of right; but he is 
capable of :im.Tllortali ty and there is offered to him 
resurrection from the dead and life eternal if he ivill 
receive it from God and on God 1s terms. There is 
nothing arbitrary in that offer or in those terms, for 
God is perfect Wisdom and perfect Love. But Nan, the:; 
creature and helpless sinner7 cannot attain to eternal 
life unless he gives himself to God, the Creator, 
Redeemer, Sanctif.ier, and receives. from Him both 
worthiness for life eternal and -vrith that 1-rorthiness 
eternal life--for indeed that worthiness and that life 
are not two things, but one.2 . 
1. Ibid., p. 470. 
2. Ibid., p. 472; also see liThe Idea of Immortality in Relation 
to Religion and Ethics II in Relig:i ous Experience ••• , p. 123~ 
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N~ Summary and Conclusions: 
A summary of the major issues considered-in chapter will 
help to claxify the significance of personality Temple 1 s analysis· 
of the meaning and goal of hist6~y. 
l. The ~'l'lcompleteness of History 
Since mind actualizes value in the world, value of events~ 
is not fixed in time. The fUll significance of event may not be 
apparent until viewed in the perspective of later Thus, what 
was considered bad, may come to be interpreted as necessary part of 
a series of events which is good. 
The actual events 1-rhich have as interpreted 
by man constitute the definition of history fo~ The historianrs 
task is to bring these events together into a so as to 
sho1-r the significance of them. Because of the 
the historian is involved in the disciplines of 
and philosophy. 
Human history exhibits a struggle between 
social order vThich is in turn rooted in the indi 
satisfy his own self-interest. Othe:r motives; 
and self~sacrifice, may also be seen at work 
this task, 
pv;e---~··'"'' art, morality, 
ridual liberty and 
~~~=~'s attempt to 
love 
more fundamental than self-interest. As a v~-~P'·~v 
<>T •. ",..."·, but none are 
center of appre-
hension and appreciation man actualizes the 
is constantly tempted to st~ess those 1-1hich he se 
estimate the significance of the values realized 
under-
This·; 
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illustrates man's bias tow-ard pride and why progress on earth can 
never be complete. Selfislmess cannot be eliminated by man alone; he 
can only replace it with enlightened selfishness. 
Hence, history is incomplete taken by itself. Its meaning cannot 
be found either in the process or the result taken alone; both must 
be considered together in relation to Eternity. By Eternity is meant 
a unitax:ff grasp of the whole temporal process. ~~has a glimpse of' 
1-rhat such an apprehension of the time process ivo'Uld mean in the unity 
of his own conscious experience which encompasses a span of tlille. The 
meaning of history, therefore, can only be expressed in the total 
succession of events; only when the historical process is complete 
will the fUll intent become evident. However, an immanent purpose is 
discernible in the historical process, and to discover its operation 
in a given period of time is the task of the historian. 
2. The Commonwealth of Value as the Goal of History 
Temple's own interpretation of the relation of time to Eternity 
represents a synthesis of three vie1-1s which stress respectively:! the 
supremacy of God, the ultimate significance of history and moral 
choice, and the inauguration of a new order beyond history. The 
relation of history to Eternity can only be grasped by means of 
analogies-e.g., a dramatist 1-rtiting a play and a human father and his: 
children. The true basis for an understanding of history is the 
affirmation of the Eternal and Perfect God ivho created the world. The 
purpose of God constitutes the meaning of history. The entire universe 
is the expression of the creative activity of God. In man a creature 
is brought into existencewho is guided by his apparent good, qy 
final as well as efficient causation. Man t:s re'SJI0nse to Go-d is 
elicited through the operation of the~ Holy Spirit in man. 
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Because the historicaL orde;t" is the necessary self-expression of 
God, history doe~ affect God. However, the succession of history ~oes 
not alter the Eternal, for whom there is no succession. HUman history 
is fully intelligible only when it culminates in a new.. order beyond 
history. Temp:le. calls this order the Commonwealth of Value in which 
the successiveness and discords of history are eliminated.. Men are 
joined together with one another and with G~d in p~rfect harmony and 
peace •. 
3~ The Conditions for Eersonal Immortality. 
The tempora:l . order can only be adeqpa.tely understoo:d in Tight 
of Eternity.. What occurs: in history is secondary to the pUTQose of 
Gbd for history. Sacrificial love aso demonstrated by Christ on the; 
cross is the sovereign power in history. Ea::ch individual is called 
UP.OD to view,- all that occurs in history in terms of the op_Hortunity 
afforded for spiritual development. Hence, accidents which resuLt 
in human suffering can become the occas~on for more com~:lete service 
to· God. 
God doe·s judge history in the sense that what is contrary to 
the- divine purpo:se is destroyed. However, God is concerned with the 
redemption of history, not its destruction. Human history will end 
and those who respu.nd to God•s love will enter the Kingdom of God. 
Though human personality arises within the World-Erocess, it$ 
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meaning and fulf'illment reside in a new order beyond earthly existence. 
Heaven is not a place~ but a relationship of love shared with God and 
f ellovTID.an. 
Man is not immortal by nature; faith in God provides the basis 
for immortality. If the purpose of God in creating human personality 
is for the sake of establishing a universal fellowship of love, then 
it would be self-contradictory for God to allovr all mankind to perish. 
Man exhibits the capacity for immortality in his ability to concentrate 
attention on an object to the extent that he becomes unaware of the 
physical environment, including his O\>JU body. Also, m.an 1 s experience 
of obligation often commands acts which are contrary to his interests. 
Who will be saved and whether or not all rne:ri will enter into eternal 
life Temple leaves as an open question, while stressing both man's 
freedom to refuse God's love and the supremacy of God's love. One 
thing is certain::- what man is offered is fellOi·lShip \>lith God. That 
some men enter this fellowship is the faith of Christians. 
Just as philosophy rnerg~s::ultimately w.ith theology, as human 
personality finds its perfection in divine personality, and as ethics 
passes ever into religion through the demand for conversion and a 
vocational calling, so too the temporal order is incomplete both in 
its beginning and its ending and necessitates an eternal order as its 
source and goal. In each case an appeal is made to some power and 
being other than that which m.an and the natural order provide to 
supply a lack ili):xerent in man and nature. What Temple considers to be 
the basis for, and the character of, this pov1er and being must now be 
examined. 
CHAPTER VI 
PERSONALITY AS A METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE OF EXPI.ANATION 
Throughout the last four chapters comprising the body of the 
dissertation, reference has;been made constantly to the Eternal. Spirit, 
the Divine Personality, or to God for theresolution of the problems 
of philosophy. AS. yet, however, ncr effort ha.s been made to establish 
the pP,ilosophica:l justification for belief in a Supreme Being who is 
the: source and sustainer of the universe, or t~analyze the nature of 
this Being. It is the purpose of the present chapter to do just that 
by examining Temple 1·s use of the concept of personality as the key to 
the solution of metappysicaL problems •. 
A. Significance of Personality for Metaphysics_ 
The philosopher's task, according to Temple, is essentially iden-
tical with that of the metaphysician: to understand systematically the 
nature of reality.l It is the philosopher's responsibility to relate 
all areas of experience with a view to comprehending the universe. 
It is he who asks and seeks to answer the~ question: Is there. any mean-
ing to the world as a whole? In order to fulfill this task it is nec-
cessary to examine the structure of reality as it is revealed in human 
experience and then to seek a principle that can best explain these 
1. See above, Chap. II. 
313 
empirical £acts. The philosophic task, then, becomes the quest £or 
an explanatory principle adequate to account £or 111b.at experience re-
veals to exist. 
1.. In Quest o£ an Explanatory Principle 
a., Ri'sume o£ structure o£ reali t:y.. The structure o£ reality 
evident in the World-Process has been shown to consist in £our levels: 
matter, li£e, mind and spirit)J. Each new level, when it appears, re-
presents a transition to a higher level in the development o£ the 
process, but in each case the higher is dependent on the lower £or its; 
emergence. The lower is thus ful£illed in the higher, but the higher 
needs the lower £or fUl£illment. The relation o£ these levels to one 
another is that o£ means and ends, or instrrrmental and intrinsic value. 
The lower level is always the necessary condition £or the existence 
o£ the next higher stage, but only in the attaining o£ the higher lev-
el is the value o£ the lower actualized. Renee though temporal pri-
ority must be granted to matter, the value of matter is far less than 
li£e which it makes possible. Similarly, li£e makes possible the 
emergence of' mind, but mind is the superior value. Spirit as the 
highest emergence in the World-Process represents also the highest 
value-realization. 
The value-distinctions evident in these levels of' reality :may 
also be noted by comparing that which' distinguishes a person f'rom 
1~ Sea above, 0hap. III. 
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both a brute and a thing.~ Most significant in this connection is 
the fact that persons are aware of their existence, recall their past 
existence, and anticipate their existence in the future. 
It is only when an existing being becomes conscious of itself 
as existing in the -vrorld and is capable of selecting from its environ-
ment certain objects for its own enjoyment that the experience of value 
is aetualiz-ed.2 Thu::; value, like spirit, appears last in term::; of the 
temporal sequence of the World-Process•, AS a result of this fact both 
mind and value have often been relegated to a second~ and adjectival 
status in the process•3 
SOme basic questions arise at thi::; point: .Are things to be con-
ceived as having an existence independent of value so that the value 
of a thing is incidental to its reality?' Or is value to be taken as 
-vrhat is real, in which case things constitute the forms through "Which 
value is expressed?4 Elsa, is the appearance of mind (or spirit) in 
the World-Process explicable if everything is reduced ultimately to 
matter?. Or is the occurrence of both matter and mind in the World-
P±ocess made more intelligible if the process is itself grounded in 
l. See.above, Chap. III. 
2.. See above, Chap. IV •. 
3. On this point Temple criticizes 111 .. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 
The IdeaL of God in the Li ht of Recent Philoso h (2d ed. rev.; 
London: OXford University Press, 1920 •. In Temple, see·: tt'Sbme 
Implications of Theism11 in Contemporary British Philosophy, I, 
4}.%-4].6; Ohristus Veritas, pp. lO-ll. 
4. Bee Temple, Ghristus Veritas, P• ll. 
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. d<)l nn.n • The issue raised by these questions is whether the universe 
can be more satisfactorily explained by the lower or by the higher 
stages which the process: exhibits. The philosopher is confronted 
here by a fundamental choice. 
b. ~ailure to account for the higher py the lower. Philosophies 
inspired by natural science take as their maxim. that the higher can 
best be accounted for in terms of the lower. Whatever scientific anal-
ysis reveals to be ultimate (e.g •. , atoms, or electrons, protons, neu-
trons, or space-time) is claimed as the starting point for the world.2 
Everything that the universe eventually exhibits is considered to be 
a .further development of, or emergent from, t}lese primitive realities. 
In this way an empirical scheme is devised 1-lhich remains in close 
contact with observed facts. 
The problem which such a scheme poses is the place of the higher 
levels in the process •. Row, indeed, can mind or value occn1r in a 
process devoid of both? Mind and value stand out as a breach in the 
continuity of the process.3 
Thus, mind on such a view is sometimes held to be an epiphenome--
non, an effect produced by the complex combination of physical 
1. see·: Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 2l3. 
2. Ibid •. , PP• 2l3-216:: 
3. Temple argues for the theistic hypothesis in this way in 
Na±ure, Man and Gbd, and the case he presents is developed in the 
next section. 
··~·' 
. ,;&·: c: ~ / ~. 
~·: .... ~~ 
317 
entities but not itself' capable of producing any effects. Or, mind 
may be seen as an addition inserted into the process by a Creator 
external to ._,_ l.u. Neither account is satisfactory. Mind is experienced 
as initiating activities in the World-Process. Hence, to reduce it 
to the status of epiphenomenon is to flout one 1 s experience of mind. 
The other alternative is equally fallacious. Tb admit the necessity 
of another principle external to the process itself in order to 
a-ccount for the occurrence of mind in the process is to abandon the 
theory that the lower can explain the higher. 
The existence of value is likewise precarious if a purely phys-
ical account of the world is proposed. Value has no ground in the 
structure of reality itself. Its status is confined to the subjec-
tive mental states of persons who respond appreciatively to their 
vmrld.- There is truth in this position regarding value, but it is 
a half-truth at best. The subjective factor in value-experience is 
a-cknowledged, but the objective basis of value in the world is neg-
lected. When one responds appreciatively to some object, he does 
so believing that the reason for responding as he does is the nature 
of the object and not his feeling alone. 
The Value only fulfils its essential nature, only 
achieves its essential excellence, in the moment 
when it is appreciated. It erists as value for Mind; 
Mind finds it and appreciates it; but Mind does not 
invent or create it in the act of appreciation.l 
To believe that man is deceived in relation to value-experience 
so that what he considers a judgment about an ebject is really only 
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, P• 215. 
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his own emotional response is to wreck the entire philosophic and 
scientific enterprise.l Extreme s:Gepticism regarding the knovrledge 
venture itself would seem to be the logical conclusion of such an 
approach. 
The fact of the matter is that a physical account of reali~ 
based on the analysis of' physical science concentrates so inten-
sively on the object of knowledge that it fails to take adequately 
into account, and thereby to account for, the knowing mind. Knowl-
edge is itself a fact of the World-Process which cannot be ignored; 
but it is ignored by the scientific method. Tb.e latter llconcen-
trates all attention upon the object under investigation, and gives 
none to the attention so concentrated.ll2 
It is perfectly legitimate for science to ignore certain aspects 
of reality in fUlfilling its task, but quite illegitimate for scien-
tists (or philosophers following the scientific approach) to deny 
the existence of what is ignored.. Temple concludes that starting 
'With 1.rhat is lower in the structure of reality, one cannot account 
for the occurrence or significance of the higher: 
If' we begin with mindless and valueless fact we 
cannot give any place in our scheme to Mind or 
1. See ibid. Though Temple does not at this point have the 
emotive theory of ethics in mind, his criticism is relevant to it. 
Of'. the critic ism made by Brand Blansb.ard in liThe Impasse in Ethics-
and a Way Out, u University of California Publications in Philosophy; 
XXVIII (1955);, No. 2, 93-112. 
2. Temple, Nature, l'llan and God, P• 215. 
Value without brealcing up the unity o£ the scheme 
itself. The very activity which makes science 
possible remains unaccounted for in the theory of 
the world which men have constructed in the ac~ 
tivity of science.l~ 
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If this is the case, then can the other alternative fare any betten; 
that is, can the lower be explained by the higher? What, in fact, 
would constitute a satisfactory explanation, if one can be found? 
2~ PUrposive Will as the only .li.Uequate Explanatory Principle 
a. P:ilroose alone as explanatory. The fundamental issue to be 
faced before a satisfactory explanation of the World-Process·can be 
found is what sort of explanation of the universe would really ex-
plain it. T.b.e inadequacy of attempting to trace what occurs later 
in the process by reference to what is temporally prior has already 
been noted. Such a procedure is fine for scientific investigation, 
concerned as it is to point out causal sequences and causal connec-
tions. But vhen an account o£ the process as a whole is sought, 
such a method fails; for the issue is not how one event follows 
i'rom another, but why the:re are any events at all and wh.y these 
events in pa:rticular.2 Thus, the issue is not just how personality 
(mind and spirit) is related to the brute (li:fe) and the thing (mat-
ter), but why any o£ these levels should appear and why these in 
particular did appear. 
1. Ibid., P• 216. 
2. Bee Temple, The Faith and J.V.fodern Thought, p. 26. 
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VJhen the question is posed in this ·way, then it is clear that 
what is sought is a self-explanatory principle.l Some principle is 
required which itself ~equires no fUrther explanation. The only 
principle offered in human experience that can satisfy these demands 
is purpose. Recourse to physical causation to answer the question 
why something occurs is to embark on an re.ndless quest; but when one 
shows the purpose for something occurring, then the issue is re-
solved and understood. 
When we find that the position of a given set of 
material objects is due to their having been ar-
ranged with a view to facilitating the accomplishment of 
some intelligible purpose, our minds are satisfied. 
That a plank should lie across a stream may call for 
much explanation if no human beings have ever placed 
it there; but if men laid it across to form. a bridge," 
so that they could cross over dry-shod, no :further expla-
nation is needed.2 
Intelligent choice provides the clue for solving the problem of 
an explanatory principle. Ohe may be confused by an action -vTb.ich 
another has taken, but that is a case of not being able to imagine 
anyone doing such a thing and not a failure to explain the act as the 
actual choice of another. Furthermore, the confusion is also removed 
when an act is traced to a purpose with -which one can sympathize. To 
understand means, in regard to human question~, to sympathize • .3 The 
1. See Temple, Christianity in Thought and Practice, p. 62. 
2. Ttlmple, Nature, Han and God, pp. 131-132. See also The Faith 
and J.vfodern Thought, pp. 16-19; Nature of Personality, pp.- S5-SS; ·Mens 
Greatri]!i, pp. 88-89; Christus Veritas, pp •. 7-10; Christianity ~. 
!f:tought and Practice, pp~ 61.':"66.-
3.. See Temple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 206, 242. 
mind is satisfied when an action is explained as the activity of a 
purposive -will with which one is in sympathy. .Applying this re~son-
ing to an explanation of the universe one can, at least, be clear as 
to the type of explanation that would satisfy :man; 
The only explanation of the Universe that would really 
expla:i.n it, in the sense of providing to the question 
why it exists an answer tb.at raises no .further ques-
tion, would be the demonstration that it is the crea-
tion o.f a Will which in t)le creative a;ct seeks an 
intelligible good.l 
However, the possibility exists that there is no explanation o.f 
the universe 1 s existence •. That is, per)laps::the best that can be 
attained is a_'ll account of the world in 1mich each part is seen sup-
porting every other part so as to be internally coherent. The vrhole 
as such would not then be accounted for, but that this may be the case 
cannot be considered eliminated. 
There is the possibility that another explanation exists dif-
ferent fram either of the two proposed.2 Personal existence is the 
highest level yet attained in the evolutionary process, and it is 
natural and legitimate to take the activity of personal beings as 
providing the best clue to nnderstanding the process as a whole; but 
there is no reason for rt1ling out the possibility of a still higher 
level emerging, not now knowable to man. The explanation of the 
process:. might reside in this higher form, but man could not at present 
l~ Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 7 •. 
2~ . See ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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know this. 
Nonetheless, viliat is clear is that at the present stage of the 
process if an explanation of the world as it is now known is to be 
found, purpose rooted in will offers the only available hypothesis. 
One must choose between theism and scepticism. 
There is philosophical cogency in this formulation of the issues 
at stake •. However, this cogency is largely sacrificed when Temple 
goes on to state that the real alternatives are scepticism or Chris-
tian theism.~ It is this tendency--sometimes explicit, more often 
implicit--to identify philosophical theism with a particular inter.:.. 
pretation of the Christian faith without justifying the identifica-
tion that renders Temple's metaphysics suspect. This point will be-
come more apparent in the next section -when the arguments for a 
personal God are examined. 
ThU$, for Temple, if the universe is to be intelligible, it 
must be the creation of a living GOd •. The levels of reality which 
the process exhibits can, therefore, best be explained by reference 
to a will acting for a purpose which is conceived as good. A value-
centered metaphysics is the conclusion to which the argument leads. 
The consequences of a value-centered metaphysics as applied to an 
understanding of the structure of reality must now be made explicit. 
l._ 'See Temple, Nature of Personalit;y, P• 95. 
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b. A value-centered metaphysics. The place to begin an inter-
pretation of' the World-Process is with the totality of' that process 
as it appears to man. Matter,, life, mind, and spirit all occur within 
the process. Thus, the totality of experience includes both matter 
and mind. There is no need either to start with matter alone and 
strive to find how mind is derived f'rom it, or to start with mind and 
strive to f'ind how matter occurs. The former is the Materialistic 
blunder and the lattex is the Cartesian blunder.l 
Matter is not to be conceived as a mental state of' some kind; 
nor is mind a complex combination of matter. Both matter and mind~ 
must be"accepted as they are and neither one reduced to the other. 
~~t is presented to us is a given articulated 
continuum in the f'or.m of a process, wherein, at 
a certain stage of' development, Mind is found to 
be active. We take this Mind as what it app·e:ars: 
to be, in its initial de~endence on the data of 
experience, in its subsequent independence of' 
particular circumstances, in its comprehension of' 
succession and ~xtension, in its purposiveness, 
in its freedom. 
Since mind arises within the process as the organism1s response 
to its environment, there.is no necessity for asking how a transition 
is effecte-d from the ideas of the mind to the objective world. Matter 
and material processes existed prior to mind; and when the latter 
emerged, it did so as consciousness of an environment which is partly 
material. 
1. See Temp~e, Nature, Man and God, p. 217; also above, Chap. II. 
2. Temp:le, Nature, Man and Go·d, pt. 217. 
From its very inception, then~ mind exists as apprehension o:r 
matter. Like~se~ from the start mind aspires toward value. Desire 
serves as the impetus o:r thought.l- The organism has needs to be 
satisfied and the process o:r selecting suitable objects to satis:ry 
these needs is what initiates thought. Similarly, the organism1 s 
:reeling o:r intimacy 1t.Lth certain objects in its environment elicits 
a response o:r affection that persists even after needs are satisf:ied.2 
Hence, mind is both passive and active in its response to the envi-
ronment. ~he awareness o:r certain objects in the environment as 
conducive to the organismfs survival is the passive character o:r the 
mind; but when the mind selects certain objects among those presented 
to satis:ry its needs, it is active. In both cases the mind is ap-
prehending value, either negative or positive. Value is actualized 
when the mind f:inds satisfaction in certain objects in its envi-
ronment; and disvalue occurs when objects are apprehended as not 
being satisfying.3 
Thus, :ract and value occur together in the World-Process just 
as matter and mind do; a...r1y explanation o:r the process must account 
:ror both combinations. I:r a mindless and valueless universe cannot. 
adequately account for mind and value, then the question arises 
whether a universe held to be grounded in mind which is directed by 
1. See above, Chap. II. 
2. See Temple, li!iture, Man and G0d, p. 218; also above, Chap. II. 
3. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 218; also above, Chap. IV. 
good can account for matter and mind, fact and value 'l. 
Such would seem to be the case. At some point in the development 
of the World-Process an organism arises which is conscious of the 
process itself'. At that moment value also is actualized. This means 
that mind in apprehending the World-Process finds something of like 
character with it13elf'. Value occurs when the mind recognizes itself 
in its object. The significance of this fact cannot be underestimated: 
:Mind, then, though it aopears within the Process::: 
at a late stage, discovers throughout that Proc-
es~ the activity of Mind-universally in the form 
of Truth, commonly in the form of Beaut;(, sometimes 
in the form of Geodness. That Mind is pervasive of 
Reality is a necessarv inference from this method of 
app~ehending the world. If that method is justified 
• • • the conclusion is inevitable. 1tind is the 
principle of unity in Reality, or at least the fullest 
eXPression of that principle known to us.li 
P.rocess is subject to mind. The activity of mind in expressing 
itself' through process is what is meant by purpose. FUrther, mind 
as purposive is guided by what it considers to be good.. This means 
that value is logically prior to existence. 
The relation of tl1is conception of value to the traditional 
philosophical concept of substance can now be stated.. n1e term 
substance must be redefined in terms of value. If substance is taken 
to refer to a real thing, then substance equals value plus e~stence~ 
Hm.Jever, if the substance of a thing is distinguished from its acci-
dents, then substance equals value. Follow:ing Plato 1 s notion of the 
1.. T.emple, Nature, I'1an and Gqd, p. 219. 
Good in The Republic, Temple offers a metaphysical conception of 
value: 
Value is the element in real things which both 
causes them to be, and makes them what they are, 
and is thus fitly called SUbstance in so far as 
this is oth~r or less;than their totality.l 
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SUbstance and actuality are distinguished in this definition. Though 
values are in one sense always realized in the purposive mind which 
is the source of everything, not all values are actual in the World-
Process at any one time., Indeed, value becomes actualized in partie-
ular objects when apprehended as valuable by a conscious being. Thus, 
the good cannot be separated from the object which is good except in 
abstraction. Tb do so is to succumb to the same error committed by 
Hedonism in ethical theory. 
There is a subjective factor ·in the actualization of value in 
the World-Process since a conscious being must respond to the world 
in order for value to become actual. BUt this subjective response iso 
elicited by a valuable object, and hence the subjective factor cannot 
be separated from the objective element in value actualization. The 
subject and object distinction vJhich first appears in the conscious 
experience of man is bridged in the very act of its appearance.. Sim-
ilarly man, whose conscious awareness of the world poses the problem 
of tilly there is a universe, also suggests a solution by responding 
appreciatively to objects in the 1iTorld and thereby experiencing the 
world as good. 
l. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 15. 
For, if our whole theory is sonnd, value determines 
existence, but value is only actual when it is ap-
preciated; therefore Mants appreciation of the world 
is the first instalment, so to speak, within the Time 
process, of the realisation of that for which the 
world "Yras made, though in the eternal Mind which 
comprehends all TJ.me this is actual eternally. :t. 
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Eecordingly, objects exist for the sake of the good which they 
reveal or make possible, either as objects good in themselves or as 
means to the realization of good.. This does not mean, however, that 
all objects which exist at any time in the process a:re good or that 
the fUnction they serve in fostering good is discernible. The value 
of an object or event can be altered;·but the point is that the World-
Process as a whole is good. The attitude which one should take to-
ward the world thus is evident: it is not a matter of equating what 
is good in the -vrorld with reality and then puzzling over how to ac-
count for what is evil; rather, one must continually strive to make 
everything serve good, even what is now evil.2 SUch an approach is 
in accord 1>Jith the activity of mind as it appears in the World-Proc-
ess.•. Ear mind is concerned not simply -yJi th objects of its environment 
as such, but it is always seeking wa:ys of using these objects for its 
ovna ends. That is, mind is first conative and only later cognitive, 
and then for the sake of assisting the organism to choose wisely in 
ffccordance with its purposes. In so acting, mants mind reflects the 
l. Ibid., p. 19 •. 
2~ SSe T.emple, Nature, Man and God, pp~ 220-221. Insight is 
provided here into Temple 1s solution to the problem of evil, which 
is considered more fully below •. 
3.28 
basic a-ctivity of the Mind vlhich is expressed in the process and 
which also e:zplains the process.;. 
The universe itself, then, is grounded in Mind determined by 
good •. The purpose of the universe is to serve as a medium for the' 
expression of value and to produce beings capable of consciously 
sharing in this value •. 
symbolism is thus the supreme philosophic principle. 
The universe exists to reveal the goodness of God 
so far as it evolves intelligences capable of receiving 
the revelation.l 
The World-Process which starts with physical things and grad-
ually gives rise to life, mind, and spirit is seen to be best under.-
stood in terms of the level of personal being. Personality as the 
highest level of reality revealed in the process also offers the best 
principle for explaining the process.. SUch au approach is not devoid·. 
of dogmatism rooted in the choice of what is considered truly valu-
able •. BU.t the risk of dogmatism can be j.ustified by the concreteness: 
and richness of the explanation that such an approach provides.. A 
mere avoidance of logical contradiction in one t:s explanation falls 
short of the concrete fullness which the world exhibits. Furthermore, 
mind and values which were unaccounted for when the world was viewed 
in purely physical terms are now made the source of the process.;. 
P.hysical entities do not and cannot exist independent of mind and 
1 •. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 19. Cf •. also ttSymbolism as a 
Metaphysical Principle Ill reprinted in Religious EXperience_. • • , pp. 
77..J..8.6~ 
value. In fact, the higher levels which emerge later in the process 
are more nearly self-subsistent than the lhwer, though none can exist 
alone. The Purposive will which created the entire _P.rocess is alone 
a truly self-subsistent being.l 
Hence for Temple, a satisfactory exp~l:'anation of' the universe ean 
be found in PU.rp,osive Mind who-se aim is the good. But does such a 
being exist? Can a divine Pllr.P.ose be shown to exist in the universe, 
and, if so, is it one with which man can sym:Rathize?. In a word, what 
empirical justification can be of'fered for accep~ing this alternative? 
B. Justification for Belief in a Rersonal!_ God 
1. The Convergence of Ihde_P.endent Lines of Argument 
Belief in Go:d is for Temple justified not by any single strand 
of evidence or by one argument alone. The approach is rather to. 
gather evidencffitogether from various areas of exp~rience, incor.P.a-
rating the methods of several disciplines. It is the~ cumulative ef-
fect which the convergence of these independent arguments affords that. 
giveE both intellectual weight and psychological force to the belief 
in God. 
Two-main divisions may be noted in the appro~ch Temp~e makeE to 
the problem. He always strives to indicate the case' for the-ism which 
philosophy offers inde:QBndent of reveal.ed religion. Then, turning to 
1. S.ee Tem:r:rle, Christus Veritas, pp-:. 21-22'. 
man's religious experience in general and the Christian tradition in 
~rticular, he £inds that the experience o£ a personal relationshiw 
with God rein£orces. the· philosophical arpent. The: two approache:s; 
converge.so as to support one another. 
For the philosophic argument points to creation by 
a personal spirit capable o£ personal relationship; 
with persons; and religious experienc~:app~ars, at 
least, to be theapprehension £rom our side o£ such 
relations with the in£inite reality.li. 
H0wever, to state Temp:Le 1s·approach to belie£ in God in this way 
is p~tially misleading, even though it is the customary manner in 
which he presents it.- Nonethele-ss, it is necessary to recalJl that 
TemJ!l'e 1s approach is that o£ theological ppilosapby;: that is, he:: starts 
with .an assurance o£ the reality o£ a _Supreme Spirit and £rom the: p:er-
spective o£ £ellowshirnshared with God seeks to•expllain the £acts o"f 
exyerience.z Thus, though TemJrie do-es strive to argue on the basis 
o£ em:girical evidence that G.od exists, he doe:s: nait strive] to argue in 
a strictly inferential manner £rom empirical £acts to belie£ in Gbd~ 
Direct experience o£ God combined with £aith in His existence. become:s; 
part o£ the evidence. 
Indeed, Tem:gJ..'e does state that one can arrive at the Absolute:, 
or a Society o£ Intellects, or even the Divine by the inferential ap-
preach, but following that method do-e:s not lead to belie£ in, or to:-
. . . 
1. TemJrle, ltMy Eo·int o"f Vievl'' reprinted in Religious Experience 
, P• 104. 
2~- See Temp;le, Nature 1 Man and God, p_• 44; also above, Chap .. II. 
331 
intercourse 1v.ith, the living God.l The latter rests more on religious 
experience. It is quite understandable ~y this is the case~ To pro-
cee·d, as philosophy does, by making ini'erences based on empirical ev-
idence leading to a, conclusion is fine for some things; hovlever ninter-
course with God or with m~n is not the conclusion of an argument, but. 
a mode of experience·. n2 In understanding individuals (things or per-
sons) there is no substitute for direct experience, just as a descrip-
tion about a picture is not a substitute for the picture itself.3 
Renee, knmv-ledge of a living God is based upon onets ovm experience 
of H:Lm.. 
For Temple, then, religious experience does not merely confirm. 
psychologically what philosophy has already established. Religious 
experience contributes something distinctive to the conception of 
God; it has specific cognitive significance as well as general psy-
chological significance. Nonetheless:; religious experience does not 
stand alone; it needs the independent support philosophy provides so 
as not to degenerate into self-hypnotism. Thus, the intellectual 
and peychological resources of philosophical discourse and religious 
experience are pooled so as to justify belief in a personal GOd •. 
1. See the following works of '1\emple respectively:: Nature of. 
Personality, pp. 8.3-84; Mens G.reatrix, pp. 82-86; Faith and l"lodern 
Thought, pp. 30-32; 1t.Re,ligious E:Z;periencelf'reprinted in Religious 
Experience ••• , P• 61; Christus Veritas, PP• 174-175. 
2. Temple, Christus V'Britas, P• 175 •. 
3. See Temple, Faith and Modern Thought, pp .• 31-32.. 
Thus Temple states:: 
IT the general argument of philosophy seemed to 
me to incline towards atheism, I could not con-
fidently reject the theory of some psychologists 
that all religious experience is illusion._ If 
there were no experience which seemed to be a 
personal relationship with God~ I should have to 
admit that the balance of probability in the 
general philosophic argument is not decisive. 
But the two converge and support each other; it 
is in the mutual support of general argument 
and religious experience that we find the main 
strength of the case for theism.~ 
Templer:s candor in this statement is quite connnendable; and 
33~ 
when he argues in this way, he is philosophically persuasive. How-
ever, what is not entirely clear in Templers presentation of the 
evidence for God is the precise relation of the evidence of reli-
gious experience and the philosophical evidence in their support of 
Gbd. _ While Temple affirms that they do not lead to the same con-
ception of God, he does not show this to be the case; indeed the im-
pression one receives from the conclusions he draws is that he is 
proceeding on the assumption that they do support the same conception 
of God.. Thus, for example, no attempt is made to correlate the con-
ception of God Temple believes Christianity affirms with the con-
ception of God supported by philosophical evidence, though the con-
ceptions are held to be different. Tlie ambiguity here is a basic one 
and warrants careful scrutiny. 
I. liMy Point of Viewu reprinted in Religious Experience • • • , 
pp. 103-104; also cf. Mens Oreatrix, PP• 259-260. 
2~- The Philosophical EVidence f'or Theism 
Templet s philosophical arguments f'or the theistic hypothesis 
seem to fall into four groups: (1) The demand f'or a principle of' 
unity such as would provide rational justifi~ation for the pro-
cedures and conclusions of science; (2) Belief' :in God providing the 
t.mif'ying principle man seeks through the activities of science, art, 
morality, and religion; (3) A. personal God offering the only legit-
:imate basis f'or the reverence man feels when confronted by the 
authoritative claims of truth, beauty, and moral goodness; (4) The 
need f'or grounding the World-Process in Mind :in order to account 
:tor the occurrence and significance of' nund in the process. 
To some extent these arguments overlap.. But there is merit 
in taking up each of the types of argument separately, and the fact 
that each one is based upon a selection from Temple 1 s writings at 
dif'f'erent periods would seem to justify this approach. 
a.. The demand of theoretical and practical reason for a prin-
ciple of' unity:.l Tne inadequacy of' explaining the world by appealing 
to the methods and conclusions of physical science alone has already 
been noted. The effort of some philosophers and theologians to prove 
God on the basis of the necessity for a First Cause to initiate the 
process; is also rejected. God cannot be found by tracing the \?orld 
back to its starting point, for science arlmits no such starting point. 
1• The earliest writings of Temple comprise the pr:i:ma.ry source 
for this argument.. see especially, Faith and Jl.fudern Thought; Nature 
of Personality; llThe Divinity of Christ 11 in Foundations, pp. 213-263. 
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.An infinite r~gress is not irrational.l 
However, it is legitimate to ask science to make explicit its 
assumptions regarding the world which it investigates and to examine 
the implications o£ this assumption £or an understanding of the world 
as a whole. Science assumes that the world which it investigates can 
be rationally understood by the investigator if he disciplines him-
self so as to examine his experience and carefully traces out the 
implications of that experience.. Tlie results obtained by such an ap-
preach science claims to be facts. This means that the world is held 
to be rational and that it can be understood by man 1 s reason. t1It is 
a:ll a;ssumed to .fit together in a rational scheme, whose principles vre 
can discover if we have the necessary power o£ thought.n2 
At this point science stops since it ·is concei'll.ed with physical 
.facts and the unity o£ the physical order, but not 1Jith non-sensory 
data:: or with experience as a whole. It is, however, appropriate to 
take the i'urther step .involved in r..ecognizing that the m:L11d w'hich knows 
is, at least, as signi£icant as the object known. Th~s, the knowledge 
man possesses is itself' a £act which must be fitted into the coher-
ent scheme assumed by science •. When the mind of 1!lal1 is fitted intm 
the rational unity which the physical world comprises, a further im-
portant conclusion can be drawn: all o£ experience, including the 
1.. However, Temple af£irms that an infinite regress does not 
explain anything. This point is developed below. 
2. Temple, Faith and Modern Thought, p. 10. 
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natural order and the mind of man, is of one piece ... Thus, ttthe uni-
verse turns out to be a rational whole.rrl: For what is now assumed 
is that reality is rational and that it is governed by the same 
principle of reason \~ich operates in man.2 There is, then, a kin-
ship between man 1's mind and the universe so that man can understand 
the world.? EUrthermore, man will be satisfied only by the facts. 
Such assumptions constitute the basis for science, though 
science does not seek to justify the assumptions or to examine the 
implications of them for an interpretation of the ·world as a whole. 
The scientist is content to explali1 each event by preceding events, 
never asking why the series as a whole or wQy that particular series~ 
These are nonetheless important questions. ~t is in attempting to 
answer them that the notion of a First Cause was proposed •. Thus, the 
~~port of the argument for a First Cause is correct, though it is 
usually formulated incorrectly.. It is not a question of postulating 
a.First Cause of any series of events, but rather of discovering the 
source of the series as a "Whole and why this particular series oc-
curred as it did.A-
1. Ibid •. , P• ll. 
2. See Foundations, P• 215. 
3. This emphasis on the significance of mind occurring in the 
universe is expanded and argued in a ·different form in Nature, J;;f..an 
and God; it is presented belo-vr as the fourth philosophical argument. 
4. See Temple, Fa;th and l1odern Thought, PP• 14-16, 25-27 •. 
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When the question is posed in this way and then is applied to 
the assumptions of science, the issue which arises may be stated as 
follows: ~here is a demand to discover a principle of unity that 
can account for the rational coherence of the tLniverse presupposed 
and vindicated by the scientific enterprise. SUch a principle must 
not itself raise further questions as to why things are as they are. 
AS already noted the only principle which human experience offers 
that meets the demands of being self-explanatory is the principle of 
purpose.l 
~b att~ibute the explanation of the universe to purpose is not 
to invent something unempirical, for purpose is the connnon experience 
of personal beings. One is, therefore, scientifically justified to 
take purpose as the hypothesis wnich offers the best hope for explain~ 
ing the world science reveals. This purpose must be granted complete 
power since everything in the world depends on it. Thus, the scien-
tific impulse if carried far enough demands a Divine Will, that is, 
purpose rooted in will.2 
This interpretation gains further confirmation when joined with 
the experience individuals have of a power not their own supporting 
and knmving them. · Sb.ch an experience corroborates the hypothesis of 
Divine,Will sustaining the world: 
1. see ~., PP• l6-l9; also Natu.re of P.ersonalit;r, P• 88 •. 
2. Bee Temple, Faith and Modern Thought, p. 27 .. 
Tnis experience of a Power in whose hands we are, 
seems precisely to correspond with such a Will, 
for its leading characteristics were, \that 'tve are 
altogether in the hands of this Povrer, and that 
this Power is intimate with us and with our ow. · 
most inmost thoughts as no other human being can 
be, as only the Maker of souls could be.l 
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TUrning to the history of man, Temple finds still another fact 
must be fitted into the scheme. That is, the principle that ex-
plains the world must be adequate to account for the fact of Jesus< 
Christ, his life, death, the resur2~ection faith, and the church 
founded on these facts)?, The povrer which produces the world cannot 
be:c conceived as being inferior to that which arises in the world: 
If Ghrist is a fact, then, ••• ,the governing 
Power of the world must be something capable of 
expressing itself in that fact; it must be adequate 
to its o"m greatest achievement.3. 
Hence, the clue to the nature of the Sttpreme Power of the uni-
verse is provided in the chara~ter of Christ. Christ reveals the 
nature of this Being to be love expressed through sacrifice which 
renders suffering meaningful as a.necessary condition for self-
sgcri:fice and which conquers sin.4 
Thus Temple, starting with the assumption of science that the 
world is a rational whole, attempts to show that this demands that 
l. . Ibid., P• Z7 • 2. Bee ibid., pp~ 60-64. 
3. Ibid •. , p. 158.. See also ibid., p. 6ltand Nature of 
Personality, P• 96. 
4.. 8.ee Foundations, PP• 216-217, 221-222., 
the world be a unity governed by the principle o£ reason. But this 
leaves open the question o£ the character o£ the principle of reason~ 
His hypothesis is that Christ provides the clue to the nature of the 
principle governing the world and at the same time points the way to 
a resolution of the problem of evil vmich is a stumbling block to 
those who call this principle good.l This is another vray of stating 
that man '·s theoretical reason-of 1-lb.ich science is the supreme ex-
ample-demands that the universe be conceived as a coherent whole and: 
that man's practical reason--of vmich morality is the example-will 
settle for nothing less than PUrposive Will •. Combining these two 
demands, it is credible to affirm, though not proved, that 11the Prin-
ciple of Reason which governs the world is the eternal victory of 
Love over selfishness at the cost.of sacrifice. 112 
That the necessity for appealing to 'the hypothesis T.emple has 
proposed has not been logically demonstrated, he quite readily admits. 
In fact, such demonstration is not possible on such an issue. If one 
is to understand, he must first believe; that is, he must first be 
willing to accept the hypothesis, and trusting in its adequacy-
though this has not yet been fUlly established--put it to the test by 
experimenting with it in one 1 s own life as he seeks to align his will 
with the D.i vine Will~ 
l. The problem of evil is raised more fUlly in the next sec-
tion. 
2. Temple, Foundations, pp. 221-22~ 
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Her~ is an explicit illustration of Temple 1 s appeal to practical 
guidance and inner certitude as the ultimate test of the adequacy of 
a world~view.l Also to be noted is the subtle shift made in the argu-
ment £rom the assumption of science that the world is a rational unity 
requiring a Divine Will to order it to the assumption that faith in 
the God revealed in Christ provides the only adequate interpretation 
of the character of Divine Will and, hence, is the necessary starting 
point for understro~ding the world. 
b. The need for God to complete man1 s search for unity through 
science, art, morality, and religion.2 Not only do the assumptions 
and conclusions of science, when the implications of its approach are 
made explicit, suggest the existence of God conceived as Purposive 
Will; so too do art, morality, and religion. In each case the effort 
is to bring unity out of the multiplicity which confront$ the individ-
. ual as he explores the world in which he finds himself; the individual 
seeks a cosmos out of the chaos of his conflicting experiences of the 
world •. The transitoriness of human life threatens to reduce thought 
and action. to futility unless some principle of permanence can be 
found operative in all of man's activities, ·which by unifying them gives 
them ultimate meaning. 
Jl~tellectual activity, typified by the procedure of science, 
l.. see above, Chap. II. 
z. This represents Temple~! s basic argument for theism in ~ 
Creatrix. 
assumes that the universe is a rational whole and, operating on the 
basis of this assumption, provides man with an understanding of the 
world enabling him to control it to ,,an extent which justifies the 
assumption. But the principle of unity that makes the universe 
intelligible to.man1 s mind required by such a procedure is not dis-
covered by the scientific approach or the intellect alone. Laws 
operating within the natural order rendering it comprehensible to man 
are discovered. Thus, in regard to time what is sought and to some 
extent found are unchanging principles governing the processes of 
change. 
.. 
However, that which makes the whole system of laws a unity re-
mains beyond the apprehension of the intellect alone. Also, the 
knowledge of the world as a unity resides in the finite intelligence 
of each knower so that each grasps the \~ole from his perspective, 
making a contribution to the knowledge of the vmole not possible by 
any one else. Thus, the extent of the knowledge of the world as a 
whole is dependent upon, and relative to, the knowledge each one has. 
Only in the society of finite intelligences is there anything ap-
proximat:iJ.1g a full knowledge of the world. Silch a unity is incomplete 
and precarious. To become complete and certain would demand.a mdJ1d 
separate from human intelligence mlose purpose orders the rationality 
of ~perience •. T.O accept such a principle of unity is to move beyond 
intellect in order to provide the full satisfaction and completion of 
the intellect. Though such completeness and satisfaction are not 
required by intellect, the intellect willingly accepts such ~ solution 
when offered~ based upon other demands of the mind.l 
Art through the imaginative activity of the mind is able to 
provide an apprehension of the world's Lurrity vrl~ich science postu-
lated as necessary but only partially glimpsed. The mind is freed 
from time and even conquers it temporarily j_~ aesthetic experience. 
The mind grasps as a unity in the present a sequence of events en-
compassing both past and future._ To this extent the transitoriness 
of the world is overcome. Also~ the value of the whole series is 
symbolized in such a way that when the mind responds appreciatively 
to the symbol, the meaning of the whole is grasped. This means that 
t)J.e mind could apprehend the meaning of the whole ·world if t)J.e prin-
ciple expressing it were symbolized in an event (or series of events) 
in time,. Fttrt)J.er, the contemplation of such an ideal experience to 
be satisfying aest)J.etically must incorporate the tragic struggle of 
good subduing evil, though partially succumbing to it in t)J.e process~2 
However, t)J.at 1mch symbolizes the meaning of life could not be 
simply a 1iTork of art, a mere transitory event in an ever-changing 
world. To be fully satisfying the s.ymbol would )J.ave to be the actual 
embod.Tinent of the ideal in a living person whose life revealed the 
meaning of t)J.e entire drama of life. Art aspires after t)J.e actuali-
zation of such an ideal but never fully attains it, and the con-
templating mind must remain to that extent dissatisfied.3 
1. .see Temple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 85-$9, 353-356. 
2. See ibid., PP• 150-152, 356. 3. See 2bid.,. PP• 352-353, 356. 
When one turns to morality, the embodiment of' the ideal in the 
lives of' great men is partially attained. The purpose which governs 
the individual 1 s lif'e transcends the transitoriness of' the events in 
the world, giving meaning and direction to his lif'e as a 101hole. When 
such a purpose is directed to~nurd the actualization of' the moral good 
of' man found to consist in a lif'e of' love and in a fellowship of' men 
bound together by love, then a principle of' unity f'or all mankind, 
individually and collectively, has been discovered •. Tne attainment 
on earth of' such a fellowship is the ideal of' morality. 
However, the attainment of' the ideal lies beyond the powers of' 
human will to produce. Indeed, it is precisely the individual t s 
self'-will vrllich is the chief' obstacle to the lif'e of love and univer-
sal f'ellowship that constitute the ethical aspirations of' man. SOme 
power is needed beyond man to break in upon both the individual and 
his society, which is capable of' effecting a r~novation of' both. 
Only the power of' sacrif'icial love embodied L~ the life of' one whose 
attitude and acts ref'lect a love that is entirely self'-f'orgetful to 
the point of self'-sacrifice can produce such results. It is such 
sacrif'icial love each man needs but cannot by himself' attain. 
Thus, the mental actiyities of' intellect, imagination, and will 
which f'ind expression through science, art, and morality respectively, 
all have been shown to point to an ideal which if' actualized would 
.perf'ectly satisf'y the demands of' each, but the ideal is not attained. 
The goal of science is not reached; Science only 
exists in departmental fragments; physics, chemistry, 
biology and the rest. The goal of Art is not reached; 
there is no experience obtainable through the 
aesthetic faculties in ·which the soul can find 
satisfaction .for ever. The goal of Ethics is 
not reached; it would be realised in the pursuit 
of a purpose, lofty enough to claim the allegiance 
of all our faculties and rich enough to exercise 
them all, conducted in a fellowship bound to-
gether by ties of mutual love; but man cannot 
ev0lve out of himself' that purposei nor can he 
of himself' create that fellowship •. 
When one turns to the religious experience of man, the purposive 
will unifying and directing ·the universe, which science, art, and 
morality seek but do not find, is claimed to be directly encountered. 
The religious experience of men of all ages testi.f'ies to what is 
believed to be colilllltlnion with the ruling power of the universe. SUch 
an experience carries with it absolute certitude, for the individual 
who has it, of the reality of the power with -w'.aom communion is., shared. 
Nonetheless, one may be deceived; and thus, religious experience too 
needs the support of the other activities of the mind.. Biit:, when. the 
Reing with whom religious men believe they are in communion is rec-
ognized as supplying the lack .felt by science, art, and morality, then 
it is reasonable. to affirm the reality of that Being.2 
Hence, science, art, morality, and reiigion require God .for their 
complete satisfaction. SUch a God must be the union of absolute power 
and perfect love if, on the one hand, the existence of the world is 
to be explained and, on the other hand, if the mind1 s moral quest is 
1. Ibid., P• 258. 
z. See ibid., pp., 25S-260~ 
to be made intelligible. The universe can be considered rational, 
then, only if it is rooted in the will of a personal being whose 
purpose for good is the justification for the existence of the uni-
verse •. The creative activities of man 1 s mind are satisfied vmen, 
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and only when, united in communion with a Divine creative mind. That 
such communion exists is the testimony of religious believers of all 
ages; a11d when their experience is placed alongside of the demands of 
the mind, such a belief is justified. 
The chief obstacle which stands in the way of accepting an all-
powerful will directed toward good as the ruler of the universe is 
the fact that so much of the world1 s history seems contrary to the 
development of goodness. The problem of evil in the world threatens 
the whole case for theism. The details of this issue are explored 
below; suffice it to state at this point that it is precisely be-
cause of the problem evil poses to the theist, both theoretically and 
practically, that Temple regards Christian theism a:s·th~ only adequate 
theism. EVil is not simply defeated through the life, death, and 
resurrection of Ghrist; it becomes itself the occasion of Godfs tri-
umph. EviL is overcome, but what is more important is that in over-
coming eviLa greater good is achieved than would have been possible 
without it. Nor is the evil of the world merely explained abstractly; 
it is Godts goodness which overcomes evil, and this is accomplished 
by God taking the evil of the world on Himself in the supreme act of 
sacrificial love through Christts death on the cross.l 
The f'act of Christ, then supplies ><rhat is lacking to satisfy 
the activities of' intellect, imagination, and will. n~e principle 
of unity which intellect demands, ordering the world, making it 
rationally coherent and intelligible to man, is provided when such 
a unifying principle is seen to be rooted in a loving will such as 
the dogma of the Incarnation suggests~ 2 
The aesthetic experience of man seeks an ideal which will 
symbolize the whole meaning of life, encompassing all of time in a;: 
single grasp, but falls short of attaining the actualization of the 
ideal in any work of art. What is required is the actual embodiment 
of the ideal in a living person. Such an historic figure is offered 
to man f'or his contemplation in Jesus Christ whose life, death, and 
resurrection reaches to the f'ull depths of the tragic in life such 
as to satisfy the aesthetic response of man and in so doing expresseS'! 
the image of the Principle of' Unity that art suggests. The imagina-
tion can accept such a symbol as the perfect fulfillment of the 
impulse which art imperfectly expresses • .3 
The same is the case 'tdth regard to morality. Each man seeks 
a life of love in a fellowship of men bound t'ogether by love, but 
no one is able of himself to act in a loving way to bring about his:; 
l. See-ibid., pp.-290-292, 351. 
2. See ibid., pp. 255, 353, 355. 
3. See ibid., PP• 352-35.3, 356. 
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o~ transformation or that of others. Once again the fact of Christ 
supplies what is needed:: 11The dogma of the Incarnation, -which is that 
fact interpreted in the light o:f its consequences, gives to man's 
moral e:f:fort alike the impetus and the goal -which it requires.ul 
The creative activities o:f man 1 s mind expressed through science, 
art, morality, and religion each seek a uni:fyihg principle which none 
can supply. These four lines o:f argument converge without meeting 
until God incarnate in Christ is accepted as the :fact required to-' 
join them together. That the Incarnation is a :fact may be denied, 
in which case scepticism triumphs, but :for those who accept the 
evidence of the New Testament that God was in Christ it suppliem 
vmat man needs• 2 Man1 s search for God ends in God 1 s act of self-
revelation, indicating that it \'ras His activity at every stage along 
the way which made the quest itself possible.3 
This argument represents a variation o:f the ontological argu-
ment for God. Temple assumes a certain ideal as alone satisfactory 
to the activities of man 1 s mind and, ·Ghen, equating the ideal o:f 
traditional Christianity with it, assumes that the latter ideal sup-
plies, what is needed. Thus, :for example, the basis on which philo-
sophical theism is dismissed as inadequate to cope 14ith the problem 
of evil would seem to be the assumption that a particular conception 
of God is necessary and hence any other conception is ~ priori 
1~ Ibid., p. 352. 
3. Ibid., p •. 354. 
2. See ibid., p •. 298. 
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inadequate~ None of these assumptions, however, has been sufficiently 
demonstrated nor adequately related to the requirements of experience. 
c., Truth,. beauty, and moral goodness as providing intimations-
1 
of a personal God. .Another argument for a personal God can be found; 
in Temple's writings, similar to the one just noted yet stressing not 
so much the need for God to complete man's search for unity in the 
creative activities of the mind as the need for God in order to make 
intelligible the awe man feels before the authoritative claims of 
truth, beauty, and moral goodness-. That is, the experience man has: 
of value exemplified by the august cla:ilns which truth, beauty, and 
goodness make upon h:iln gives int:ilnations of a power transcending the 
universe whose will it is that sustains these values and by whom the 
individual feels confronted in his quest for these values. What 
Temple is attempting to show in this argument is that the theistic 
hypothesis is superior to the humanistic theory in accounting for 
man 1s value-experience. 
There is an authoritative quality about all of the experience 
man has. The judgments man makes about his experience are themselves·; 
based upon and corrected by experience. Similarly, the individual 
seeks to be freed from an appeal to others as authorities for his 
beliefs and to become more reliant upon his ovm reflective judgments. 
But authority is not escaped in this way, for the individual comes 
1. The best summary of this argument is found in Temple's 
Nature, :Man and God, pp. 246-254. 
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under the authority imHDSed by the quest for truth.ll 
When mind apprehends truth, it recognizes· in that act something 
akin to itself. 2 But the mind also recognizes in truth an object 
worthy of reverence that is not appropriate to the apprehension of 
an isolated fact. When such a fact is viewed as integral to a 
system o:f truth, then it too takes on the quality appropriate to 
reverence. Thus, for exam:g:ie, the proposition, "Today is Wednesday" 
is either true or false, but even if' true there is no sanctity about:. 
it. Isolated bits of information do not command one 1s reverence a:S3 
a rule such as is the case with a system of' truth. The distinction 
is significant, but the fact remains that there is something com~ei-
ling and exalted about truth, as a system of' truth or an isolated. 
fact, so that one ts relation to it takes· on the quality of a personal. 
relationship:-. 
'Willingly tobelieve.what is suspected to be~false 
is felt to be not only a degradation of the credu-
lous believer's personality, but an offence against 
the: order of rea1:ity. This feeling is guite unrea-
sonable if' the oxder of reality is a brute fact and 
nothing else; it is onlY justifiable if' the order of 
reality is the expre~sion of a personal mind. for the 
sense of moxal obligation towards Truth is of' that 
quality which is onlY appropriate in connexion with 
personal claims.3 
To, view.c truth in this way seems to Temit.Le to be an intuitional 
judgment which cannot be established b,r argument; the individuali 
1. See ibid., p •. 249. 
2. See ibid!., pp:-. 130, 165; a:lso above, Chap •. IV. 
J. Temple, Nature~, Man and God, p., 250. 
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either agrees with it or he does not. What can be stated in defense 
of such a...TJ. attitude toward truth is that the claim truth makes· upon 
the individual takes on the special quality attached to obligation 
arising from personal relationships as distinguished from the obliga-
tion one feels to~mrd impersonal values. Just what this special 
quality is Temple does not clarify, but the point he is making is 
evident. It is that the quality of feeling one has toward truth, 
even that of a materialistic scientist toward the truth of the 
physical world, is justifiable only if the universe is the expression 
of a personal mind; that is, only if mind is meeting mind in the 
truth to which one submits and which it seeks to apprehend is the 
reverence of truth justified.1 
Such a feeling toward truth may, of course, be due to cultural 
influences extending from a period when belief in such a Supreme 
Mind vre.s prevalent. This hypothesis cannot be ruled out. But 
insofar as most men feel a special reverence for truth, this feeling 
must either be recognized as implying a personal mind or be discard-
ed as illegitimate. Paradoxical as it seems, some persons as a 
result of their felt obligation to truth reject belief in a personal 
mind such as \.Jould justify their reverence for truth. Thus Temple 
concludes:: 
We have here then an intimation, though it is no 
more, that what the mind confronts in its search 
for Truth, and in the claim of Truth upon it, is 
1. See ibid., pp. 250-251. 
something more than an intelligible system of uni-
formities; it is a Mind akin to itself, though so 
vastly greater as to be the controlling principle 
o:f that vast realm of being vrhich our minds labor-
iously and very gradually apprehend.l 
When one examines man 1 s experience of beauty, a similar 
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authoritative claim is made upon man which is commensurate only with 
mind confronted by mind. In the experience of beauty the intimation 
o:f mind is even more evident. One :feels a reverence toward an 
object apprehended as beautiful such as would be justified only if 
one were communing 1~th another mind; but also the act of apprehen-
sion itself feels like such communion. There is no difficulty on 
this issue with regard to works of art created by man. The work of 
art is expressive of the artist; it is not due to chance or mechan-
ically produced. But, must not the same hold true of the beauty of 
nature?: Must not beauty be a communication betw·een ti>ro minds to be 
satisfying~ Temple 1 s own experience leads him to answer in the 
affirmative:: lfTh.ere is more in Beauty than Beauty alone. There is 
comnrunication from, and communion with, personal Spirit.n2 
A third intimation of a personal mind as the source and sus-
tainer of -values is gained :from onets experience of the claim made 
by moral goodness. Morality means respecting another as a person and 
striving to love another as one loves himself so as to :foster personal 
1. Ibid., PP• 251-252. 
2. Ibid., p. 253. Temple quotes approvingly on this issue :from 
Arthur James Balfour, Theism and Humanism (New York:: Hodder & 
Stoughton, George H. Doran Company, 1915), PP• 67-102. 
3:51 
fellowship. To do what is right means to act on the basis of love 
and for the sake of promoting love. 1 The personal quality of morality 
is thus unmistakable. .Also, when one fulfills his duty, particularly 
a difficult and demanding duty, he has the feeling that he entered 
into an already existing reality which has a claim upon him such as, 
only exercised by persons. To take the insight of those who are 
ethically most sensitive, a failure to fulfill one 1 s duty becomes· 
a violation of a claim held to be sacred. Such a feeling of rever-
ence toward one 1 s obligation is justified only by a theistic 
philosophy. 
For no Law1 aoart from a Lawgiver, is a proper object: 
of reverence. It is mere brute fact; and every living 
thing, still more every person exercising intelligent 
choice, is its suoerior. The reverence of persons can 
be aoorooriatel~ given only to that which itself is at 
least personal. . 
Thus, truth, beauty, and moral goodness give intimations of a 
personal mind vThich for Temple justify a theistic interpretation 
of experience. To doubt the intimations of these feelings 1J.hich are 
more persuasive than the sensations of touch or sight is to throw in 
doubt all of one 1 s convictions.3 
Temple 1 s conclusions based upon this argument are much more 
1. See above, Chap. IV; in Temple, see especially, Nature, 
Man and God, pp. 190-196. 
2. Temple, Nature, lvfan and God, p. 254 • 
. 3. The 1-mrd ttfeelingll used in this context is for Temple 
closer to the German Ahnung (presentiment) than to GefUhl (a sense 
of feeling, a sensation); see ibid., p. 255. 
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modest than those dravr.n from the preceding arguments. It is the 
superiority of theism over humanism that is held to be established, 
though he does not clarify what version of theism he believes is 
established by this argument. He does recognize-that such feelings 
of reverence are not self-evid~mtly genuine to everyone, and thus:, 
another empirical line of argument is submitted which likewise leads 
to theism. 
d. A Supreme !'lind as the necessary ground for the occurrence 
of mind in the World-Process.1 The most empirical argument for a 
personal God proposed by Temple is found ill his Gifford Lectures. 
A Supreme ~lind is held to be the most adequate hypothesis to account 
for the occurrence and significance of mind in the World-Process. In 
the Gilford Lectures this argument is joined 'i-7ith the evidence based 
upon man1 s intimations of a personal God arising from his reverence 
for truth, beauty, and moral goodness, and together they constitute 
Temple 1 s most philosophically convincing case for the theistic 
hypothesis. 
Temple directs his attention to an examination of experience 
in general, apart from any specifically religious experience claimed 
to be revelatory of a transcendent God. It is noted that mind arises 
and develops ·Hithin the course of the World-Process. The occurrence 
of minds within the process and as a part of it is indicative of the 
pro-cess itself; that is, the process must be such that it can give 
1. See ibid., especially Lectures V, VIII, X. 
rise to minds.l 
The basic characteristic of mind when it emerges is its capac-
ity to apprehend the process of which it is a part. At its most 
rudimentary level it is simply a means of fostering the organism 1 s-· 
adjustment to its environment by selecting among objects presented 
to it those most likely to satisfy the needs of the organism. At 
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its highest level of personal being mind directs the organism by 
selecting the ends to be sought as well as the means for attaining 
them.2 Mind, then, though a product of the process partially tran--
scends the process through awareness of it and the ability to 
apprehend at least part of it. Thus, though the immensity and 
grandeur of the universe are not to be diminished, neither should: 
one overlook the significance of the fact that man can to some extent 
know the world of which he is a part. Insofar as the astronomer 
knows the existence and location of heavenly bodies 1-l'hile they do 
not know him, he is superior to them. 
The implications of the fact that the process should produce 
in one of its members the capacity to know the process are far-
reachil1g. To consider mind when it occurs as an emergent, not 
reducible to previously existaat entit~es and neither the product 
of chance nor of teleology, 1nay be all right when the parts of the 
process are viewed separately; but when one considers the entire 
1. See ibid., PP• 12.8-134. 
2. See above, Chap. II. 
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process; then mind must be presumed to be accounted ~or either by 
the most primitive entity in the process or by the process in its 
totality. In either case, mind must be grounded in the process, 
and, hence, the process itself must be interpreted as in some sense 
nm.ental.ll In any case, what needs to be explained is the process as 
a -vrh.ole including mind as an element in it. 
Three alternatives are suggested as possible solutions for the 
origin of minds within the World-Process~ (l) l{ind developed as a 
result o~ chance circumstances, none o~ which in themselves contain 
an element of self-consciousness; (2) Whatever gave rise to existence 
in its various manifestations injected mind as an additional creative 
act into the World-Process; (3) Mind must have been present from the 
be,ginning, but in such a rud:ilnentary form. that it was unintelligible~l 
The ~irst alternative seems entirely inadequate. The disparity which 
exists between non-conscious physiological fUnctions and conscious 
organisms is so great that to suppose the former is the cause of the 
latter is to render the notion of causation meaningless• To state that. 
when an organism becomes sufficiently complex, consciousness will ne-
mergett is s:iJ:nply to evade the issue. It is lflike supposing that the 
mechanical-robot at a street corner will automatically turn into a 
policeman if the traffic is sufficiently congested. u2 In such a view 
1. see Temple, Nature, IVJan and God, PP• 198-199. 
2.. Ibid. , p. 199. The illustration is taken from 3 ohn Wood 
Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural (Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1931), P• 45· 
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mind remains a brute :fact unexplained by, and unintelligible in terms:; 
o:f, the rest of the process. 
A choice between the second and third alternatives need not be 
made, since in both cases mind is involved :from the start. There are, 
however, advantages to choosing the third view since it preserves the 
continuity o:f the process which the :first alternative stressed. Hence, 
it is the third alternative Temple chooses as the more reasonable hy-
pothesis. To test it on the basis o:f the implications resulting :from 
SLlch a belief now remains. 
Previous analysis o:f mind has revealed that its distinguishing 
:feature is its capacity to transcend and to view the process o:f 
which it is a part. By :forming concepts (or n:rree ideastt) not tied 
to an immediate sensation the mind can apply ideas gained from the 
past to the :future and even :form conceptions o:f :future experience it 
would like to have but which have not been experienced.. In so doing 
the mind conceives the process as an organic unity so that the past 
is a determining :factor of the present; and, likewise, the :future 
modifies both past and present. The mind thus attains a degree o:f 
superiority to, and independence o:f, the process; and, though the 
mind never completely transcends the process, it transcends it to 
the extent that the process becomes encompassed by mind and mind by 
process. I>find, then, is capable of llselecting the direction o:f its 
own attention, and thereby determining the action which it initiates, 
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even in the physical sphere. nl 
Three points warrant careful consideration when an explanation 
of the process itself is sought: (1) If it is true that the mind 
initiates activity, including physical movement, then the universe 
cannot be considered a closed system ruled by its otv.n laws. \Vhen 
freedom of the mind isadmittea, regardless of how slight a difference 
it makes in the total process, the closed system of the physical world 
must be denied; (2) Whatever explanation is offered to account for 
the process must include mind as a part of the process.. nrts ex-
planatory principle~'' Temple writes, llmust contain the ground of 
freedom as against naturalistic determinism.n2 The character of the 
universe must be such that the event of free minds within the process: 
is in accordance 1vith that character; (3) Whatever it is which is 
held to explain the universe nmst itself require no further ex-
planation; that is, the ground of the universe must be self-ex-
planatory. It is precisely for this reason that the universe cannot 
be explained by physical laws. SUch laws explain present occur-
rences by tracing their connection <nth past events, but then these 
too need to be explained. Furthermore, what is the source of the 
physical law since it has no efficacy- of its own, and why this type 
l. Te:m.ple, Nature, Man and God, p. 255. 
2. Ibid., P• 256. 
of law and not another?l 
In light of these three points what explanation of the World-
Process best satisfies the requirements? Temple suggests: 
When Mind, determined by Good as apprehended, 
initiates activity, no further explanation is 
needed. The enquiring mind, confronted 1-Tith an 
example of what it perfectly understands as the 
essential characteristic of its own being, is 
completely satisfied. Whenever the subject of 
enquiry is traced to the action of intelligently 
purposive mind, the enquiry is closed; Mind has 
recognized itself and is satisfied.2 
On the basis of this explanation it is not at all surprising or 
incongruous that:mind should arise in the process, since the proc-
ess is itself grounded in mind.. Furthermore, purpose is a self-
explanatory principle, indeed the only self-explanatory principle 
known to man. 3 
Thus c~~ates the quest for a satisfactory solution to the 
World-Process on the basis of empirical evidence. Temple defines 
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the solution as theistic: liTo adoet the hypothesis that the process 
of nature ~ all its range is to be a~counted for bz the intelligent 
eurpose of Mind is Theisrn.lf4 
But another question arises demanding an answer: Is the mind 
l. see ibid., PP• 255-257; also pp. 132-13~ 
2. Ibid. , P• 257. 
3. see ibid., PP• 131-132, 2l9-220; also above. 
4. Temple, Nature, Ma..TJ. and God, p. 257. 
ack:no~orledged to be the power behind the universe conta:L'tled solely 
vrlthin the World-Process? Temple answers this question in the 
negative. The immanence of Mind has been established; it remains 
to show how such a l1ind is also transcendent. 
lnsight into the question is gained when one considers the fact 
that any explanation of the world must reveal why the process de-
veloped as it did and how such a development could occur. To rec-
ognize an immanent being in the process as the ground of possibility 
for the process is not to account for the totality-mind plus proc-
ess• To explain adequately Why the total process is as it is neces-
sitates attributing to the immanent principle qualities which go 
beyond both mechanism and organism to Personality. 
It is on this issue that Temple departs from Wbitehead1 s philos-
ophy of organism, from whom he has drawn heavily up to this point. 
The principle of organism implies the unificatioJ:l of the whole which 
serves as the determining factor in action, but what is required is 
that the agent be capable of self~determination both prior to and 
during the course of an action. 
This point iJarrants further consideration. Pointing out how 
the Organic theory proposed by Whitehead surpasses the mechanistic 
interpretation, Temple also suggests that an adequate conception of 
personality must go beyond the Organic theory: 
Organic differs from mechanical reaction in tnat the 
reaction is determined by the whole organism as a 
.. unity •••• But ~orhile the organism as a whole and its 
vital needs thus determine the reaction of its several 
parts, it is the organism as it is at that moment which 
exerts this determining influence., There is nothing 
transcendent there. But in the self-determination 
of a personality something, which as yet is not, is 
envisaged as determing that which is. • • • The 
future self does not exercise efficient causation 
upon the present self; ••• it is the apprehension 
of what shall be, or at least what may be, which 
exercises efficient causation over the self in its 
choice of conduct.l. 
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Thus, at the personal level of existence the future becomes a prom-
inent factor in decision such as is not the case for an organism. 
The present moment in vmich choice is made, furthermore, needs to be 
conceived as itself a span of time such as includes more than simply 
physical movements or organic reactions; determination is made in 
the moment by reference to one1's ideal of "What he vmuld like to be-
come. This means that the 1"self, which frames ideals of itself, is 
certainly something more than appears in its actions. u2 Hence, a 
person can never be reduced t~ or equated wit~_his conduct; be always 
transcends l:lis conduct at least in reference to an idt.e-aL he bas of 
himself not yet realized btLt guiding his actions in the present. 
This is the freedom of self-determination which requires a self that 
transcends its own actions. 
A, 1-rord of comment is in order. Temple's criticism of Whitehead 
in regard to the significance of the future as envisaged by the self 
in the choices it makes in the present would not seem to be justified. 
I 
Whitehead 1 s emphasis on tt~mbj ecti ve aim tltl is al111ost identical with 
Tarnple 1·s view of a future ideal. statements made by Whitehead on 
1. ~~' P• 261. 2. Ibid • ., p. 262. 
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mentality as it operates in higher occasions seem to have been over-
looked by Temple • .L- Ho-vJever, in emphasizing the moment as enduring 
through time, Temple comes closer to a legitimate criticism of White-
headts atomistic view of occasions, even higher level occasions. 
In any case, Templets point is clear: whatever accounts for the 
World-Process must account for the fact of self-determination based 
upon self-transcendence as occurring ~dthin the process. The prin-
ciple of organism fails to do so unless qualities are attributed to 
it that usually are reserved for personality.2 It is the principle 
of personality which is adequate. Personality is, as already noted, 
self-explanatory, thereby avoiding an infinite regress. Further, 
personality as the highest principle the process reveals is adequate 
to account for all that appears; he~ce, the difficulties involved in 
trying to e:xplain the higher by the lo-vrer are avoided. Still an-
other point in its favor is the w~y personality acts in the present 
but in light of the future so that efficien,t causation is.combined 
vdth rational coherence. 
ih~e See, ~or example, Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 164-
165; Frinctlon of Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 26-34. 
2. On this point Dorothy Einmet, one of Whitehead ''s interpreters. 
states: ."Whitehead leads us finally to the conception of a logical- ' 
aesthetlc ord;r, and Temple is, I think, justified in his criticism 
th~t much of vhe qua~i-personalist language vlhich "Whitehead uses about 
this at the end of hls P~ocess and Reality goes beyond what is 
warr:=mted by his own theory; 11 Dorothy Emmet tlTb.e Philosopherrt in 
F. A. Iremonger, William T.emnle ••.• , P• 5zs. 
a 
~ ~--- ----------- -
-
When a person acts purposively his several actions·-·. 
cohere in one intelligible scheme, while in each 
action the present choice, which is at that stage~ 
expressive o£ the constant purpose, is an e££icient 
causeo£ the changes e££ected in the enviromnent.l 
The adequacy o£ perSonality to explain the World-Process3 
is most clearly evident in the mani£estation o£ personality in 
action. The mani£estation which is most signi£icant, because o£ 
its remoteness £rom the mechanical or the organic, is in terms o£ 
£ello-vrship or love. This indicates the necessity f'or other persons 
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(or personalities); in order £or personality to realize itself f'ully. 
Thus, the po-vrer behind the World-Process becomes not only purposive 
mind, but a mind whose actual purpose is love. This completes the 
survey because persons appearing vrithin the World-Process are 
explained by the same principle (i.e., personality) as is the procesro 
itsel£. Value and creation are both made intelligible. on this basis. 
Temple concludes:~ 11The exolanation o£ the world is to be sought in a 
Personal Reality, or to use the historic phrase, in a LJ..ving God.u2 
Temple has presented one o£ the strongest lines of' argument 
£or God based on empirical analysis available. It represents an 
extensive development o£ what is sometimes called the epistemological 
argument £or God.3 Temple would seem to have indicated the high 
l. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 263. 
2. Ibid., p. 265. 
3. See F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology (Cambridge:: The 
University Press, 1930), II, 61. 
- - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - ~ - - - -
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probability of truth in theism over any variety of naturalism tvhen an 
expl~~ation of the process as a whole is sought. There are some 
questions, ho"Yrever, which remain unclarified. It is doubtful if the 
optimism of Temple's theism is any more justified than the optimism 
Whitehead exhibits, though Temple argues for the superiority of his.~ 
own position at this point.1 Further, it needs to be made explicit. 
that Temple 1 s argument has not been sho-ym to establish Christian 
theism. Indeed, even a modified deism is acknowledged by Temple as 
satisfying the minimal requirements. Finally, there is unacknowl-
edged disparity between Templets conclusion that this argument leads 
to a LiV:U1g God as the best explanation of the process and his 
statements in other writings that one cannot infer a Living God, 
that is, that philosophical discourse does not lead to God. Hence, 
Temple presents a philosophically persuasive case for theism, but .. 
not -yJithout some ambiguity regarding alternative positions and the-
kind of theism he believes has been established. 
This completes the philosophical case for theism as developed 
by Temple. But as was noted at the beginning of this section, and 
-
explicitly stated in the course of some of the arguments presented, 
philosophical theism does not stand alone as evidence for God; it is 
supported by, and supports, the direct evidence for God afforded by 
religious experience. 
1. See Skelton, llThe Problem of Evil in the Works of William 
Temple, 11 p. 71. 
3. The Evidence of Religious Experience 
a. The meaning of religious experience. Although Temple 
contends that the philosophical evidence for theism is convincing, 
belief in God is not to be construed as a matter of intellectual 
assent to sophisticated philosophical discourse. Indeed, for the 
religious man the existence of God is based upon his own direct, 
l experience of C~d. Nor is such experience confined to a few 
individuals or to a :few moments in one r s life. Too often religious 
experience is conceived exclusively in terms of the ecstasy of the 
mystic or confined to specific moments when one becomes conscious of 
God 1 s presence. Even 1-lilliam .James must be criticized on this point. 2 
There are such moments of special illumination :for some people, but 
it is false to restrict religious experience to special experience~ 
and isolated moments. 
Such an approach tends to emphasize religious experiences, 
rather than the testimony of religious experience as a whole. For 
the person who believes in God this means all of his experience. 
It is the whole reaction to circumstru1ce resulting 
from that belief and from that acknowledged relation-
ship that should be uppermost in our minds when 1~e speak 
of religious experience and its significance--the 
1. See Temple, Faith and Modern Thought, p. 4. 
2. See William James, The Varieties of Reli ious Exoerience 
(,New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902 ; in Temple see Christus--
Veritas, p. 36; Nature, Man and God, p. 334. 
apprehension by the psycho-physical organism 
of its environment as (amongst other things) 
divine.l 
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Furthermore, even one who shares no belief in God is not without, 
experience of God, though he does not recognize it as such* If the 
source and sustainer of the universe is Divine Will whose purpose 
for good is expressed through the world, then one's consciousness· 
of value as absolute and the experience of absolute obligation which 
it imposes constitute.experience of God. 2 Knowledge of God is 
gained in this r,.ray apart from any explicit religious orientation, 
though many do acknowledge this to be an experience of God. A 
sense of absolute obligation to something which the individual 
priz-es and toward •rhich he feels reverence would seem to be universaL 
Furthermore, to the extent that one feels the constraint of moral 
obligation or the joy of love, he is:having intercourse with God 
whether recognized as such or not. 
Religious experience, then, in its most general form is the 
experience of something ultimate or absolute in the presence of which 
one feels reverence and awe.3 That one could go through life without 
ever feeling reverence toward something that he tru(es to be his moral 
superior or without ever feeling awe toward the universe itself which 
1. Temple, Nature, Nan and God, p. 335. 
2. See Temple, Christus Veritas, PP• 35, 95. 
3. See ibid., pp. 39-40. There is an affinity here with 
Tillich t s vier.-r of religion as one 1 s ultimate concern; see Paul 
Tillich, §ystematic Theology, I, 11-15. 
gave him life seems doubtful to Temple. Concerning the implications 
of this universal experience of awe and obligation, Temple states:~ 
11
·If his reverence and his awe are justified, they imply a Reality 
fit to be their occasion. If he is genuinely subject to the obliga-
tion, that implies a universe in which obligation has a place.ul 
Even the experience more directly termed religious experience 
has a universal import and is not to be equated with special visions 
or trances. Defining the nature of religious experience in this 
narrow sense, Temple states:: 
By religious experience I do not mean an ecstasy 
or an extraordinary thing that happens to a fe-vr 
people here and there, but simply that impL1lse, which 
comes upon most people at some time, to throw oneself 
back upon a Power greater than oneself, and the sense, 
the perfectly sure sense, that that Power has received-
one and is supporting one.2 
For Temple, the chief characteristic of religious experience, When 
it is acknowledged as such, is the feeling one has o:f being confronted· 
by a Being who knows him more intimately than anyone else and vihose 
power supports him even in times of distress.3 Religious experience 
is, therefore, inspiration in which one feels that he is in direct 
conrrnunion with God. Evident at this point is the difference between 
knowledge arrived at by inference based on a chain of reasoning and 
1. Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 39. 
z. Faith and Modern Thought, pp. 7-S. 
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knowledge by direct acquaintance.1 · Philosophical discourse provides 
the :former, religious experience the latter:: HAll philosophy 
culminates -.lith the Divine; only religious experience can give us.> 
God. n? Individuals can be understood only by means of direct experi-
ence. The same is true of God:: He also is known best through a 
personal relationship with Him. Thus in religious experience it is 
God Himself who is revealed and not some proposition about God.3 
Though Temple does not state it explicitly in this context, the 
implication is that God is revealed to be personal. Indeed, Temple 
is sufficiently certain of the personal nature of God that he never 
seriously considers any other option.4 
The experience of God is thus dire.ct but mediated. The characten· 
of the person, the religious heritage which is his, the circumstances 
under which it occurs--all condition the experience one has and his 
interpretation of it. Indeed, because one has a religious experience 
does not mean he has interpreted it correctly, still less that the: 
experience itself offers a solution to particular problems~ ·The 
individual has received inspiration and felt that he was in the 
1. See ibid., pp. 30-33. 
2. Ibid., pp. 31-32. The contradiction between this statement 
and the argument for God proposed in Nature, Man and God has already 
been noted above. 
3. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 354. The implication$ 
of this for an interpretation of revelation is noted below .• 
4. _ See W. R. Matthe-vrs, nwillia.m Temple as Thinker, 11 in W. R. 
Matthews and Others, William Temple: An Est.imate ••• , p. 15. 
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presence of God; the content which he ascri~s to the experience may 
or may not be correct •. 
In inspiration we are given, no:t solutions, but 
new data. • • • lt is contact with God; not under-
standing of God, but living in vital union with 
Him: and it is ppssible that the man who has the 
most vital communion with God will be least able' 
to make a· scientific theory of that experience.l 
b. The insufficiency of religious experience. The difficulty 
which religious experience poses arises precisely at this point, 
namely, its incommunicability and the possibility of self-deception 
regarding the experience itself. How, can one refer meaningfully to 
religious experience as ppoviding communion with God to another man 
whO'· has had no such experience?: Furthermore, to the claim that God 
is met in religious experience the psychologist may rep:1y· that the; 
experience is itself' due to one •s expectations and vivid imagination, 
or to.group·hypnosis. 
The validity of religious ex:gerience is challenged in a way not 
true of man's other experiences (e.g •. , sight and hearing). In repiy 
to these challenges Temp:Le, reaffirming his realistic epistemology, 
state.s that all. p-erceptive exp_erience involves_ the ap~ehension of 
something that is given.. "We do not- have1 experiences and infer the) 
object which occasions them; the e-xr>erience is the apprehension of 
the object .. n2 However, still undetermined is the nature of the) 
1. Tempie, Faith and Modern Thought, PP• 43, M.· 
z.. Tem11i.e, Ghristus Veritas, P•· 38. 
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object given in each case. This can be determined only by critical 
reflection which necessitates moving beyond what has been given in 
order to interpret it correctly. .All human experience involves such 
interpretation. Furthermore, the reflective process is a fuller 
articulation of what was given; it is not theorizing about some fact 
given to it. Religious experience is the same at this point as any 
other experience which claims to provide an apprehension of reality.l 
Nonetheless, because of the charge of illusion brought against 
religious experience} there is need to justify its claim to apprehend 
reality through independent argument substantiatL~g the claim that 
God exists. Indeed, as already noted, Temple asserts that religious 
experience alone is not sufficient to make a case for theism. Reli-
gious experience needs to be put to the same test a11d examined in the 
same way as all other experience claimed to be an apprehension of 
reality. Its claim cannot be held validated until this has been done, 
but neither should its claim be rejected on an ~ priori basis which 
denies the possibility of validation. 
Hence, the evidence of religious experience is precarious and 
seeks philosophy for support. At the same time, religious experience 
because it is direct and not inferential provides intercourse with the 
Living God, which philosophy can never attain. The complete case for 
theism thus rests upon both the evidence of general philosophy and the 
evidence of religious experience. 
1. See ibid., PP• 37-39. 
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A basic ambiguity seems evident in Temple 1's position on this 
issue., Religious experience is necessary to complete and confirm the 
PFilosophical argument for God, but religious experience itself can 
be substantiated only on the basis of the validity of the philosoph-
ical argument. They support each other, but what supports them both? 
That is, Temple confuses philosophical justification for the existence 
of God with philosophical justification for the existence of the 
object of religious experience. BUt the object of religious experi-
ence has not been established as the God of philosophical theism. To 
do so would necessitate a thorough analysis of religious experience 
as well as a correlation of the nature of God arrived at by philo-
sophical discourse with the nature of the object with whom one believes 
to be in communion in religious experience. Neither of these analyses-
has been provided by Temple •. 
Temple is, nonetheless, convinced of the theistic hypothesis on 
the basis of these converging lines of argument. BUt to trace the 
cause of the universe to a personal God whose power sustains it and 
whose goodness guides it requires an explanation of the evil evident 
in the world 1-Jhich seems to contradict either God 1 s povmr or His 
goodness and, in fact, to jeopardize the entire theistic hypothesis. 
It has already been noted· that a tension is evident in Temple 1's 
position in his attempt to show that general philosophy leads only to 
the Divine, not to God, and his unwillingness to remain content with 
the conclusions of philosophical argument so that he always supple-
ments them with the assumptions of, and evidence from, the Christian 
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faith. However, it is in the attemp~ to answer the problem of evil 
that T.emple the philosoJ?her be_comes most explicitly T.emple the Chris-
tian awlogist, and the theism to which philbsoW!y leads, is re.21Jaced 
by a metaphysics of the Incarnation. An e:xamination of the:se issues 
must now be made. 
C. From Theism to a MetB:Rhysics of the Incarnation 
1.. The Good o£ Evi];l 
Using the hyp0:thes~s of a Ge·d whose purp:nse it is to create the 
world and man so that good can be~ achieved, the philosopher can pro-
ceed to eXP.~ the facts of experience. HOwever, one fact re~ists 
such an explanation, and that is the fact of evil. The. error, suffer-
ing, and sin in the world seem to defy the contention that the world 
is created and sustained: so that goodness can be., realized. Ho.w is 
evil, then, to:' be explained? 
TemF~e rejects any attem~t to solve the problem of evil which 
w.ould limit either Go:d 1's goodness or his power. To) limit the~ goo:d-· 
ne:ss ·of God ·is to eliminate G.e:d as the principle of exWJ.anation, 
since the adequa·cy of theism resideS3 in thee self-e:x:g5l.tma.tory charac-
tar of purposivffiwill directed b.r good. Is the other alternative, 
limiting God 1 s power, satisfactory? T.emple thinks not, but it doe:s; 
have the merit of not reducing evil to illusion. 2 
1.. Tempille:1 s most com:R~ete account of the problem of evil' is pre-
sented in Mens Creatr~ PP• 261:...292; but see also Faith and Mo:dern 
Thought, pp. li4':'"l46; Christus Veritas, pp. 191-199, 253-273~; Nature, 
Man and God, PP• 356-377, 500-520. 
2. See Temple, Mens Creatrix~ pp. 262:...264. 
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However, to strive to limit God1 s power while retaining His per-
~ection in goodness is to deal too abstractly with the nature of God~ 
No uJ,timate distinction bet1veen GOd 1 s goodness and His power can be 
made. FUrthermore, on what basis can one claim that God 1 s power is 
limited if His w"ill sustains all that is? In any event, to limit 
God's goodness or power when confronted by the problem of evil is 
really to admit de~eat and give up the quest ~or a rational explanation 
o~ the universe.l' 
Temple correctly sees the necessity ~or dealing with Godts 
nature as a unity but then draws the umrarranted conclusion ~rom this 
that the notion of a God vTith unlimited po1orer and per~ect goodness 
constitutes that unity. What, rather, seems to ~ollow is that Temple 
brings to the facts o~ experience an ideal conception o~ what God 
must be like to be GOd and then proceeds to ~ind an explanation o~ 
the ~acts which is most in accord with the ideal. This ontological 
approach becomes increasingly apparent as his solution to the problem 
o~ evil unfolds. 
Temple suggests that there is an alternative solution which 
avoids reducing both evil to an illusion and God to ~initude; it con-
sists in recognizing that evil is evil but that the good of the world 
is itse~ greater because of the evil which must be overcome. 
'When particular ~orms o~ good are examined, it becomes e::vident 
1. SSe ibid., PP• 264-267. See the re~erence to Temple on this 
point by Dav:ld E1 ton Trueblood, PhilosoPhy o~ Religion (Ne1-r York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1957), P• 243. 
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that the difficulty involved in attaining them constitutes: an inherent 
part of their excellence. What costs one something is valued more~ 
highly than something which does not. Thus moral victory, as a prime 
examP-le of good, is possible only if there is an antagonist; only if 
there is a real struggle can victory be eaaimed. 
Man is so great in and through the struggle, and 
good so glorious, that we would not have the evil 
simply abolished; for that would be to abolish the 
struggle, and with it much of the greatness and 
the glory.l 
But this means that a world in which evil is overcome and victory won 
is a better world than one which contained no evil' to be overcome:. 
It is for each man to decide whether his value judgment confirms this; 
claim. For Temrr:re, nevil o:vercome; by good is often justified. nZ The 
problem of evil is solved, then, not in thought but in action. 
Perhaps, the following statement provides the best clue to 
Tem:Q-Jle 1s approach to the problem evil· poses; for the theist, revealing 
his usual candor in such matters:· 
The reas-onable attitude is not that which says "·This 
is good, therefore it must be reail., 11 or "This is 
evil; how can it be expiained? 11 but that which a:sks 
concerning every situation that arises how good may 
be won out of it. and how; even what is no:w. evil in 
it be.made subservient to good.:3-' 
The problem, according to Tem.Rle, is not to account for evii 
l. TemJF-e, Mens Creatri~ p•· 152. 
2. Ibid., .R:O. 269. 
3. TemP.le, Nature-, Man and God, PP•. 2zo:;.2.2JJ .• 
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occurring in the world operated by an all good and all powerful God; 
rather, the problem is for man to respond to evil in such a way that 
good can be derived from it. It is not the efficient cause of evil 
that is sought but the final resolution of it.l 
For Temple, then, evil loses its decisiveness when viewed as a 
necessary component and even as a necessary means for the actualiza-
tion of the greatest possible good. EVil is conceived as a~ instru-
' 
ment essential for the realization of the greatest good which good-
ness:-dtself renders possible. As previous analyses of value in the 
World-Process; indicated, value to become actual requires a personal 
being who is aware of his existence and -vlbo responds appreciatively 
to certain objects in 'his world. This means that value must be 
realized in and through individuals;: goodness must be an achievement, 
something -vrhich is won or conferred as a result of struggle. Thus, 
error, suffering,. and sin are a part of the struggle which engages 
. 
man as he strives to-vrard truth, beauty, and moral goodness. The 
justification of such a view with regard to the three main types of 
evil must be presented. 
If truth is to be attained, then it must be by man's ow.n efforts. 
Furthermore, the act of discovery is a greater good than if no intel-
lectual effort had to be expended. Xherefore, error in the form of 
an improper synthesis of one 1 s experience must be a possibility to 
which man can succU!ll.b. It is in the elimination of error that man 
1. See Temple, l~ns Creatrixj pp. 261-262, 267-273. 
- - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - --'"""- -- - - -- - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - -
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finds his highest intellectual satisfaction. Error arises only in 
the act of eynthesis, for Temple, when one asserts the 11identity of 
different objects 11;l error never occurs -vmen one merely analyzes the 
content of his eiperience. Error is, therefore, a necessary element 
in the actualization of intellectual value: 
Error, then, may be regarded as the symptom of the adven-
turous character of the intellectual life; if it were 
impossible, that character would be gone; if it were 
never actual, that character would he.unperceived and 
therefore valueless.2 
Value can likewise be discovered in suffering. First, suffer-
ing elicits sympathy from others, therby making it a positive gain 
both to the sympathizer and to the sufferer. Second, there is value 
received from suffering when one endures it gladly for the sake of a 
worthvrb.ile cause.3 Finally, suffering offers to man a dramatic 
challenge to exhibit courage, or what is even more ennobling, to 
exhibit love for another despite the personal suffering such acts 
might entail. 
Pain, coupled with fortitude in its endurance, 
especially -vmen this is inspired ·by love, and 
meeting the full sympathy ~ich at first lightens 
it and at last destroys it by removal of its 
grounds, is sometimes the condition of w.hat is 
best in human life.4 
1. ~., P• 274~ 2. Ibid.' pp. 277-278. 
3. See ~emple, Faith and I>iodern Thought, pp. 122-123. 
4. Temple, Mens Greatrix, P• 278. 
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Hence, suf£ering is not intrinsically evil, since it is a necessary 
condition £or the realization of some aspects o£ character which are 
supremely good; e.g., heroism and sel£-sacrifice.l 
Temple admits that. this vie1·T does not £ully satis£y all particu-
lar cases o£ suffering as, for example, the tragedy of one entrapped 
in evil by the situations which elicit conflicting obligations, or 
of an othello whose virtue renders him powerless to cope with an Iago.2 
In such cases Temple £alls back upon his religious faith, asserting 
that eternity alone of£ers the possibility of ultimate justification. 
Summing up his solution to the fact of suffering in the world, Temple 
states: 
.All we can claim is that we have £ound a principle on 
1~ich, ~ere we can trace its operation, suffering 
becomes a necessary element in the full goodness o£ 
the world; that in some cases this principle can actu-
ally be traced; that in others its action must be 
assumed if we are to maintain the rationality of the 
world .. 3 
Thus, the £ulfillment 1~ich sacrificial love provides, if not on 
earth then in heaven, does justify su£fering in principle.. At least 
this is the assumption religion makes. It is an immense and audacious 
assumption, but the only alternative to it is_an unintelligible world. 
There are, in fact, only three consolations which can be offered' 
1. See T.emple, Foundations, p. 220. 
2. See Temple, Mens Creatrix, PP• 2g2-2S4. 
3. Ibid • ., P• 280. 
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for the anguish of the world represented by the approach of the Epi-
curean, the Stoic, and the Christian. In the face of pain the counsel 
of the Epicurean is that life will end soon, and then there 1nll be 
no more pain. The stoic advises heroic endurance in the face of pain, 
indicating that the wise man concentrates his attention on other mat-
ters. The Christian simply points to Christ and his suffering. That 
life is short and pain brief is some consolation to one in pain; that 
wise men forget their pain is no consolation to the unwise; but that 
GOd Himself suffered as a man is real consolation to man when he suf-
..,.. 1 .~..ers. 
Sin offers a peculiarly difficult problem.. It is rooted in a 
perversion of the object of self-will which is the same will necessary 
for all goodness. lis such, sin seems inexplicable in a universe 
claimed to be the medium of Godt:s purpose for good. But even as auf-
fering can be the occasion of eliciting the greatest love possible by 
a sacrificial act for another which thereby renders the suffering 
meaningful, so too sin can be the occasion for rnaJJ.' 1~s e:Xperience of 
greatest love when he surrenders himself to the love of another. 
But the self-surrender cannot be complete if there 
is not the utmost opposition that can be quelled. 
Love whose return is achieved by struggle is better· 
than spontaneous affection, not accidentally but 
essentially; for the specific ardour of the struggle 
enters into the fibre of the love itself. In fact a 
sinful world redeemed by the agony of Love's complete 
1. See ibid., pp •. 279-280. 
self-sacrifice is a better world, by the only 
standards of excellence we have, than a world 
that had never sinned.L 
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However, Temple contends that these resolutions of the problem 
of evil remain speculative and inconclusive. On the basis of them 
alone it might seem better to some persons to accept the irrational 
and inexplicable elements which evil introduces into the world. What 
is needed is a fact of history that demonstrates the sacrificial and 
redemptive love of the Supreme Power of the universe. The Christian 
GOspel testifies to just such a fact as is required. The p.reseJaee 0£ 
evil in the world is finally removed as a challenge to God 1 s goodness 
and povrer when one turns to history and sees in the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ the sacrifical love of God, taking the evil 
of the world on Himself so as to serve as the dramatic and actualized 
event ~1ich could elicit from man the love he needs to win him to 
goodness. In Christ, then, the source and sustainer of the universe 
can be seen actually engaged in the work of redeeming man and the 
goodness of the whole is vindicated •. The theory proposed by reason 
that the governing principle of the universe is a Personal Being whose 
purpose is love is now demanded by the facts of experience as well.2 
Thus, for Temple,. the Incarnation taken as a fact of history 
which illuminates all of history provides the most adequate basis for 
1. ~·" P• 286. 
2.. See ibid., 290-292. 
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metapnysics.1- A. transition is made from the ppsition of philosoph-
ical theism to a metaphysics of the~ Incarnation, or what is called 
at one _RG>int, nua,_ Christo-centric meta:g:bysic~ .. n:~ 
Before exploring the details of this Christian metap:Iaysics, some 
comments on the exposition thus far are in order. DeSP-ite· his criti-. 
eism of vie-ws which deal abstractly with evil, TemJ?.i.'e has analyzed the:. 
problem only in an abstract way;, particular sufferings of individuals 
remain unjustified though guidance for practical problems is what.:. 
distinguishes Christian J?.hilosoJ?.by from other varieties. Furthermore~ 
that good can be)derived from evil is indisputable, but this only 
P.roduces: an instrumental. good and lets untouched the problem of in-
trinsic evil'.. 
The argument that an instrumental good may be .. derived in the fu-
ture- from what is now evil- is just as valid ,conversely stated;; that 
' 
is, if what is now evil may be altered in the future so as to be: 
viewed as really good, then, following the same reasoning, what is 
now considered good may become evil- at some future time. Obce again 
Temp-le has posed the problem in such a way that a choice must be) 
made between scepticism and Christian theism so that the intell~gi­
bil~ty of the world is identified with the latter and irrationality 
with the former. Indeed, one is asked to assume intelligibility in 
1. See Temple, Nature:. of Personali$Y, .p. 96. 
z. TemJ?.le, Christus Veritas, P• ix. 
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order not tQ lapse into scepticism. Other alternatives (e.g., fi-
nitism) surely warrant more careful consideration from the philos-
opher than Temple provides. Finally, the transition from philosophi-
cal theism to a Christian metaphysics is a procedural one for purposes 
of exposition, since the adequacy of Christian theism is assumed 
throughout; this assumption is made e~~licit in the next section. 
2. A Christo-centric metaphysics 
Though the present study is not concerned with Temple's theology, 
as such, inasmuch as theological concepts become for Temple the cor-
nerstone of his metaphysics, then his theology is relevant. Such is 
the case with regard to the interpretation and significance of the 
Incarnation, and the form which it takes as expressed by the Atonement. 
According to Temple, the Incarnation and the Atonement provide fun-
damental insight into the nature of the Supreme Spirit and, therefore, 
are germane to the present investigation. 
The power and love of God have been seen to be guiding and con-
trolling the universe. If man is to fulfill his own nat1.1re, then he 
must respond to this power and love. A:!Jso, man as a personal being 
is free in that he is determined by what seems good to him. That is, 
the individual follows his apparent good, but is unsatisfied with 
anything less than the supreme good.l Thus, he cannot be coerced into 
goodness without goodness itself being forfeited. The SUpreme Spirit 
cannot command the allegiance of finite spirit without sacrificing 
1.. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, pp. 519-520; also above, Chap. 
IV. 
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the voluntary devotion that is sought; God lill:!st l·r:in man 1 s loyalty and 
love. The true nature of the Supreme Spirit, therefore, must be made 
knovm to man in a form vrhich man can understand and to which he can 
respond appreciatively. Man needs redemption and not merely progress.] 
Furthermore, since man is a personal being, the mode he knows best is 
that of a hu.mru1 person; and thus if God is to reveal Himself fully 
to man, He must do so by taking on the limitations o:f ht1ID.an person-
ality without succumbing to the temptations o:f :finitude.. There must 
come into existence a person for whom his appaxent good is ahmys the 
supJJeme good. 
This is the signi:ficance o:f the Incarnation: Christ becomes for 
all time and for all mankind the manifestation of the eternal truth 
o:f GOd in a particular moment of time and in the form of a particula..r 
human being. In so doing Christ also made available the release of 
a:. new power or in:fluence in the -vmrld,. called by Christians the Holy 
Spirit, by showing the true nature of Divine love. 
By living a li:fe of love Christ exemplifies God 1 s love concretely, 
calling all men to a life of love; then upon the cross and in the res-
urrection which :follows, Christ demonstrates Godt's conquest of death 
and of the sin which caused his mm death. Through the cross man may 
come to know what sin costs GOd and at the same time know that his 
sins;.are forgiven.2 Hence, m.an 1 s sin which seems most contrary to 
1. See'T:emple, Nature, ¥..an and God, p. 513; also above, Chap •. TIT~ 
~ See: Temple, Christus Ve"i tas, p.. 260. 
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GcYd t:s goodness and power is seen to be i tsel:f' the occasion of the 
triumph of goodness: "God in Christ has not merely defeated evil,_ 
but has: made it the occasion of His own sup,remest glory .. nl The; 
classic examgle of the alteration of the value of events is supplied 
by God Himself. 2 The cross and the resurre.ction rep;resent tragffily 
transmitted into trium~h and offer the key to an interp~etation of 
the.: world • .33 
The meaning and the mode of the Incarnation are revealed most 
exp~L"icitly in these events. It is what the Christian refers· to· a93 
the· doctrine of the Atonement. Commonly viewed as the means qy which 
the sin of man is forgiven, the atonement is for Temple: rtthe mode of 
the Deity of God"' as well.4 Hence, the central declaratio~ of the 
Christian faith, more ·fundamental even than that nthe word became:: 
flesh 11 ' (John 1:-14) is express.ed by the author of the Gosp~l according 
to John in the-se words:: "Go:d so loved the. world that he~ gave: his on:Ly 
bego.tten Son, that everyone that believeth on hiln may not perish, but;. 
have eternal Life.n5 
1.. 'lJemple, Mens Greatrix:, P• .322. 
2~ See Temple, Nature, Man and God, pp:. 210, .358, 511. 
.3. See Temple, Ghristus Veritas-, E-. 271. 
5.. J.ohn 1:.14; it is Temple..'s own translation in his Readings' 
in St. John 1s Go·spel:: First and Second Series (,London: Macmillan 
and Go:.,, Ltd., 1945), p• 48. 
The characteristic activity of God is shovm to be sacrifice. 
Herein is revealed the nature of the SUpreme Spirit. Sacrifice re-
presents the highest spiritual quality knovm to man. It means doing 
or suffering something for another which apart from one•·s love for 
him. would not be done or suffered~ l_ SUch is the nature of the Supreme 
Power of the universe.. GOd is the sovereign ruler of the universe, 
and what Ghrist reveals is that the cross is God 1 s earthly throne. 
The only object adequate for God1·s love is the world itself, and in 
order to redeem it He willingly sacrifices Himself. 
S.o GOd vindicates His own Deity.. Only such a God can be 
the GOd of the world 1o1e lmmv. For the Name of God sig-
nifies the union of perfect goodness and absolute power. 
We should have to deny the one or the other if we could 
not believe in the Cross and Resurrection of Je.sus. He 
reigns from the Tree.. Because, and only because, His 
goodness is so perfect as to include self-sacrifice, His 
po-v;er is lmo1m to be supreme and all-controlling. 2 
The ideal conception of God which has been operative throughout 
~emple1 s presentation of the problems of philosophy is now made e.K-
plicit. God is not God unless He is both perfect in goodness and 
absolute in power. It is such a God that Christ reveals. According-
ly, just as philosophy needs God to satisfy the theoretical demand for 
a.principle of unity, so religion needs Christ to satisfy the practi-
cal demand for assurance and specific guidance. But can one justify 
l. See Temple, Christus Veritas, p. Z73, and The Universality 
of Christ, p. 72. 
2. Temple, Ohristus Veritas, p. Z73. 
the acceptance of Ghrist as the complete revelation of God? It cannot 
be done on Philosophical gTounds alone, though the hunger of philosophy 
for a specific revelation which Would make the world intelligible of-
fers some justification. Indeed, when the ultimate principle of ex~ 
planation is conceived to be a personal God, then revelatory acts are 
not merely possible but probable. In this way philosophy can show 
what is needed but cannot assess the adequacy of a revelation claimed 
to supply the need. It is not clear in Temple's presentation at this 
point why philosophy cannot assess the adequacy of a revelation-claim 
if" by accepting it the world becomes intelligible. 
TO base one ''s understanding of the ultimate principle of explan.,_ 
tion oV the evidence of God's revelation in Christ is to live by 
faith and not by knowledge alone, but it is, Tilmple contends, a 
reasonable f"aith.l From the standpoint of reason the Christian f"aith 
is an hypothesis which must be tested in both thought and practice. 
It is neither a seli'-evident premise f"rom which deductions can be made 
nor a conclusion legitimately iP1erred f"rom empirical f"acts. 
Though 
resting in part On both Of these methods'" what Temple now seems to 
.. h r both together. 
t
. . th t iL is not proved by el~ er one o be sugges lng ls a v 
Ultimately one must act -by faith. and the acceptance of Christianity 
is no excep lon. ' t
. 2 ACtion not thought7 is decisive in enabling one 
1. See Temple, Nature, "Man and God, P• 264~ 
+> v· n reprinted in Religious See Temple, ''My Point o.~. lew 2
• pp. 105-106. . EXperience • • • ' 
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to co:mmit h:i.m.self to life as worthwhile.l In any event, personal 
security is the assurance that results from such .faith and does not 
consist of the logical certainty that results from knowledge •. Such 
assurance is won by personal loyalty and not by rational discottrse; 
and the test of its adequacy is not in logic but is in the experiment 
of living. 2 
The Christian hypothesis may not be true; there is no way of 
being absolutely certain, but what does seem evident to Temple is 
that it alone offers an intelligible account of the universe. The 
universe may be inexplicable and, hence, the Christian faith un-
founded; but if the universe is intelligible, then Christ alone 
supplies the principle of explanation. The choice is between co~ 
plete scepticism or Christian theism. Hence, T'emple proclaims trthe 
philosophy of the Incarnation as the only tenable metaphysics. tt3 
Templers aim as a philosopher is, therefore, the construction of 
a comprehensive interpretation of the universe as a whole from the 
perspective of Christts revelation of God. However, the comprehensive 
scheme Temple seeks is oriented more toward practical guidance than 
it is toward theoretical understanding and in such a way that the two 
1. 
2. 
.. ' 
S.ee Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. Z78. 
See Temple, Mens fueatrix, p. 4; also, Repton School Sermons 
PP• 101, 104-105 • 
3. Temple, Nature of Personalit~, p. 96; of. also, Mens Creatrix, 
pp. 292, 253; Christus Veritas, PP• 7-8; Nature, Man and God, pp. 266, 
520~ 
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aims seem severed. 
Nonetheless, later ilL life when time and energy were concentrated 
on the practical affairs of the Christian church, Temple raised doubts 
about the feasibility of this task. Whether these later reflections 
represent a fundamental change in position or simply a change in 
emphasis is analyzed in the appendix to this chapter. What needs to 
be stated at this point is that Temple is justified in taking a cer-
tain dattun of experience as the clue to an interpretation of all ex-
perience. Success in the latter task is sufficient justification for 
the choice. But to narrow the choice of. alternatives to scepticism 
or Christia.n theism does not seem justified. Nor does it seem legit-
imate to sever practical guidance from theoretical understanding. Can 
guidance that is lasting and true be provided if it is not rooted in 
understanding? 
One task remains to complete Temple 1 s interpretation of the ul-
timate principle of explanation as purposive 1dll, and that is to 
present in a more systematic way than has been done so far his con-
ception of a personal GOd. 
D. Resultant Conception of a Personal God 
An attempt to find a self-explanatory principle capable of ac-
counting for the universe and man as a part of it led to the hypothesis 
of a personal God Whose will for good provides the groundand goal of 
all that is. But 'What is the relation qf the living God to the World-
Process?.' Furthermore, since the explanatory principle of the universe 
J.$6 
is based upon the analogy of human personality as the highest level 
of reality known to man, it is essential that the distinctive char-
acteristics of Divine Personality be made as clear as is humanly pos-
sible. An exposition of Temple 1 s views on these issues constitutes 
the remainder of the chapter. 
1. God 1 s Relation to the World 
a. God as creator. ACcording to Temple the world owes its 
existence, both its origin and continuance, to the Divine Will, and 
the world is the expression of His vrill. This is the meaning of the 
doctrine of creation. It does not mean that God existed alone and 
then at some time initiated the creation of the world. There seems 
no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning, and certainly 
the view tb.at GOd at some time b.ad no relations at all to anything 
other than Himself is meaningless for man. 
For the essence of tb.e doctrine of Creation is not 
tb.at God inaugurated the existence of tb.e 1·JOrld at 
a particular moment of time, but that it owes its 
existence--not only its beginning--to His volitional 
.+.t:.• • 4-;,., 1 ~ lkl_ v:L. "'ll';/ •• -
What is denied by the doctrine of creation is a conception of 
the world as the necessary emanation from the Divine Being •. Also 
rejected is the view that simply correlates God and the world, each 
dependi.11g on the other for existence. 2 What is claimed instead is 
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 301; cf. also, Nature of 
Personality, p. 87. 
2. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 301. 
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that tb.e l·rorld is sustained by tb.e will of God.. Thus, the world is 
dependent upon God, but God is not dependent in tb.e same way upon the 
world. If the world is destroyed, God will remain and be capable of 
creating another world. To be a person means to express oneself, but, 
what is expressed is not equal to the expresser. The world remains 
effect, and God the cause.L 
However, since God is personal, He desires other persons :for 
fellowship. Hence, in :flill expression o:f the character o:f God in 
this sense, He needs the world and persons in the world.2 The World-
Process is the medium :for God's personal actions. The creator is 
related to His creation by being both immanent in the process and 
also transcending it. SUch a conception o:f God is traditional Chris-
tian doctrine, but the content Temple gives to these terms intra-
duces some novel elements. 
b. God as an ilnmanent principle of variability~ When God is 
referred to as immanent, •rhat is commonly meant is that He sustains 
the world according to certain prescribed principles or laws; vmereas 
God as transcendent is held to possess a reserve o:f energy which can 
be utilized on special occasions to intervene in the orderly process~ 
Accordingly, it is o':ften stated that what is immanent in the process 
is a principle, both a constant principle o:f action and a principle 
o:f constant action. One speaks o:f a principle as being immanent in 
1. SSe ibid • ., P• 265. 
2. However, Temple is neither entirely clear nor consistent at 
this point as is evident in the discussion o:f the relation o:f the 
Eternal to the temporal; see above, Chap. V. 
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a certain action wnen that action conforms to the principle. Temple 
employs the £ollovnng illustration: 
So Nationalism is a principle to which certain policies· 
and politicians conform; it explains their particular 
methods and actions.. It is other than these~ but it 
has no existence apart £rom these. In other Wordi it 
is distinguishable, but not separable, from them. · 
The principle is not identical with the actions; but apart from them 
it has no objective reality. 
Such a view o£ immanence is inadequate, Temple contends, i£ 
God is personal. Personality cannot be confined to this rigorous 
mechanistic conception. The true immanence o£ a person discloses 
itself only in his present conduct. Thus, a m~Dts personality cannot 
be truly seen in a record of ~is past conduct; it can be inferred, but 
it is in the adjustment that the personality makes to present cir-. 
cumstances that most correctly reveals the immanence of the person. 
SO too with God: as an immanent principle His will determines at 
every moment the various modes of activity o£ each part o£ the World-
Process. Therefore, personality (both human and divine) vrhen immanent 
exists as a principle of variability, that is, a principle capable o£ 
adjustment to the circumstances of the environment. 
It is this capacity for malting adjustments according to cir-
cumstances that the older view o£ immanence inadequately accounted for 
by positing unutilized energy. The difficulty is i..D employing mechan-
istic categories vrhen only personal ones are appropriate. Temple 
l. Temple, Nature, Man and God, P• 283. 
concludes: 
What a true doctrine of divine tra_Dscendence will 
assert is not a reservoir of nor.mallyunutilised 
energy, but a volitional as contrasted with a 
mechanical direction of the energy utilised.I 
God is ::i.romanent in the world in that the entire universe is determined 
by Him according to His purpose. The constancy of the process exists 
because it serves His purpose so to order the world. This means that 
any particular event might be altered, from the standpoint of human 
expectancy based on past events, if to do so would be more in accord 
~rith the purpose of God.2 
Ail intelligible basis for so-called miracles is provided on this 
theory. Miracles are no more the activity of God than any other 
events, since all events are directly the result of His will. However, 
vJhile all events are equally the result of God's activity in the world, 
not all events equally reveal God 1 s nature.3 Just as the character 
of a human person is best known in moments of crisis when courageous 
or cowardly acts may be elicited, so too the personality of God may 
be more adequately revealed in certain events than others. God may 
even choose, when conditions are appropriate, to submit Himself to 
finite limitations so as to reveal concretely and definitively His 
character. 
---·-----
1. Ibid., P• 284. 
3. Ibid., p. 315. 
2. ~·, PP• 267, 290, 298. 
In other words, if the immanent principle is personal, 
we must not only seethe whole universe as the ex-
pression and utterance of His activity, but must ex-
pect to find in its course special characteristic and 
revealing acts, which are no more truly His than tfe 
rest, but do more fully express Him than the rest.· · 
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However, there is nothing capricious or chaotic about the order-
ing of the universe. Events can be depended on to occur in causal se-
quence, but the point is, the regularity is not due to the fact that 
the universe is mechanically determined; it is due to the £act that it 
is the expression o£ a personal Being. The uni£ormity o£ nature is 
rooted in the constancy o£ purpose that characterizes personality. 
Such constancy is not rigid con£ormity; it is constancy of intent, 
varying its expression when circumstances warrant it.2 Still more 
£undamental £or Temple in assuring activity which is constant w/ith 
variations according to 11suf£icient reason, 11 ··is that God is tran-
scendent and not only immanent in the process. 
c. God as the transcendent self-identical person. Behind the 
immanent principle of variability in the World-Process exists the 
personality o£ God Himself. Thus, as a personal being God not only 
is immanent in the world but also transcendent to the world, just as 
a man is expressed in his conduct but is always more than his conduct. 
Furthermore, though a person may vary his specific acts depending on 
the circumstances in a way which will best fulfill his purpose, the 
purpose itself remains unchanged. Such is the case with God; as an 
1. Ibid., pp. 296-297. 
2. See ibid., pp~ 267, 295, 29S. 
immanent principle C~d is variable, but as a transcendent Deity He 
is changeless.1~ 
Such a view of the transcendent God would seem to contradict 
Temple1 s view of creation. Also, it sheuld be noted that human pur-
poses often are modified as a result of circumstances and not merely 
the means to the ends sought. To be consistent a more radical dis-
tinction between God as immanent and God as transcendent would seem 
to be required. Instead, Temple contends that it is the transcendent 
God who is immanent in the world, and it is the immanent person who 
also transcends the world.2 
God, then, is at work in the natural order as a living person. 
He expresses a constancy of action by means of variations appropriate 
to the specific occasion; these variations do not result in an in-
coherent universe because they are grounded in the identity of the 
person who transcends particular actions. 
Temple is not clear as to whether this identity itself endures 
through time and hence is dynamic or -vrhether it is static. What 
does become increasingly evident is the emergence of a soul-substance 
view of the unity and identity of the personality of God, though 
Temple has explicitly rejected such a view on the human level.3 
1. Ibid • ., P• 295. 2. See ~., p. 298. 
3. See above, Chap. III. 
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According to Temp:Le the immanent person do.es not operate· apart 
from the transcendent God, so that everything expresses the purposffi 
of the transcendent God. But what also needs to be clarified is 
whether the. transcendent God can operate independent of the immanent 
p-erson·; Man 1 s lmowledge of the transcendent God is held to depend on 
the activity of the immanent person, for God is known only as He re-
veal-s Himself'. The converse is also true:.:: Go:d is what He is revealed 
to be. That is; God is only known by His actions, but by knowing 
Godts actions man knows God directly, not inferentially." The-meaning 
of, and justification for, revelation as interp~eted by Temple demands 
fuller examination. 
d. God 1 s revelation of ffimseli. To; explain the universe by re-
course to the p!JWer and love of a personal Being means that the entire• 
universe is the expression of Him. But, if God is personal, it is not 
only possible but probable that certain acts will reveal His character 
more fully than others. Special revelatory acts can, then, be expected; 
and if any acts can substantiate their claim to be the purposive self-
revelation of God, then they would provide evidence of the charanter 
of Gorl that no evidence to the contrar,y could refute.l At the same 
time, special revelatory acts are p:ossible' only if all events reveai~ 
God. IT any events are; an intrusion into an orderly process that is: 
not itself the expression of God, then such intrusion renders the world 
incb:herent. 
1. See TempTe, Nature, Man and God, p ... 264. 
But if all existence is a revelation of God, 
as it must be if He is the ground of its existence, 
and if the God thus revealed is personal, then 
there is more ground in reason for expecting 
particular revelations than for denying them.l 
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Tlie forms that special revelations of God have supposedly taken 
are varied. Confining himself to the Christian tradition, Temple still 
encounters significant differences. The Bible is held to be the rev-
elation of God, but how is God revealed in the Bib+e? Temple rejects 
the traditional interpretation which holds that the Bible has been 
divinely recorded and is infallible. This contradicts man 1 s freedom 
and destroys the possibility of spi:dtual development. The natural 
faculties of man can be enlightened but not superseded. Therefore, 
the Bible is not itself the revelation of God; the Bible is the record 
of events which are a unique revelation of God.2 
It is necessary to reconceive the meaning of revelation. Insofar 
as God is the source and sustainer of all that is, then the process 
is guided by God. Man as occurring within the process and as inter-
a-cting ,.n.th it becomes aware of himself and the world. Furthermore, 
as a created being, man is also under the guidance of God. When the 
process guided by God and man also guided by ~od interact, revelation 
occurs. Revelation requires, then, the occurrence of special events 
in the world (objective factor) ru1d the appreciation of these events 
by someone (subjective factor). The essence of revelation is the 
interco1trse of mind vr.ith event and not some propositional formulation 
l. Ibid., p. 307. 2. See ibid., pp. 307-312. 
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of the experience itself. There are no revealed truths, but rather 
there are truths of revelation. The locus of revelation is in the 
historical event and is hence objective. But this event needs to 
be apprehended by one able to appreciate it if the revelation is to 
be effective. Li-~e all value eA~erience, revelation is an objective 
occurrence, subjectively conditioned. One 1 s religious traditions 
influence the interpretation rendered any event, but the impact of 
the experience may lead to a revision or rejection of the tradition.l 
Revelation occurs primarily through events and to minds able to 
apprehend it, though direct revelation by God to an individual also 
takes place. Thus, Temple holds an inspirational and not an intel-
lectualistic view of revelation. But in terms of his epistemology 
man directly interacts with his environment; and when this environment 
is God, then man knows GOd RXmself.. The content of revelation, 
therefore, is not doctrines about God, but is Ged Hmself. What man 
encounters in a specific revelation tlis not truth concerning God 
but the Li vinll GOd Himself. tt2 The meaning of religious faith for 
Temple is now apparent: it is not believing that certain doctrines 
axe true, but it consists in one 1 s own intmate fellowship with GOd. 
SUch is Temple 1 s formulation of his position. However, to refer 
to truths of revelation rather than revealed truths is misleading in 
light of What is affirmed about the experience of revelation. Thus, 
1. SBe ibid.; PP• 312, 314, 315-316. 
2. llisl•, P• 32Z.: 
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to claim that one encounters God Himself in revelation is itsel£ an 
interpretative statement of the experience held to be revelatory. 
Hence, though the distinction Temple makes would seem to be a sig-
ni£icant one by ruling out revealed truths, its effectiveness is 
greatly reduced at this very crucial point. SO long as one knows that 
he has met lithe living God11'in an experience he has had, then at least 
that truth has been revealed. This raises the important question of 
hm·T revelation is authenticated? 
Since Temple rejects miracle as traditionally conceived, he-can-
not appeal to a supposed miraculous event to authenticate GOd's 
activity. Vindication of a special revelation is rather to be found 
through an inner assurance arising from a felt power of activity 
(especially a power of self-forgetfulness) not previously available.l 
When one sees mercy combined with povJer, there is God. ALso, all of 
li£e is illumined by 1o1hat is revealed. The marks of revelation may 
now be summarized: 
K.union of holiness and power, before which 
our spirits bow in awe, and i·Thich authenticates 
itself by continuous development to sbme focal 
point in which all preparatory.revelation finds 
fulfilment, and from which illumination radiates 
into every department of li£e and being.2 
Finally, the revelation of a personal God to persons could be 
complete only if God Himself chose to tal{e on the limitations of 
human personality.3 SUch a personal self-disclosure lies beyond the 
purview of philosophy to discover or to just~y. Nonetheless, that 
1. See ibid., P• 245. 
3. See ibid., P• 321. 
2. Ibid., PP• 324-325. 
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God should become man has been shown to be what morality~ society, 
and, indeed, all of' history require to make human lif'e and history 
truly meaningf'ul and truly worthy. That Christ is God is the faith 
of' Christians. ~t the same time the revelation of' God in Christ 
satisfies mants desire f'or meaning and his need f'or guidance; but 
such f'ai th is justified only by making the experiment itself' .1 
For Temple, therefore, Christ provides a dl~amatic and concrete 
demonstration of Divine Personality toward which the World-Process 
points. It is necessary that an examination of Divine Personality 
be made, and for Temple this is best accomplished in terms of the 
Christian doctrine of' the trinity. 
2. Divine Personality: A" Triune God 
The discussion of personality in Chapter Ill of the present 
study concludes with, an analysis of the limitations of human person-
ality and an affirmation that only in God is personality fully de-
veloped. ·., .In the noting of the distinctions among thing, brute, and 
person an ideal of personality 1va.s develo:Qed whose consciousness 
encompasses all of time; who is concerned with all of mankind; who 
is completely sell-determined; who is totally unified under the guid-
ance of a universal purpose; finally, whose vlill is directed to the 
expression of love and the development of a fellowship of love among 
men. Human personality falls short of such an ideal in each instance. 2 
1. See ibid., P• 520. 2. See above, Chap. III. 
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A conception o£ Divine Personality which satis£ieE; the ideal in each 
case is essential to meet the requirements. However, the conception 
o£ the Ideal Personality poses. problems which need to be examined be-
£ore a £ull exposition o£ the nature'o~ Divine Personality can be 
presented •. 
a. Problems posed by the Ideal Personality. The: £irst problem 
posed by a conception of the Ideal Personality is how such a Person-
ality can both know· everything that occurs in the world and a:J..sn 
sacrifice If:imsel£ for the world through acts of love. It woul:d seem 
that He must both knm·T the victory o£ good over evil~ in the world and 
experience the suf'£ering necessary to· achieve. this victory. Temple< 
state:s the pro·blem in his own words as £allows: 
If God is to hold the world together in His PurQDSe, 
its_. whole history must p];"'oceed £rom Rim and be kl;lown 
to Him. But if He is to be the explanation and 
unif'ying principle not only o£ some· world but of the 
world we know; with men and women in it, He must be:: 
p_er£ectly loving and must reveaL Hl.s love in rea2L 
sacrifice that He·may win the hearts and ROSsess the: 
wills o£ those men and women, so drawing them into the 
unity o£ His ~pose.• ObJ_y so moreover can He fulfil 
the ideal· o£ Personality.l 
That is, a conception o£ God must be:; formulated which ma.ke:s: 
p_o·ssible both actual knowledge of victory over the good and at the 
same time the experience:' o£ sacrifice and suf£ering in gaining this 
victory. But these two typ;es of experience are incompatible in human 
experience. 
1. Temp~e, Nature o£ Personality, pp. 99-100. 
Historically, it was this problem that led to the formulation of 
the trinitarian conception of Divine Personality.l HOwever, the doc-
trine of the trinity is not to be viewed merely as the solution to a 
problem; for primarily it represents a summary of' man 1 s experience in 
the varied relationships shared with God. 2~ 
Some of' the diff'icul..ty of this problem can be removed by clarify-
ing the meaning of' trinity. TempLe rejects the view. of the trinity 
which interprets it as three• individuals and hence three centers of 
consciousness. He does not employ the term "p:ersonality" in the same 
way that "pf3rsonn is used in the trinitarian formula, nthree persons 
in one Goa.n3 The differences. among the persons of' the trinity are 
not the same as those which separate~ individual minds in human ex-
p~rience, but rather the differences reside in the distinctive qual-
ities of each. However, even this sort of unity-in-diversity is not 
combined in one consciousness in human experience. Thus, the problem. 
of' God t s kno:wledge and experience of suffering is not removed;. and 
from the standpoint of the trinity this is the problem of the rela::..,.. 
tion of' the Father to the Son. 
Another difficulty arises in the relation of the Father to th&. 
Jfoly Spirit. Ehilosophically conceived, it is the problem of how God 
1. See ibid., pj 99. 
2. See Temp~e, Studie·s in the Spirit and Truth of Christianity, 
PP•· 143-145, l4S. 
3. See Temple, Nature.· of Eersonality, pp• 101-102"'. 
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can lmo-vr everything and yet the process of the vorld be real. It would 
seem that either everything is predetermined, in which case there is 
no real novelty; or else if there is novelty, then G0d is not omnis-
cient.l 
Temple finds the clue to the resolution of this difficulty in the 
analogy of the artist who realizes his vision in the very process of 
creating it. Present experience is at once affected by both the past 
and the future. In this sense novelty is part of the creative experi-
ence itself. In regard to history this :means that it can be understood 
only in relation to eternity, but that lll-;:ewise eternity requires his-
tory for its content.2 Temple affirms both that there is novelty in 
the vlOrld and that God is omniscient. Hence, again two types of ex-
periences are combined within the Divine Personality ·which on the 
human level are incompatible. What this seems to prove to Temple is. 
that analogies of human personality are not wholly adequate to under-
stand Divine Personality; what is not considered is whether his ideal 
of personality is adequate and '1-iarrants reexamination as a result of 
such incompatible experiences. 
The relation of the Son to the Spirit still needs to be conceived, 
and for Temple the distinction here is between the method for saving 
the world (Son) and the power by which the method is effected (Holy 
1. See ~., p. 106; also Christus Veritas, pp .• Z77, Z79. 
z. See Christus Veritas, pp. 89-90, 282; also above, Chap. V. 
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Spirit). In the attempt to solve these issues a positive interpretation 
of the trinitarian view of God becomes evident. 
b. Tlie trinity as the simultaneous activity o:f God.. In terms of 
the logical order o:f the trinity God as Father, the ground of all that 
is, has priority; dependent upon Him is God as Son, expressed as the 
wisdom (logos) creating and governing the universe; :finally, dependent 
upon both Father and &m is God as Holy Spirit, expressed as activity 
by means of which the purpose of God (as Father) is realized according 
to His wisdom (as Son). 
In man1 s experience, however, this order is reversed. It is the 
activity o:f G0d1 s power in the world which is discovered first and 
which leads to an understanding of the purpose guiding and sustaining 
the activity of God in the world.l 
The clue to understanding the nature of the power and activity 
o:f GOd operating in the world is provided, as already noted, by the 
Incarnation. Inasmuch as creation is the expression of God 1 s love 
toward the end o:f establishing a fellm·lShip of loving persons, then 
God1 s activity in the itrorld is such as to win men1 s love and thus in 
its supreme manifestation is an act of sacrificial love. In this way 
the meaning which the trinitarian vie-w of God seeks to convey is made 
explicit: 
We have these three moments: God creating the world; 
God appearing in the form. of the thing created that 
He may manliest to the created beings that lYJethod of 
1. See Temple, Nature of Personalitz, pp. lOS-111~ 
Sacrifice which is the Divine Wisdom; God thereby 
vr.Urrning from the cr.eated spirits that love for the 
sake of which they v1ere created. Creation, Redemp-
tion, Sanctification, constitute the experience from 
which the doctrine of the Trinity arises.l 
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God Himself is encountered in each of these experiences. It is 
God who creates, God 1orho redeems, and God who sanctifies. There are 
not, then, three centers of consciousness of GOd but a Utriplex con-
sciousness.u2 The distinction in each case is inferred by man from 
the different experiences he has with the one God. Once again Temple 
turns to the theater for an analogy in human experience of this 
triplicity of consciousness. 1~en one watches a play the plot of 
which is familar to him, he shares in the emotions of the actors as 
the play proceeds but also knows the import of their actions in light 
of the whole plot which as characters the actors do not kno1ol. 
' Temple applies Occamts razor to the interpretation of the trinity 
as a society of beings united in love. This is to multiply entities 
needlessly. Furthermore, the SOn cannot be separated from the Eather 
and the world as if He were a conscious being distinct from them. To 
do so is to assert tritheism, not trinitarianism. 
The (c~~ of the matter for Temple is that the complexity of God 1 s 
personality, uniting as it does activities and relations far exceeding 
what is possible for human personality, finds its unity, even as is the 
case vnth man, in the purpose which controls, unifies, and directs the 
personality as a whole. SUch a view of God would seem to be a variation 
1. Jlli., P• lll. 2. SBe ibid., p •. 112. 
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of the moual theory of the trinity, the distinctive element being 
that God Himself is met in each of the three exgressions. · However, 
Temp:Le makes a point of distinguishing his view. from the modalism of 
Sabellius. The latter affirms that th~ trinity refers not to three 
distinct persons but to the three. modes· by which God manifests Him--
self. For Temp:Le God is conceived as operative. at once in all three' 
activities. The trinity is not three successive :modes by which God 
operates; rather it represents the simultaneous activity of God. All 
of God acts in each instance.~ 
This raises again the p~oblem of how the eternal God can operate 
in the temporal order as Incarnate-, Son and Holy Spirit without either 
reducing history to an illusion or making eternity temporaL In regard 
to the· Incarnation Tempi.e does not acyeJtt the two-nature theory of 
Jesus in which human and divine exist together as: two centers of con-
sciousness. Also discarded is the view.which proposesthat Jesus} 
conscious self is human and his subconscious is divine. The formulm 
Tem:p_J.le proposes is as follows:: "The~ f'orm of His consciousness is Human, 
the content is Divine •. n2 Jesus Ghrist is truly human, but it is a81 
Go~d living a human life.3 This relation of Christ to God may be, ex-
p:r?e.ssed in terms of a unity of will so long as by will, in this easel, 
1. See ibid., PP·- ll5-ll6. This point is also made explicit in 
TemJ?.i.e. 1 s analysis of revelation; see Nature, Man and God, H• 3221 and 
above. 
2. Temp_le, Nature of I?ersonality, p. 116, n •. 1. Temple presents 
a brief' summary of the history of' the controversy in Foundations, PP• 
223-242, and Ghristus Veritas; pp• 125-1.38. · 
3. See Ghristus Veritas, p_•· 139. 
- - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - -- - -- - ~- -- ~ 
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is meant the total personality organized for action. Perhaps the bes~~ 
"l·Tay of expressing the relation is to state nthat in Christ God and Man 
are personally one; the Person of the Man Ghrist .Jesus is God the Son.nl 
Hence, in .Jesus Christ is expressed the fulfillment of the levels of 
reality which the process has disclosed. He reveals both what GOd is 
like and what man should be like. 2 In Christ real humanity is .focussed 
so that ftall the significance and destiny o.f the human race is summed 
up in Him. 113 
There is also the question o.f what difference .Jesus 1 earthly life 
had upon the Eternal God?. G0d was always what Jesus revealed Him to 
be .from the standpoint of eternity;~ but, temporally viewed, God 1 s 
nature is enriched by the concrete experience o.f sacrificial love.4 
Thus, Temple claims that the Incarnation tldoes not make Him different, 
but it does not leave Him unaffected. u5 What Temple seems to be sug-
gesting is that what was actual for God as Eternal Being became in 
Christ temporally actual .for both GOd and man. The difficulty o.f com-
prehending such a view for man is readily admitted by Temple, but it 
is his contention that the difficulty occurs where it is to be expected 
1. Ibid., P• 149. 
3 •. Ibid., p. 153. 
2.. Bee ibid.' ·pp. 124-125. 
4.. S.ee ibid., pp. 122:,:.123, 279-280; cf. also Wi'lie GOdhead of .Jesus" 
reprinted in Religious ExPerience • • • .?:, p. 75. 
5 ... Temple, Ohristus Veritas, p. 279. 
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for human minds striving to apprehend the Divine Personality.l 
That man will always have dif'f'icul ty trying to comprehend the 
1.ll timate principle of' explanation is granted; but when contradictions 
arise, then a reyision of' the interpretation rendered would seem in 
order. For example, if God Himself' is in Christ as Temple contends, 
then God Himself' is affected by what happened historically to Jesus or-' 
else language becomes meaningless. Temple liTants Gbd to be self-sui'-
f'icient and yet directly active in a real process in which novel 
elements occur. Row both can be maintained is far from clear. 
It is the trinity, then, which provides the answer to the per-
plexing problem of' permanence and change which the universe exhibits. 
Change is observed every-~.vhere, and in .this process time is significant.;. 
Bnt ~t explains this process cannot itself change and must, therefore, 
be timeless. The ioJOrld as change involving temporal sequence is real, 
but what accounts for this must itself be an unchanging principle dis-
tinct from change and time though explaining them as experienced and 
not as illusory. The activity of God in creating the world and provid-
ing the means for saving it, and thereby fulfilling His purpose, occurs 
in the time process, but the trinitarian formula which renders this 
process meaningful is changeless•2 Here Temple, apparently unwittingly, 
falls back upon a soul-substance view of Divine Personality though he 
1. see ibid •. , pp. 281-282. 
2. S.ee Temple, Nature of Personality1 pp. 118-120; Christus 
Veritas, PP• 279-285; Nature, Man and God, pp. 2.95-300. 
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has rejected such a view'of the unity and identity of human J{erson-
ality. 
Hence, once again it is the philosophy of the-:- Incarnation which 
offers the only adequate' metaphysics- and the doctrine of the trinity 
which offers the only adequate· formula for interp~eting the history of 
the un£verse• Personality, then, finds its fullest meaning and ex-
pre:ssion in the power which guides the uni'verse accoraing to loving 
purpo·se. Such a being supplies the meaning of Divine Rersonality. Be-
cause of the comp:l.exity and perfection of God, He is best conceived as 
personal, though not as a person.1 IT the term person be emgToyed, 
then such a Being can be understood only in the analogy.,- o:f a unity 
which for man vould be:: the activitie.s of three:: persons; and it is 
to:ward an understanding of the-:se activitie·s that the:~ doctrine of the 
trinity is directed. Go:d is a threefolld personality. 2 
E. Silmma.ry and Conclusi0ns 
In this chapter T.emp,i'e's conception of B9rsonality has been ap-
:giied to~ some of the major problems of meta_ghysics in an effort to ren-
der an intelligible account of the uniiverse itself. Fo.ur main ~0ints 
may be no::ted as constituting the basic argument of the chap;ter. 
1.. See TemJil:e; Christus Veritas; p-. 2777. 
2. See Temple, Nature,of Personality, p• I20. 
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1.. Personality as the Key to·· Reality 
The p_icture vhich modern science p,re:sents is that of a physical 
o:rder vhich existed long before the appearance:' of mind and of value:. 
But once mind and value,appear in the.World-Process, then the process 
its·a.r cannot be exp;Lained except by reference to them. A mindless and 
valuele-ss universe cannot produce a universe that contains mind and 
value, vi thout destroying the unity of the scheme·; conceived as strictly 
physical. However, if the process is its.oel:f the expre-ssion of mind 
for the sake of what is considered good, then mind, value:, and the 
peysical order are'OJ all intelligible:. To: explain vhat o:ccurs by indi-
eating the p~p,0·se for its o·ccurrence is to· provide a sel:f-eXQi.anat'ory 
principle •. 
Hence, the World-Process, which at the beginning exhibits only 
physical objects, gradually produces life, mind, and spirit. IDle: to-
t 
tal p~o.-cess. including the inorganic, the organic, and the p-ersonal 
levels can be:s.t be understoad by reference to the highe-s:t level. There-
f0r.e:, personality a:s: the. highest Ieve-1 produced by the process offers; 
the best princiP.le for exp-_Iaining the pro-cess • 
.An eXJll'anation of the universe may not be'? forthcoming; but if 
there' is one, it res.ides for Tem.Q:I.e in the purp0se of a Eersonal Being. 
The universe serve:s as the medium for the exprassion of value~ and pro-
duces beings capable of consciously sharing in this value. What evi-
dence can be offered :for the e:x:istence of such a:Su:greme Be.ing? 
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2~ Evidenc~for a Personal God 
The. quest f'or belief in God is for Tem.pie initiated by his mm 
P.ers:onal experience of' a Personal God. However, pldlbsopPica:L argu.._ 
ment offers indep~ndent evidenca~f'or the reality of God. Without at-
tempting to· correlate the·: concep1tions of' God arrived at by the two ap-
proaches 1lemple assumes that they supp:ert ea:ch other. Hence, the. com-
p~eta:basis f'or justifying belief' in a Rersonal God consists of' the 
converging indep~ndent lines of' evidence from both religion and phi-
losophy. 
Four types of philosophical argument presented by Tempie can be 
briefly summarized •. First, theoretical and practical reason combinEP. 
to demand a princip:le of unity sufficient to account f'or the rational 
coherence and moral goodness evident in the world. Purposive will alone 
satisf'ie.s these demands; in Ghrist the nature··of such a being is given. 
Second, man•s search for rmity through science,, art, morality, and re-
ligion remains incomRilete and p_recarious unless there is a God such as 
Christ reverls to. comRlete the quest •. Each of these activities of manta 
mind seek and partially grasp: a uni:f'ying principle, but none can actu-
ally supRlY the princiP.le required. There is, then, a convergence of 
these four lines but·.no actual meeting untiL God incarnate in Christ is 
acceDted as the fact necessary to bring them together. Third, intima-
tions of a p~rsonal God are provided in mants quest f'or truth, beauty, 
and goodness. IT an intelligible account is to be rendered of' the a\le 
man i'eels before the authoritative claims of' truth, beauty, and mord 
goodness, then a Personal God must be ppsited whose will sustains these 
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vaiue·s. and to whom the p:erson feels related in the pprsuit of' them •. 
Fourth, the crccurrence in the World-Process of' mind capable of' appre-
hending the process indicates that the process is grounded in mind. 
When mind appears, activities are initiated for the sake of' an end 
that mind itself' determines. Only a Supreme Mind which is itself' 
determined Qy what it takes to be good is sufficient to account for 
the.World-Process which includes mind. 
When the-se arguments are combined with the direct encounter with 
God that religious believers claim occurs in religious experience, the 
justif'ication for belief in a Fersonal God is complete. TemP-2e iden-
tifies the God established by these converging lines of' argument with 
the God affirmed by orthodox Christianity. 
3· The. Person of' Christ 
In Christ the nature: of' God is revealed. Temp2e argues that such 
faith is confirmed by the solution Christ provides to the problem of' 
evil through his lif'e, death, and resurrection. The problem is not to 
eXP-2ain the fact of' evil in a world supposedly existing as a medium for 
the expre:ssion of' the goodness of' God. The problem is for man to re-
spond to the evil he finds so as to derive good from ite Evil exists 
in the world because when overcome it makes:possible a greater good 
than would be the case without it. The example Christ give·s of God Him-
self suffering for man 1 s sake offers real consolation to those who also 
suffer. Also, the love of God manifesxed in Christ is capable of re-
leasing man from the bondage of sin. Intrinsic evil remains unexplained, 
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though in Eternity there is hope that inequitie·s will be rectified. 
An adequate account of the universe, then, including both good 
and evil: can be provided only if the Incarnation and the .A.tonement 
are taken as the central facts. Man needs to make his apparent good 
what is, in fact, the a~tual good. In religious terms this means 
that man needs to be redeemed •. Further, if his freedom;is to be re-
tained, then he must freely choose to surrender himself to the Supreme 
Spirit. This requires that man know what is the actual good for him; 
that is, that he knows what God is like.. Hence, God must reveal Him-
self to man in a form man knows beat--the life of a person. Jesus:; as· 
the Christ is for Temp-le that person. The life of love. Christ lived 
demonstra.te:s the lbve of Gb:d and elicits from man a response of love •. 
Ob. the:: cross Christ shows Ged 1 s willingness to suffer for the sin of 
man.. Ih the resurrection Christ shows God 1's sup;rema.cy over death and 
the sin which produced it.. Tragedy is transmuted into··, trium.P.h• 'IDle 
nature· of Go·d is revealed by the:; cross and the resurrection, and the· 
\ 
world is rendered intelligible by reference to them. S'uch is the faith 
of Christians •. 
4• The Divine Person 
Eersonality appearing in the. process offers a clue to the exgJJa:-
nation of the process. Jfu ideal of personality is suggested minus the 
limitations of the human p_erson •. Such a being would be com:gletely self-
determ.i.D.ed and totally unified under the guidance of a .universal I{Ur-
ppse) exp_ressed in the form of lo.:ve of others. Only such a conception 
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of Divine Personality is adequate, according to Temple, tojmeet the 
requirements. For Temple this means that God must be conceived in 
terms of the trinity. Despite the difficulties involved God is held 
to be a unified Personal Being whose total nature must be described 
as a triplex consciousness; the ultimate source and purpose of every-
thing (The Father); the creating, governing, and redeeming power of 
the world (The Son);and the power active in the world effecting the 
ultimate purpose (The Holy Spirit). 
God is the creator of the world. He operates in the world as 
an immanent principle of variability adjusting His purpose according 
to changing circumstances. But God transcends the world also and as 
transcendent He is the self-identical Person whose purpose for the 
world is unchanging. The personal nature of Qod indicates the prob-
ability of special revelatory acts and the true nature of revelation. 
The latter does not refer to propositions but to a personal relation 
shared between human persons and the Divine Person. Further, revela-
tion of a personal God to persons attains its fullest expression when 
God takes on the limitations of human personality. Once again, it is 
the faith of Christians that Christ is the human embodiment of God •. 
Human persons as the highest level of existence suggest an ideal 
of personality as the explanation of the process which includes human 
personality. The revelation of God in Christ provides a concrete 
example of the Divine personality in a human J.ff:e~ 
With the exception of the Appendix added to this chapter, the 
eXP.Dsition of Tem£le 1s philosophy £rom the perspective o£ his conception 
of personality is now comp1eted. What remains to be done is to evaluate 
critically the solutions ~emRle of£ers to the major philbsophicall.prob-
lems, and then to summarize the;conclnsions of the present study. 
Appendix: to Chapter VI. 
Temple, writing in 1939 with a second World War in progress, 
looks back with misgivings on some o~ his earlier writings, partic-
ularly his aspirations as a.Christian p~ilosopher.l Two sentence$ 
he had written in the "Ere~ace 11~ to Christus Veritas.: (1924) are:; sin-
glad out ~or comment. Taking note that the dominant theistic p.osi-
tion in 1924 conceived o~ God as the, source o~ everything but as 
never doing anything in pfU'ticular, Tem¢-e had stated:: 
I believe that a very sl!ight: touch to the intel-
lectual balance ::may make the scales incline the; 
other w~y. • • • What is needed is the exposition 
o~ the Christian idea· o:f God, li:fe and the world, 
or, in other words, a Christo-centric metaphysics.2 
Regarding these comments, Temifle writing in 1939 states:: 
The two sentences I have italicised seem very 
remote to-day. The estimate-expressed in the 
earlier was p~obably mistaken in 1924, when that 
sentence was written; it has no relevance to the 
situation to-day. The later sentence· expresses.' 
what I believe to be a permanent need and the 
supreme task o~ theology; but it is a task o~ 
which we now see the impracticality in anything 
less than many generations .3 
Even earlier in the ''Pre~ace" to Doctrine in the Church o:f England,4 
1. See "Theology To-daytt~ reprinted in Thoughts in War-Time) 
(London: Macmillan & Co •. , Ltd., 1940), PP• 93-107~ 
2. Ibid., p •. 98; also Christus Veritas, P• ix. 
3. IITheology- To:day11 reprinted in Thoughts in War-Time, pp-. 98-99. 
4. See William Temple and 0thers, Doctrine in the Church o:f 
England (London:: Macmillan and Co., 1938). 
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TemRle had felt the need for a different emphasis in theological writ-
ing from that which he had been :making.. The times were out of join'§; 
not simply was an intellectual mapJof the world from a Christian per-
spective. needed, but there was an urgent demand to convert men to the 
Christian faith.. Thus a Christo:...centric meta.P.bysics, though a' p_eren-
nial need, is held to be less urgent than a theology o:f Redemption. 
Indeed, Temp:Le in 1939 even despairs of the p~ssibil:ity of constructing 
a coherent Christian world-vieM. Individual sin, manife·s:ted in :gride, 
and social evil, reflected in war, must first be overcome in fact and 
not merely reconciled in principle with a Christian philbsopey a:s he 
had tried to do in his earlier writings. He state-s: "The world of 
to-day is one of which no Christian map;' can. be made. . . . Our task 
with this world is not to explain it but to convert it .. nl 
The Christian theologian must strive to recover the essence o:f 
the Gospel and to make clear its message for the war-torn world. Sum-
mihg up'the task which confronts theology, TemP.:Ue state:s: 
We have to face this tormented world, no::t as 
offering a means to its coherence' in thought 
and its harmony in :gractice; but as. cha:llenging 
it in the name and power of Christ crucified 
and risen. We shall not try to "inake sense" 
of everything; we shall openly pro claim that 
most things as they are. have no sense in them 
at all. We shall not say that a Ghristian 
philosophy embraces all experience in a : co-
herent and compreh~nsive scheme; we shail de-
clare.that in the Gospel there is offered to 
1. "Theology To-dayu reprinted in Thoughts in War-Time, p~ 101. 
men deliverance from a system of things--"the 
world"--which deserves the destraction which is 
coming upon it, a deliverance offered to all.so 
that rrthe worldn itself may receive it if it 
will. We proclaim, not general progress, but 
salvation to them that believe.l 
H0wever, despite his despair over the world situation in 1939 
and particularly the ineffectiveness of the Christian church to avert 
war, Tem!fL'e , did no:t relinquish in principle the significance of work-
ing out a coherent Christian Rhilosoppy, though it should not, and 
coula not, be,done in his geneBation. 
Ohe day theology will take up again i te larger 
and serener task and offer to~a new Christen-
dom ·its Christian map of lli'e, its Christo-...-
centric metap:blysic.. But that day can hardly 
dawn while.any who. are;now already concerned 
with theology are still alive.2 
The.tenor of this writing by 'Tiem:gie is certainly quite differ-
ent'from the mood which prevails in his three major works and through-
out the majority of his writings. Do:es the emphasis on redemption 
repre·sent a fundamenta:l shift in Temiile:o'1s R0sition-that is, in his 
t-heological philosophy?. Or, do-es it mean instead a shift in emphasi$ 
and in strategy for one who was by :gosition at the time an imp0-rtant; 
re:gre.s.entative of the Christian church, actively engaged in Rre:senting 
the message of Ghrist to a divided and disillusioned world? 
No definitive answer can be given. Temn:le himself is ambiguous 
as to the extent of the change in position. Some of his assertions3 
2. ~·, p:. l07-~ 
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seem to repudiate his :grevious efforts to:formulate a Christian phi-
losoppy. But he afl.so sugge:sts that the emphas·es on redemption and 
conversion are,formally contamed in Mens Creatrix and Ghristus~Veritas, 
in which a Christian world-view' is expounded.l The prrrblem is further 
com:g-licated by the fact that no· major books on theological p:hilosophy 
appear· after 1939.. Obe might i.nf'er from this fact that a significant 
chang~ has occurred, since his writings center on the relevance of the 
Gospel:. for the personal and social issues of the day. However, his 
concern with these same issues throughout his life, the responsibilities 
of his p_0sitions and the world crisis at the time, equally justify in-
ferring that only a change in emphasis: has o.ccurred. 
That there is a shift in emp:ha:sis, at least, from a theoretical 
formulation of a: Christian philosophy to. practical imR:l..ementation erf 
sp~cific doctrine·s of the Christian fa-ith is apparent.. But such B3 
shift could be~ made vi thin the framework of TempJ..e 1'5 ppsition. He had 
rlready a-cknowledged that only a theological p_hilosop)ly was adequate .. 
This means not simply a philosophy which includes religion among its 
dat~ but a ppilosop_hy which makes the deliverances of religion central. 
Furthermore:, in the:; formulation of his O'Wll position he gives· central 
R.i'ace to the. p_erson of Christ and strives to construct a metaphysics 
o~ the Incarnation.. The pra~tical concerns of the religious believer 
also play a ppominent role in T.em11i:e 1 s position. Throughout the pres-
ent study it has become apparent that the·"pra:ctical re-solution of 
1. See ~·, p-.. 102. 
issues is of primary importance to Tem:g:Le.. Thus the resolution of' the 
problem of' evil, though of' a formal nature._which he seems to lament in 
the comments noted above--is rooted in the believer's relation to God 
and the new·llf'e of' love which even suffering, when gladly endured, 
makeB possible. This is certainly mca·e a practical than a theoretical 
solution of' the problem of' evil; evil is to be overcome and not simplly: 
understood. 
The Gifford Eectures are) concluded with a chap;ter entitled "The 
H"tinger o:f Natural Religion~~' in which 'nemy-Ie suggests that it is the:; 
actual, not theoreticrl, justification of evil· which man needs, and if' 
evil is not conquered in practice, then theism is :false in theory.l 
But man cannox oYercome evil himself', and what he needs most of' all is 
to be redeemed. The redemption of' man so as to transform his entire· 
being and not merely the gradual improvement of' certain asp,ects of his 
nature.~ is what is required and desired. 11Man cannot meet his own 
deepest need, nor find for himself' relea-se from his profoundest trouble •. 
What man needs is not progress, but redemption.n2 
The need of' :mail for conversion and not merely int-ellectual en-
Iightenment has been shown to-:- be fundamental to the solution proposed 
by TemQle to the practical problem of ethics. In one of' his eaTliest 
books, Temg:l:e stressed that though man can recognize the goon and his 
duty independently of religion, he needs the exam]!le of Christ's love· 
1. Nature, Man and God, P•· 511. 
2. Ibid., P• 513~ 
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and sacrifice to effect a change; in will in o-rder to be able to love:: 
as commanded.1 
Also, n~ shift has been made ~ Temple from an attempt to con-
struc~a p~ilosophical system bas~d an reason and experience to one 
rooted on faith in G0d;: TemRle t:s a:ssurance of the·; adequacy o:f his 
vie:ws was .. from the start founded on :faith and no:t knOMledge: usecurity 
is of Faith and not of Knowledge; it is not won by intellectual graSlp) 
but by p~rsonal loyalty; and its test is not in logic only, but in 
life.n2 
Nor is the emp):la:s is on the vor 10.' s unintelligibility, a:s it is 
and apart :from G.0d t:s redeeming lbve JlliDiifested in Christ, absent~. from 
Tem:g:le's major writings: at all perio:ds of his life• In affirming 
that love~ is sovereign in history he exp:licitly states that this d0e:'Sl 
not mean that everything is made clear as it is in the world. 3J The 
meaning and fulfillinent of history is in the ·Kingdom of God beyond' 
history .41• 
What, then, can legitimately be·) conclUded regarding a shift in 
'l'emp_ie:1!s theological philosophy?: No fundamental change~ seems to have) 
cro.curred. This recogniz:es thffi contention on the part of some 
1.. See Kingdom o:f God, p~ 56-66, IGll-lOJ' .. 
2\. Mens Greatrix; p;~. 1;,. This book was pablished in l9Jfl, butL 
JP-anned while Tem:R"le was an OXford don in 190g; see P• vii. 
3. See Christus Veritas, p~•· 19GL:..l9ll; also- above; Chap. V. 
l/.,.. S:ee Nature., Man and God, .R-.. 51.3; also above, Chap. V. 
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interpre"ters that Temple. wa:s; more a metaphysical ideailist in earlier 
writings' and gradually mo:ved closer to reail..ism •. 1 "What dcre-:s seem to' have: 
taken place is that certain Christian concepts received increasing empha-
sis in Temple 1 s thought and that in some instances the concepts become:: 
dominant in his presentation of the Christian message. Such is the ca:s-.e; 
with the emphas·is on the redemption of man and the created world and man 
by reference to the God revealed in Ghrist. However, as noted above, 
the redemption of man through conversion to Christ is prominent in 
Temple.1 s earlier writings, including his major works. The p0int is, 
therefore~ that a· shift is made within the;framework of his Christian 
philosophy. It is not a shift from _P-hilosophical theism to Christian 
theism or from Idealism to Reaiism. Christian theism is affirmed from 
the start, though expressed more in the language of metaphysical ide~-
ism in earlier writings. and more in the language. of metaphysicail reBil.-
ism in later writings. But always it is TemJrle~ts o-wn Christian philos-
ophy which is being expressed. 
Further, it may be that Temple was not fully aware~ prior to 1939 
of the importance) he had given ta P-ractical guidance and redemption in 
the solutions he offered to RhilbsoP.hical:: pro:blems. If so, then -what 
happened is that in 193~he becam~ more clearly aware of the centrality 
of these conceBts in his thought; it was a case of making explicit what 
Rrior to that time wa:s more im:glici t in his own thinking. He had come. 
to the realizai;ion that for him only a pra-ctical resolution can be :ma:de 
1. See a:bove, Gha~. I; also the issue is explo·red further in 
Chap;. VII below. 
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o£ the crucial problems faced 01 a Christian believer and that a theo-
retical £ormulation is deceptive.1 In that case what are~weak links 
in an otherwise strong chain o£ supP.Drt £or Christian apo~ogetics have; 
been removed and reforged to constitute the entire chain o£ sup~rt 
£or Christian evangelism. 
lliwever, to suggest that Temple has.given up completely the 
P.<DSsibility and desira.billity o:£ constructing a coherent Christian map: 
of the world is to exaggerate the shfft in em2hasis within his p_0si-
tion. He has not given up. com:r:d.etely the task o£ £ormulating a 
Christian philosophy; rather he has come to recognize the necessity 
of RQStponing the task and is, perhaps, reflecting a certain amount 
o£ misgiving for having taken so long to come to this awareness. 
1. Criticizing HObbes' system of thought, Temgle states in 
Christianity and the State: (1928), p. 61:: "When a £inite intelligence~ 
offers a per£ectly neat and tidy scheme to cover all human experience, 
there is good ground £or sup_p0sing that many o£ the £acts have been 
ignored •. rr 
CHAPTER VII-
EVALUATION 
In the pre.ceding five cha:gters · Tem:gie 1 s philosophical position 
has been analyzed from the p:erspective' of his conception of p;ersonality. 
Some brief critical comments hava been made at various points for the 
sake of noting ambiguities.~ and to facilitate an understanding of Temple 1 s 
position. The task of the present chapter is to offer a more extensive 
and systematic evaluation of Temple.'s conception of philosophy, his con-
ception of personality, and the use he makes of personality as a phil-
osophical principle of explanation. .An exhaustive critique of all facets 
of his philosophy would require a more detailed analysis than is germane 
to the present investigation; however, an attemP.t is made to focus on 
the major critical points of Temple's position. Where it serves, to 
clarify TemP.le 1s views or to sharpen the evaluation, a reformulation of 
the problem leading to a po·ssible alternative solution is outlined. .An 
estimate· is tendered of Tem:P.i.e 1's contribution to the construction of a 
Christian philosophy and the use he made of his time and talents. 
A.. Temile 1s Conception of Philosophy 
The concern of the pre·sent study is with both Temple 1 s general 
philosophic position and the significance of his conception of p:er-
sonality for his philosophy. Hence, the first aspect of TemRle's 
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thought that needs to be evaluated is his conception of' Qhilosophy. 
Three issues: seem to be- centraJ.:i_ in his-- concep,tion of' Qhilosopby andi 
can serve; as the:: basis for evaluating his views': (l) 'Ehe nhiiosophic 
task of' rendering the universe intelligible; (2) the relation of' both 
believing and doubting in making knowledge :g:cossible; (3) the nature 
and ppssibility of a Christian Qhilosophy. 
1:. The :ailosophic Quest for Understanding 
TemJ!Te-l s philo sop_hicrel sympathies~ are with the efforts to con-
struct an adequate metaphysics. ~tever else the phiJJosopher 1 s task 
may be; as a metaphysician he is called upon to Qrovide as; coherent an 
account of' experience as the facts warrant. This means striving to 
understand man and the~ world in which man lives-. There; is, then, an 
obligation to make sense of the universe; and if this obligation is 
denied, then to that extent the philosophic task is forsaken. 
In his lament against his own emphasis on a coherent account of 
experience noted in the Appendix to Chapter VI, Temple does;des};?air, 
f'or the time being, of' the Rhilosophic task. Hb:wever, for the most 
part, Tem:P.le is concerned with the attempt to understand the universe. 
The difficul"ty inherent in his philoso:ghic efforts are at once more 
subtle and more· serious than thre lament of' 1939. For in Temple 1s ca--se 
it is not so much his f'orsaking the philosophic task to interpret ex-
periencro as it is a case of not really taking up)the task, and of em-
ploying Qhilosophy f'or non-philosoppic ends. 
Tem:P.i-e does not begin the quest f'or truth perplexed about the 
world and wondering how to resolve the conflicting f'acts of' ex:g:erience; 
422 
he starts the quest already convinced' of a particular conception of 
ultimate reality, certain that whatever ambiguities there are can be 
clarified, and unclear and uncertain only as to whether man can. appL)" 
these truths adequately to the world in which he lives. He is per-
fectly willing to be expedient in the method employed to convey these 
truths to others, but concerning the truths themselves there is no 
wavering. W. R. Matthews succinctly states the p~int in the following 
passage: 
Some of the greatest philosophers and theo-
logians convey to us a deep sense of the pro-
found mystery and tragedy of the being and 
destiny of man; we feel that it is this which 
has stirred them to think; I do not find this 
in the writings of Temple.l 
The believing disposition of Temple's mind has already been noted and 
is relevant here.2~ Tempie•s beliefs were not held tentatively as a 
result of being baaed on philosophical wobability about which there) 
were serious doubts. He was thoroughly convinced of, and committed 
to, certain fundamental truths about man. and the world. 
Therefore, Temple does· not approa:·eh phil.osophy in order to dis-
cover by means of the philosophical method the nature of reality; he 
brings to philosophy a conception of the nature:;of reality and tries 
to show how far philosophy can by its own procedure support this view. 
Philbsophy is also employed to explicate the view. of reality he holds. 
1. ''William Temp:Le as Thinker, " in William Temple: .An Esti-
mate; • , P•· 20. · 
2. See above, Chap•· I. 
Tem~le 1 s p~sition is thus often cast in the language of philosophy, 
but the basic conclusions are.religious both in origin and in content. 
Temple is expTicit in indicating his preference:for the method of 
theological philosophy. Ohe begins with the assurance of the real'ity 
of the Supreme Spirit derived from a personal relation with Eim, and 
the facts of experience are~eXR]ained qy reference; to the character 
of the· Supreme Sp_irit)l Further, for Temple, the nature} of God is 
revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. Hence, he is assured of God~ 
through his personal relation with Him and is assured of the,naturE% 
of God through the pBrson of Christ. 
It is no wonder that Temp~e is critical of the conclusions tm 
which philosophical argument leads. Is it not equally clear that his 
criticism is unjustified? In order for a• philosophy to achieve the 
certainty and cJ:arity that his own convictions provide, it would have 
to cul:ininate· in a deductive· system in which each part is necessarily 
rel:ated to every other part while at the same time starting from em-
pirical evidence. For philosophy to be. adequate; Temp:ile seems to sug-
gest, it must conform to the ideal of an empirically coherent system 
which is absolUtely certain. Purely deductive systems ar~ condemned 
because they fail to deal with the real world; but inductive systems: 
are rejected because they fail to result in conclUsions which ar& 
certain. 
Does the fault lie with philosophy or in requiring of philosophy 
1. See Templ~, Nature1, Man and God, It•· 44• 
what the data of' exp~rience:: do not admit to be possible?. Though Tem:gie 
argues eloquently that probability is all one can hope;for in an em-
:Rirical analysis; of the world, he . demands certainty;; and since' philos-
op,hy does.not provide it, he justifies ap~:ealing to religious faith 
which does·., Siinilarly, while arguing cogently for the dialecticall_; 
meth0:d in which f'act and theory emerge jointly in the process of in-
terpreting the data of' experience and in which conclusions ar~con­
stantly checked by the facts, Temnie starts his o~ investigation of' 
e:x:g:eriencffiwith the:a:nswers alrearly f'o:rmulated. 
It is one thing to· point out that the conclusions of philosophy 
arffi always tentative and that they are. constantly subject to modifi-
ca:tion and revision; it is quite'l another thing to sugge:st that phi-
losophy fails because of this and must be.replaced by a type of f'aith 
which starts with a view·of reality acce:g:ted as.final on the basis of 
which certainty is provided. Therffi is no apparent reas.on why the' 
same certainty could not be achie-ved by arssuming from the start:- that 
the conclusions reached by p,hiloso:phy would be absolute? and final. 
Such dogmatism is equally appiicable: to any set of doctrines and is; 
a~ually unjustified •. It indicates rofailbre to distinguish between 
psychologica:l.certitude resulting f'rom one's inner convictions-and 
philosophica=l certainty (or nrobability) resulting from coherent in-
fe:rence:m bas:ed upon the available) empirical facts. The:: only means of 
distinguishing between the assurance· of' the-· fanatic and sound a;sEurance 
is to 12ut one 1s inner convictions to the test of e:x:p:laining the f'acts 
oi' eXJ2erience. 
Similarly, it is one thing to demand that a philosophy should be; 
relevant to life; it is q~ite, another thing to evaluate the auequacy 
o£ a philosop~iCal p~sition on what immediate guidance is provided. 
In examining possible world-view.s, Temi:fle tends, to be le-ss concerned 
w;ith whether or not they pre-sent a- coheren.t account of the facts than 
he is with the practical~ guidance offered. This is to misconceive the 
ppilosophic task in which guidance for living emerge:s: in the very at-
tempt to understand the. world., Plato stressed the necessity foT the:J 
philosopper to· return to the cave to give guidance to those wh~ had 
no:t seen the llght.. But the· point is, the philosopher can offer guid..,... 
ance. only as he catches· a·~ glimRSe> of the ·truth. Just as the best kindl 
o:f a:ssurance one can have is that which is grounded on an hrn0thesis 
established as having a high probability of being true, so too the 
bes;i:; kind of guidance~, is that which is bas.ed on an understanding o:f 
the world. S'iinilarly, what of'f'ers: the best guidance for living 
fo:sters an understanding of the: world.. Hence, unders:ta:nding the world 
and guidance for living cannot be severed; they rep;resent the joint 
effort of the philosopJJ.er to discover what is true;; and valuable •. 
Ohly in so. far as one is in quest o:f truth to the extent that 
it can be3 a.ppro:x:imated and only in so far as the method of critical 
inquiry is employed. in which no: area~ of eXQerience; is granted exemp:tion 
from criticism, can the quest legitimately be called ];l:hilosophical'. By 
these standards Temple 1 s method is not completely philosophica-l, as he; 
readily admits in affirming theological philosophy, but for other 
reas.ons than those he suggests. It is not simply his starting with 
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the assurance·that God as; revealed in Christ constitutes: the; character 
o~ reality that renders his approach philosophically suspect; it is 
his failur~to examine critically such a view of reality when put to 
the test of p~oviding a coherent account of experience. 
Nor is it a question of whether or not one has faith; it is a 
question of what one p:nts his faith in and whether he is willing to 
examine critically the basis and content of the faith.. Faith can be 
p)-aced in a set of beliefs regarding man and the world to which one 
clings regardless of the facts of experie:nce, or faith can beplaced 
in the method of critical inquiry so that one is willing to live and 
act on the basis of what seems to be-, most :I?robably true. 
Hence, it is not so much a question of where. one starts his quest 
for truth, whether from a religious or a sc&entific perspective, but 
rather whether one is willing to subject even his starting p~ace to 
critical evaluation when the facts of exp~rience require it. Also, 
the issue is not whether a view provides certainty or probability, but 
whether it provides the most adequate understanding of the world. 
Thus, though Temple 1 s academic training was philosophical, his 
intere-sts and outlook were religiously oriented.1 His intere:st in 
philosophy is real, but it is fox the sake of the indegendent suppn:rt 
that philosophy can p~ovide for the Christian convictions of which he 
is personally and epistemologically certain. An evaluation of Temple 1s 
epistemology is in order. 
l. See ibid., p. 55'; also Skelton, "-The Problem of Evil in the 
Works of William Temple, 11 P•· 67. 
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2. Believing and Doubting 
The notion of certainty plays a prominent role both in Temple 1 s 
critique o£ Descartes and in the formulation of his own epistemology. 
At the base of the Cartesian error, Temple contends, is the false 
separation made between the thinking process and the objects of 
thought. No such separation is p~ssible for Temple; the subject:-
object relationship is ultimate. Ohly such an abstract separation 
could lead one to believe· that cogito, ergo ~ establishes any more: 
than psychological assurance. 
Temple is quite correct that thought is always thought of 
something. It is, however, questionable whether De·scartes challenged 
such a fact~ or that he strived to separate thinking from its objects 
in the way Temple argues. The question Descartes do:es raise -is: 
What can a person be certain of when thinking something? His answer 
is that, though he ca..n never be certain that the objects of thought 
accurately des:cribe a real state3 of affairs, what is certain is that. 
when one thinks there is· a thinker. This is logical certainty and 
not merely psychological certitude; or, rather, it is p~ychological' 
certitude based on the·logica cogency of the. deduction. The dis-
tinction here is a significant one. .There can be inner certitude about 
the·o:bjects of thought, but the question at issue is the e:R:i.stemological 
justification for the psychological assurance• 
The· second thing which distre13ses Temp]je abo:ut Descartes•' pro·-
ce:dure·. is that he1 is initiating the; quest for knowledge by doubting. 
This is artificial doubt, according to Temp:Le. Of course it is 
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artificial in the sense that it is self'-fuposed doubt. But the pur-
:g.ose is not doubting for doubting's sake, but doubting for the sake 
of discovering a rational basis for belief.. Descartes; is attempting 
to establish an adequate bas:is in reason for distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate bel'iefs and doubts. 
The point is not that the mind begins in isolati0n.from the 
w0xld.. Temp2e is quite correct that the mind must think objectffi, 
some of which, at leas.t, do refer to a state of affairs existing in-
dependently of the thinker. If this were:: not the cas:e>_, then there 
would be no reasnn for either doubting or believing. One can only 
justify doubting if some things which have been believed turn out to 
be false on the basis of additional exp~rience; and one can only 
justify believing certain things if additional experienc~has su~ 
ported the belle£ in them. Hciwever, the q11estion Descartes·· is rais-
ing, far from being "nursery make-believ~n~ is the self-conscious 
p~sing of the problems of methodology and epistemology. That is, 
what is.at issue is how one knows that the objects he is thinking 
actually refer to what they prima facie seem to refer? Granted that 
man begins in a subject-o-bject relationship). all that he can be sure 
of is himself in relation to something; and what he wants to know is 
the nature of that to which he is related at any given m0ment. He 
wants to know to what extent the o·bjects of his thought, feeling, and 
willing exist independently of' him in the same way in which they appear 
1. Temple, Nature:, Man and God, p •· 66~ 
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to him. 
T~ doubt thffiself-authenticating veracity of particular appre-
hensions is reasonable doubt for the sake, not of doubt, but knowl-
edge. The basis for building up knowledge is the self and the objects 
known by the self. This self is not isolated from the world; it do-esJ 
think objects which refer beyond itself.. Indeed, it is precisely to 
check the references of one's objects of thought that causes the 
problem. The self can only test the references of its ideas qy addi-
tional experiences it has which elicit further objects of thought that 
either confirm or negate· the· accuracy of the references;. 
The difficulty with Temp:le:•·s o'WD. epistemology is evident at 
this p_oint. WhiTe criticizing Descartes for imgcrsing doubt artifi-
cially on the knowledge venture, Temp:le imp:coses; belief na1vely and, 
as a~ resullt, :fails to take error s·eriously •. Hence, Tem!Tl·e t:s proposed 
synthesis is no-t really a synthesis: too much is conceded to the; 
thesis. It is truffi that if one never had any objects given to-his 
mind from beyond himself, he could know nothing of the real world; 
theref'ore;, the references of' all' ap_P.rehensians cannot be. :false. But 
this is an abstract or :formal re-solution only.. What is required is to 
determine whether any particular apprehension does correctly refer to~ 
the;world beyond one's thought and whether it exists as described by 
the~. apprehension. To this issue> Tem:g:le:~•s answer is inadequate, and 
his belief for the sake of understanding degenerates into belief :for 
the sake. of believing. 
Hence, what is really at stake between Tem:Ri·e and Descartes: are 
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two opposing methods for initiating the quest for knowledge. Descartes 
encourages one to begin by doubting in order to build a reasonable 
basis for believing; Temple urges that one begin by believing in order 
to provide a reasonabl-e basis for not having to doubt. Tem_gle starts 
by assuming that one does know reality, even directly at times• His 
only concern is that what insight into reality one gains at the moment 
is related to, and corrected by, what is gained in other moments. Al-
so, though all app~ehensions are of reality, not all are equally sig-
nific®t. Error is relegated to a minor place and even serves the 
nesitive function o"f stimulating the quest for a fuller gras:g:. 0£ reai-
ity.l Oh this basis there is no, way 0f accounting for error which 
fosters further misconceptions, that is, error which hinders the quest 
for truth. 
Both belief and doubt must be joined if a true synthesis is to 
emerge. What is required is the belief that the mind is in interaction 
with a world beyond itself, making the knowledge venture possible. 
However, this general be~ief must be subjected to particular doubts 
regarding every apprehension one has until it has been checked by other 
apprehensions. There· must be~ a willingness to discard any p~rticular 
belief not suppmrted by as;much of experience as available. 
Hence, the issue is not whether one believes_'. in order to under-
stand, but whether one continue:s'; to believe: when understanding d0e-s; not 
ensue, and whether the belief that knowledge is possible is itself 
l. See Mens Creatrix, PP• 274~275, 277-278; also above, Chaps. 
II and VI. 
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s:ubj e:ct to interiJ.retation resulting f'rom the kn<Wledge that is gained. 
Tem_P.Sle not only wants. to begin the knowledge venture by believing that 
the-re is a real world which can be; known by man; he wantS' to begin by 
accepting an interpretation of' tha:t re.eil.ity bas.ed on what he i'ee~s to 
be his own encounter with it and which further knowledge can only ex-
plicate, never refute. Belief of this naturffi is not justified on the:: 
basis of the error man experiences;, and it is not necessary for atta1i.n-
ing knowledge of the world. 
It is because Templer, believes that in Christ the nature, o£ 
reality is revealed and that in his own experience he:, is in direct 
communion with the Go·d reveal"ed in Christ that he is so· bold as to. 
claim that he. has corre.:ctly grasped final truth. The justificattion 
f'or the claim that the Go·d re:veal.ed in Christ is the starting :goint; 
and goal of _P.hiloso_P.hy must now be) eva.J..'uated-. 
3. Phil'osophy and the Christian Faith 
Temn:le:describe-s his own !+osition as theological philosophy or 
as the attempt to construct a Chris to-centric metaP.hysics •1 · Tempile; 
employs the concepts he interprets as central to the Christian faith 
a:s:providing the only adequate solution to philosophicrol. problems. 
He claims that it is from the perspective of' the certainty resuLting 
from an experience of personal f'ellowship:;with the God revealed in 
Christ that one; can best discern and eJCR:lain whateYer meaning the:J 
r.. See Christus Verita--s-, p: •. 1:&>; Nature-., Man and Gou, P• L~;. 
ai."so abo::ve:, Chaps. II, VI. 
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world has-. .. 
Ho-vrever, Temple raises doubts about the philosophical legitimacy· 
of his· starting ppint. He·· justifies it by claiming that a moxe ade-
quate philosophy is possible by accepting a:S3 final the· revelation of 
God in Ghrist, than by refusing to· give Ilriority to it. He:; sta::te:sl:: 
While1 I have le-ss right, phiTosophicail.ly spea:king, 
to my starting-:9.oint when I. pro.ceed in this way, 
none the less ••• a.morecomgrehensive and there--
fore~ philosophically superior s:cheme can be. pro~ 
duced by this method than can be,worked out from 
the other side, and that so far the supp0sed reve-
lation with which the method started has had it~ 
character vindicated and guaranteed.~ 
Teml[le. woula· seem to have;misconceived the relation between 
p;hiTosophy and religion at this point. On the one hand, he too' rea:d.ily 
concedes that his starting ppint is not philosophicrolly justified; on 
the other hand, he too readily concedes. that his conclusions are:: philo-
sophicailly justified.. There? is no~· need to make appil..ogy to. philosophy 
for where: one begins the p_hilosophic q!lest so long as one 1s aim is to 
procee·d critically and to render a~ coherent account of all the data. 
The philosopher cannot ask for more:; than this, but neither can he per-
mit less. Thus, the c~:of the issue in terms of Temple's position is 
whether philosoRhy is permitted to consider critically th~rav~lation-
claim, and the content ascribed to it, that God is revealed in Christo, 
The p,h.ilosop_her must be able to evaluate;; even the starting p0int of 
the Christian believer and to modify or reject it, if in the course of 
1.. Ohristiani ty in Thought and Practice:, p-. 33.; · also see above, 
ChaJ:T-. II. 
apJrLying it to the:: da:ta1 of ex,Q:erience a. mG;re.: philosophically coherent 
hyp9thesis: woul'd re~mlt. Hence:; the; issue is not whether :priority 
can legitimately be) granted tm one datum of e:JCRerience-, such as the 
Incarnation, but whether one is willing to acce:pt as the most adequate 
inter:pretation both of this. datum and o.f the·.:world .. whatever hypo.the:sti.s 
renders the most coherent account of the data. Indeed, the philosopher 
has the obligation to acceP._t that hypothe-sis which relates the da:tro. 
most coherently; the source of the. hyppthe-sis is secondary. 
OWen Thomas in his study of Temple~ claims that Temple has;missed 
the ROint regarding the p_ro:p:er method for arriving at and evaluating 
a world-view.l According to Thomas., no one can proceed intellectually 
to understand the universe without many pre:sup:g:ositions that have. far-
reaching implications. Tem,P.le t s ·.difficulty stems. from thinking that 
p_hiloso-:RhY must proceed without such pre:supRe:sitions as Thomas argues 
arenecessary.2 Neither the philosopper nor anyone else can com-
pletely transcend his own world-view. so as to get directly at the 
facts and to evaluate them. Ea-ch world-view. 11 is derived from a unique 
encounter with reality which resui:ts in a unique: choice of a key-
category by which exp:erlence: is to be interpreted •. 11:B~ 
AJT. philosophy is held by Owen Thomas; to be apo-l:ogetic so that 
the tension is not between p_hilosop,hy and theology, as Temple believed, 
1.. See "The Philosophy of Religion o.f William Temple"; also-· 
above, Chap~~ I. 
2. See Thomas, R•· 207. 
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but among different world-vieWS'• Furtherm0-re~, no:. one can e:sca:p·e~ hav-
ing a world-view either implicitly o:r exp_licitly.l The: RhiJ1oSOJ2hfcal--
theological enterprise, Thomas concludes, consists of a variety o:f 
world-viewsc:, some of which are;; called religious, some of which are 
called phiLosophical~ A person may madify hfs RDsition or even e2e--
change one view for another. The latter is what is meant by conver-
sion. Ho:wever, 11there; is nrn neutral intellectua11.. JXEmition in which 
susJXension of judgment and total la-ck of commitment is Rossible and 
from which all world-views: may be·: viewed impartially and obj ec-
tively.-112 
There: are-: bases, acco-rding to Thomas, in the:. common dat~n 
analyzed and in the rules: of logic by which insights are} gained and 
e:x:Qre:ssed so as to make possible conversation among those coiillllltted 
to:; different world-views>. nso; mutual criticism and debate~ can b~ 
fruitfully carried on as to which wo-rld-view. best eXQ:Lains the data;. 
1'he ability oi' a· view. to make- sense of the~ data· and to--- exp-lain co-. 
herently all the_ facts: are significant te-sts, but mo'll:'e-.; than one; view. 
may meet the-se tests. A mo:re:: adequata te-st, Thomas argues, is what 
Tillich calls experiential verification in the life:-process of man--
kind•3- Thus, the ultimate3 test is thre adop.tion of a-wo:rld-view and, 
as one liv-e-s by it, to see if it does.make sense of' one 1 s lifer. 
1. See ibid., p-•. 216. 2. Ibid. , p• 226:. 
3~ See; ibid~, pp_e 226-227; also Tillich, Systematic Theology, 
I, IG2-1Cii5~-
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There is much truth in what Thomas state.s. Temple is insuffi-
ciently aware that what he is presenting is often closer to Christian 
apo~ogetics than it is to Christian philosophy. Also, that Temp~e is 
mistakenly concerned about where one starts his philosophic quest has 
already been noted. However, Thomas, like Temrrle, is insufficiently 
concerned about what one:does with his connnitment to a world-view. 
Because everyone has at least an implicit' world-view does not mean 
that each one is equally capable of explaining the data or that ea·ch 
one is equally dogmatic. Further, granted that there is no:·~ priori 
basis for ruling out the possibility that more· than one world-view 
may provide a coherent account of the data, it doe:s not follow that 
this actually is the case. The burden of demonstration certainly 
rests with Thomas. Assuming that there are two, or more, coherent 
world-views, it might 'bhen be~ asked which one offers the most co--
herent explanation of the fundamental points in the alternative po-
sitions and which one provides the most adequate practical guidance. 
The proper role and place of inner assurance and practical 
guidance can be seen at this point. Certainly Temple. cannot be 
criticized for failing to take verification in the life.;..process seri-
ously--though not always explicitly acknowledged by him--as the ulti-
mate:: test of adequacy. Both Tem:rrle and Thomas, however, fail to take 
seriously enough the demand for theoretical clarity and comprehensive 
understanding. No doubt only as one live·s out his commitment to a 
world-view will he know what it means, let alone whether it makes 
sense of the world. There is the possibility here, of' course, that 
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two or more vie:ws. will 1'fnake sense"' in the lives of' different people. 
What must also be considered is that the living out of' one 1·s commit-
ment may not make. sense o:f the. world... Hence, one must always be' 
willing to alter or reject a world-view. which has:· been adopted if' in 
the P.rocess of' living in accordance with it he discovers: that it does; 
not make sense of' the. world.. Life. does coerce one to make a commit-
ment as to what is considered to be of' suppeme value; not to do so 
becomes.a choice by default. Further, a half-hearted commitment 
avoids the decisiveness of' the; qtu.estion and lea-ves one unsatisfied •. 
But error exists in such matters and personal integrity must be :gre:;.. 
served. Hence, though one. shouTd commit himself' expliicitl:y and 
totally to· a world-view., the commitment shouJJd no;t be) absoLute; or 
irrevocable. Ohe can never relinq!l{tisll the right and the o:bligation. 
to change his commitment in light of' the facts oi' eXJ:?:erience:> •. 
Thus, there· seems no way of' avoiding making the mo:st coherent 
rendering of' the data P.Grssible; the.' last court of apJP3a"R... That strength 
and guidance.f'or living be.gained from one 1s commitment to what is con-
sidered of' supreme: valUe, is a legitimate:; reqtu.esot.. HOwever,. thiSJ 
should be supp:Lemented by the objective reC!luirement that what one is 
committed to fosters the develo:gment and real-ization of' the poten-
tialities of' alJl of' lli'e. Unla-ss both checks arec maintained, there 
is no way of' ruling out· as inadequate the ultimate commitments made to 
such false ideals as espoused by the Nationalist So:cialist :garty under 
Hitler •. 
Thus, :g·ersonal verification in the: life-process of' the world-view 
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to which one is committed is imQortant. Indeed, the ultimate test 
of any position both in theory and in practice would be to apply both 
the experiential and the empirical checks. However, verification in 
the life-process should not become a substitute for a coherent ac-
count of the data. 
The philosophical difficulty, therefore, with TemP.29's approa~h 
is not that he affirms a particular interp~etation of the Christian 
faith as the starting p_oint for his pp.ilosophic quest, but that he3 
doe·s. not move beyond the place? where:~ he starts. To seek to inter-
p_ret all of experience from the persp_ective and illumination pro-
vided by an event such as the Incarnation is p_h.ilosophically justified 
if one is willing in the process to modify the original interpretation 
of the event as eXP.erience requires. However, to take a particular· 
interp~etation of' the Incarnation as identical with reality so that 
one refuses to alter the interpretation if' and when the facts require 
is philosophically unjustified. 
It is Temple's failure to follow the procedure of' relating all 
the datacof' experience into a coherent scheme and of modifying his 
original assumptions in accordance with the facts that exclUdes his 
position from being described with complete accura:cy as a Christian 
philosopliy and which places.him closer to the Christian apologist. 
What makes this f'ailbr~ on Temv.Ie 1 s part to be true to the philosophic 
task particularly unfortunate and inconsistent is that he describes 
so well how the philosopher should proceed in what he calls the 
dialectical method. 
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The question is not, therefore, whether there.can be a Christian 
p!J.ilosopp.y, anymore than it is a ques.tion whether there can be a 
naturalistic or an idealistic philosophy. The only question is whether 
one is willing to proceed pp.irosopP.1cally from his avowed Christian 
starting point. It is, then, a matter of examining Christian posi-
tions to see if the data of the Christian faith and the other data 
of experience are.. handled pp.ilosophically •. A. philoso;phy is Christian 
when the key-concepts and inspiration are derived from what is inter-
p;reted to be one t s encounter with the- God revealed in Christ. A 
specific Christian phiJJoso:phy is justified· when the universe is 
rendered intelligible on the basis of the conce:Q::ts derived from that 
particular· 11encountern: with the Goxl Christ reve:aiLed and when the in-
terp_retation of thee: encounter is itself continually and·~ critically 
e;valbated in the process of relating it to the facts of experience;.. 
Temv.le "s concep;tion of philosophy,, therefore:; is n<mt wholly 
a:deqQ!IB.te. An excellent analysis-; of the philosophic method is pre,_ 
sented by Templ:e but not followed by him. The nature: of reality, he 
contends, is given, and he·, does. not critically re'l.ate=: this concep_tion 
to the rest o:f eXP.,erience. EYen the philbsop}lic ta:S'k of rendering the 
universe intelligible is not fully accepted when to do so woul'd require· 
a modification of his conceptions o:f realliity and of intelligibility. 
!fence, Temp~e tends to sever understanding the world from p:ersonail·_ 
guidance for living whereas; the two should be joined.. He is more• 
concerned with discovering supp0rt for his Christian convictions than 
heJ is with discovering the most coherent account of exp:erience:, if 
the latter shouid entail modif'ying his beliefs. The dif'ficultie·s with 
'Jlemv.le's p_hilosophi.Cal. ap.Pro:ach, then, reside._Rartly in his conception 
of philosophy and partly in his faiJJure;; to adhere::. to the philosophic 
task as he conceives it. 
B.. Temgle 1 s Conception of Personality 
The concept of p,ersonality is employed by Templ:e to solve' funda-
mental philosophi.ca:l pro.blems. How adequatelY he executes this task 
needs to be: evaluated. However, beforathat can be done, it is 
necessary to evaluate·Temp:lets conception of personality •. Three 
issues serve to focalize. the main critical points in Tem_p'le 1s con-
ception of personality:: (1) the status which personality enjoys in 
the total. scheme of the universe:; (2) the type of unity which charac-
terizes-: the human person; (3) the relation of, and difference between, 
the person and his psychological p~rsonality. 
l. The Status of Personality in the World-Erocess3 
In Nature, Man and God Tem_R:le pre:sents a brief but iml{ressive 
analysis of the origin and development of personality in the, World-
Process. The evolution of the distinctive features; of the :gersonal 
lever of existence are too often neglected by those affirming a re~ 
iigious philosophy. Tem_R:le is to be commended for striving to: dis-
cover what· insights such an ap_proach affords. 
s·ignif'icant in this connection is Temple 1s account of the origin 
of consciousness.. He traces conscious awareness to the effort of the; 
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organism to adjust to its environment. Hence, organic reaction to:, en-
vironment constitutes rudimentary consciousness;.1 Thought is rooted 
in desir~ and arises so as to facilitate the organism 1s satisfaction 
of its needs)~-' Hence:; from the very beginning conscious awareness is 
purp_oseful. The distinguishing feature of mind at its highest level 
is also its purposefulness reflected in the attempt to alter the world 
to suit its own ends • .3 
Some of the ep:istemolbgical conclusions which Temple has drawn 
from this analysis have. been challenged in the previous section, but 
there are important features in his discussion that warrant further 
comment. Temple p~ofesses his reliance on Whitehead at this point. 
It is worth noting that a similar view regarding the origin and char-
acteristics of consciousness is expounded by the bio~ogist Edmund 
Sinnott in his more recent philosophicail writings •- Sinnott traces 
consciousness and :mind to "the sell-regulatory and goal-seeking char-
acter of protoplasm.n4 The basic characteristic of all life is a 
tendency toward goal-seeking which is manifested in the activities of 
both body and mind.Y There is a tendency within the organism for 
l. S'ee TempTe, Nature, Man and God, PP•· lll-122:; also see above, 
Chap. III. 
2~ See Temple, Nature:, Man and God, In 22L 
3. See ibid., P• 207. 
4· Sinnott, Matter, Mind and Man, p;,, 85. 
5. See Edmund W. Sinnott, The Biology of the Spirit (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1955), pp. 49-74~ 
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bo:dily development directed to some end. Sinnott calls the end toward 
which develo~ent is directed a goal. Purpose and desire represent the 
inward exp~rience of' this process of' development toward a goal: TIThe 
ei'i'e~t oi' the operation of' this goal.on the living system is experi-
enced inwardly as a purpm:se ii' one intends to achieve the goal, or as· 
a desire if' one is.simp)._y attracted toward it.nl At the higher levels 
oi' lii'e the inner experience of' protoplasmic purposiveness constitutes 
conscious purpose.2 
Hence, the conclusions of' Sinnott, the biologist turned philos-
op:her, render additional suppG>rt to the analysis of' Temp:ie, the Chris-
tian theist, on the origin and rudimentary characteristics of' mind. 
Unfortunately, however, Temp~le does not carry on the analysis with 
sufficient thoroughness. His discussion of' matter and lli'e are brief' 
and superficial~ The conception of matter as inert which he employs 
most frequently, especially reflected in the distinctions drawn between 
Thing, Brute, and Person, is antiquated and inconsistent with his own 
emphasis on the physical world as 11continuous becomihg. u3 The analysis 
of life tends to serve only as a transition point from matter to mind 
and is conceived as hardly more than mind at a rudimentary level. 
The distinguishing feature of mind does not arise until:. it develops 
1. Ibid., p,~ 53, n., Z;. 
2. See ibid •. , p;. 56; also Sinnott, Matter, Mind and Man, P• 86. 
3. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p;. ll5. See the criticisms 
noted by Geoghegan, Platonism in Recent Religious Thought, pp~ 94-95, 
105-106. 
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a relatively independent status in regard to the environment by forming 
concepts which are not tied to immediate percepts of existing objects.~ 
This conception of llfree ideas:" is fundamental to Temple 1s position. 
It is on the basis of a partial transcendence of the process that 
mind controls matter, that self-determination is actualized, and that 
spirit emerges making immortality possible. To hold that mind devel-
OJ!S a life of its own and at the same time is organically re:iated to 
the physical organism requires a more comp:tete analysis of the prob-
lem involved in relating mind to body than Temifle offers •. 
The level of :gersonal~ty is attained only when the organism it;.. 
self detel'1Iliile-s what goal is to be sought. In this way s:girit con-
trors the total nature of man comp-ased of matter, rife:, mind, and 
s:girit•. What, then,. is the rela.ticm oi' spirit to. the nhysical organ-
ism? To- sp~eak of controJl by spirit, as Tem:r;rJJe do·es-, when all the; 
e-lements of man 1 s nature are organically united needs further clari-
fication than he provides.. This issue is best considered in terms; 
of Temni!e' s analysis of the organi.c unity of man •. 
Z~ The UniqCille' Unity of the Human Person 
A fruitful evalUation of Tem:gD~ 1 s views on the mind-body problem 
and on the problem of the unity and identity of the self can be made 
by com:garing his views: with tho:se- of Edgar Sheffield Brightman. It 
is particularly relevant since Temp-I:e has. been labeled a yersonaJ2. 
I. See Temgle, Nature::, Man and God, PJr• 202, 212~ 492;. also 
above, Chap •. II. 
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ideaYist by some interP.reters,l and Brightman calls himself a ~~rsonal 
idea.rist •. 
Brightman prop_oses a strictly empirical definition of the self •. 
He call·s it the datum self and means by it one t:s present conscious 
experience.2 EVerything that the. self is nox aware. of, or canna~ be 
aware, of, is not-self', no matter how. intimate one 1·s relation to it. 
The self thus refers to' consciousness, on.J.:y and must be distinguished 
from its environment. Brightman states.:· "Personal consciousness alone 
is experience, and ••• all bodies, brains, and go:ds are objects of 
bel .. f n3' J.e •· 
Brightman, therefore:, distinguishes. the mind from the body •. 
Bony is not the mind or any part of mind, though it is in interaction 
with mind.. futeractionism proposes that both mind and body act. 0n and 
affect each other. Mind and body act as one, however, and even con-
stitute a "functional unity. 11.4 Nevertheless, they indicate different 
rea:lms of experience, just as the brain is not the same as one's 
awareness.. Though closely related, mind and body are not to be con-
sidered as one for the following reasons:;:: (;L) there is a difference) 
between one 1 s body and one 1s exp~erience. of his body; (2) cause and 
effe·ct are not to be identified. Ohly confusion results when causes 
1. See above, Chap.. I. 
2. S:ee~ Brightman, Philosoph.y of Religion, P•· 227 •. 
3· Ibid.,· P•· 349'. 
4· Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Nature'j and Values (New, York: 
Abingdon-Ookesbury Fre·ss, 1945), P•· 55. 
and effects are identified. Hence, Brightman states:: 
If we are to insist that the causes. which arer, 
essential to the existence of personality are 
all a part of it, then the body, the subcon-
sciousness, the air we breathe, the life-giving 
sun, in fact, the whole of nature, must be·, 
parts of every person, and every person is all 
bodies, all minds, all things .1 
It is not even accurate to state that the mind is in the body. For 
if so, then where: in the body is it?. Mind cann0t be located in the; 
body.. Mind is what it is experienced to be, namely, personal con-
scious awareness. Body, interp~eted metaphysically, is the activity 
of the Divine:mind with which one is in intimatre interaction~Z 
It is Templ-e 1 s thesis that an analysis of man indicates not a 
separation into mind and body, but the union of mind and body. Mind 
arises within the organism and is an extension of organic reaction 
to environment. Hence, mind and body are one; man is a psycho:-physi-
cal organism. 3 
Hbwever, Temple does not identify mind and body. Also, he re:.-
fuses to endorse either a ~psychism which would ppsit a "mind-
stufftl at all levels of reality or a view which holds to the activity 
of thought minus a thinker.. These rejecti0ns seem inconsistent with 
Temple 1s mm analysis of mind in its rudimentary forms and points up 
his failUre to provide an adequate analysis of matter and 11fe. At 
1. Ibid., P.:P• 55-56. 
2. See ibid., PP•· 124-125. 
3.~ Temvl'e, Nature, Man and Go:d, pp. 2Dl, 282-283, 489". 
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this po-int Temple is mo:re concerned with emphasizing the distinctive 
feature of mind at its higher levels. Accordingly, he claims that 
whatever proves to be the ultimate resoluticm of the relation between 
matter and mind, a distinction will remain. Though the mind is im-
manent in the body and organically related to it, mind transcends the 
body and is always more than the movements of the body.1 Mind initi-
ates· activity for the sake of what it takes to be some good. Hence, 
the mind directs the body by means of a p~pose it seeks, and the 
body is the medium for the execution of the purp0.se •. 
Elf distinguishing the activity of the mind from bodily activity, 
Temp~e tends to sep~rate mind and body despite his insistence that 
they are joined. What the actual relation is between body and mind, 
as the physical activity of the body carries. out the non-physicail. 
purpose of the mind, is not indicated. A characteristic inadeq~cy 
in Temple 1 s analyses of issues comes to the fore in this: connection. 
What asp~ect of a problem he stresses and what solution he propo·ses 
tend to depend on the point he is making at the time. When he wishes 
to distinguish his view from idealism and show the inadequacy of any 
position that denies the reality of matter, he then points out the: 
emergence· of consciousness in the organism and traces its rudimentary 
analogue at lower levels. In such a case he is content to argue as a 
critical naturalist or organicist might argue, that is that mind and 
1. See ibid., p• 282, especially n. 2. 
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body are organically related. But when he wishes to show the inade-
quacy of' materialism and the philosophy of' organism, then he stresses 
the distinctive characteristics of' mind as distinct f'rom matter, sug-
gesting an entitative state f'or mind. In the latter cas~ he willingly 
employs arguments that arffi a:kin to idealism. What is lacking is a; 
thoroughgoing ef'f'ort to relate systematically these disparate; empha:... 
ses and weave them into a coherent pattern of' explanation. 
A f'ailure· to relate varying emphases on a particular issue 
characterizes Tem_2ie 1s entire gosition. In his argument f'or God he 
is content to show that philosophical argument sup.:gmrts a theistic 
p~sition and, then, maNes on to the evidence of religions expBrience 
which indicates. ao personal God. Further, the Ge:d arrived at through 
these two avenues of investigation is identif'ied with the God of' the 
Christian f'aith. He does: no:t show that one leads to another or at-
tempt to relate the conclusions f'rom the- various strands of' evidence •. 
It inay be that this def'ect is due to-, the busy lif'e he led and the: 
hurried manner in which mast of his writing was accom:glished-in odd 
half'-hours, as he states.l rt ma-y !rlso indicate" that Temple.1s real 
concern is nat with the develo~ent of a systematic .:ghilosoyhy, but 
with the use of' philosophical-. discours-e whenever relevant to support 
his religious convictions. Whatever the reason, the f'aillure o£ a 
phil-osopher to· relate his views; so that m coherent pattern is clearly 
I'. s·ee TemW:e, Mens Creatrix, p·. vii; also Iremonger, p-. 482'. 
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discernible is a major defect. Clarity at the expense of contact with 
actua:lity is certainly undesirable, and this TemJrle rightly condemns; 
but lack of clarity is no virtue in itself and when inconsistencie:s 
are)ap~arent, then failure to make clear. what is meant is a serious 
omission. 
Brightman's exp0sition of this issue, on the other hand, suffers 
from clarity at the expense of contact with experience~. Too sharp a 
distinction between mind and body is made. I.t is true that one 1 s 
conscious awareness is not the same as the physiological processes 
which occur in: the brain. I.t is also to._ be granted that a line must 
be drawn somewhere between cause and effect, and that in one sense the 
whole of nature is essential to the existence of mind. But fewwould 
be willing to admit the sun as part of anyone 1s body. It does not 
follow, however, that the place to draw the line is between mind and 
body or that the distinction is as clear-cut as Brightman suggeBts. 
Also, the fact remains that one 1 s p_articular bodily organism is more, 
intimately and causally related to his mind than the sun. My body is 
experienced as mine in a way that the sun or the air one breathes are 
not. 
C. J. Ducasse indicates the peculiarities which serve as cri-
teria enabling one to identify decisively one's own body.l First, 
one's body is the only physical object in which movements or other 
I. See C. J. Ducasse, Nature, Mind,and Death (La Salle, 
Illinois:~ The Open Court Publishing Company, 1951) , PP• 424-429. 
bodily changes are directly initiated by one 1s mind.l In only one 
body does an arm. raise when one wills it or does blushing result 
when one .feels ashamed. Second, one 1 s body is the only pb.ysicail 
object which when stimulated produces corre:spc:mding sensations in 
one•s mind. 2 Thus, though one perceives many hands protruding .from 
under a cloth and observes a p?-n being stuck in each one, only the 
PFicking o.f a particular hand produces a .feeling o.f pain and that 
hand is identified as one •·s own.. Third, in only one body does cer-
tain mutilations result in changes in one 1 s conscious mind. For 
exam:gie, the severing o.f certain nerve tissues in the brain can 
destroy the capa·city o.f the mind to. respond to certain sense stimuli .. 
Fo_urth, in only one body can certain structural changes be produced-
such as establishing specific connections among brain neurons which 
corres:Rond to certain skills or habits-by the mind 1 s willing the 
acquisition o.f the-se specific skills and habits .. 
As Ducasse notes, what such evidence suggests is that the re-
lation between a mind and "its1t body is that o.f direct causa::l inter-
action.3 Mind and body directly act on each other in a way not 
1. Ducasse qualifies this statement in light o.f the evidence o.f 
psychical research pointing toward .l?K or psychokinetic e.f.fect. Admit-
ting PK e.f.fect, Ducasse maintains that there is still only one material 
object which can be moved more than minutely by one •·s will, and this 
object one refers to as his body; see ibid., PP• 426-427. 
2. Again a minor qnJiaTi.fication is made by Ducasse on the basis 
o.f the evidence for "Clairvoyance" in which there is causation by 
physical events without intermediary stimulation by these events on 
the sense organs; see ibid., p~ 427. 
3· See ibid., P• 429. 
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characteristic of the relation each sharas with other psychical or 
physical entities. Further, as Whitehead observes and the above 
evidence implies, the relationship between mind and body is experi-
enced by the self as a unity of mind and body.l 
However, the question remains of the kind of unity which the 
mind and body enjoy •. Since Temple 1 s position has definite affinities 
on this issue with the views of Whitehead and Sinnott, a comment on 
their views is in order. According to ~itehead, the mind's role 
is to act as coordinator of, and to exercise a unified control over, 
the multiple organic cells constituting the living organism and the 
diverse objects potentially capable of being included within the 
mind 1 s purpose.2 Sinnott 1 s analysis suggests a similar view: nAn 
organism is a mind-and-body unity. n3 Mind is the integrating and 
dire·cting agent that sifts the various sensations and controls the 
possible responses.: so that unity of conduct is maintained under the 
guidance of a goal. The advantage of stating the mind-body relation 
in this way is that the unity of mind and body is clearly indicated. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that it seems to imply an 
identifi.ca tion of mind and body.. But, if mind and body are identi-
fied, then the distinctiv~ characteristics and activities of each 
1. See Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New. Y.6rk: 
The Macmillan Company, 1938), PP• 218 .... 228. 
2~ See Whitehead, Process and Reality:, pp• 164~1677. 
3. Sinnott, Matter, Mind and Man, P• 78.. 
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are blbrred or even eliminated~ 
Ifence, if' both the unity of mind and body and the distinctive:: 
f ea ture·s of each one are to be mainta1i.ned in a:ccordance:; with the:: 
evidence, then their relation is best described in terms of inter-
action and their unity referred to as, functional •. Ifo~ever, such m 
conception of functional unity is not the same as prop:Grsed by 
Brightman.. The union of mind and body repr:e:-sents a comi¢TI.ffiXi: unity in 
which the physicail a-ctivity of body and the psychical activity of mind 
dire·ctly interact., Thus, the. experience one has of his bo:dy indicates 
a .. more' distinct and unique: existent than is~ allowed by Brightman in 
making bo:dy the· direct activity of the Divine Mind. At the same time, 
the uniq~eness of mind must be maintained and its activities distin-
guished from those of the·body. 
Mind and body are distinct, as Brightman argue:s; they are also 
uniqCillely related, as Tem:g:Le argues~ The relation shared by mind and 
bo-dy cannot be equated with any other relation. Lt is, as J •. B. Pratt 
suggests, sri generis, unique.ll The human mind, though rooted in the 
body from which it arose, may still act as the agency of control o.ver 
the body. 
The difficult problem of how the. activity of mind intera·cts with 
bodily activity remains unsolved. Ho:wever, there is merit in recog-
nizing that there is a unity of mind and body even if' the P.recise 
1. See. James> Bissett Pratt, Personal Realism (Newi York: The: 
Macmillan Company, 193?), p·., 2o9. 
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relation of the component dimensions cannot be indicated at this stage 
of the investigation. If the nature of body turns out to be a rudi-
mentary form of mind or self as :ganpsychism suggests, then the re:,-
lation be:tween mind and 11body0 conceived in these terms would pro:ve 
quite understandable• Ob the other hand, if the :ghysicai and the 
psychicai are· coequal, repre-senting "two asgects of the same organ-
ized: living system, nl as Sibnott suggests, then their unique rela:-
tionship,is also rendered intelligible. 
What the,available evidence.does suggest at present are two· 
entities with distinctive characteristics causaily interacting and 
uniquely united. What must be re:si!:lted, therefore, is the attempt 
to identify mind and body. Brightman tends~ to eliminate; the body 
as a:. distinct existent, while maintaining the unique features: mf' 
mind and its interaction with a body sustained qy God; Temple, while 
insisting on the unique unity of mind and body, denies interaction 
and thus blurs the distinctive . chara~cteristics of each. 
In regard· to the problem oi' the idemtity of the self a>: func-
tional vieW/ also seems mo·st in accord:. with the facts. Both Temple~ 
and Brightman affirm such a view, but differ in that Temp-le-1 includeSJ 
the continuity of the physical organism as the basd.s' for, and as; part 
of, the self's identity. Both reject a soul-substance view which 
ppsits an underlying ego that persists unchanged through the diversity 
1. Sinnott, Matter, Mind and Man, p• 112. 
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o£ experience providing the unity and identity o£ the self. 
For Brightman the unity o£ the sel£ is the wholeness and in-
dividuality o£ its consciousness, and its identity is the eX£erience 
o£ self-identification in immediate exr.Brience through memory o£ the 
p~st and anticipation o£ the £uture .. l Tem.Rle and Brightman agree 
that full psychical unity and identity are attained only when all the 
activities of the self are integrated under the guidance o:f a pur-
pose. However, £or TemyTe the body is included in this unity when 
it submits to and expresses the p:tJrpose which the sel£ has esta:b-
lished; 't.J"hereas £or Brightman the body responds to. the self 1 s pur-
pose through the direct activity o:f God. Such a dichotomy o£ man 1s 
uniq~e unity as Brightman asserts seems unnecessary and unwarranted. 
The unity of the sel£ is compleX', sufficiently cpmplex:: that bodily 
functionings glay their part and must be incorporated into the sel£ 1 s 
unity and identity. 
There.:i.is, there£ore;, cogency in Temple:~s analysis o£ the three-
fold unity of the self rooted in the ppysical.continuity o£ the body, 
manifested on the conscious level by the effort to unify one's impul-
ses, and culminating in a purpose to which the total self is committed 
and which serves to organize the activities of mind and body. Having 
stated the unity and identity of the self in this way, the £allure on 
Temple's part to relate these views to his analysis o£ the mind-body 
1. See Brightman, Philosophy of' Religion, p. 357. 
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p~oblem, or to his conception o£ personalit,y is all the more striking. 
One thing is clear £rom this comparison o£ Temple and Brightman 
on the nature~o£ the sel£: Tem~le is not ~personal idealist in r~ 
gard to this £undamental issue• What label. best suits Temv.le 1's pnsi-
tion is dlificult to determine because he has not systematically de.-
velo:rred a philosophy, and inconsistencies are; apparent. It is not:. 
amiss to refer to his philosophica~ tendencies as. being closest to:· a; 
type of personal realism, not the same metaphysica[ly a$ that af-
firmed by Pratt, but having af£inities with Pratt 1 s position in rED-
gard to epistemology and the mind-bo"dy pro,bl!em.I 
Hb:wever, any attemgt to label"- Temp:t.e•s position without taking 
into account", his reliance on the. Christian £aith is misleading. 
Tem}#e; is a Christian theist who mcrst fre:quently employs the· phiJlo';-
SORhfcal' arguments o~ personal realism in order to support and to: 
elucidate the. particular issue he is expounding. Persoruril existence: 
is for Tempie the, highest rerlity, and hi's concep±.ion o'£ personality 
is derived £rom the Christian view;o£ God. Further, mat~er enjoys 
a' relativeTy independent status in the; created universe and serveS> 
as the mediinn through which gersonal beings execute their purpo:ses; •. 
H€mce1, Teml!J2e:; might bro labe~ed a. Christian p:ersona:listic realist. 
l. See' Pratt, Personal Realism. Concerning the aim o£ the' book 
:Pratt state:s: "Its aim is to de£end bo-th Bealism and the. a-ctualJ.ty o£ 
the individua21.~ •••. It is my belief that the only trustworthy da~ 
£ense·o£ the reality o£ the:self, af a~metaghysically grounded indi-
vidualism, must be based uprm ~·realistic epistemology; 11 p. viii •. 
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3;;. The Person and His Personality 
Th~£aiLtire:of Temple to relate various strands o£ his thought 
and weave them together into a meaningful p,attern is nG~herffimoxe:ap­
paxent. than in his concep.tion of pBrsonality. In his book entitledi 
The NatureJ of Persona2.:ity the anal.ysis is carried on alm0:st entirely 
in ethiCal terms. There is a, discussion of the distinction between 
p~ersonal· and sub-:gersonal levels of existence, but even that involrves 
the ethical concepts of rights, and dutie:s. It is significant that 
Lecture:s; III through VI o:f The:; Nature o:f Eersonality: are:; incorporated 
· almost verbatim into the section in Mens Creatrb;: dea3Ling with con-
duct, Chapters; TIII and XIV~ In Nat'ure::, Man and GO:d' when the:; evolu-
tion oi' mind is traced, no: attempt is made to relate:. his analysis of 
the dimensions of personality arrived at in earlier works, and only 
in a general way are: the levels; of existence--matter, life, mind, and 
spirit--related ta\the distinctions drawn between thing, brute, and 
:gerson. Some; of the chief characteristics of p:ersonali.ty affirmed 
by Temp:le do ap:g:ear in his discussion of the G".r:igin o£ mind in the; 
W0.rld-Pro.cess, but nm attem:g:t is made to. point out the relationship) 
and significance o:f the analysis at this level· with the discussion 
o:f :g:ersonality at the human and divine: Tevels:. 
What is indicated by the distinction made between p:ersoneiD and, 
sub-pBrsonal levels is the greater individuality o:f the former. Per-
sons take the initiative; they are:: p,:ur:g:osefun. Hence, the concept 
of purp:mse is carried through by Tem:Rle: from his eJ<..-po:sition oi' rudi-
mentary consciousness to higher leve2s o£ self-awareness, though not 
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systematically or with this explicit intent in mind. So too the sociall. 
orientation of man is expo.unded at length both in regard to the early 
stages of thoughtts emergence within the life of an organism and in terms 
of the necessity of society for the development of each child into man-
hood; but the relation of the-se factors to flillowship)as a characteristic 
of human p:ersonality is not indicated. 
The evolution of love, as the third characteristic of personality, 
is not traced, though as an emotion it would seem to have its basis in 
the feeling of affection. Affection is a positive feeling of attraction 
on the part of the organism towardi an object in its environment. It is 
not based on a felt need as is the case with desire but is characterized 
rather as 11the intimacy of comradeshi.!P11 an organism feels for an obje.ct. 
The exampl-e Temple gives is the trust and affection the child feels towardi 
the mother. ·Temple does not, however, relate love to affection and is un-
clear as to what love means. It entails sacrifice for others and intelli-
gent concern for their welfare. TO this extent love is not necessarily an 
emotion. But the ideal of love. seems to be a community of persons inti-
mately related in a way which does involve feelings of mutual trust and 
affection. Love would be an emotion in the latter case. Which conception 
of love is intended, or what the relation is between them if both are in-
tended, remains ambiguous. 
These three::characteristics would not seem adequate to describe per-
s<;mality, though they suggest more than might seem to ee:~the case. Purpose 
includes the notion of conscious awareness, which transcends the present 
through memory and anticipation, linking the self with past and future. 
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p:. l43!; also above, Chap~ II. 
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Fellowship stresses the self 1 s dependence upon, and interaction with, 
the environment and particularly other selves. Presumably, apprehen-
sion of the environment is involved here, though Temple does not make 
this explicit. The emphasis on love extends and gives direction to 
the self''s relation to other selves. 
An ambiguity arises in regard to whether the body is included by 
Temple in personality. In discussing the total being of man, he refers 
to man as a psycho-physical organism which includes matter, life, mind, 
and spirit; but the distinctive element of personality is held to be 
spirit.1 The conclusion which seems to follow is that the distinctive 
traits of personality--purpose, fellowship, and love--do not necessar-
ily entail a physiological organism for their expression, and God as a 
personal being has no body. However, in human experience personality 
requires a body. Also, reference to man as a personal being by Temple · 
does seem to signify the organism as a whole including body arid spirit. 
Indeed, the initial unity and identity of the se·lf is based upon the 
continuation of the physical organism. Perhaps Temple means that pur-
pose, fellowship, and love are the distinguishing marks of a psycho-
physical organism; but if he does, he nowhere states it to be the case. 
A major defect in Temple's discussion of personality is the lack 
of psychological orientation and consideration. William McDougal alone 
of personality theorists of recognized stature is referred to by Temple 
and then only to support his own view of the social dimension of 
1. See;Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 190, n. 1. 
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personality.
1 
No attempt is. made by Temple to assess psychological in-
terpretations of personality. Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy as tech-
niques for aiding integration are totally neglected. At one point Temp~~ 
refers to the field of psychology as an rtadolescent science, ado-
lescent in the sen~e that it is still immature, still far from being 
wholly integrated.".2 He chides: 11Regarded as an entity it is suffering 
badly from what it has itself taught us to call the disassociation of 
personality and, consequently, from a certain self-consciousness or 
self-assertion. r•3 Considering that these statements were made in 1936, 
they are not altogether unfair. Temple does show familiarity with 
psychological concepts and insights, but there is no indication that 
he had made a serious study of the field. 
In terms of psychological theories of personality, Temple's 
theory would seem to be closest to the Social Psychological theories 
of Alfred Adler and Harry Stack Sullivan and Gordon Allport's rrpsy-
chology of the Individual.'~ Allport defines personality as "the dy-
namic organization within the individual of those psychophysical sys-
tems that determine his unique. adjustments to his environment. ,.5 In 
a later work, Allport employs the term 11propriumrr to refer to the 
1. See Temple, Nature of Personality, pp. 46-49. 
2. William Temple, The Church and Its Teaching Today (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1936), P• 30. 
3. Ibid •. 
4. See Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personal-
ity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 116-127, 134-151, 
257-293. 
5. Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpreta-
tion (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), P• 48. 
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"central interlocking operations of personality.nl Temple also vie~s 
the person as a self-organizing system and roots the initial unity 
and direction of the self in the phy~liological organism. Temple 
states: 
The concrete person is a self-organising 
system of impulses, instincts, sentiments, 
emotions, ideas, and all the rest which 
psychological analysis may set out.2 
However, Temple shares only incidental affinities with these 
psychologists. His interests and aims were quite distinct from theirs. 
Further, as the above quotation indicates, Temple does not make clear 
whether he means to distinguish between person and personality. At 
times he uses the terms interchangeably. At other times he confines 
the term person to the notion of spirit, indicating that spirit is 
the distinctive element in personality.3 In the latter case, per-
sonality would presumably refer to the entire psycho-physical organ-
ism. It is this interpretation which Temple would seem to mean, but 
there is no attempt to make these issues clear. Indeed, it might 
fairly be concluded in the light of Temple 1 s analysis of the mind-
body problem that the term person, or personal being, refers to the 
entire organism, physical and psychic. In this case personality might 
-be used to signify the mode of' adjustment which the person develops 
1. Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1955), P• 54. 
2. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 231. 
3. See ibid., p. 190, n. 1. 
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in interaction with the environment. Temple makes no such distinc-
tion though it would be consistent with his position and would have 
facilitated matters if he had. 
Another weakness in Temple's conception of personality concerns 
certain omissions. Despite his emphasis on the organism•s apprehen-
sion of environment and on "free ideas," TempJ_e does not explicitly 
incorporate into his account of personality the concept of the self 
as knower. It is implicit in Temple's emphasis on purpose as involv-
ing the ability to reflect upon experience so as to construct ideals 
toward which one strives. .Also, in the empirical argument for a per-
sonal God in Nature, Man and God, Temple stresses the fact that man 
knows.1 Nevertheless, the relation of self as knower to other char-
acteristics of the person is not indicated. 
Similarly, Temple stresses the uniqueness and individuality of 
each person. What distinguishes the personal from the sub-personal 
is, in fact, the special contribution each person brings to each ex-
perience he has. But in his epistemology and in the emphasis on 
sacrifice in his ethics, the privacy and uniqueness of the individual 
are partially lost. In reaction against what he considers to be 
Descartes' overemphasis on the selfts privacy, Temple fails to deal 
adequately Yith it. To emphasize privacy does not necessitate af-
firming solipsism. The self is in interaction with the environment, 
but the objects selected and the relations shared are his and are not 
1. See P• 129. 
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identical with the objects selected or relations shared by others. 
The same is true of the individual 1s uniqueness. In arguing 
for personal immortality the unique value-contribution of each indi-
vidual is stressed, but in emphasizing sacrifice for others these 
same values are neglected and the self is to forget himself in service 
to others. This is another examp~e of Temp~e•s failure to integrate 
what he states at one stage of the argument with what is stated at 
another stage. 
In terms of Temple•s conception of personality, then, there-
are some serious ambiguities and less serious omissions. The funda-
mental problem, however, lies not so much in what is or is not stated, 
but in a failure to deal thoroughly and systematically with person-
ality so that a coherent interpretation results. Somewhere in his 
various writings many of the important elements are, at least, noted, 
but nowhere is a conception of personality expJ;icitly developed in a; 
way that relates to his entire position. 
c. Temple's Use of Personality 
An evaluation of Temple 1 s conception of pJ.lilosophy and his con-
ception of personality has been p~esented. It is necessary now to 
examine the adeqcgacy of the use which Temple makes of the concept of 
personality to solve some traditional philosophical problems in the 
areas: of moral and social philosophy, philosophy of history, and meta-
physics. 
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1. Personality, Morality, and Society 
Temple's moral and social philosophy taken together serve to 
P?int up both the merits and defects of his philosophical approach 
as an examination of the following issues will substantiate: (i) 
the relation of potentially valuable objects existing independent of 
man to man's experience of them; (2) the significance and efficacy of 
human will in man's quest for ethical goodness; (3) the role that the 
forseeable conseq~ences of an act play in deciding one's obligation 
in a given situation; (4) the application of fundamental Christian 
social principles to the existing political and economic orders. 
a. Value-possibilities and value-experience. As indicated in 
Chapter IV Temp).e 's theory of value is ambiguous. He seems to want 
to maintain at one and the same time an objectivist conception of 
value in which value exists independent of man's app_reciation, and 
a subjectivist view which holds that value is actualized only when 
mind finds satisfaction in an object. 
Temple could have clarified the issue if he had distinguished 
between value-possibilities and the actualization of these possibil-
ities in the value-experience of persons. Temple implies such a dis-
tinction at one point but does not develop: it in relation to his theory 
of value.l There are value-possibilities in the world which man does 
not create and which do not depend for their potential valuableness 
on anyone's knowing them. However, such objects exist as potentially 
1. See Temp:J..e, Nature, Man and God, p~ 364. 
valuable until someone does choose them thereby actualizing their 
value potential.l 
In terms of Temp~e's position this means that the satisfaction 
one receives from the experience of kinship)with an object consti-
tutes value-experience, and the object to which one is related exists 
independently of him as a value-possibility. 
b. Individual integrity and moral worth. Few philosophers 
have stated the moral dilemma of man with greater perceptivity than 
Temple. He correctly diagnoses as fundamental issues the problems 
of motivation and direction. Man needs not only to know what he 
should do, but also how he can gain the p~wer necessary to do it. 
The self1 s bondage is to itself and the limited vision and inner 
strength which it has. At the same time the source of what moral 
values are to be realized in the world can only come through the 
wisdom and efforts of man. 
Temp]e 1s solution to the major practical problem of ethics 
also provides much illumination, but fails to shed adequate light 
on the road which man shoultl take. Temple tends to set up an ideal 
state for man in which man is truly free: and completely good onJ.y 
when the freedom exercised and the good achieved are not,consciously 
sought by him or acknowledged to be his.. Man is to love others 
sppntaneously with no thought of himself. Such disinterested love 
Go:d alone through Christ can elicit in man. Ifence, man 1:s total being 
1. These distinctions are further elaborated by Bertocci, 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, PP• 255-267. 
has to be converted in a way which admits no conscious choice or 
effort on man1 s part lest he be proud of his own achievement. He 
must be possessed by God and of himself possess nothing but the need 
to be possessed. Scientific ethics is inadequate for the task •. 
It is quite true that only an act of God could effect what 
Temple proposes to be the ideal for man. But is the ideal justified? 
Perhaps it should be candidly admitted and courageously acceP-ted that 
man can attain only a human affection toward his fellowman and a 
limited circle of loyalty toward the best he knows with the recog-
nition that the self is involved in all efforts of love and loyalty. 
Perfection in either one is not man's to attain;_ he can hope only for 
a continued opportunity for perfectibility. lt is in the quest itself 
for perfection that moral goodness resides and not in a state of per-
fection. Man can never be absolutely certain that his love is truly 
disinterested or his loyalty complete; nor can he be certain that 
the objects of his love and loyalty are the most worthy ones. Such 
uncertainty in regard to ethical goodness is necessary if man 1 s in-
tegrity and individuality are not to be sacrificed, which would be 
too high a price to pay even for the certainty of Gou•s grace. 
In terms of Temple's position this means that man does recognize 
his dependency on the source of the universe and continually strives 
to avoid arbitrary exclusiveness which elevate~ his interests, goals, 
and prized objects to an unwarranted status of importance in the 
scheme of things. Temple affirms such a"' view, but he go.es further. 
In order to insure the self1s concern for universal objects and the 
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sell's sacr:if'ice of' itself', Temple moves toward a position which 
annihilates the self' as a moral agent. The individual Temple wished 
to save is lost by the method proposed f'or his salvation. 
The self' alone can be the agent of' his actions, but the objects 
to which his ef'f'orts are directed need net be, and should not become, 
theself' alone. Hence, it is quite correct that the Spirit of' the 
Whole should become the motivation f'or the self' 1's ef'f'orts and the 
goal toward which the self' strives. At the same time, it is the self' 
who.must choose the whole and the self' who·must realize the values 
which are available. Toeliminate the self' as an active.moral agent 
does not solve the problem of' what values he is to realize;; itelimi-
nateB the problem and the possibility of' any values being realized. 
Temple's account of' f'reedom is instructive but def'ective at 
this point. Man must will to love others and f'orget himself', but 
this he cannot do, Temple argues. Such a view is true only if' an 
abstract account of' the self' is maintained. For the self' to concen-
trate on f'orgetting himself' is indeed absurd, but the self' can con-
centrate on another so as not te be concerned with his own concentra-
tion. Man can will that God become the motivation and goal of' his 
lif'e. It does not f'ollow that man can always will to abide qy his 
commitment or that he is always willing to commit himself'. What the 
self' cannot do is will that he cease to will; he cannot will that as 
a self' he cease to be the locus of' his own activities. Nor can man 
will to achieve identif'ication with God. But is such identif'ication 
possible or even desirable? 
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The will of the individual must always be op~rative in deter-
mjnjng what course is taken. This is true even in regard to the self 
accepting what he may come to believe is offered to him by God through 
Christ. FailUre to accep~ what is offered to him is his prerogative 
and his loss; but by the same token, to accept is a response of his 
will and is also his gain. If this is the P.elagian heresy, then so 
be it. Man cannot simply by willing lift himself up by his own boot-
straps without causing himself to fall down again;, but neither can he 
be lifted Up_' by another apart from his willing it without being sac-
rificed as a moral agent. Not to maintain the efficacy of self-will 
in choosing is to eliminate the self as a personal and moral being. 
Man must always will to cooperate. with another--be. it God crr fellow-
man-in the performance of an act or the acceptance of a gift if in-
dividual integrity and moral worth are to be maintained. Though 
Temple indicates that he is not arguing for the destruction of' the 
self', his position does lead to the self's annihilation as a center 
o~ value-realization. There is a fundamental contradiction here with 
Temp~e's argument for personal ~ortality which rests on each indi-
vidual's unique value-contribution. 
c. The obligation to will the best possible consequences. In 
emphasizing vo-.cation as the solution to the major theoretical problem 
of' ethics, Temple assmnes that man can know what his vo·cation is and 
that the clue is contained in the logic of his being. One 1s conscience 
is his guide, though he is to evaluate the act by the consequences 
which result. 
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Temple seems to be,unaware.that in relying on conscience as 
determinative in the decisions one ha~ to make he has moved to a 
dif.ferent interpretation of the experience of obligation. To feel 
obligated to do what is right do.es not mean that one kno.ws what it 
is right to do. Temp_le acknowledges this point in attributing abso-
lute obligation to the will only and not to any particular act.l A 
non-cogniti~e theor,r of moral obligation is affirmed at this point. 
However, not content to stop with the formal guidance this 
provides, Temp~e suggests that sp~cific acts can be discerned to ~ 
right through the e.xp;erience of fellowshiE) with God and the deliv-
erances of one's own conscience. Temple apparently fails to recog-
nize that in claiming one can discover the specific will of God in 
a given context, he has moved to a cognitive theory of moral obli-
gation and a specific theory of value. and value-knowledge.. Not only 
does one experience an obligation to do what is right; one can dis-
cern what God 1s will is for him and hence know what it is right .for 
him to do. The consequences of an action are considered in evalu-
ating the goodness of the action. 
There is insufficient justification for this shift to a cog-
nitive theory of obligation in Temple's position, though it is in 
accord with his realistic epistemology. Also, Temple has proposed a 
false dichotomy between right and good ~t the time an action is de-
cided upon by restricting obligation to; what is right (will) and 
1.. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, PP• 178-179, 405. 
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goodness to the consequences resulting (act). The same problem arises 
in discerning what is right to do as in discovering what is a true 
apprehension: one can be wrong in both cases. If it is conceded, as 
Temp~e does, that one may be misled by his conscience and should check 
the consequences of his act, then why not include the consideration of 
consequences in the decision to act? Temp;te's objection that it is 
impossible to determine beforehand all.the consequences of an act can 
be removed if the individual is held morally responsible for consid-
ering tl:).e foreseeable.consequences of his act.1 The right and the 
good are in this way merged in the decision to act and not only in 
the relation of the decision to the evaluation of the action taken. 
There is, then, a necessity :for calculating the consequences of 
one's action before deciding what action to take. Do the :foreseeable 
consequences promote the good that one desires to achieve? In terms 
of' any p,a.rticular experience of obligation this may mean modifying 
what one feels ought to be done in light of the expected consequences 
that will result. One's feeling of obligation is rarely, if ever, a 
bare feeling that he ought to do what is right. Such a conception is 
a legitimate abstraction :frpm one •s total exp~rience of' o·bligation .. 
In a given situation one often feels that he ought to do, or not to. 
do, a certain act. Because one feels a certain way, however, does not 
itself make it right or good for one to go ahead and act on the basis 
1. See Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Moral Laws (New. York:: The 
Abingdon Press, 1933) , PP•· 142;;_15 5 • 
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o£ the £eeling. A consideration o£ the consequences serves as an 
objective check on one 1s subjective and at times irrational £eelings 
o£ ought. The standard that one should employ in making a decision 
is the extent·to which a given act will promote the best possible 
consequences in that particular situation. 
Stating one's obligation in this way brings together Temple's 
notion of right--in regard to the will to act--and good--in regard 
to the consequences o£ the act. Ohe is obligated to do what promotes 
the best results that are possible o£ being attained in a given situ-
ation.l This removes the obligation to do the impossible, but sets 
be£ore one the ideal of always stri"'ring to realize the best possible. 
Also, it encourages the individual to recognize the extenuating cir-
cumstances peculiar to a given situation and asks him to achieve the 
best possible in that situation. Hence, the strategy £or dealing 
with the experience o£ obligation is to recognize that one's obliga-
tion, in principle, is to will the best possible realization of the 
ideal life as he conceives it.2~ In a given situation what one experi-
ences as the best thing £or him to do should be critically examined 
in terms o£ the £oreseeable consequences o£ the act. Once an act is 
performed, it can then be. reevaluated in regard to what the actual' 
consequences were and serve as a guide £or £uture decisions. 
1. See ibid., PP• 156-182. 
2". . See the interpretation o£ the experience o£ moral obligation 
in Bertocci, Tntroduction to the Phil.osopl;!.y of Religion, PP• 239-246. 
Such a consideration is consistent with Temple's total position 
and woulCI bring together more coherently than he does the view o:f ab-
solute moral obligation as applying to the will only and o:f one's 
particular obligation as involving the act as well~. However, Temple's 
concern may well lie in another direction.. Implicit in his discussion 
is the urgency to act in certain situations and the :fear that one will 
become so involved in calculating consequences that the decisiveness 
o:f action will be lost or that prudential :factors will P.revail.. His 
:fears are not without :foundation. H0:wever, risks are necessary i:f 
subjective :fanaticism is to be avoided, and certainly unreasoned, 
hasty decisions o:ff'er risks of' their own. Cannot a merely prudential 
consideration of' the consequences be avoided without eliminating the 
necessity .:for care:fully examining consequences? Furthermore, there 
ara ideal consequences to be considered as well as :factual conse-
quences. In a given situation the ideal one acknowledges to be ob-
ligatory may be o:f such overriding importance that the consequences 
resulting :from :forsaking the iO.eal would be worse than the speci:fic 
.:factual consequences resulting :from the choice to be loyal to the 
ideal. So.crates r choice o:f the hemlock and Jesus • choice o:f the cross 
are. illustrations o:f individuals who abided by their ideals despite 
the un:favorable consequences .:for themselves and others. Each inter-
preted his mission in li:fe as o:f such importance that to :forsake the 
mission would be more disastrous than death and destruction rffsulting 
:from adherence to it.. Actual consequences were considered, but the 
ideal which each felt obligated to realize and the consequences which 
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it entailed were held to be more significant whether realized by him 
in that situation or not. Loyalty to an ideal in such a case retains 
the valile and efficacy of the ideal so that its significance is · not 
lost and the possibility of its realization at another time remains. 
There is a place then for "noble recklessness"1 in which after weigh-
ing consequences carefully one still chooses to risk everything for 
the ideal itself. 
Therefore, what would seem to be Temple's concern to foster 
forthrightness and bolaness of action is well-taken, though his means 
oi: pre:serving them by neglecting consideration of consequences in 
forming one's decision to act is unwarranted. 
d. Toward a Christian civilization. Throughout the present 
study it has been necessary to call Temple to task for holding to an 
ideal, sometimes acknowledged and sometimes illl8.cknowledged, on a 
p~rticular issue to the extent that he employs it as a standard for 
criticizing o~her views without subjecting the ideal to modification 
when app)ied to problems of human existence. Temple's social thought 
is avowedly Christian. The ideals of man and society operating in his 
thinking are derived from his conception of God and the fact that God 
is held to be the creator of the natural world and of man. An evalu-
ation of his conception of God is presented below. However, at this 
point what is significant is that in.his social thought his ideal con-
ceptions of God and man are modified where necessary to cope with the 
1. See Brightman, Moral Laws, P• 149. 
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emp~rical situation. It is in Temple's social thought, then, that 
he most closely app~oximates the role of the Christian ppirosopher 
as it has been interppeted in the ppesent study. Some illustrations 
of this point in regard to his social thought are in order •. 
Love has been noted to be a dimension of human personality and 
represents its highest expression.l In expressing love for another 
and receiving love expressed by another, human personality best ap-
proximates its own fulfillment. It would not be surprising to expect 
.that Temp~e would, as a result o£ the sacrificial conception of love 
he espouses in his conception o£ personality and his ethical theory, 
elevate· self-sacrifice to the key position in his social thought •. 
But, as a matter of fact, in his iater writings Temple rejects 
sacrifice as a basic social princip;te, though he retains it as an 
ideal which should be set before. men. 2-: Service to others is required, 
but no.t self-sacrifice. One should seek the welfare of others, but 
this doe:s: not mean ignoring or relinquishing one 1 s o-wn legitimate 
interests and aims. Temp_:le recognizes. that sacrificing onets own 
interests for those of another could readily be interpreted as weak-
ness by another; rather than eliciting a response of loNe, it might 
encourage the other person to take further advantage of him. When the 
latter occurs, then both individuals suffer and no one gains. This is 
especially true when groups are involved •. To expect either management 
1. See above, Chaps. III and IV. 
2. See Temple, Christianity and the_ Social Order, p_p:. 72-74. 
or labor to sacrif'ice their interes.ts without the assurance of' 
com:garable·concessions on the part of' the other group·is to encourage 
selfishness and irrelevant sacrif'ice. An equitable comp~omise of' 
conflicting interests is what one should strive f'or in such cases. 
Justice has its role in making the expression of' love empiri-
cally .. relevant. Hence, whereas the self' as an initiating center of' 
value.,....realization is sacrif'iced to God's grace in Temple's ethics, 
self'•sacrif'ice is forsaken and rep~aced by the challenge that all. 
should serve society in his social philbsopby. 
Temp~e recognizes that the social order is largely composed 
of' competing centers of' power and that it is of' no~ avail to condemn 
individual sin in the hop_e of' eliminating the power blocks. Con-
f'licts of' power cannot and should not be eliminated. To strive to 
do so is to miss the point of' group:· relations; a lesser but equally 
signif'icant goal must be sought: 
What has to be aimed at is such a distribution 
and balance of' power that a measure of' justice 
may be achieved even among those wh~ are actuated 
in the main by egoistic and sin:ful impulses. It 
is a modest aim, but observance of' political lif'e 
leaves n£·doubt that this must be its primary 
concern. · 
The ideal of' brotherly love remains to challenge everyone, but it must 
be recognized that justice in the sense of' an equitable resolution of' 
competing interests may be the best possible realization of' l'ove in 
1. Temple, "What Christians S.tand f'or in the Secular World, n 
reprinted in Religious Experience ••• , P• 252. 
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a given situation. Though TemRle does not refer to the standard 
he is employing as that of willing tlie best possible consequences, 
it is fair to conclude that such a standard is operating in his 
analysis at this point. 
Temple's concern is not with the withering away of the power 
of the state or of the capitalist economic order. He is concerned 
with putt~ to the best possible use the power necessary for both 
political stability; which fosters individual freedom, and economic 
productivity, which promotes spiritual development. To achieve this 
goal radical changes are viewed as necessary particularly in the 
economic rea:lfu •. 
It is not a sentimental conception of personality development 
which dominates Tempie~s social thought.. '11he power of the state to: 
command its citizens to fight in times of aggre~sion is acceP.ted, 
though the right to refuse on grounds of conscience is stoutly UP.~ 
held. The ambiguity which characterizes the Christian's role in so-
ciety is correctly diagnosed without loss of the ideal toward which 
he is called to work. Christ is held to be the center of history, 
and the Kingdom of God the goal of history. The Christian is called 
upon to work toward achieving whatever embodiment of the Kingdom of 
God can be attained on earth.. The Christian is called upon to work 
toward the construction of a Christian civilization; that is na 
civilization in which the Christian standards of value are accep;ted 
as those by which both persons and policies are to be . judged, and in 
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which there is a.steady effort to guide policy by Christian prin-
ciples. niL 
Temple's social thought represents a coherent app)."ication of 
his Christian ideal of p_ersonality and its primacy to. the actual 
existing social order of his day. Temple comes closest to con-
structing a systematic position at this point. He proposes a gen-
eral theory of value and develop~ a conception of personal and social 
morality.. Weaknesses in regard to his value theory and his system 
of ethics have already been noted. Further, the ideal of person-
ality which Temple employs in his sOcial thought has been challenged 
in the present study and his conceptions of history and of God will' 
be challenged below.. Certainly many of the specific proposals Temple 
made :for social reconstruction are no~ longer relevant. 
Hence, the social pJ:lilosop.l!ly TemRie has set forth is not with-
out flaws. Nor is his position entirely original.. Many of his the~ 
oretical views, such as those on the origin of the state and the pur-
p_ose of the economic order, were derived from recognized thinkers in the 
respective fielas, such as Maciver and Tawney... But in terms of the 
social principles he has formulated and the general ~pp:lication of .• .. : .. 
them to the political and economic orders-with which the present 
study has alone been concerned in Temple's social philosophy--a sign~· 
icant contribution has been made toward the task of defining and im-
plementing a Christian civilization. The full impact of Temple's 
l.. Tempie, The Hope of a New World, p~ 65. 
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Christian commitment and p;hilosophically oriented mind were brought 
to bear upon the fundamental social issues of the day with cogency 
and clarity, even though the philosophical. basis for his understanding 
of the Christian faith is not as clear and as: cogent as he believes. 
W. G. Peck aptly summarizes TemP.le 1 s contribution toward the formu-
lation of a distinctively Christian philosophy of society: 
Whether his conclUsions are ultimately sub-
stantiated or not, his perception of the 
necessity of this approach to the chaotic 
p;roblems of our time and his valiant at-
temirts to reach a statement of Christian 
social doctrine will doubtless pro:ve to 
have been amongst the most ,significant in-
tellectual labours of our ~poch.l 
I 
2. Personality and the Historical; Process 
In contrast to TempTe 1·s social philosop_hy 1 his philosoplzy· of. 
history P9ints up the defects of his theological philosophy. The task 
which Temp:Le set for himself in formulating a philosophy of history is 
certainly a formidable one. He propo~es to bring together 8.11 of the 
basic truths which traditional Christianity has taught regarding God 
and history. Thus, he: constantly affirms the "advantage"· of the com-
pfl.ete supremacy of God o:ver history while · claiming that man is free •. 
The reality of history and belief in progress are held to be essential. 
Finally 1 Temple strive·s to hold on to the eschatological expectation 
of those Christians throughout the ages who anticiwte the day when 
1. ''William T.emple as Social Thinker," in W. R. Matthews and 
others, p. 59. See: also the estimate by Geoghegan., Platonism in Recent 
Religious Thought, p:• 108. 
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God will usher in His ne~kingdom. 
Has Temple succeeded in bringing together these ~acets of Chris-
tian tradition and demonstrating their cogency for rendering history 
intelligible z- The answer must be in the negative:. Ohe can but agree 
w;ith the- sentiments exp_ressed by W. R. Matthews, who write.s concerning 
Temple's ambitious endeavor:; "We are-~ persuaded, while we read, that 
in principle the problem is solved, but subsequent reflection awakens 
doubt whether the solution may not be p~tly verbal.nl The just~i-
cation ~or this judgment can be indicated by re~erence:• to two funda.~­
mental issues:: (1} the relation of Go-d to. history and history to God; 
(2) the meaning of human history and the grounds ~or belief in the. 
survival o£ human p~rsonality beyond hi~tory. 
a·. The incomplete suprema:-cy o~ God over history. W. R. 
Matthews t· comment on Temple is especially app~opriate with regard to 
Tem_Rle 1s emphasis on the complete supremacy of God over history.. He 
praises the first and third views of history for their advocacy of 
God's complete supremacy and criticizes the:second view because it 
fails to assert lfis supremacy.~ No.where in the entire discussion, 
however, do:es Temple attempt to just~y, on the basis of a coherent-, 
interpretation of history, that God is completely supreme.. In fact, 
the.very argument which Temp~e employs to reject the second view-in 
1. rrw'illiam TemP.le as Thinker, n· in W. R. Ma. tthews and Others, 
P.•· 21 •. 
2. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, PP•· 434-441; also above, 
Chap. V. 
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which Eternity is conceived as "the integral totality of Time 11l __ 
namely, that what seems bad now will prove to be good when viewed 
in relation to the whole, is the same reasoning he employs in arguing 
for the alteration of values in time and to solve the problem of evil. 
On the latter point he writes:: "The presence of evil can enhance: the 
excellence of what on the whole is good, and the event or act which 
in isolation is evil can be itself an integral and contributing part 
of a whole which, as a whole, is good.n2 It is equally arguable that 
what is at p;r-e-sent good may turn out to be evil; moreover, man 1 s sup-
posed freedom and resp_onsibility prove to be merely fictitious. 
This point must be belabored because it is the fundamental fal-
lacy which Temple makes throughout his presentation of the relation of 
God to history. The basis on which Temple asserts God's comf)lete 
supremacy over history and independence of it is as. tenuous as the 
view he criticizes.. This comes to the fore especially in regard to 
Temple's view of time and foreknowledge. From the standgnint of God's 
immanence in the historical process God is limited by time, and hence 
future choices by man are unknown to him. However, God as transcend-
ent Being is omniscient. Temple's argument at this point is merely 
verbal. First of all, to distinguish God as transcendent from God 
as immanent as Temple does is either to succumb to the fallacy of 
logical abstraction or else to posit a separate and distinct being. 
l. Temp;Le, Nature, Man and God, P• 437. 
2. ~., P• 35S. 
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What ll:emple is po~siting is, in effect, a substratum substance or a 
sort of ":gure being •. n: Though he has rejected a soul-substance view 
of human personality, Temp~e affirms such a view of God.. But is it 
p9ssible for a part of God to operate in the world without affecting 
all of God?.' Neither Temple's conception of personality nor his in-
terpretation of revelation support such a view.. 'What man encounters 
in revelation, according to Temple, ttis. no~t truth concerning God but 
the living God Himself •. ni. 
Occam1s razor is needed at this point to cut away some of the 
rounded edges of Temp~e 1 s reasoning. As Bowne states regarding the 
attemP.:t to distinguish an agent from his activity: 
Pure being is objectively nothing;: and even 
if it wer~ a possible existence, we could. 
neither reach nor use it without bad lbgic. 
Only the definite can exist; and only the 
definite can fo.und the definite:-.2 
BoJ.me go:es on to· state what the mark of any real existent must be.t 
"Things exist only in their activities, and have n<Y· being apart from 
them.-"3 
!fence, the notion of God as existing distinct from His activity 
in the World-Process is beyond man's comP.rehension and also demands 
accounting for the immanent P.erson in th~ process, or the process it-
self becomes fictitious. God as a transcendent being may be logically 
1. Ibid. , P•· 322. 
2., Borden Parker Bo.wne, MetaphYsics (rev. ed.; Boston:; Boston 
University Press, 1943), P• 14~ 
479 
distinguished from God as immanent, but neither one has ontological 
reality apart from the other. TempLe fails to give due consideration 
to the view that God's self-identity is what endures through the 
activity, though he affirms this view in regard to human personality. 
The fallacy of logical abstraction is evident in the analogy 
which Temp-le employs also. He argue:s3 that just as the dramatist is 
not personally within the pl'ay, though the play depends on him,. so 
too God is not Himself within the time process,, though what happ:ens 
:in time depends on God.l The point: is, ho.wever, that tha; dramatist 
{or God) is personally within the p:lay when he is writing it. He is 
at that moment only a dramatist, not a husband, citizen, or anyone; 
else. The fact that he has been other than a dramatist in the past 
and will be other than a dramatist in the future is dependent up:on 
memory and anticipation.. In short, in the moment of writing the; en-
tire personality of the dramatist is involved; nothing is "totally 
other.n What endure·s, through it all is his self-identity. 
The analogy of the dramatist brea:ks down at a very cruciaJl 
p:oint in regard to. God •s relation to· man, namely, the fact that man 
is alive and is endowed with freedom •. The~ characters have· no exist~ 
ence and no actual freedom.. Further, if either Gbd or the dramatist 
entirely separates himself from his_ creation, such as the dramatist's 
arbitrarily ending the pilay, then the freedom of their creaturesl 
1. See Temple, Nature,, Man and God, pp~. 114!4._445; also above, 
Chap. V. 
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ends and the creatures no longer exist. However, so long as man (or 
the characters) exists and his £reedom is real, then God (or the 
dramatist)' is intimately involved in the choices which are~ made, is 
limited by them, and is not capable o£ knowing in any absolute sense 
·what the choices will be• 
The conclusion to be drawn, there£ore,. is that God must be' 
limited by the historical process, or else freedom is an illusion 
and the entire process becomes meaningless. Further, there,must be: 
at least as much succession in God as there is succession in history 
li history is to .. have meaning for the Eternal.. In a word, time must 
be real. Temple wants God related to.history and yet fundamentally 
unaffected by it and in so doing has sacrlliced both God and history. 
If history is to make a dliference to·God, then the temporal process 
which is of the essence o~ history must also make~a dliference to 
God.. Qhe philosopher of history, Arthur Mllnk, concisery states the 
case for the reality of time:. 
History, by its very nature, is process, 
change, movement, from past to present and 
from pre·sent to .future, and it therefore 
involves time. Thus it must be essentially 
temporal •••• Deny the ontological real-
ity of time, and history, robbed of all 
possible metaphysical significance, is re-
duced to a mere appearance which cannot 
possibly, in any real sense, be a mani-
festation of the ultimate.l 
1. Arthur W. Munk, History and God (New York: The Ronald Press 
Company, 1952)., P• 80. 
w: R. Matthews perceptively analyzes the primary difficulty 
which is the basis of Templels problem and proposesa reasonable 
alternative to it:. nThe difficulty arises from the conception of 
God as self-sufficient. Why not try the hyp_othesis, suggested by 
the Gospels, that God is not self-sufficient?.nl The empirical de-
mand for a limited God is further suggested by the irrational-fac-
tors which even a cursory survey of history reveals. Munk notes 
some of the irrational factors that demand careful consideration by 
the ppilosopher of history: 
Savagery and inhuman cruelty, the struggle for 
existence and the appalling waste, perversion 
· and corruption, the apparent weakness of ideals 
and the tragic fate of idealists, together with 
the slowness of evolution and progress--these 
are all outstanding characteristics of the 
human story which find expression and illustra-
tion in every chapter. Consequently it would 
seem that these factors also must have real 
metaphysical imp~ications, since history seems 
to· be: a· manifestation of that which is ultimate 
and not mere app.earance only.. There must be 
something in the very nature of the ultimate. 
which makes for the continual appearance of 
these irrational factors in history.2 
Munk proposes that the irrational factors indicate the necessity 
for ppsiting a limited God as the ultimate cause of history, and the 
evidence is convincing. Temple would seem to be logically and empir-
ically driven to the same conclusion, but in his aversion to departing 
1. UWilliam Temple as Thinker," in W. R. Matthews and Others, 
P• 21. 
2./ Munk, P• 1.36. 
from the traditional Christian conception of God he rejects such an 
alternative. For Temple God is not God unless He is omnipotent. But 
on what basis is an omnipotent God held to be the only legitimate· 
conception of God?.' Temp_le is here clinging to an ideal conception 
of God as perfect in power and in goodness even when the facts of 
experience require a revision, and when to persist·in affirming the 
ideal necessitatffs at the same time affirming contradictory proposi-
tions.l' 
If the difficulties inherent in Temple's position are to be 
avoided and the empirical facts of temporal process and the irra-
tionali ty exhibited by history are to be explained, then the in com-
plete supremacy of God over history must be acknowledged. If God is 
the ground of history, then history to havre meaning must actually 
affect God, not just a p_?.rt of Him but His total personal nature_. 
God is, then, in a real sense limited by historical process including 
the irrational factors in history, temporal sequence, and man's 
freedom •. 
b. The meaning of history within history. Temple 1 s suggestion 
that history is incomplete and that at a:ny stage. it points beyond it-
self for its own fulfillment needs to be examined. He suggests that 
there is evidence for a progressive upward movement of history in 
certain areas of life, but not evidence that history itself contains 
sufficient inherent power to overcome all the conflicts and evils it 
1. This issue is perceptively analyzed in Brightman, A Phi-
of Religion, PP• 305-341~ 
produces. · 
Even if these conclusions be granted, and they are debataple, 
to posit another order beyond history as necessary to render the 
present historical order meaning~ul does not follow. Nor does it 
follow that immortality is required to give meaning to the lives of 
those who died be~ore the result of history, whatever it may be. 
Once again an ideal Temple has in mind is determining the solution 
which he accepts as adequate.without s~ficient concern for the re-
quirements o~ experience. There is no doubt that if' there is another 
order beyond history ~or which the present one is preparatory, then 
this does provide a:·. kind o~ meaning ~or history and ~or the indi-
viduals who· share in the new order. But it is not the onlY meaning 
that either history or man can have~ 
I~ in history there is some evidence o~ progress,along techno-
logical lines and even a movement ~rom self-interest to enlightened 
se~-interest, then history cannot be claimed to be without meaning 
unless the only kind o~ meaning one accep~s is that o~ a state o~ 
p_er~ection. Further, if ethical goodness resides; in the quest for 
perfection and not in a perfect state, then so long as history p~­
vides the opportunity ~or growth and ·development there is some mean-
ing ~or the individual. The individual shares in the "eternal" sig-
nificance of history to the extent that he realizes his own poten-
tialities~ and ~asters the personal development of others. This does 
not remove the trageqy of history for the vast majority of people who 
throughout the ages have not had even the opwrtunity for ful:I p-er-
sonal development. 
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But neither is the tragedy removed by positing another order 
beyond history. To claim that the meaning of history resides in a 
non-historical order does not make the historical order any more mean-
ingful unless that meaning can be discovered in, and made relevant to, 
the p:;resent order; and if' it is discovered and is made relevant, then 
to that extent history is meaningful~-whatever lies beyond. If the 
meaning of history is not found in history, then it has no meaning 
for one in history. This is true whatever awaits one upon death. 
Temple •s argument for eternal lif'e rests fundamentally on faith 
~ the goodness of God. For the most part, he develOP-S the case 
clearly and cogently, granting his assumptions. Waiving the latter 
for the present, there are:: still some ambiguities and defects in the 
way Temple states the case for eternal lif'e. The meaning of resur-
rection and how it dif'fers from immortality is never clarif'ied •. 
Though Temple could have develoP-ed the point more fully, he does indi-
cate the basis for immortality in the capacity of man to transcend his 
physiological organism and the historical order in the quest of truth, 
beauty, and goodness. EHowever, Temple weakens the case in his theory 
of value by wavering in the interpretation of man•s role in realizing 
values in the world. Also, his stress on the supremacy of God and 
man's utter incapacity before God does not support the notion that 
God needs man in any real sense, or that He is sufficiently concerned 
with the values man realizes to continue man 1 s existence for the sake 
of mutual fellowshiJr.. 
In any case, the argument for lif'e, eternal based on the goodness 
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of God is extremely precarious. Concisely stated the argument funs 
as follows:: If God is conceived as the Eternal conserver of values 
and persons alone realize the values of life, then God would seem to 
be committed to the preservation of persons. Even on the basis of 
this argument Temple hesitates to conclude what alone seems warranted, 
namely, conditional immortality. That is, Temple denies that man is 
immortal by nature, while affirming that he has the capacity for 
immortality. Also, man•s immortality is dependent on the goodness 
of God and on the unique value-contribution of each individual. But, 
if an individual fails to develo:g:; his value-potential, then it would 
seem that there is no basis for his surviving death. 
However, a more fundamental difficulty is the recognition of 
the conditional nature of the religious argument for eternal life. 
liB Ducasse points out, there are a number of llifsll involved in the 
argument: llif there is a God • if he is good a,nd sufficiently 
powerful ••• if the existence of evil is reconcilable with the 
goodness and power of God .•• if value is metaphysically structural 
in the universe: ••• etc.nl Hence, the argument represents an at-
tempt to deduce what should follow from the nature of God, if there 
is a God and if the nature of God has been correctly interpreted 
from the evidence of human experience. But man may be wrong about 
any of the "ifs 11 and, then, the entire argument is weakened or even 
rendered invalid. 
1. Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p• 448. 
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When the close union of mind and body is affirmed, as Temple:· 
as_serts, then the issue is further complicated. Nor does Temple help 
matters Qy rejecting psychical research* The latter offers possible 
empirical evidence for p:ersonal survival. 
However, if the religious argument for immoTtality is inde-
cisive, so is the case.' against any form of survival. The cas-e against 
survival of death rests both on the p,aucity of positive empirical evi-
dence for it and on the physiological argument against it. According 
to the latter, conscious experience is only observed to exist in direct 
interaction with a properly functioning physiological organism. Fur-
ther, when the organism is impaired, consciousness is correspondingly 
affected.. Finally, when the organism is destroyed, all the usual evi-
dence of consciousness also ceases.. Therefore', when the body dies, the 
basis of consciousness is eliminated and survival is impossible. 
The physiological argument against survival--just like; the re;.. 
ligious argument for survival--is conditional and rests on a meta~ 
physi.cal bias.. That is, what is being claimed is that conscious ex-
perience not only interacts with a budy but is entirely dependent on 
the body. Also implicit, is the metaphysical assumption that for 
something to be real· it must be material, that is, a part of the phys-
ical world that man p_erceives.l Hence, only if mind is completely de-
pendent on body, and only if the material alone is real, does it follow 
that the mind cannot survive bodilY death. 
1 •. See~., PP• 458-463. 
But the introspective experience of mind and its rerlation to· 
the body reveals only that there is direct interaction, not identity 
or comP-lete dependence of mind on body. Indeed, the fact of inter-
action argues· against identity and comn~ete dependency. Also, the 
nature· of conscious experience is such that man is enabled to trans-· 
cend partially the natural order through the formation of concepts or 
"free ideas~~' and through the ability to concentrate3 attention on an 
object so as to become unaware·, o:f his body. Furthermore, the ex..-
perience of value and the experience of moral obligation commanding 
man to act contrary to his intere·sts indicat& a: P.artial inde11endence. 
o::f the physical order. .Added to the.se direct experiences of the con-. 
scious life relatively independent of the body is the empirical evi-· 
dence for the p:ossibility of survival based on allegedly paranormal, 
capacities of the mind., 
Ducasse summarizes; the evidence for survival disclosed by psy-
chical research, and some~ statements from his writings suffice for pur-
R<'Jses of the present study.l TwO' catagorie:s of evidence are noted. 
The:first concerns ttapparitions of a.person dying or having just died 
but not kno'Wil to have been ill or in danger. nZ' In some instances the 
ap:garition conveys information not known by the percipient until that 
1. See ibid., pp. 46'4-483; also C. J. Ducasse, .A Philosophical 
Scrntiny of Religion_ (New. York: The Ronald Pre·ss Company, 1953;), PP• 
}80-412. 
2. Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, P.:'o 473. 
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time.I A second "type of empirical evidence of survival consists of 
communications pprporting to come from the dead, made through the; 
P.9rsons commonly called sensitives, medi1.nns, or automatists.,n2 _ The 
f~cts communicated in many instances verffiunknOMn to the medium. Ih 
some cases the facts were also unknown by the sitter and even unknown 
by any living person. 
on the basis of the introspective evidence o.f the nature of mind 
and the evidence from psychical research Ducasse concludes- that sur-
vival in the sense of the continuation of some psych~psychical capac-
ities of the human mind beyond bodily death is theoretically possible, 
and that there; is strong prima facie evidence for belief that some 
mental capacities actually survive.3 However, he contends that the 
evidence~only conciusively establishes the theoretical possibility o.f 
p_artial survival; it does not establish that there actually is sur-
vival of death. 4'. 
The issue of personal survival of death remains, therefore, 
unsettled. Neither the argument for nor the argument against is 
decisive• The argument for survival fails to establish that it ac-
tually occurs, but, on the other hand, the argument against survival 
amounts to no more than the same thing-namely, a denial' that survival 
l. See ibid., p.- 474. 2. l!ilii·, P• 475. 
J. See~., PP•· 482-483; also A Philosophical Scrutiny of 
Religion, pp. 402, 412. 
4~ See~ Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, P• 483 • 
. 
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has been demonstrated to have actually occurred. Hence, the theoreti-
cal possibillity of' life in some f'orm af'ter bodilly death would seem to 
. . 
be established. This means that the nature1 of' mind aWn.its the possi-
biiity of detachment flrom the body such as survival of' death reqUires. 
Whether such detachment actually occurs is at pre-sent not empirically 
established, but belief in its occurrence does not represent an un-
reasonable f'aith.. There' is, therefore;, a reasonable basis f'or hope:· 
in the personal.survival o£ death. 
Any hyp:o::thesis offered about life after death is, of' course, 
highly tentative.. Man knows not if anyone lives> beyond earthlY ex-
istence; he knows only that there is the possibilli.ty o:f survival, 
and that if it occurs it will probably be an extension in some form 
of the consciousness he now experiences •. Hence, this earthlY lifffi 
is, at least, the primary determining factor both in terms of rife: 
on earth and in terms of the possibility· of life:~ beyond. Whatever 
may or may not lie beycmd histo-ry, man is thrown ba:e.:k to an under-
standing of the presBnt historiCal realm in order t~ discern the 
meaning of human existence'; and he is called 1.l_P.0Il to commit himself 
to the present order by devoting himself to realizing within history 
what meaning he has discovered. 
3. Personality as: a Metaphysical Princi.P.:l..e of E:X:QJ..anation 
The centrality of the concept of personality in Temp:J..·e 1s phi-
losophy is particularly apparent in the use he:make:~of gersonality 
as a: metaphysi'cal principle of exp:Lanation.. Two points. need to be3 
I 
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evaluated in Temgle.1 s analysis:: (l) the justification for using pur-
pose as the most adequate:exp_lanatory principle; ~2) the adequacy of 
Temple's approach in arriving at the nature of' the Supreme Being 
who·se purpose explains the universe•, 
a·. Purpo·se as the ideal o:f explanation. Temple argues. that 
when an account of' the World-P.rocess itself is sought, then there is 
only one princip~e offered in human experience which really explains 
it. It is the principle of' purpose. A teleologicai: explanation of 
the world alone is held to be self-explanatory. For Templ&Jthis 
means purposive will determined by. good •. 
Temple has been criticized for the ap_proa:ch which he follows in 
explaining the: Wbrld-Erocess by reference to purpo·se. S0me inter-
preters of' Temple contend that in earlier writings Temp:Le appealed 
mo:re to the self-evident exp;Lanatory character of Divine• purpose and 
that in his later writings he stressed m0re·the need of' faith in ac-
cepting God. Doxotby Emmet seems to· have been instrumental in perpet-
uating this notion. She writes: 
Dc>"es Temple assume too. easily the unique 
explanatory value of' the category of Pur-
pose when it is app~ed not only to certain 
kinds of activity within the world, but to 
the world as a who:Le? And does: he tend to 
assume that, if' an e~;Lanation in terms of' 
Purpose would satisfy our minds, then such 
an explanation there: must be.?.. Iri his 
earlier works he does often seem to be 
saying just this. But increasingly in his 
later work he puts forward the ideaiof' a 
Divine .Purpo:se for Goo.d as a venture of 
faith, supported though not demonstrated 
by reason and experience.l. 
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Another criticism has been levied against Templet's method for 
the opposite reason •. Me Garvey claims that mo·dernistic tendencies 
in the form of an appeal to the emp;irical evidence and language of 
science; become evident in TemQie 1's later Yritings.2 At issue, 
Me Garvey contends, ar~two contrasting conceptions of the intelli-
gibi]ity· of the world-the philosophical .. (or :gersonal) and the sci-
entific (or impersonal!). Man, it is held, is so created that he 
seeks to understand the. world in which he finds himself. Science 
attem:Qts only to orient man in terms of the relations among partie-
ular objects in space and time.. Philoso:Qhy is not content until the 
question why the universe is as it is has been answered, not simply 
how; it happened.. The two idea:l.s of intelligibility are apparent in 
these different app;roa:ches. Me Garvey go:es on to~ affirm that the 
only way to terminate the philosophic q,uest is to discover a·. self-
authenticating reality acknowledged to: be significant and meaningful.~ 
It is from the perspective of this kind o£ re:ali.ty in providing the 
meaning of intelligibility that Tem:Qie is criticized• 
Ih one sense these criticisms cancel out one another. Me Garvey 
is criticail. of Temple 1s fail'ure to follow in later years an ~ priori 
IJ. Dorothy Emmet, 1'The Philosopher,,." in Iremonger, P• 52:7. 
2 •. See Me Garvey, "Modernism in Archbishop•Templets Metaphysics 
and Value Theory, 11 PP•. 29-31. 
3'~. See ~., PP•· 125-1'27. 
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approach rooted in religious exp~rience, and Emmet claims that Temple 
increasingly makes explicit his reliance on faith. HOwever, evidence 
may be suggested for the concl'usion that both have :Qartially miscon-
ceived Temple's approach. 
Einmet, and those who follow her Iead,l fail to· take into ac-
count that in all his attempts to offer a metaphysical explanation 
o:f the- vorld Temple; app~als ultimately to·. faith and not to reason, to 
inner assurance and p~ctical guidance as the tasts of adequacy and 
no.t to rational coherence alone. In The Faith and Modern Thought, 
'11emple ts first book published in 1910, he argues that the religious 
experience of a Power supporting one and the rational demand for 
understanding th91 vorld as; a whole meet and are satisfied by the1 
view. that the world is operated by a Purpose:: rooted in will!. 2 Christ 
is held to supply the cl'tle to the content of the nature~ of the Su-
P.,reme Power.. Also in Mens Creatrix (1917), Tem1rle explicitly states· 
that ultimate: certainty resides in faith and not in kno:wledge.3 
Me Garvey 1s contention would seem to be· supported by what has 
been noted. However, he fails to recognize that there is a continuity 
throughout all of Tem:rrle 1 s writings. Temple 1's position in Na:ture . ., 
1. See Skelton, uThe Problem of Evil in the Works of William 
Tem:gle, tt p• I37;; ai.so Carlton, "The Rea:.ch and Limits of Naturail. The-
ology in the Formulation of lJljJ.liam Tem:Qle• s Christo logy. rt 
2. Faith and Mo·dern Thought, pp:. 20:..22~ 25-27; also see~ above, 
Chap~- VI, and OWen Thomas, pp:;,. 117-118. 
3.·. Nens Crea trix, Ir•· 4· 
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Man and God (19341 do:e:s.no:t reppesent a break with earlier writings; 
nor can his views be so·readily identified with those of Whitehead as 
Me Garvey suggests.. Indeed, it is Temple's ovm assumption of the 
validity of the Christian faith as he interprets it, indicated even 
in the Giffordi Lectures, that renders his views philosophically sus-
p~ct, rather than too much reliance on emyirical.evidence. Nature) 
Man and God ends with the emJlhas:is on the hunger of natural theology 
for a specific and final revelation which it can neither produce nor 
evalUat~ but must accept on faith in order to) render the world in-
telligible. It must never be forgotten that as a committed Christian 
TemRie strive:s to. set forth as best he can a phil'osop_hiCan.y intel-· 
ligibre exposition and defense o'£ his faith. 
Temple 1s contenticm that in p}lry.e:se al.one a self-explanatory 
ppincipihe is found is well ta:ken. One: may choose not to ask for an 
exp~anation of the·World-Process, and it is conce~vable that there 
is none in the sense of explaining why the world is as it is. How-
ever, it is certainly questionablewhether this is as intelligible:lan 
account of the f~cts as the attempx to discover an exp~ion o£ the 
whole, but a refusal to raise the question is no::t self-contradictory. 
If a self-explanatory principle of the universe is sought, then 
purp_o:se does supR:I!Y what is required. RUrpe:se . is e~ana:tory in a 
way that no· other principle knoJND. to man is •. Hence, p:urpo·se serves 
as the ideal of explanation for the Wo:rld-Process. To:: explrln some-
thing by p:urpo:se is to ppovide an intelligible reason for its being 
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where· and what it is.. It is to suggest that the reason why an object 
is the way it is serves:some end which is inherent in the object it-
self or that the object is· a means to· an end which has been imJ?.osed-
UP9n it., 
The primary alternative-. principle o:f exp].anation to purpose is 
some :form o:f mechanistic expjranation.. The latter suggests that every-
thing happens as the result of definite, antecedent causal laws, 
com_P.:licated as these:laws,.may be.. Quantitatively measurable :ghysical 
events p~oduce all o~ccurrences in thel universe. The problem raised 
by this approach is that of accounting for the novelty and the:· change 
whi:ch the world exhibits.. Eliminate potentiality from the world, and 
change and growth are~ likewise eliminated. Furthermore, there is 
RUrpo~e in the world at least at the.organic and personal levels o:f 
life. Ho_w can a meaningless, P.Dr_P.0-seless me:chanism generate· J?.nrpose 
anywhere: in the world? As Temp:J.:e; J?.0'ints out, th.e. activity of spirit 
(or person) resides in self-determination by an envisaged goal; the 
person is moved by final. as well as efficient causation. Finally, . 
the app~al to mechanism is an abstraction.l Mechanism is itself 
meaningless apart from purpose. The purposes of machines are built 
into them; organisms have purp,oses of their ow. 2 There is no evidence 
that machines make organisms in human exp~rience, but ample evidence 
that organisms lilake:: machines•· Purpose can, therefore, account for 
1.. See Brightman, Introduction to· Philosopb.y, PP• 242-245. 
2. See Sinnott, Matter, Mind and Mari, P•· 59. 
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mechanical processes as.existing in the world, but mechanism cannot 
acco1mt £or the existence o:r purJl9se in the world. 
The question at issue is not TemP._le t s reliance on purpose as: 
alone seli-expl~to:cy, but whether he.has adequately interpreted the 
nature· of the purP.o·se which explains the World-Process. Temple as;-
sumes that the purpose. must transcend the world and be embodied in a 
conscious being whose nature is perfect goodness and absol'utepower. 
As already noted, this interp~etation is not justified by the £acts 
of' experience. Temple 1s approach is at issue here_and warrants care-
ful evaluation. 
b. The ontological-cosmological approach •. Temgie's analyses 
of' the world and of' man leading to the positing of' God as the ground 
of the universe do seem at :first blush to be empirically grounded. 
Particularly in Nature., Man and God_ the epistemological argument for 
G0d combined with the intimations of' a personal mind provided by the 
quest for truth, beauty, and goodness seems rooted in an interpretation 
of' the empirical facts. However, Temple is never content to remain 
with such empirical evidence; alone and he eX!{licitly states that he 
does not begin there.. His app_roach, it must be recalled~ is that of' 
theological· philosoP-hy. . Temple willingly employs the evidence 0f' ex-
perience until·. it leads him to posit a Supreme Intelligence as- Creator 
and Sustainer of' nature and man. Having reached this point on the 
basis of' a cogent empirical argument, he then makes a "leap of' faith" 
and equates the Supreme Mind with the God o~ the Christian tradition. 
However, it is misleading to suggest even that Temple follows 
the empirical evidence up to a point and then sWitches to a reliance 
on faith be~use the faith provides the motivation and goal for the 
quest itself. Whenever experience conflicts with the insights of 
religious faith as expressed in traditional Christianity, Temple is 
hesitant to accept experience and invariably ends up either by re-
solving the contradiction as being apparent only or by simply aban-
do~ing experience at.that point in favor of his religious faith. 
Examples of this approach have been noted at various points through-
out the present study. It is suf~icient to recall some of them. 
Temple's conception of God as self-sufficient and as exercising com-
plete supremacy over history despite the contradictions involved is 
one such case. 
The resolution of the problem of evil by Temple offers ~ clear 
example of sacrificing empirical evidence for an ideal conception of 
God as Perfect Being. Temple admits that intrinsic evil involved 
in much suffering is not accounted for on the basis of the instru-
mental value of suffering in producing character.1 He frankly appeals 
to religious faith for courage and to eternity for hope. As Brightman 
cannily observes: "Faith asserts optimism where reason has no answer."2 
Also, the notion of a triune God is a clear case of forsaking human 
experience of personality; man is asked to accept what on the human · 
level w!Oltl!l),.d be the activities of three persons ·Within:;the unity of a 
l. See Mens Oreatrix, pp. 2S2-2S4. 
2. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 176. 
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personal being, though to combine them is contradictory for man •. 
It shoula be recalled at this point that 'l:emple justifies be-
ginning with the assumption of the finality of a particular Chris-
tian world-vieW; on the basis that the data of experience can be in-
terpreted more adequately by this approach.l But when faced with 
concret~problems of experience which confllict with his Christian 
world-view and which this world-view fails to illuminate, Temp~e 
choo·ses to surrender the goal of rendering the data· of exp-erienc~ 
intelTigible rather than mo~dify his world-view• Thus, Temple fails 
tmaffer a coherent interpretation of experience from the persp~ctive 
of the Christian faith even though it is on the condition of pro-. 
viding such an account that he justifies assuming the finality 0f 
the Christian faith. To give up the obligation tm render the world 
intelligible is to.· give up,· the justification that the Incarnation 
exp:Dains all the facts. z: Therefore~ Templ.e •~s failure to be true to 
the philosophic enterprise is not simJtly that he begins his investi-
gation o~ experience with a Christian world-view already formulated, 
but that he· relinquishes the ppiloso:phfc task of rendering human ex-
perience intelligible from the persp~ctive of his Christian world-· 
view. 
Temyle 1 s approach throughout his writings is thus onto-logically 
1. See Temple, Christianity in Thought and Practice, P.:. 333; 
also above, Chaps. II and VI. 
2. See Temple, Mens Greatrix, p• 353. 
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oxiented. This is not to suggest that he relies on the traditional 
ontologi.cal argument for Go.d.. What is meant is that Tem:2~e: begins 
with an ideal conception o~ God as a being perfect in goodness and 
absolute in power and employs the ideal to interpret the empirical 
facts of the natural order.. This ideal conception of God is basedi 
on his own religious experience and confirmed by the conception of. 
God in the orthodox~ Christian tradition. . The approach TemplLe, uses 
may be called ontological in that the nature of God is held to be 
directly given in religious experience •. This ontologicalapproach 
may be distinguished from the cosmological approach-also not to be 
identified vith the cosmological argument for God, though having 
definite similarities with it. Ih the cosmological approach God is 
inferred on the basis of evidence derived from an investigation of 
human experience.. No· p]>iority is granted religious experience as; 
offering uniqp.e or certain kno_wTedge·of God in the cosmologicail. 
ap_proach.,r· 
Tem:gle does not employ the cosmological appxoach in the sense 
in which a concep:tion of God is inferred from the emp_irical facts of 
. the natural order as the most coherent hyppthesis to account for the· 
facts. The cosmological approach is used by Temple to explicate his 
1. A similar interp~etation of these two approaches and the 
recognition of the need to synthesize them are presented by John E. 
Smith, "The I?re·sent Status of Natural Theology, n, The Journal o-f 
I?hilosoph.y, LY, No· •. 22~ (October 23, 1958), 925-936.. Cf. also the 
article by Paul Tillich, nThe Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," 
Union Seminary Quarterly, I, No. 4 (May, ~946), .3-13. 
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ideal conception of God and to determine to what extent reason and 
experience suppe-rt such an ideal. Temple has the assurance of the 
reality of a Supreme Being from his personal relation with Him and 
he finds in Christ the clue to the nature of the Supreme Being. 
Thus, for Temple, religious experience. initiates the quest for 
God and indicates that God is personal., Christ reveals the full per-
sonal nature of God.. However, since one can be deceived, it is nec-
essary to discover independent support for the reality of the object 
of religious experience. The argument for philosophical theism sup-
plies this support according to Temple. No· attempt is made to corre,... 
late: the type of God arrived at by the two approaches. Temple simply 
identifies the God of philosophical theism with the God of the Chris-
tian faith.. The living God canno:t be inferred;, He can only be ex-
perienced. The God of philosophy is not the God of religion, and the 
latter alone is definite-. and rich enough to. explain the facts of ex-
:p:erience and to meet the needs of man. ..Ah evaluation of the·se • con-
tentions iB necessary. 
It has already been ~t'ed out that Temple 1's approach is am-
biguous and empirically unjustified.L To argue ph~osophically that 
the hypothesis of God best eXP.i.ains the facts of experience is not 
the same as justifying philosophically the object of one"s religious 
e:xp:erience or the God of the Christian tradition. However, such an 
assumption is made by Tem_2le. The error is further compounded by 
1. See above, Chap •. VI. 
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TemQ~e 1 s admission that the conception of God in each case is dif-
ferent, though he must assume their identity to provid~even a sem-
blanca of cogency to the argument. 
Temple's intuition at this point may have be:en better than his 
reason, and his failure,to argue empirically for the existenc~and 
nature of God is not without some justification, though not the justi-
fication he offers.. ~e difficulty confronted by any argument for the; 
I 
I 
existence:: oi' God bas been shown in Kant's famous refutation of the 
ontological argument.. It is not possible to move from the concept 
I 
of something to the existence': of that same object. GOd either exists 
or He does not; no one can argue Him into existence. Kierkegaard's 
suggestive illustration concerning a detective~ attempting to sol¥ffi a 
crime conveys the ppint admirably.ll A detective.doe:s not set out on 
the basis of certain clues discovered at the. scene of a crime to-· 
demonstrate that a person exists who committ-ed the crime.; but rather 
he' assumes. the existence of such a person and then strive·s. to dis-
cover the tYPe oi' p-erson who did the deed. 
Sofar so good:· existence is no:t produced; it is experienced. 
However, granted that ne~her the· existence:; of God nor the criminal 1 s 
existence is really being argued, this does.not make less significant 
the necessity of arguing for the. re·asonableJ: pe:ssibility and nature~ of 
ea-ch.. That is, there is still the need for interpreting the empiricaJJ. 
evidenC$ and formulating an bn>9:thesis to; expia.in it. The brunt even 
1. See Kierkegaard, Philosophi'cal Fragments, pp:;,. 31-35. 
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of' the traditional arguments f'or Go.d is not merely that God exists 
but that it is reasonable to believe He exists and what it is rea-
sonable to believe He is like. F. R. 'Dennant '1s wider teleological 
argument, f'or example, is an attempt to show what the nature of 
reality is like:: and to justif'y calling this reality God. This asp~ct 
of'. the argument is both valid and essential and is insufficiently 
acknowledged by Kierkegaard and his contemporary discipleE. Temple 
acknowledges it but fails to employ it suff'iciently for gaining in-
sight into the nature of' God. Philosophical argument plays more a 
ps.ychologically supportive role for the conception of' reality of 
which . Temple is convinced than a role of p~oviding empirical clue:s. 
to the nature; of reality. 
The relation between religious experience and ppilosophical 
argument in determining the reality and nature of God needs to be 
re~examined. Both are necessary and should be combined more than 
is usually recognized. It is not a case of philosophical argument 
confirming what religious experience has revealed to be certain, or 
of religious experience confirming what philosophical discourse has 
shown to be most probable. Religious experience and philosophical 
argument supplY both cognitive insight and psychological assurance. 
Likewise, the conclusions drawn from one need to be checked and 
modified by·the conclusions drawn from the other. 
The attempt to argue for God is most frequently initiated by 
an experience believed to be an experience of God. Hence, religious 
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experience is often the incentive for the search for reasonable 
grounds of belief while providing psychologically, and to some ex-
tent epistemologically, some clues to what is sought. But at the 
same time the experience of God, or rather what is claimed to be an 
experience of God, is not itself adequate to justify the claim. T.o 
interp~et an experience one has had as an encounter with God is to 
assert a truth-claim which is subject to the same philosophical 
scrutiny as· all other truth-cla~s about reality. This is the dif-
ference between psychological assurance and philosophical probability. 
One can be assured of something within oneself and no one else can 
contest the assurance; but when the feeling is formulated into a 
statement about reality, then one is in the p~losophical business 
and must meet the standards of the profession. That is, insofar as 
a religious e~rience has occurred, it is subjectively valid and 
unique. It, perhaps, cannot be fully communicated and can only be:: 
understood by someone who has had such an experience. But when in 
the experience insight is claimed regarding the subject to whom one 
is related as being ultimately real or claiming for the relationship) 
ultimate reality, then this interpretation of the experience has; be-
come a claim for truth and as such must be related to other claims 
and brought into a meaningful whole with them. 
Religious experience is not self-authenticating, though without 
some such experience claimed to be an experience of God, it is doubt-
ful if any argument however reasonable would convince one of God's 
existence. An argument can show to one's satisfaction the reasonable 
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possibility of a certain kind of God existing, but the fact 0£ His 
existence· cannot be so demonstrated. Arguments for God are: as inef-
fective on the latter point as arguments for the fact of redness are 
to one who ~s color blind. P.erhaps a better analogy is an argument 
for the sincerity and genuine friendliness of a person to a paranoid. 
A~t from direct experience of the existent, one can only affirm or 
deny its possibility. If one claims to have~no experience of God, 
that is, if he refuses to affirm God as the source of any experience 
he ha:s had, then for such a person God doe:s not and cannot exist. 
Argument can at best only make the possibility of God's existence 
reasonable.· But granting direct experience, it does not follo-w that 
the experience is unmediated or that it carrieiD its own authenticity. 
It is at this point that the arguments for the existence of God 
serve a twofold function. They can serve to eliminate through rational 
discourse a philosophical p~edisposition one might have against the 
possibility of such a being existing and hence make reasonable the 
possibility of there being a God. Further, such arguments, when 
rooted in an analysis of the structure of the universe, can provide 
clues to the nature of reality. These clues need to be related to 
the clues derived from religious experience, and a coherent synthesis 
needs to be formulated. 
What is being suggested is, on the one hand, the need for in-
sisting on religious e~rience as a necessary factor in any attempt 
to p9sit God and, on the other hand, the need for insisting on the 
relevance and role of rational and empirical arguments for G.od. Both 
are necessary to supplement and modify each other. There is no 
prescribed order o:f occurrence in the life of an individual. All 
that can be claimed is that if the total man is to be satisfied, 
both must occur at some time and be related in some way by the per-
son. 
It is true, as the defenders of the ontological approach have 
contended, that one does not begin the quest for God without some 
I 
ideal concep~ion of a being to whom the t~r.m God is addressed. But 
it is also true, as the defenders of the cosmological approach have: 
maintained, that only by analyzing the evidencg: derived f'rom the 
natural order can a reasonable basis be p~ovided for belief in God. 
Furthermore, because one starts with an idea of God does not mean 
he should end up with the same conception.. The analysis of' the facts 
of experience may require modifying or enhancing one 1 s conception, 
and only a constant relating of the two approaches can avoid the 
errors of each taken alone. What is necessary then is an ontological-
cosmological approach to the problem of God. 
Temple is, therefore, correct in insisting that if the living 
God is to be :found, then religious experience:: should initiate. the 
quest for God. However, Temple errs in failing to take seriously 
enough the analysis of the World-Process which he has presented as; 
offering insight into the nature. of' God. 
The ontological and cosmological approaches are both required 
and need to be constantly set one against the other. The idea of God 
one has· based on personal religious experience must be subj ectad to 
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the test of emp~rical criticism. What legitimate inferences about 
the nature of reality can be drawn from the natural order, and how 
are:. they related to the conception of God one has~ as a result of his 
religious experience and his religious heritage?. At the same time 
one rs conception of God is brought to bear on the data of exp_erience 
for the sake of rendering them intelligible. The ultimate· test of 
the adequacy of one 1s conception of God is that of providing a co~ 
herent interpretation of the data of eX}Derience. Temple's dialec-
tical method suggests such an approach, and in his proposal that 
critical philosophy be employed as a check on theological philoso~~ 
he affirms a form of the ontological-eosmological method.l However, 
Temple does not actually put the method to use in arriving at any 
of hiS own conclusions regarding the nature of God. 
D• Eersonality as the Basic Philosophical Concept 
In the present study the attempt has been made to show that 
personality is the primary concept in the philosophy of William 
T.empl.e. The basis for this claim may now be summarized. There is 
also a need to evaluate the legitimacy of Temple 1 s use of personality 
as the fundamental pP.ilosophical principle of explanation. 
1. See Temple, Nature, Man and God, p~ 44; also see above, 
Chap·• II. 
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l. Personality as the Primary Concept in Temple's Philosoppy 
There can be no doubt about the significance of personality 
in the Christian philosophy of William Temple. Personal existence 
represents the highest level of reality that the World-Process has 
produced. Only a.t the level of persons does knowledge take on a.n 
indep·endent status so that it is sought as an end in itself a.nd not 
merely a.s a. means of aiding the organism to adjust to its environ-
ment; only in persons capable of responding appreciatively to their 
environment does value become actualized. 
The arenas of personal and social ethics are constituted b.r 
the relations persons share one with another both individually and 
collectively and the relation they share with the natural order. 
Furthermore, only persons who a.re aware.! of their existence have to 
strive to orient themselves in this world. Ruman history needs to 
be understood, and an attempt needs to be made to discern the sig-
nificance of history for man and of man for history. Persons arising 
in the historical process provide some clue to the meaning o£ that 
process. Since persons make a distinctive contribution to the world 
through their individuality and value-realization, they possess the 
capacity for survival beyond history. 
Finally, only persons feel related to the source of the World-
Process and· only persons seek to comprehend the universe as a whole. 
The fact that persons appear in the process suggests that there is a 
perfect p~rson who is completely self-determined, who is guided by a 
p;urpose which totally integrates His be:Ui.g, who knovs the actual good 
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and who eX2ends Himself in realizing it by means of disinterested 
love of others.1 It is such a ~ersonal Being who offers the satis-
factory explanation of the universe. Hence, the universe which gives 
rise to persons as the highest level of existence is expiained qy 
reference to a Divine Person who created and sustains the world for 
the sake of the develoP.ment of human p;ersonality and the fellowship 
shared among persons, human and divine. It is in persons that the 
problems of philosoppy are posed, and it is in personality that a 
principle is provided which offers a clue to the solution of these 
problems. 
2. Justifieation of Personality as the Basic Philosophical Principle 
If the problems of philosoRbY are p9sed qy persons and persons 
rep~esent the highest level of reality yet attained, then why not 
seek the clue to an eXQlanation of the:se problems in Itersonalityit· 
Such is TemP.le 1s reasoning for emp~oying personality as the principle" 
of explanation. His own religious experience of a p~rsonal relation 
shared with a Rersonal Being confirms this approach as applied to an 
eXR:lanation of the~ World-Erocess. 
1m evaluation of Temple 11s solution to some of the Qroblems of 
moral and social philoso:gby, of philosophy of history, and of meta-
physics has already been made. .A final word is in order regarding 
1., See Temple, Nature of Personality, pp;• 78--79; Christus 
Veritas, PP.• 174-175; V. E• Thomas, p,. 124; and above, Chap• III. 
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the use of }?:ersonality as a philosophical principle of explanation. 
At the levels of personal and social morality the significance of 
personality development is not seriously challenged. The development 
of human personality, even if not the personality of those noM ex-
isting, is the concern of most moral and social Qhilosophers. History 
too centers· on human p~ersons in terms of what meaning, if any, history 
has for man and what, if anything, lies beyond history for man. How-
ever, in the case of a metaphysical explanation of the universe:· the 
thesis that ~rsonality sup~ies the key to reality is severely chal-
lenged.l 
Tn terms of Temple 1·s position the justification of a teleologi-
cal exp~anation of the World-Process has alreaqy been noted. PUrpose 
as;one characteristic of personality is, therefore, legitimate. The 
other characteristics need to be examined. FellowshiP..J signifying the 
inherent social nature of p13rsonality is extensively and persuasively 
argued by Temple at the level o£ human yersonality, but at the level 
of Divine Fersonality TemP.le wavers between affirming the need of 
God to exp;r-ess Himself and of God 1s total independence of everything 
He.· creates.· The only basis :for asserting the self-suf:ficiency of God 
would seem to be that this conforms to the most perfect ideal o:f p:er-
sonality conceivable. This is to be granted; but for an ideal to be 
1. For a recent defense of the conception of God as personal 
against the criticisms of science and theology, which follows Temple's 
thesis, see Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, pp~ 259-274. 
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relevant to the facts of experience and to be justified as a principle 
of explanation, it must account for the facts of experience without 
sell-contradiction and without explaining away the facts. To affirm. 
the sell-sufficiency of God while a.rgui.hg that the universe can be 
e:x:Qiained by reference to His pur~o:se :for :fellowshiR? with ~rsons in 
the world and for fostering the develoRment e:f persons is both self-· 
contradictory and contrary to the :facts of human e-xperience. God too 
must be conceived as requiring another for the full development and 
exp~ession of His nature. The ideal of God as perfect must be re-
p;Laced by the ideal of inexhaustible perfectibility which applii.es: 
as well.to human p;ersons.l 
The love of God is also unclear in TemR:Le for much the same; 
reasons.. The notion of totally disinterested love is inconceivable 
in human terms and must, therefore, be rejected. The mutual response 
o:f affection among persons and concern for the wel:fare.o:f others even 
at the expense of great sa.crliice :for oneself are sufficiently high 
ideals to challenge both human and Divine yersonality. 
There is cogency in Temple 1s choice of p~rsonality as the pregnant 
metaphor which offers the best ppssibili ty :for explaining the problems 
o:f human existence. The :fact that nersons are the highest level o:f 
existenceo:ffers prima.facie evidence, at least, of the legitimacy of 
1. The conception of p~rfectibil~ty as OPP.OSed to p~rfection is 
develon:ed nersuasively by Brightman, Philosophy of' Religion, pp:l. 340-
341.·· 
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personality as a p_hilosophicaJ. principle of expJ_anation. The prob-
lems inherent in any attempt to account :for what is higher by ref-
erence to what is lower have already been noted. However, this does 
not mean that the origin of personality in the World-Process can be 
neglected. · How personality arose offers some clues to its relation 
to, and sup;remacy over, the process and, therefore; clues to the: con-
ception of p:_ersonality which is adequate: to explain all that occurs. 
Just as the problem of explaining the higher by the lower is that the 
lower categories are not rich enough to account for the qualities of 
experience exhibited by the higher, so too the highest level can be 
so abstracted from its context in the World-Erocess that it fails to 
render an empirically oriented account of the lower levels. The con-
cep~ion of personality one employs to explain the process must be 
varied enough to account :for all that occurs and not so q}la.].itatively 
different from what does appear in the P..rocess as to be unable to ac-
count for the lower levels and hence be empirically unjus.tified. 
It is not, therefore, so much a question of whether or not 
p:ersonality employed as a principle of exp_lanation is justified, as.; 
it is a question of whether or not the particular conception of per-
sonality emp;I:.oyed is justified.. Eb.ilosopby is not as . concerned about 
where one begins to p,hilosophize as it is how one advances from the 
starting place to the conclusions. The question at issue, then, re-
garding the use of personality as the basic philosoBhical princiQle:: 
may be formulated as :follows:: Are the characteristics of p:ersonali.ty 
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derived from an analysis of exp~erience, or, at least, are they modi-
fied by reference to the facts of experience~ 
That the universe is grounded in a pprposive will is a suggestivei 
metaphor, the philosophieafl. justification for which T"emJ?.:I.e, at times:;, 
argues :r:rersuasively. However, his uncritical recourse to J?.:ersonal 
religious exp·erience3 and to the orthodox• doctrines of the Christian 
faith as of'f'ering definitive interppetations of the natur&of the pur-
posive will is not philosophically justified. To) po:sit J?.UI'p_osive: will 
as; a p:hilosophical princip;Le of' explanation is one thing; to affirm 
that p_11rposive will is embodied in the most perfect being that is 
conceivable is qp.ite a different thing. T.em:gJ.le argues:. cogently for 
the former, but relies uncritically on his personal religious ex_:g:eri-
ence and on a traditional conception of' Go:d for the latter. 
A.. personal encounter with reality may le-ad to the formulation 
o:f an hyp9thesis to interpret reality, and the choice o:f personality 
as offering· the mo·st likely key to reality is both personally and 
philosophically justified. The only things at issue· philosophically 
are·:whether or not the content that is given to the concept of per--
sonality is empirically based and whether by employing it the facts of 
exp-erience'! are: rendered intelligible.. Only in the ease~ of fundamental 
social principles and their relevance to social problems does TemP.:l.e; 
exemplify these demands. His conception of personality as derived 
:from the Christian faith and from his own p~rsonal religious experi-
ence:; is modified in accordance with empirical demands to solve::- :grassing 
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problems of society. Unfortunately, the same reference to empirical 
facts is not true of Temple's conception of personality itself; nor 
is it true of the application he makes. of personality to the other 
philosoph1cal problems. 
E. Conclusion: The Best Possible Realization of Time and Talents 
The time has' come for a final summation and assessment of 
Temple 1 s contribution to phllosopmy in general and to Christian phi-
losophy in particular. Th the extent that Temple 1s efforts are di-
re:cted toward the application of Christian conce:g:ts to fundamental 
sncial issues of' the day, he has been eminently successful as a 
Christian philosopher; to the extent that his ef'f'o:rts ar&. directe:dl 
toward a philosophical exposition of, and apoTogiafor, the Christian 
f'aith, he has been moderately successf'ul. To the" extent that Temple's 
aim is to provide a coherent philosophical interpretation of' experi-
ence f'rom the perspective of' the Incarnation--that is, to construct a 
Christian :ghiloso:gby-he: has not succeeded, but neither has he entirely 
failed. Finally, to the extent that Temple sought to of'fer indeJ2:endent-
P.hilosophicaJ.' justif'ication f'or a theistic :g:0sition that would render 
support to orthodox Christianity, he has both failed and misconceived 
the task o£ the Christian :ghilosopher. 
At no :g0int, however, has Temn:le f'ail-ed to p_rovide Jtro.vocative, 
analyses of' the,p,hilosophical problems he'discusses or to of'f'er sug-
gestive solutions, even though at only one point doe:s he· deal thor-
oughly and systematically with an issue. Hence, Temple's merit lies: 
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more in the suggestions he proposes of possible solutions, which need 
to be worked out more critically and systematically than he has done, 
than it does; in offering definitive solutions to philosophical prob-
lems. Indeed, his writings reflect this approach and arffiappropriately 
labeled essays or lectures~ aimed at outlining possible positions but 
not at developing a syatem of thought. Such an approach no doubt re-
fleets not only Temple 1s scepticism toward such a comP._leted system 
of thought 'but also the sim.Rl·e fact that he never thought out com-
p;letely a systematic philosophy. 
In terms of Temple t:g total life and thought measured by the 
standard of the best p9ssible realization of one 1s time and talents 
in light of the needs of society, TemP.le wouia seem to have" apP.rox-
imated that ideal as closely as is humanly possible. The ideal o£ a 
coherent and systematic Christian philosophy was no~t achieved. But 
then, in terms of temF,erament, social concerns, and the mission to 
which he felt called, it is doubtful if a life of thought would have 
been the most fruitful use of his life. The words of W. R. Matthews 
reflect a similar estimate·; and provide. a fitting conclusion to this 
chapter evali.la.ting TemP.J..e 1s contribution to philosophy: 
Temple once remarked that we required a new; 
Sunnna. but that probably the time was not ripe 
for it. There were few. men of our time who 
had greater qualifications for writing a new 
and reasoned system of Christian theology. 
• • • In some moods we may regrat that he did 
not devote his life to this supreme task, but 
doubtless we are wrong. He did what was laid 
upon him to do, and we must be .gratefuLfor 
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CHARTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the:. we:sent study has been to expound and to 
evaluate the concept of personality in the p]lilosopby of William 
Temp~e. Temp~e•s conceptions of pPilosopby and of personality were 
analyzed in Chapters II and III, respectively. Chap~ers IV through 
VI presented the use Tempi"e makes of :gersonality to solve: some of 
the major problems: of philosophy in the areas of p,ersonal and social 
morality, plrllosop_hy of history, and meta:ghysics. A critical evalu-
ation of Temple's position leading to the reformulation of some of 
the solutions he prOP.0:Sed constituted the seventh chapter. What r~-· 
mains to be done in this chaRter is to summarize the major conclu-
sions drawn from the ppesent investigation. 
1. Tempie conceive:s the. philosophic task e-ssentially in terms of 
rendering alll.of experience intelligible. This is held not to bffi 
possible apart from the assurance~of personal fellowship)with God 
and ap~rt from the perspective of the Christian faith. TheologiCal 
I{hilosop,hy is Tempie 118 name for this approach. . The philosophic quest 
is not initiated in the mood of doubt or uncertainty; Temple knows 
from religious e-xp.erience that there: is a God and he is certain that 
in Christ the nature of God is revealed., Hence, though Tem:gi.e has; a 
515': 
genuine intere'st in philosophy, it is not for the sake of develop:ing 
a coherent philosophic system, but for the sake of expounding and de-
fending the conclusions derived from his own religious experience and 
his own interp~etation of the Christian faith. 
The difficulty inherent in Temple 11s philosoP..hic efforts is not 
that he forsakes the p:hilbsophic task but that he never fully accepts 
it; he tends to use p)ri..Tosonby for non-philosoP.hic purpo-ses. This is 
true despite Tem.Irle 1s excellent analysis of' the philosophic method~ 
He refers to the latter as the dialectical method in which fact and 
theory emerge: jointly in the process of interp~eting the data of ex"'" 
p~rience and in which conclusions are constantly checked qy the facts. 
A more adequate) description of the philosophic method would be diffi-
cult to find; however, it is this continual correlation of facts with 
theory which Temple fails to follow. Furthermore, the objection to 
his approach is not, as Temple believes, that he begins with a con-
ception of reality, but that he ends where he began, without suffi-
ciently employing an analysis of the data of' experience to discover a 
conception o£ reality or to modify his view. 
2. Temple 1's epristemology may be described as critical realism. He 
seeks to synthesize the nalve realist 1s emphasis on the object in 
knowing and the certainty of one 1's knowledge with Descartes 1 emphasis 
on the subject as isolated in knowing and the uncertainty of' any object 
known. Temple starts by assuming that one knows reality but that mo-
mentar,y apprehensions of reality must be checked with other apprehensions 
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and thus that knowledge is built URJgradually. Each apprehension is 
of reality, but not each one is equally significant. Error occurs 
only in an act of synthesis when different objects are falsely iden-
tified. Error serves as a stimulus to knowledge. 
Error which gives rise to further misconceptions is not ex-
plained by Temple. A real synthesis is not achieved because too. much 
is conceded to the thesis. Temple begins the knowledge venture not 
only believing that there is a world which man can know but claiming 
that a particular interpretation of the world is known. r.t is true 
that man begins the knowledge venture believing that he can know the 
world. Such belief is justified but must be joined with doubt re-
garding the veracity of any particular apprehension or series of 
apRrehensions of the world. The self and the objects crf which it is 
aware provide the only bases from which the ·self can build up ''knawl-
edge.n The self must check the references of its ideas on the basis 
of additional exgeriences it has which elicit further objects of 
thought that either confirm or negate the accuraqy of the references. 
Hence, belief and doubt must be joined if a true synthesis is to 
resui:t. 
3. Temple traces the origin of personality in the World-Process. He 
starts with the view science presents of a material order existing and 
changing lopg before man came on the scene. Matter is basic to every-
thing else. Other levels of reality--life, mind, and spirit--emerge 
which are not reducible to matter, though not existing apart from 
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matter. The transition is from a response to stimuli by an object 
to which the object contributes only inertia (matter):.to the response 
of an organism which itself initiates the action taken for the sake 
of an apparent good (spirit). 
Templet s analysis is imp_ressive but brief. Also, his account 
of' matter and life tend to be superficial. Matter is conceived pri-
marily as inert "stuff, n and life as rudimentary mind. Man is de-
scribed as a psycho-p,hysical organism. Mind arises within the organ-
ism and is an extension of organic reaction to environment. Though 
the mind is organically related to the boqy, it transcends the body 
through the formation of "Tree ideas~nr thus making possible the quest 
for truth, beauty, and goodness. Mind directs the body by means of 
a PUXH0Se it seeks, and the body is the medium for the execution of 
the purpose. 
Hence, the unity of mind and body is asserted with mind dominant, 
but the relation between body and mind as the physical activity o£ the 
body ·carries out the non-physical activity of the mind is not clarified. 
There is a wavering on Temp,le •·s part between a view of mind and body 
as organically unified and a view of mind as distinct from, and inde-
:gendent of, body. 
What the available evidence suggests at p~esent are two entities 
with distinctive characteristics causally interacting and uni~uely uni-
fied. To be resisted is the attempt to eliminate the distinct exist-
ence of mind or body, or the attempt to identify mind and body. 
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Temple argues cogently f'or the threefol-d unity of' the self' 
rooted in the ppysical continuity of' the body, manifested on the 
conscious level by the ef'f'ort to unif'y one t s impulses, and culmi-
nating in a purpose to which the total self' is committed. 
It is clear from this analysis that Temple is not a personal 
idealist. ·Though closer to personal realism, he is best classified 
as a Christian theist who makes the concept of' personality central 
to his philosophy. Personality is f'or Temple the highest reality, 
and his conception of' personality is derived from the Christian view 
of' God. Further, matter enjoys a relatively independent status in 
the created universe and serves as the medium through which R9rsonal 
beings execute their purpo10e. Hence, Temple might be. labeled a 
Christian personalistic realist. 
4· The chief' characteristics of' human personality f'or T.emple are 
purpose, fellowship, and love. The person is aware of' his continued 
existence in a way not possible to the thing (matter) or the brute 
(lif'e); and the p~rson can, through memory of' the past and anticipa-
tion of' the future, identify himself with ideal goals. Eersonal 
action is purposeful action in which the total conscious life of' the 
self' is unified around some end apprehended as good and expressed 
through the medium of the body. 
The self' cannot attain a unity of' impulses alone any more than 
the self' can survive alone. Persons need the fellowship)o£ other 
persons if each is to attain the full stature of personal existence. 
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Also, persons desire the apppoval of others. Hence, only a purpose 
common to the interests and welfare of all mankind is adequate to 
satisfy the individual person and to unite J?..ersons together in a bond 
of universal fellowship:• Fulfillment of self is made possible through 
service to society. The highest manifestation of personality is at-
tained in the expression of love for others. However, the ideal of 
a totally unified, self-determined person expending himself in service 
to the good of others is not attained on the human level~ 
The fault wouid seem to be in Temple's conception of the ideal 
p,erson. He fails to relate the ideal to the empirical demands of 
experience. Also, Temple is not clear as to whether the body is in-
cluded in his conception of personality. Perhaps he means that p~­
J?..0Se, fellowship, and love are:) to be viewed as the distinguishing 
ID?-rks of a psycho-J?.hysica:l. organism. But if so, nowhere does he 
state it to be the case. 
Amajor defect in Temnle 1s discussion of personality is the lack 
o.f psychological orientation and consideration.. No attempt is made 
to assess psychological interpretations o£ personality. Omissions 
are also evident. TemJ?.~e does not explicitly incorpo-rate into his 
account o.f personality the self as knower or the self 1s uniqueness 
and privacy. The fundamental problem, however, lies no-t so much in 
what- is or is not stated, but in a .failUre to deal thoroughly and 
systematically with personality so that a coherent interJ?..retation 
re-sults. 
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5. Temple ''s reliance on the characteristics of the personal level 
of existence is evident in his theory of value. Actual value is a 
relation between mind and object, in which the mind finds something 
akin to itself in its object. The relation between appreciating mind 
and valuable object is ambiguous in Temple t;s presentation. He could 
have clarified the issue if he had distinguished between value-
possibilities existing in the world independent of man and the actu-
alization of these possibilities in the value-experience of persons. 
6. The moral dilemma of man is perceptively analyzed by Temple. He 
correctly diagnoses as fundamental issues the problems of motivation 
and direction. Man needs not only to know; what he should do, but also 
how he can gain the power necessary to do it. The self's bondage is 
to itself and the limited vision and inner strength which it has. 
Scientific ethics is held to be inadequate to effect man •·s escape. 
from the dilemma; religious conversion is required. 
The solution proposed for man is that of an ideal state in which 
man is truly free and comnletely good only when the freedom exercised 
and the good achieved are not consciously sought by him or acknowl-
edged to be his. The disintere·sted love man is called upon to express 
can be elicited in man only by God through Christ. Man must be pos-
essed by God, contributing only the need to be possessed. 
Temp~e's position leads to the self's annihilation as a center 
a£ value-realization. Man must always will to cooperate -with another-
be it God or fellowman--in the p~rformance of an act or the accentance 
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oi' a gif't if' individual integrity and moral worth are to be· maintained. 
Hence, Tempie t:s ideal is unjustif'ied. Man can never be absolutely 
certain that his love is truly disinterested or his loyalty complete. 
A state -of p~rfection is not possible for man; he can hope only for a 
continued opportunity f'or perfectibility. 
7. Ih regard to conduct, man is obligated to will what is right, ac-
cording to Temple. The clue to what is right is f'ound in the logic 
of' man 1 's being. 
right conduct. 
Hence, one•s conscience is the guide in determining 
However, goodness is determined by evaluating the con-
sequences of an act. 
A shi::ft is made by TemP.le f'rom a non-cognitive theory of' obli-
gation to,a cognitive theory in which man can know what is right f'or 
him to do and not merely that he o:ught to do what is right. Also, an 
unnecessary dichotomy is drawn between right and good at the time an 
action is decided upon by restricting obligation to what is right 
(~liT) and goodness (act) to the consequences resulting. These can 
be~brought together by making obligatory f'or the individual what pro~ 
mo:tes· the best possible reBUl'ts in a given situation. What one ex.._ 
p.eriences as the best thihg f'or him to do should be: critically exam-
ined in terms of the f'orseeable consequences of the act. At times an 
ideal and its consequences which are acknoMledged to be obligatory may 
be,of such importance that the ideal is followed whether realized or 
not. 
8. Temp1..e 1 s social philosophy rep,resents a coherent application of 
his Christian ideal of personality and its primacy to the actual 
existing social order of his day. Freedom, fellowship) and service 
constitute the basic principl:es; on which society should be founded 
and for the sake of which it exists. 
Society Cor community} is a natural product arising out of man's 
need and affection for others. At the same time society and its in-
stitutions exist for the development of personality. The state is a 
necessary organ of society enabling it to fulfill its function b,r 
maintaining unity, Reace, and justice. Ultimate;; political loyalty is 
reserved for the community. As the relations among men increasingly 
extend beyond national borders, so too the stat~shourd extend its 
:gu.iLitical affiliations beyond its o~ borders by participating in an 
international organization. The economic order is to be judged no:t 
only in terms of' economic productivity but also b,r what it does for 
the development of' human P.:ersonality.. The social; order is recognized 
as comQe:sed largely of comp,eting centers of power; it is of no; avail 
to condemn individual sin in the hop.e of' eliminating the p_0.wer blocks. 
The ideal of' brotherly love should be set before individuals and groups, 
Ifowever, justice in the sense of' an equitable rg_soluti0Il of comp:eting 
intere:sts should be.·· acceP-ted as the best possible realization of' love 
in given situations. The Christian is called upon to work tovard 
achieving whatever embodiment of' the Ki!igdom of' God can be attained on 
earth. 
Thus; Tem_Rle modifies his ideals of' human personality and of' a 
Christian society in light of' the empirical demands of' his day. It 
is, therefore, in Temple 18 social thought that he f'ulf'ills the role 
of' the Christian philosopher. The f'ull impact of' Temple •s Christian 
commitment and philbsopP,ically oriented mind is brought to· bear upon 
the fundamental social issues of' the day with cogency and clarity, 
even though the philosophical baS:is f'or his understanding of' the 
Christian f'aith is not as clear and as cogent. as he believes. 
9.. In contrast to Temple 1 s social philosophy, his philosophy of' 
· history p_oints up-. the defects of' his philosophical approach. Temp,le 
.strive-s to bring together the basic truths of' traditional Chris-
tianity regarding God and history. 
History is held to be. incom)2i.ete:; by itself. OnlY by; viewing 
the historical process in relation to Eternity is its meaning evi-
dent. The purpose of' God constitutes the meaning o:f history. 
Temp;I:e •·s interpretation of the relation of' the temporal order to the 
eternal God represents an attem:Q:ted synthesis of' three viewswhich 
stress the supremacy of' God, the ultimatre significance of' history 
and moral choice, and the inauguration of' a new. order beyond history. 
The synthesis, however, is more verbal than actual.. TemJ2le:- sees 
Gorl related to history and yet essentially unaffected by it, but in so 
doing he sacrifices both God and history. If God is the ground o:f his-
tory, then history, to have meaning, must actually af'f'ect God. Sim-
ilarly, if man is f'ree, then God cannot know what man will do bef'ore 
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man does; it. Nor can omniscience be preserved by positing time as 
unreal. Time is of the essence of history; and if history is to make 
a difference to God, then time must be real. Finally, there are ir-
rational factors in history which point to a limit c;m God's supremacy. 
The incomp,lete supremacy of God over history must be affirmed. 
10. The only kind of meaning for history which Temple seems willing 
to .accept is a state of p;erfection in which mankind and God are joined 
together in R:erfect harmony and peace. A' new. order must be ushered in 
if this is to· be real'ized. The ideal does not seem justified. So 
long as history provides the opportunity for personal growth and de-
velopment, there is meaning for the individual in history. Further-
more, the individual shares in the significance of history to the ex-
tent that he realizes his own potentialities and fosters::.the personal 
development of othersA What meaning history has must be discovered 
within history not beyond it. 
Thus, for Temple, human Rersonality finds. its fulfillment beyond 
eartbl7 existence. Man exhibits the capacity for immortality in his 
ability to form trfree·ideas," in the eXH,erience of moxal obligation, 
and in. the values which he actualizes• However, the ultimatal basis 
for personal immortality resides in the goodness of God.. Temple ''a 
faith is that some will be saved; his hoge is that all will· enter in-
to fellowshiwwith God. 
Temple's optimism is more than the facta warrant. Neither the 
argument for nor the argument against survival is decisive. When the 
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evidence noted by Temple on the nature of' mind and value-experience 
is joined with the evidence of' psychical re~earch and a conception 
of' mind as distinct f'rom body, then the theoretical possibility of' 
lif'e af'ter bodily death would seem to be established~ The evidence 
doe'S not establish that there" actually is survival. However, there 
is a reasonable basis f'or hop,:e in the personal survival of' death. 
ll. Personality is also employed by Temple as a metaphysical, prin-
ciple of' eXI{lanation. Temple argues that starting vith what ~s lower 
in the structure· of' reality, one cannot account f'or the o:ccurrence or 
signif'icance:: of' the higher. A, mindless and valueless world cannot 
give rise to mind and value without sacrif'icing the continuity of 
the physical order. It is ppssible that there is no) exp).anation of' 
the universe; but if' a self'-eXI>,lanatory principle is sought, then 
purpose alone supplie'S what is required. When an action is traced 
to the intelligent choice-;; of a mind f'or the:· sakeo of' some end, no-
f'urther q,_ues:tion need be raised. Temple 1's argument is persuasive at 
this p<!rint and is supported by the f'act that recourse to mechanical· 
ppocesses leaves unexp).ained the purpose which exists in the vorld; 
whereas the principl-e. of' purp.o:se; can a:.ccount f'or mechanical.pr<llcesses. 
Temple" argue:s f'urther that the p;ur_g:ose which explains the World-
Process must transcend it and must represent a conscious being who-se 
nature is perfect goodness and absolute~power. The f'acts of' experi-
ence do not justif'y this interp~etation• The f'ailnre of' TemRle to 
modify his conception of God despite the contradictions involved 
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indicate the uncritical priority he grants to the doctrines of the 
Christian faith. His solution of the problem of evil and his con-
ception of a triune God serve to illustrate Temple's reliance on an 
ideal conception of God. While admitting that intrinsic evil involved 
in much human suffering is not accounted for on the basis of the in-
strumental value of suffering to produce character, he rejects limiting 
Godts power. Instead he appeals to religious faith for courage and to 
eternity for hope. In terms of a triune God, man is asked to accept 
what on the human level would be the activities of three persons with-
in the unity of a personal being, though to combine them is contra-
dictory for man. 
Has not Temple relinquished the philosophic task of rendering 
human experience intelligible from the perspective of his Christian 
world-view? He justifies beginning with the assumption of the final-
ity of a particular Christian world-view on the basis that the data 
of experience can be interpreted more adequately by this apppoach. 
But when his Christian world-view fails to illuminate certain data 
of experience, Temple surrenders the goal of rendering experience in-
telligible rather than modify his world-view. 
12. Thus, the approach Temple uses may be called ontological in that 
the nature of God is held to be directly given in religious experience 
and is confirmed by the conception of God in orthodox Christianity. 
Temple begins, therefore, with an ideal conception of God as a being 
perfect in goodness and absolute in power. He employs the ideal to 
interpret the empirical facts of the natural order. This ontological 
approach may be distinguished from the cosmological approach in which 
God is inferred on the basis of evidence derived from an investigation 
of human exyerience. Temple emp~oys the cosmological approach only 
for purpo:ses~ of ~licating his ideal conception of God and for de-
termining to what extent reason and experience support such an ideal. 
Tem~le does not employ the cosmological approach to- discover clues' 
to the nature of God. 
A combining o:f both ap_Hroaches woula seem to~ be required. 'Y.emple 
is correct that religious experience shoul'd initiate. the quest for: 
God. trnl·e·ss one begins with some notion of: a being to whom the name 
Go:d applies, there is no~ po:ssibility of' arriving at Go-d. The ontol<D".gi-
cal.app,roRch correctly points up this insight. HGWever, the cosmologi-
cal ap:Qroach also makes a contribution by providing a reasonable basis 
for belief in Go:d and clue:s to. His nature. It is on the latter point 
that Temp,:Le errs in failing to take seriously enough his analysis of 
the; W:orld-Pro~cess as itself offering insight into· the nature of God. 
What is needed is an ontological-cosmological approach to the problem 
of: God in which one t;s idero of God is constantly related to the data 
of: experience. 
13. Personality is the ·primary concept in Temp:Le''s philosophy. Eer-
sonal existence~repre-sents the highest level of reality that the World-
Process has produced. The indep:endent status of knowledge a-ccurs only 
at the. level of persons aware o.:f their existence and curious about the 
world in which they find themselves. Value·s are actualized when 
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persons re-spond appreciatively to objects in the environment. The 
relations persons share: one with another, both individually and col-
lectively, and their relation to the natural order constitute the 
domain of personal and social morality. Human history ~s largely a 
product of self-interest, and its goal beyond history is the estab-
lishment of' the Kingdom of God characterized by p:eace and harmony 
among persons, human and divine. Finally, the fact that persons ap-
p:ear in the process suggests to Temple that there is a perfect Person 
who is not bound by the limitations of human ~ersonality--a Person 
who is completely self-determined, who is gu~ded by a purpose which 
totally integrate-s His Being, who knows: the actual good, and who ex-
pends Himself in realizing it by means of disinterested love of others. 
The univers-e; is exp;J_ained by reference· to such a Eerson. 
14~· Is the use of personality by Tem:g:Le as a'. philosophical princi:p:Le 
of explanation justified?. In terms of the problems arising in regard 
to personal and social morality and human history, recourse to per-
sonality as the primary :grinciJ?.:Le of eXP.J.B.nation is more readily con-
ceded than is the case with metaphysics. But there is cagency in 
TemP.le's use of personality as the key-concept for understanding the 
World-Process. The fact that p:ersons ar~ the highe:st level. of exist-
ence·- offers prima facie evidence of the legitimacy of personality aSJ 
a phlloso:phical prin.cipJJe of e'X!R:lanation.. The difficulties inherent 
in the attempt to e:x:plain the higher by the lower add further suRP.Ort. 
What is really at issue philosophically is the particular 
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conception of pBrsonality that one uses, not whether the concept of 
personality: can justifiably be employed to interpret reality. Is 
the content that is given to the concept of personality empirically 
grounded?. Is the most adequate interpretation of the data of ex-
perience offered by reference to the concept of personality?- Temple's 
argument for a purposive will to account for the universe is per-
suasive, but his uncritical reliance on the doctrin&s of the Chris-
tian faith as offering definitive interpretations of the natur~ o£ 
the purppsi ve will needs further :Rhilosophical justification. 
15. Finally, an estimate of Temple t;s achievements as a Christian 
philosopher indicates that he.does not construct a systematic phi-
losop,hy. He. made the most substantial contribution in the formula-
tion of the social princip:l'es operative in a Christian civilization 
and the programs propo:sed to implement the realization of that goal. 
He was least successful~ in attempting to offer independent philosophi-
cal justification for a theistic position that would render sUp]>ort 
to orthodox Christianity. Kdwever, in every area Temple examines he 
offers provocative analyses of philosophical problems and suggestive 
solutions. 
In terms of the contribution of Tem:gie t:s total life and thought 
he would seem to have approximated the best possible realization of 
his time and talents in light of the needs of society and his own 
mission in life:. 
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This dissertation has two~ purposes: first, to expound Temple's 
conception of philosophy and personality; second, to evaluate Temple's 
use of personalit7 as a philosophical principle to solve problems of 
moral and social phil9sophy, philosophy of history, and metaphysics. 
Temple begins the philosophic quest with a conception of reality 
derived from his own religious experience and the doctrines of the 
Christian faith. He ends where he began, without adequately employing 
an analysis of the data of experience to discover a conception of 
reality or to modify his ,view. Although, as Temple contends, man be-
gins the knowledge venture believing that he can know the world, doubt 
remains about the veracity of any particular apprehension. 
Personal existence represents for Temple the highest level of 
reality that the World-Process has produced. Man is a psycho-physical 
organism. Temple wavers between considering mind and body as organi-
cally unifed and mind as distinct from body. However, the evidence 
seems to suggest two entities with distinctive characteristics causally 
interacting and uniquely united. 
The chief characteristics of human personality, Temple holds, 
are purpose, fellowship, and love. Ideally conceived, personal action 
is purposeful, unifying the total conscious life of the self around 
some end apprehended as good and expressed through the medium of the 
body. Temple insufficiently relates this ideal to the demands of 
5~ 
543 
experience. No attempt is made to assess psychological interpreta-
tions o£ personality. Nor does Temple explicitly incorporate into 
his account o£ personality the self' as knower or the self' 1s unique-
ness and privacy. 
Temple analyzes man's moral dilemma as the sel£•s bondage to 
itself' and its limited vision and inner strength. Man must be pos-
sessed by God, contributing only the need to' be'possessed. But this 
tends to eliminate the sel£ as a center o£ value-realization. Temple 
proposes conscience as man 1s guide in determining right conduct; 
whereas, goodness is determined by evaluating the consequences o£ an 
act. This dichotomy between right and good seems unnecessary and can 
be overcome by making obligatory what promotes the best possible re-
sults in a given situation. 
I 
Temple's social philosophy is a coherent application o£ his 
Christian ideal o£ personality and its primacy to the social order. 
Freedom, £ellowship, and service constitute the basic principles £or 
the establishment and existence o£ society. 
The meaning o£ history £or Temple resides in a new order beyond 
history in which God and mankind are j o:ined together in per£ect har-
many and peace. But is there not meaning £or the individual in his-
tory to the extent that opportunity is o££ered £or personal growth and 
development? While Temple does not regard man as immortal by nature, 
he believes that some will. be saved; his hope is that all will enter 
into £ellowship ¥lith God. The £acts would seem to estab;Lish only the 
theoretical possibility of survival. 
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Purpose alone, Temiile argues, offers a self-eX]?.lanatory prin-
ciple capable of accounting for the World-Process. Persons appearing 
in the process suggest a pBrfect Person.not bound. by the limitations 
of human n~rsonality. There is cogency in Temple 1s use of personality 
as the key-concept for understanding the World-Process. He argues: 
persuasively for a purposive will to account for the universe, but 
relies uncritically on religious experience and orthodorChristian-
ity as offering definitive inter::pretations of the nature· of ptlJ:'RDsive 
will •. Ah ontological~cosmological approach is needed in which onets 
idea of God is constantly related to the data of experience. 
Temple does not construct a systematic philosophy, but he does' 
offer ::provocative analyses of philosophicai ::problems and suggestive 
solutions. His mo·st substantial contribution is the formulation o-f 
social princip~es and programs to imp~ement a Christian civilization. 
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